The concept of “strategic stability” was formally defined in the 1990 Joint Statement by Russia and the United States as “the state of strategic relations between the parties that removes incentives for a first nuclear strike.” This understanding was reflected in the START I Treaty and five subsequent treaties, including the current START III Treaty (2010). Thanks to them, according to the criteria of strategic stability adopted at that time, the current strategic balance between Russia and the United States is much more stable and excludes the possibility and incentives for a first nuclear strike. Nevertheless, strategic stability is now dangerously undermined by the collapse of nuclear weapons control regimes, changes in the nuclear world order, and under the influence of military-technical development. The arguments in favor of abolishing the arms control system and process, as well as the proposed alternatives to them, do not stand up to scrutiny. At the same time, it is clear that 30 years after the 1990 Joint Statement by Russia and the United States, the concept of strategic stability requires updating in the light of changed conditions and new threats. This updated understanding of strategic stability should be the basis for further arms limitation negotiations. At the same time, negotiations with the United States should be based on a solid foundation as an effective Russian deterrent potential with an emphasis on increasing the survivability and combat readiness of information and control systems, as well as offensive and defensive weapons systems. 

This article was published within the project “The Postcrisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition, and Cooperation” under a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for implementing major research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development.