

**PEACE AGREEMENTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS:
FOCUSING ON FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT INCOMPATIBILITY**

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Abstract The Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset was first published in 2006. Its main goal was to provide the research community with a dataset on peace agreements that was not linked to conflict termination, i. e. included both successful and failed agreements. The latest update of the dataset includes 355 peace agreements concluded in the 1975–2018 period. A number of studies have been based on the dataset over the years. The dataset is unique in its strict connection to the UCDP conflict data and in its focus on the conflict dyad, actors, and the conflict incompatibility. The dataset's focus on only those agreements that involve the dyadic relationship between primary warring parties – between governments and rebel groups or between two governments – has direct policy implications, as it is exactly these parties who need to change their stances on incompatibilities in order to solve a conflict. Also, the Peace Agreement Dataset's focus on agreements that address the key incompatibilities contested by the parties allow it to distinguish peace agreements on other negotiated deals, including ceasefires, and to differentiate between full, partial and peace process agreements. Finally, the analysis of key trends in peace agreements is presented. It shows that in contrast to the previous historical peak in the number of armed conflicts back in the early 1990s that corresponded to the peak in annual numbers of peace agreements, the new peak in annual numbers of armed conflicts in the late 2010s was not matched by a similar rise in peace agreements.

Keywords peace agreement, armed conflict, war, incompatibility, warring party, data, datasets

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Название статьи	Мирные соглашения в вооруженных конфликтах: поиск решения базового противоречия
Аннотация	База данных о мирных соглашениях была впервые опубликована в 2006 г. в рамках Программы данных о конфликтах Уппсальского университета (UCDP). Ее цель – предоставить исследовательскому сообществу базу данных о мирных соглашениях по конфликтам вне зависимости от дальнейшего исхода этих конфликтов, т. е. включающую как соглашения, которые в итоге привели к миру, так и те, после которых вооруженные конфликты продолжались. Последняя версия базы данных включает 355 мирных соглашений, заключенных в 1975–2018 годах, и на ее основе уже проведено немало исследований. Уникальность базы данных состоит в ее жесткой привязке к данным UCDP о конфликтах, а также в ее фокусе на конфликтных диадах (парах противоборствующих друг другу акторов) и на базовых противоречиях, по поводу которых ведется вооруженное противостояние. Включение в базу данных только тех соглашений, которые заключены между основными противоборствующими сторонами – между правительством и повстанческими силами или между двумя государствами (правительствами) – имеет вполне конкретные последствия для практической политики, так как для разрешения конфликтов необходимо, чтобы именно эти акторы изменили свои позиции по ключевым вопросам противостояния. Тот факт, что в базу данных включены только те соглашения, которые напрямую затрагивают базовые противоречия между противоборствующими сторонами, позволяет отличить мирные соглашения от любых других договоренностей, в т. ч. о перемирии, и провести разграничение между полными, частичными и процессуальными мирными соглашениями. В конце статьи представлен краткий анализ основных тенденций в сфере мирных соглашений. Он, в частности, показывает, что, если предыдущий пик числа вооруженных конфликтов в мире, который наблюдался в начале 1990-х годов после окончания «холодной войны», совпал с небывалым ростом числа мирных соглашений, то новый пик вооруженных конфликтов в конце 2010-х годов таким подъемом договоренностей о мире уже не сопровождался.
Ключевые слова	мирное соглашение, вооруженный конфликт, война, базовое противоречие, воюющая сторона, данные, базы данных

I. Introduction

Armed conflicts can be terminated by peace agreements, but not all peace agreements terminate conflicts. This simple assumption led to the first publication of the UCDP Peace Agreement Data in 2006.¹ At the time, peace agreements were often analyzed as a type of termination of war and all agreements failing to end the violence immediately were left out of the relevant studies and data collections.² However, contrary to what was portrayed in the data, peace agreements were concluded in all types of conflict settings and not only as a means to terminate a conflict immediately. Some peace agreements were signed years after the violence had ended as a way of managing residual conflict issues. Other peace agreements were signed at the height of a civil war, leading to a de-escalation of violence but not to a total halt of deadly attacks. Yet other peace agreements failed to have an effect on the level of violence. Truncating the data by including only those agreements that led to an end of violence involves the risk of biasing any results of

analyzing the data. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset aimed at rectifying this problem in data on peace agreements by including agreements concluded at all conflict phases irrespectively of whether they brought an end to violence. The inclusion of these peace agreements facilitated studies of both successful and failed cases.

