Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward [Text] / A. Arbatov // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2019. – Vol. 75. – Issue 4. – P. 151-161. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628475.
ISSN 0096-3402
DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628475
Against the background of new US-Russia and US-China political confrontation and the comprehensive crisis surrounding nuclear arms control treaties, there may be little immediate hope for successful talks on the non-weaponization of space. Even so, if and when political preconditions change and serious arms control negotiations resume, the non-militarization of outer space will inevitably return to the disarmament agenda. The United States and Russia, as a minimum, have an obvious common security interest in space – limiting as much as possible the dedicated anti-satellite (ASAT) systems that threaten the satellites that are designed to warn each nation of a ballistic missile attack by any state. A focus on the verifiable ban on the testing of such anti-satellite systems would give the United States and Russia a practical starting point for further negotiations on the non-militarization of space.
This article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project №18-18-00463 “Prospects of arms control under the effect of new military-political and technological factors”).
Ключевые слова: satellites | anti-satellite weapons | ballistic missile defense | nuclear arms | launch-on-warning | strategic stability | non-weaponization of outer space |
Размещено в РИНЦ
Ссылка при цитировании:
Arbatov A. Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward. – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2019. – Vol. 75. – Issue 4. – P. 151-161. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628475.
ДРУГИЕ ПУБЛИКАЦИИ НА ЭТУ ТЕМУ:
Аничкина Т.Б.
Limit missile defense - or expand it?: A Russian response [Text] / T. Anichkina // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2015. – V. 71. – Issue 2. – Р. 17 – 20.
Савельев А.Г., Александрия О.
What Factors Affect Strategic Stability? // Russia in Global Affairs. 2022. Vol. 20, Issue 1. P. 93-111. DOI 10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-1-93-111.
Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament (Ballistic Missile Defense, High-Precision Conventional Weapons, Space Arms). Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergey Oznobishchev. Moscow, IMEMO RAN, 2010, 67 p.
Аничкина Т.Б.
The future of US-Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control [Text] / T. Anichkina, A. Pezceli, N. Roth // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2017. – Vol. 73. – No 4. – P. 271-278.
Арбатов А.Г.
The vicissitudes of Russian missile defense [Text] / А. Arbatov // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2018. – Vol. 74. – Issue 4. – P. 227-237. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2018.1486595
Арбатов А.Г.
Saving Nuclear Arms Control [Text] / A. Arbatov // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2016. – Vol. 72. – № 3. – P. 165 – 170.
Арбатов А.Г.
Global Stability in the Nuclear World // Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2021. Vol. 91, Issue 3. P. 364-373. DOI 10.1134/S1019331621030023.
Стефанович Д.В.
Nuclear Posture and Technology Trends in South Asia and Ways Ahead // The National Security Journal. 2022. Vol. 3, Issue 4. Art. 11. DOI 10.36878/nsj20220301.11.
Куприянов А.В.
Exploring the Impact of Submarine Saturation on Strategic Stability in South Asia // The National Security Journal. 2022. Vol. 3, Issue 4. Art. 8. DOI 10.36878/nsj20220227.08.
Карасев П.А.
Cyber factors of Strategic Stability // Russia in Global Affairs. 2020. Vol. 18, Issue 3 (71). P. 24-52. DOI 10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-3-24-52.
Problems and prospects of Russia – US / NATO cooperation in the sphere of ballistic missile defense. Executive editor: Trubnikov V.I. - Moscow, IMEMO RAN, 2011. - 40 p.
Стефанович Д.В.
Missile Trends in South-East Asia // Новый оборонный заказ. Стратегии. 2022. № 1 (72). P. 71-76.
Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security / IMEMO supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2018. Edited by A. Arbatov, S. Oznobishchev, N. Bubnova. – Moscow: IMEMO, 2019. – 152 p.
Топычканов П.В.
US–Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India [Text] / P. V. Topychkanov // Strategic Analysis. – 2018. – Vol. 42. – Issue 3. – P. 251-259 . DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2018.1463958.
Арбатов А.Г.
The Hidden Side of the U.S. – Russian Strategic Confrontation [Text] / A. Arbatov // Arms Control Today. – 2016. – Vol. 46. – P. 20 – 24.
The prospects of engaging European nuclear-weapon states in strategic arms control. Edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergey Oznobishchev. Moscow, IMEMO RAN, 2012, 94 p.
Богданов К.В.
Russian Nuclear Weapons: Reason or Feeling? // Ethics and Armed Forces : e-journal. 2020. Issue 1. P. 64-69. URL: http://www.ethikundmilitaer.de/en/full-issues/20201-nuclear-deterrence/bogdanov-russian-nuclear-weapons-reason-or-feelings/ (аccessed date: 16.10.2020).
Арбатов А.Г.
Mad Momentum Redux? The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Arms Control [Text] / A. Arbatov // Survival. – 2019. – Vol. 61. – Issue 3. – P. 7-38. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1614785.
Савельев А.Г.
China and Nuclear Arms Control // Russia in Global Affairs. 2020. Vol. 18, Issue 3 (71). P. 54-69. DOI 10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-3-54-69.
Загорский А.В.
Tactical nuclear weapons/ A.V. Zagorsky // Security and Human Rights. - 2011. - V. 22. - Issue 4. P. 399-410.
Еще публикации по теме
![Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward [Text] / A. Arbatov // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. – 2019. – Vol. 75. – Issue 4. – P. 151-161. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628475.](/dreamedit/pfoto/130E8D8A_CED9_1421_A91E_BD9F95286BC2_b.jpg)






Нет комментариев