Russia and China in the Great Strategic Triangle // Russia in Global Affairs. 2025. Issue 4. P. 118-133. DOI 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-4-118-133.
ISSN 1810-6374
The current NATO-Russia confrontation over Ukraine and the intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. are increasing the importance of nuclear weap-ons and nuclear deterrence, especially for the three great powers: Russia, China, and the U.S. Their policies have led to the formation of a Great Strategic Triangle, which contains an accelerating strategic (nuclear) arms race that fundamentally differs from that of the Cold War, may trigger serious conflicts between the players, and may be extremely diffi-cult to stop.
Ключевые слова: arms control | strategic stability | nuclear deterrence | strategic triangle | arms race | nuclear doctrine | great powers |
Ссылка при цитировании:
Luchina M. Russia and China in the Great Strategic Triangle. – Russia in Global Affairs. 2025. Issue 4. P. 118-133. DOI 10.31278/1810-6374-2025-23-4-118-133.
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