Since the first UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset was published in 2006, the Peace Studies community has seen an increase in datasets on peace agreements. Most of these datasets have also moved away from the focus on conflict termination, so the inclusion of failed cases is no longer unique for the UCDP data. However, the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset still stands apart from other similar efforts in several ways. One of the main advantages of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is that it is fully compatible with other UCDP datasets on armed conflicts. Only agreements signed in armed conflicts included in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset are covered, which requires that an eligible conflict should relate to either a fight over government (power) or to the status of a territory.³ This approach has a number of benefits. First, it ensures that the cases included are all tied to the same phenomenon: armed conflicts fought over either government, or territory. Second, as the peace agreement dataset is compatible with the other UCDP data products, this phenomenon can be studied in relation to various other conflict features and dynamics.

The UCDP definition of an “armed conflict” includes three main components: actors, behavior, and incompatibility. Actors and incompatibilities are also important parts of the program’s definition of a “peace agreement”. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset defines a peace agreement as a formal agreement between at least two opposing primary warring parties, which addresses a disputed incompatibility either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process of how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.⁴

The latest version of the dataset includes all peace agreements between warring parties concluded within the period between 1975 and 2018. In all, the dataset includes 355 peace agreements meeting this definition.⁵

In the following sections, the actors and incompatibility issues of peace agreements are addressed in more detail as the two elements that distinguish the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset from other contemporary peace agreement datasets.

II. Actors and the focus on the conflict dyad

The UCDP conflict data differentiates between various types of actors. The program views a conflict as a process that starts when an armed actor first states a goal of incompatibility, i. e. when it states that its aim is to change the status quo either concerning how or by whom a state is governed, or regarding the status of a territory within the state. The actor that claims an incompatibility and the actor that is challenged by this incompatibility are called primary warring parties in a conflict. Primary warring parties are seen as part of the same conflict if more than one of them challenges the state either over government, or over the same territory.

During a conflict, different actors may have their own views on how to solve the conflict issue or incompatibility. Apart from the government and various rebel groups challenging it, other actors may feel that they have a stake, e. g. civil society, political parties, diasporas, former rebel leaders, other governments, the UN, and other international governmental organizations. These actors can be the sole signatories to a settlement of a violent conflict while the main conflict belligerents in some cases can even be excluded from an accord.

The accords that do not include the primary parties to a conflict – the government and at least one of the rebel groups challenging it – do not meet the criteria for inclusion into the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. In the case of interstate conflicts, all governments involved have to be represented in the peace agreement for it to be included in the UCDP dataset. To summarize, in its datasets on armed conflicts and data on peace agreements, the UCDP focuses on the dyadic relationship between governments and rebel groups or between two governments. The dyad focus is unique for the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and is one of its main advantages over other similar collections of data.

The main assumption for including only agreements signed by the primary warring parties in the dataset is that it is exactly these parties who need to change their stances on incompatibilities in order to solve a conflict and to reach a long-lasting solution which could end a war. Because of this criterion, some well-known agreements, such as accords on Indonesia (East Timor), Lebanon and Nicaragua, are disqualified, as they were *signed by actors other than the primary warring parties*. At the same time, the UCDP treats equally all of those primary warring parties that have ever been active. Some peace agreements are included even though only minor primary warring parties signed them.

Peace agreements can be inclusive, embracing all warring parties that challenge a government in a conflict, or they can be dyadic, involving only some of the warring parties. Although most peace agreements in the UCDP data (55%) were inclusive and involved all warring parties of relevant conflicts, most of them were signed in conflicts involving only one active dyad. Inclusive agreements in conflicts with several or many dyads and a plethora of rebel groups are rare. An absolute majority (88%) of peace agreements in conflicts involving more than one dyad were dyadic, i. e. they covered only a single dyad.

One of the main obstacles for collecting UCDP data on peace agreements has been the need to identify legitimate representatives of warring parties. The issue is often a delicate matter. Sometimes, agents claiming to represent a warring party in fact represent those factions that had never engaged in combat with the government. It is common for warring parties to splinter in the midst of negotiations. In some cases, the main group stays within the peace process while hardliners leave the group to set up a new faction that resumed fighting. In other cases, a new faction is willing to make more concessions and signs a settlement while the main group continues fighting or raises its demands at the negotiating table. In cases when several factions of a warring party claim to represent the original group, the UCDP treats the group keeping the majority of the fighters on the ground as the “mother group” and the smaller faction(s) as splinter(s). In cases where it is problematic to determine the main party, the original leader of a warring party is identified and the group over which he continues presiding is treated as the original one. Two cases in point are presented below.

