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used image: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi // Internet

© Ekaterina Kosareva, 03.08.2026

© Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, 03.08.2026

The recent string of visits by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand from 6–11 July reflected New Delhi’s commitment in further consolidating its engagement with the Indo-Pacific countries. The visits come at a time of considerable headwinds in the regional order, and arguably shifting US approaches to the region. The tone and tenor of the visits was demonstrative of a coherent view on India’s current priorities in the Indo-Pacific, aiming to strengthen cooperation with regional states and showing larger interest in bolstering resilience in the region to diversify the risks posed by US-China relationship dynamics. 

The broader discussions were centered on the strategic sphere, with considerable importance laid on deepening defence and maritime cooperation, building more resilient supply‑chains, expanding technological and economic partnerships, whilst tailoring concrete deliverables to the different strategic profiles of each state.  

The Indonesian leg of the visit aimed to broaden the comprehensive strategic partnership established in 2018. India’s ties with Indonesia have seen a considerable uptick in recent years, evidenced in the growth in bilateral trade, around $30 billion as of 2025.^[i] The country holds considerable salience in India’s strategic calculus, given that it shares a maritime boundary with the Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Alongside the announcement of the Ganga–Mahakam Vision, presented by Narendra Modi before the Indonesian Parliament, which implied transforming “shared history into a source of strength for the future”^[ii], the two sides signed 14 agreements spanning defence and industrial cooperation, maritime security, space, agriculture, healthcare, digital technologies, and education. The Indian Prime Minister described this visit as “the beginning of a golden new chapter”^[iii], trying to present it as a decisive commitment of like-minded Global South nations to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. 

As for Australia, the partnership with the largest South Pacific nation has received a renewed impetus since 2017, which was evidenced by the Quad’s revitalisation in the same year. ^[iv] The visit further solidified the emphasis laid towards further enhancing defence and security cooperation, which was called “a cornerstone of the partnership in an increasingly complex strategic environment.”^[v] Key outcomes of the visit included the updated Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation, a Maritime Security Collaboration Roadmap, and the announced Partnership on Cyber, Critical Technologies and Supply Chains. Taken together, they reflect that the two Quad partners perceive each other as increasingly capable security partners to bear greater responsibility for stability in the Indo-Pacific region.^[vi]

Furthermore, the two sides have finalised the arrangements to enable exporting Australian uranium to India for “exclusively peaceful purposes”^[vii] on the basis of the 2015 India-Australia Civil Nuclear cooperation agreement. This decision is an important step signaling impetus in strengthening their comprehensive strategic partnership. Along with agreements on closer critical minerals and technological cooperation, as well as declared intention to accelerate negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, which is supposed to substitute the existing India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement, it underscores that Australia and India are trying to go beyond declaratory partnership toward more pragmatic economic and supply‑chain objectives.

The final leg of the tour – the first visit of the Indian Prime Minister to New Zealand in 40 years – was rather of symbolic than practical significance, yet not entirely devoid of substance. In the course of the visit, New Delhi and Wellington elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership and agreed on a Roadmap to 2030, institutionalising mechanisms for political dialogue through establishing a regular foreign ministers’ dialogue and expanding cooperation in defence, maritime affairs and economic engagement.^[viii] Such declarations are a typical element of the Modi government’s approach and don’t always lead to real strengthening of relations, remaining primarily symbolic achievements. The litmus test will be whether the recently signed FTA, New Zealand’s investment commitments and the visit’s arrangements translate into sustained, measurable cooperation. 

Along with the articulation of strategic interests and security challenges, all parties reaffirmed their commitment to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to Indian experts, New Delhi’s approach is reflective of a greater interest to strengthen resilience and regional cooperation, as Washington’s shifting attitudes towards regional security, combined with Beijing’s assertive positioning in the region, have pressured regional states to recalibrate their foreign policy by diversifying their strategic partnerships to minimise dependence on Washington.^[ix]

Against this backdrop, countries such as India, Australia, Indonesia and New Zealand that face supply‑chain disruptions, contested maritime spaces and an unpredictable great‑power environment are increasingly prioritising institution‑building measures with regional states that enhance mutual resilience and might alleviate their strategic vulnerabilities.

So far, the Indo-Pacific remains the major foreign policy direction for India. Although it is the Indian Ocean region that prevails in New Delhi’s strategic calculus, the recent Narendra Modi’s visits highlight ongoing attempts to expand India’s reach and establish it as a reliable and even indispensable regional actor in the eyes of its counterparts.^[x] Along with the geoeconomic factors, security prerogatives influence New Delhi’s engagement in the region, particularly in the maritime domain, where, as Indian experts argue, its positions have evolved from a “security provider” to that of a “preferred security partner”.^[xi]

With the confluence of the security dynamics of Indian and Pacific Oceans within a single stratagem, in recent years New Delhi’s positioning in the region has become more proactive: along with the continued interest to participate in ASEAN-led regional formats, it demonstrates the will to amplify the role of its own initiatives such as MAHASAGAR, where it has a more prominent role. At the same time, there is a more pronounced interest in strengthening minilateral cooperation in the undercurrent of weakening supply chains, disruption, and security challenges such as the rising Chinese belligerence in the region. Against this backdrop, the resurgence of Quad forum was timely for New Delhi and its strategic interests in the region.