The first example where identifying legitimate representatives of a warring party proved to be challenging is an agreement signed on April 21, 1997 in Sudan. The accord was signed by the Government of Sudan and some of those factions that had broken with the mainstream Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) in 1991. According to the agreement, one of the signatories, Commander Karubino Kawanyyn Bol, signed it for SPLM/A, but in fact he did not represent the party at the time. His faction as well as other factions that signed the April 1997 agreement had not been involved in the fighting against the Government of Sudan prior to the signature. Some of them had even received support from the Government of Sudan to fight the mainstream Sudan People's Liberation

Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement is consequently not part of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset but is part of other peace agreement datasets.⁶ This particular agreement has been in the focus of a Swedish lawsuit against the “Lundin Energy” oil company. “Lundin Energy” was charged of complicity in war crimes occurring between 1999 and 2003 in Sudan. In the proceedings, representatives of “Lundin Energy” claimed that they based their analysis and decision to invest in the region on a belief that the April 21, 1997 peace agreement would secure peace in the region, since it was signed by the relevant conflict actors.⁷ The decision of whether or not to include agreements that involve actors other than the ones fighting the war in a research study should be made consciously. It will influence the results, for example, if a study tries to establish whether or not a peace agreement leads to termination of violence on the ground. The case above highlights the importance of identifying those who have the right to represent a warring party in a peace agreement.

The second example is the 1990–1991 peace process in Colombia. In the early 1990s, the Government of Colombia negotiated and reached dyadic peace agreements with some warring parties. With one of them, the EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación; Popular Liberation Army), they signed three partial peace agreements in 1990 and a final peace agreement on February 15, 1991. These agreements are all part of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and they are seen as successful cases, as they ended the violence in the Government of Colombia – EPL dyad. However, in the midst of negotiations, the EPL splintered. While one faction of 2200 members demobilized and formed a political party “Esperanza, Paz y Libertad” (“Hope, Peace and Liberty”), another faction comprised of approximately 500 members and led by the original EPL leader Francisco Caraballo rejected the peace agreements and continued fighting. Since the Caraballo faction was the smaller group, it is seen as a new, splinter actor by the UCDP. This new actor has continued to clash with the Government of Colombia and is still active at a very low level of violence. However, the larger faction continues to abide by the peace agreements.

D.Nilsson was one of the first researchers who used the dyadic information in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset in her study in 2008.⁸ She looked at whether dyadic peace agreements were as durable as those inclusive peace agreements that incorporated all rebel groups. Nilsson found that although a conflict with warring parties outside of a peace agreement may continue after a dyadic peace agreement is signed, actors who sign a dyadic agreement tend to stick to it regardless of actions taken by non-signatory groups. She argued that the signatories already tried to anticipate actions of all actors in a conflict when taking the decision to sign a peace deal, including actions of rebel groups outside of a peace agreement. Therefore, according to Nilsson, partial peace is possible.

Another article that benefitted from the dyadic focus of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset was authored by C.Manning and I.Smith (2016).⁹ They studied under what conditions rebel groups successfully integrated into democratic politics after civil wars. The authors found that rebel groups were more likely to form political parties by the end of war when a peace agreement was in place. This regularity manifested itself stronger in cases when rebels signed a dyadic peace agreement with a government and in cases where external guarantors were present. S.Akcinaroglu (2012) also used dyadic information from UCDP dataset when she studied the relationship between allied rebels and peace agreements.¹⁰ Her study found that allied rebels were unlikely to terminate a peace agreement, especially when an alliance is durable. Some research has demonstrated the

importance of involving other actors apart from the warring parties in the peace agreements. In her 2012 study, Nilsson found that inclusion of civil society actors in a peace settlement increases the durability of peace. She also discovered that peace accords that, in addition to the warring parties, also involve civil society actors and political parties are more stable.¹¹

Some other research on signatories of peace agreements focused on gender inclusion. M.Anderson and L.Swiss (2014) suggested that gender inclusive peace processes result in the accelerated adoption of electoral gender quotas in the aftermath of a peace agreement.¹² J.Krause and her colleagues (2018) demonstrated correlation between peace agreements signed by female delegates and durable peace.¹³ All these studies are examples of research that benefitted from the UCDP dyadic information connected to peace agreements as well as from the database's interconnectedness to other UCDP datasets on armed conflict.

III. Incompatibilities

The other factor that sets the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset apart from other current datasets in the field is the focus on conflict incompatibilities. For the UCDP, the goal of a peace agreement is to settle an underlying conflict issue between the conflict parties over which the conflict has been fought. As previously stated, the UCDP data includes conflicts that involve incompatibilities over government and/or territory. An incompatibility over government generally refers to a type of political system, replacement of the central government or changes in the composition of a current government. An incompatibility over territory refers to efforts to change the status of a territory, for example, efforts to achieve secession or autonomy. When applied to the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the focus is on how these incompatibilities are handled when conflicting parties want to move from violence to more constructive relationship. The focus on incompatibilities in the peace agreement is also used as a way to distinguish peace agreements from other agreements, such as ceasefires. For the UCDP, ceasefire agreements merely focus on change in the violent behavior. Since they do not attempt to regulate the core conflict issues, they are not included in the Peace Agreement Dataset.

UCDP categorizes peace agreements based on how they deal with the core incompatibilities between the parties. It distinguishes between full peace agreements, partial peace agreements, and peace process agreements. The most clear-cut of these three categories are full peace agreements, defined as peace agreements where at least one conflict dyad agrees to settle the incompatibility. During the 1975–2018 period, there were 78 full peace agreements. An example of full peace agreements is the “Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations – The Final Act”, signed in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Government and all main warring parties and civil society actors signed this full peace agreement that ended the conflict between the signatories and provided for elections, interim governance, and a new constitution.

The second category, partial peace agreement, is defined as an agreement where the parties of at least one conflict dyad agree to settle a part of the incompatibility. In some cases, a peace process is pre-planned to include several agreements dealing with different aspects of the conflict. In those cases, each separate agreement on a specific aspect of the incompatibility is categorized as a partial peace agreement in the dataset and a conflict is not regarded as solved until the final agreement is concluded. An example of this kind of

agreement is the peace process in Sudan, where partial peace agreements were signed over security issues, wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and administration of certain areas before the final peace agreement was concluded in 2005, formally ending the conflict. Other partial peace agreements are signed when the warring parties agree on some or most aspects of an incompatibility but the peace agreement notes outstanding issues and postpones them to be solved in later negotiations. The status of Jerusalem in peace agreements between the Government of Israel and Fatah¹⁴ is a notable example of this kind.

A peace agreement is also considered as partial when conflict issues are delegated to a commission. An example is the “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan” (R-ARCSS) concluded in 2018 between the Government of South Sudan and SPLM/A-IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement in Opposition). In this case, the relevant incompatibility was regulated through a power-sharing deal. A part of the conflict issue was also about the boundaries and the number of states of South Sudan. This issue was delegated to an Independent Boundaries Commission that would work for three months attempting to solve the issue. Overall, in 1975–2018, there were 199 partial peace agreements.

The third category includes peace process agreements. These are agreements where at least one conflict dyad agrees to initiate a process to settle their incompatibility. A typical peace process agreement contains a detailed agenda for talks, but in some cases the parties only agree to initiate negotiations on substantive issues, such as the territorial status of a region. In many high-profile peace processes (for instance, the 1990–1996 peace process in Guatemala), a number of agreements dealt with the agenda of talks before approaching conflict issues. The UCDP records 78 peace process agreements for the period between 1975 and 2018.

Peace agreements include different provisions designed to solve an incompatibility. Conflicts fought over government incompatibilities and those fought over territorial issues may sometimes require different solutions. The main ways for managing the incompatibility in intrastate conflicts over government include making provisions for elections, in some cases along with forming an interim government and giving a rebel group the right to become a political party. Another solution for conflicts over government involves various forms of power-sharing – either by integrating rebel leaders/members into the government and/or civil service, or by providing a specific quota for a former rebel or ethnic group in future governments. The most common solution in intrastate conflicts over territory has been granting a region some form of local governance and cultural freedoms, such as allowing a group to speak their native language. The promise of elections and provisions for regional development in the disputed region are other points that are common for peace agreements in conflicts over territory.

Some examples of research articles based on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset that have focused on different solutions to the conflict incompatibility are presented below.