Regional states are recalibrating their approaches amid major economic and strategic changes happening in the Indo-Pacific. India and other regional countries are trying to diversify risks in the confrontation between China and the US by strengthening relations with each other. This tactic makes it possible to improve their own positions in cooperation with Beijing and Washington, as well as to establish themselves as more prominent regional and global actors.

What does it mean for India-Russia relations?

Modi’s July tour has limited implications for India–Russia relations. The outcomes of Australia and New Zealand visits are unlikely to drive a wedge between Moscow and New Delhi, as Russian leadership realises the reasons India cooperates with these countries on maritime security, economic connectivity, or supply-chain resilience, and does not view it as affecting its core strategic interests or partnership with the Indian side.

New Delhi’s strengthened cooperation with Jakarta, however, deserves closer attention: Indonesia occupies an increasingly important place in India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while Russia has also sought to maintain constructive political and defence ties with one of the ASEAN leading states and a newcomer BRICS+ member. Southeast Asia has become a more prominent direction of Indian diplomacy throughout recent decades, and Moscow is positive about their expanding partnership, which suits its own interests as both countries are valuable partners in the Asian region.

More importantly, the tour highlights an apparent difference in Russian and Indian regional priorities. For New Delhi, the Indo-Pacific has become the principal area for pursuing its economic and security interests. Indian leadership views it as an arena well-placed for multilateral cooperation, potentially useful to reinforce its claim for “benevolent” leadership in the Indian Ocean. Russia, on the other hand, continues to approach Asia primarily through its Eurasian agenda and remains cautious of the Indo-Pacific concept, often associating it with US-led geopolitical initiatives.^[xii] Although recent official statements suggest a more pragmatic attitude towards India’s Indo-Pacific engagement and an attempt to avoid overt critique of the concept, Moscow’s practical involvement in the region remains comparatively limited.

Nevertheless, these differing priorities do not imply a weakening of the India–Russia strategic partnership. Bilateral trade has expanded significantly since 2022, defence cooperation remains substantial, and Russia continues to occupy an important place in India’s energy and security calculus. Still, the Pacific dimension of the relationship remains underdeveloped compared with the pace of New Delhi’s engagement with other Indo-Pacific partners. As its external priorities increasingly revolve around maritime security and technology-driven growth, sustaining the long-term relevance of the partnership with Moscow requires greater attention to economic cooperation and practical initiatives such as the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor that would resonate with India’s evolving strategic agenda.

All in all, Modi’s recent tour reaffirms the centrality of the Indo-Pacific in Indian foreign policy. And while Russia does not view Australia’s or New Zealand’s expanding ties with India as a direct challenge, New Delhi’s deeper engagement with Southeast Asian states might create new opportunities for Moscow’s own diplomacy in the region. In this context, the future trajectory of India–Russia relations will depend on the ability of both sides to develop practical forms of cooperation that correspond to India’s evolving regional priorities.

Endnotes:

^[i] Embassy of India, Jakarta, Government of India. URL: https://www.indianembassyjakarta.gov.in/users/assets/pdf/menu/submenu__87166256.pdf
^[ii] English translation of Prime Minister’s Address to the Parliament of Indonesia (July 07, 2026). URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41412/English_translation_of_Prime_Ministers_Address_to_the_Parliament_of_Indonesia_July_07_2026
^[iii] English Translation of Prime Minister’s Press Statement during the Joint Press Statement with the President of Indonesia (July 7, 2026). URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41407/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_Press_Statement_during_the_Joint_Press_Statement_with_the_President_of_Indonesia_July_7_2026
^[iv] Panova V. Tectonics of a New World Order and the Russian Far East // Russia in Global Affairs. 28.10.2018. URL: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/tectonics-of-the-new-world-order-and-the-russian-far-east/
^[v] Third India - Australia Annual Summit Joint Statement. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41426/Third_India__Australia_Annual_Summit_Joint_Statement
^[vi] India and Australia Are Reshaping What It Means To Be Strategic Partners. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/india-and-australia-are-reshaping-what-it-means-to-be-strategic-partners/
^[vii] India - Australia Joint Statement on Energy Security. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41427/India__Australia_Joint_Statement_on_Energy_Security
^[viii] India-New Zealand Joint Statement (July 11, 2026). URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41445/IndiaNew_Zealand_Joint_Statement_July_11_2026
^[ix] Haldar S. G2 and a Multipolar Order in the Indo-Pacific // Observer Research Foundation. 03.12.2025. URL: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/g2-and-a-multipolar-order-in-the-indo-pacific
^[x] Anand K. Anchoring India in Oceania — A Pacific agenda for the India–australia comprehensive strategic partnership // National Maritime Foundation. 29.04.2026. URL: https://maritimeindia.org/anchoring-india-in-oceania-a-pacific-agenda-for-the-india-australia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
^[xi] Haldar S. Towards a Cohesive Maritime Security Architecture in the Indian Ocean // Observer Research Foundation. 26.09.2024. URL: https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-a-cohesive-maritime-security-architecture-in-the-indian-ocean
^[xii] Kireeva A., Kupriyanov A. Russia and Quad Plus. Is There a Way Forward? // Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. 2020. Vol. 3, Issue 5. P. 222.