Vast literature has investigated the connection between power-sharing provisions, intrastate conflict and the result whether or not power-sharing has had a positive, negative or no effect on peace. Some studies on power-sharing in peace agreements have been based on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and the datasets that have been built on it, such as the Implementation of Pacts (IMPACT) data¹⁵ and the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED).¹⁶

Table 1. Political provisions in peace agreements in conflicts, 1975–2018

Political provisions	All peace agreements	Full agreements over government	Full agreements over territory
Elections	29%	63%	30%
Interim government	17%	30%	4%
Local government	16%	20%	39%
Integration into government	15%	35%	13%
Regional development	15%	11%	26%
Institutional power-sharing	14%	24%	22%
The right to become a political party	12%	39%	0%
Cultural freedoms	11%	11%	39%
Integration into civil service	9%	22%	4%
Autonomy	6%	4%	22%
Local power-sharing	6%	6%	17%
Referendum on future status	4%	2%	13%
Federalism	4%	4%	1%
Independence	1%	1%	0%
Number of agreements	355	54	23

Basing their study on the IMPACT dataset, A.K.Jarstad and D.Nilsson (2008)¹⁷ studied if implementation of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements were the key to durable peace. They concluded that even after being implemented, governmental power-sharing pacts proved to be somewhat less effective than military and territorial power-sharing pacts.

Another study by M.Ottman¹⁸ used the PSED data with the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED)¹⁹ and looked at two other types of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements – personalized and structural power-sharing – to see how different types of power-sharing affect the level of violence in the conflict with the participation of rebel groups outside of the agreement. His study found that personalized power-sharing was associated with lower levels of battle deaths while structural power-sharing was associated with higher fatality numbers.

W.Maekawa (2021) who relies on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and PSED takes a new approach and looks at how territorial power-sharing arrangements can solve intrastate conflicts over government.²⁰ She argues that the main problem with territorial power-sharing provisions (for example, through including autonomy arrangements in a peace agreement) is that it eventually provokes secessionism. However, for conflicts over government the same solution can be used without this fear, since in this case secession is not on the political agenda for the groups involved. Still, those warring parties that fight over incompatibilities concerning government may benefit from territorial power-sharing, since in some cases they have limited territorial claims besides a broader political agenda. The local

claims might be portrayed as a fight for federalism or ethnic recognition. Maekawa finds that, in conflicts over government, including territorial power-sharing provisions in a peace agreement increases chances for the survival of an agreement and the likelihood of a further peace agreement to be reached with another warring party.

Another line of research concerns the relationship between provisions regarding elections and conflict recurrence. A.M.Matanock (2017) studied if elections after a negotiated settlement reduced the risk of conflict recurrence.²¹ She looked at cases where warring parties added electoral participation provisions in peace agreement (i. e. clear expectations that elections were going to be held on a set date) and provisions that legalized rebel groups as political parties. The study found that “although post-conflict elections as a whole do not produce peace, electoral participation provisions are associated with an 80% increase in the odds that peace endures”.²² In the 2018 study that built upon and developed this idea, Matanock found that while no peace agreements included such electoral participation provisions until the end of the Cold War, those types of provision appeared in nearly half of all agreements since then.²³ She argued that warring parties chose to include electoral participation provisions to engage those international actors who could enforce the deals and help the warring parties to overcome commitment problems.

IV. Trends in the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset


Turning to the general trends that can be discerned on the basis of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, it can be seen that the number of peace agreements per year fluctuated between 0 and 24 during the 1975–2018 period.

The 1970s and the 1980s were two decades with low numbers of peace agreements in general. During this period five years saw no peace accords signed at all. Many conflicts were fought over ideology and warring parties were often supported by one of the superpowers – the United States or the Soviet Union.

The number of peace agreements increased sharply after the end of the Cold War. The culmination in the number of peace agreements corresponded with a peak in the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. Between 1991 and 1994, the UCDP reported a high number of active conflicts. In the same period the data shows a similar peak in the number of peace agreements: 82 peace agreements were concluded in 28 conflicts involving 40 dyads. The highest number of peace agreements was recorded in 1993, which was followed by a rise in the number of partial peace agreements for four years. The number of full peace agreements reached a peak in 1993 when six such agreements were concluded. Most of the dyads – pairs of actors who signed peace agreements in the 1990s – were still actively fighting each other when concluding their agreements. In fact, the UCDP registered termination of as many as seven conflicts (including conflicts in El Salvador and Mozambique) due to peace agreements concluded between 1991 and 1994.

At the end of the 1990s, the world experienced decline in the number of peace agreements corresponding to a decline in the number of conflicts. The trend of decline in both conflicts and peace agreements was broken in early 2010s. However, this time the rise in armed conflicts was not followed by the same sharp increase in the number of peace agreements, as it was the case in the 1990s.

Figure 1. Conflicts and peace agreements by type, 1975–2018



The new peak in the number of conflicts was reached between 2015 and 2018, when UCDP reported a similar number of active conflicts as during the 1991–1994 period. However, compared to the early 1990s, this period experienced fewer peace agreements: only 23 peace agreements were concluded in 14 conflicts involving 15 dyads. Of those, only one peace agreement led to conflict termination²⁴ in 2015–2018: the 2016 “Final Colombian Peace Agreement” between the government of Colombia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, in 2018 this conflict restarted with participation of two non-signatory groups: the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) and the splinter faction of FARC dissidents.²⁵

V. Conclusion

The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset has now been available for 15 years. A number of studies have benefitted from the interconnectedness between the UCDP Peace Agreement data and UCDP’s other data resources and combined the UCDP Peace Agreement data with that from other academic datasets. In particular, the studies that benefitted from the dyadic focus of the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset and from its inclusion of agreements dealing with the conflict incompatibility have shown that dyadic peace is possible and suggest how power-sharing may work as a way to end conflict.

ENDNOTES

¹ Harbom L., Högbladh S., Wallensteen P. Armed conflict and peace agreements // *Journal of Peace Research*. 2006. V. 43. № 5. P. 617–631.

² Fortna V.P. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004; Licklider R. The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945–1993 // *American Political Science Review*. 1995. V. 89. № 3. P. 681–690; Hartzell C.A. Explaining the stability of negotiated settlements to intrastate wars // *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 1999. V. 43. № 1. P. 3–22; Wallensteen P. *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. – London: Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002.

³ An armed conflict is defined by the UCDP as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”.

⁴ Harbom L., Högbladh S., Wallensteen P. Armed conflict and peace agreements // *Journal of Peace Research*. 2006. V. 43. № 5. P. 617–631.

⁵ Pettersson T., Högbladh S., Öberg M. Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements // *Journal of Peace Research*. 2019. V. 56. № 4. P. 589–603.

⁶ For instance, in the PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset (University of Edinburgh), this agreement is coded as part of the “UCDP Sudan: Government Conflict”. For more detail on the PA-X dataset, see the next article in this issue: Badanjak S. The PA-X Peace Agreement Database: reflections on documenting the practice of peacemaking // *Pathways to Peace and Security*. 2021. № 2(61). P. 24–42.

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¹² Anderson M.J., Swiss L. Peace accords and the adoption of electoral quotas for women in the developing world, 1990-2006 // *Politics and Gender*. 2014. V. 10. № 1. P. 33–61.

¹³ Krause J., Krause W., Branfors P. Women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace // *International Interactions*. 2018. V. 44. № 6. P. 985–1016.

¹⁴ “Fatah” (“Conquest” or “Opening” in Arabic), an inverted acronym of Ḥarakat al-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī (“Palestine National Liberation Movement”), – is a Palestinian political party that forms the largest faction of the multi-party national liberation movement and organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Mahmoud Abbas, the Present of the Palestinian Authority, is a member of Fatah.

- ¹⁵ Jarstad A.K., Nilsson D. From words to deeds: the implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords // *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 2008. V. 25. № 3. P. 206–223.
- ¹⁶ Ottmann M., Vuellers J. Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED). Harvard Dataverse. 2015. V. 1. URL: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/29657>.
- ¹⁷ Jarstad A.K., Nilsson D. Op. cit.
- ¹⁸ Ottmann M. Peace for our time? Examining the effect of power-sharing on postwar rebellions // *Journal of Peace Research*. 2020. V. 57. № 5. P. 617–631.
- ¹⁹ Sundberg R., Melander E. Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset // *Journal of Peace Research*. 2013. V. 50. № 4. P. 523–532.
- ²⁰ Maekawa W. Strategic territorial power-sharing and multi-party bargaining in civil wars // *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*. 2021. V. 27. № 1. P. 91–117.
- ²¹ Matanock A.M. Bullets for ballots: electoral participation provisions and enduring peace after civil conflict // *International Security*. 2017. V. 41. № 4. P. 93–132.
- ²² Ibid. P. 95.
- ²³ Matanock A.M. External engagement: explaining the spread of electoral participation provisions in civil conflict settlements // *International Studies Quarterly*. 2018. V. 62. № 3. P. 656–670.
- ²⁴ Note that a conflict is not recorded as terminated until all active dyads have ceased fighting. Thus, a conflict-dyad can be terminated due to a peace agreement, but the conflict as such will continue to be recorded as active as long as another rebel group keeps fighting. Termination of a conflict by a peace agreement is coded for years were the conflict activity drops below 25 deaths in the same year as the agreement was signed.
- ²⁵ Matanock A.M. External engagement.

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