RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

IMEMO SUPPLEMENT TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2007
CONTENTS

PREFACE ............................................................................................................. 5

ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................... 6

PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS

1. BACK TO ARMS CONTROL? Vladimir BARANOVSKY ..................... 11
2. LOOKING FORWARD TO A WORLD FREE OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. Hans BLIX ......................................................... 17
   The Commission on WMD and the outlook for the Report .......... 18
   Findings of the WMDC Report .............................................................. 19
   Nuclear weapons ..................................................................................... 20
   What does the Commission propose? .................................................. 22
3. INF TREATY: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY. Alexei ARBATOV .......... 25
   Retrospective view ................................................................................. 25
   Motivation for the withdrawal from the INF Treaty ....................... 27
   Missile threat from third states ............................................................ 28
   Response to ballistic missile defense ................................................... 30
   BMD or IRBMs? ..................................................................................... 31
   Sober view on U. S. plans for missile defense in Europe:
   No need to abandon the INF Treaty ..................................................... 32
4. GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM
   Alexandre KALIADINE .......................................................................... 35
   Risk-increasing factors ........................................................................ 36
   Shaping effective global strategy ......................................................... 38
   Russian-American initiative ................................................................ 44
   Assessments and initiatives originating from the expert community... 48
5. ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE. Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV ............. 53
   The substance of differences ................................................................. 54
   Attempts to solve CFE problems through negotiations ................ 55
   Reciprocal efforts are indispensable .................................................. 58
6. DISCUSSIONS AT THE IMEMO. Vadim VLADIMIROV ................. 61
   Presentation of the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2006 ... 61
   Debating issues of arms control and WMD-terrorism ....................... 63
PART II. EXPERT INSIGHTS

7. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM. Alexei ARBATOV ........................................... 69

8. RUSSIA-NATO COUNCIL: FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
Vladimir BELOUS .................................................................................. 75

9. ELIMINATION OF CW STOCKPILES IN RUSSIA
Alexander SAVELYEV and Vladimir KOUHACHEV ................................. 82

10. CHEMICAL NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
Alexander SAVELYEV and Sergey TSELITSKY ..................................... 89

11. RUSSIA AND CANWFZ. Vladimir SOTNIKOV ............................... 96

SYNOPSIS OF FEDERAL LAW NO. FZ 198 (2007)
Pyotr ROMASHKIN .............................................................................. 100

ANNEX. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
(January – December 2007). Tamara FARNASOVA................................. 109

1. Legislative acts .................................................................................. 109
2. Normative acts .................................................................................. 111
3. Documents submitted to the Conference on Disarmament .............. 114

About the contributors ............................................................................ 121
PREFACE

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations presents in this volume the 8th edition of *RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*. It provides IMEMO contributions to the Russian edition of the *SIPRI YEARBOOK 2007*.

The authors of this volume offer data and analyses, all based on open sources, which illuminate both risks to international stability and processes of security and arms control, focusing on Russia’s involvement in counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, disarmament and human security.

IMEMO researchers examine arms control imperatives; the impact of the U.S. plans to install elements of its missile shield in central Europe on various international arms control regimes. The authors explore available options, including alternative, non-confrontational schemes based on Russian-American cooperation in the area of missile warning to address emerging threats. They also reflect on issues of nuclear terrorism; arms control in Europe; Russian-NATO intricate relations; Russian perspectives on the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; elimination of CW stockpiles; risks for the production of chemicals as non-lethal weapons.

The special study, elaborated for IMEMO by the prominent expert Dr. Hans Blix, chairman of the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, highlights recommendations on what the world community, national governments and civil society can and should do to free the world of nuclear, biological and chemical arms.

The book contains the brief overview of Russian key official documents related to arms control efforts.

Particular appreciation is due to Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr Alexei Arbatov and Dr Alexandre Kaliadine for contributing, compiling and editing this volume. My appreciation also extends to George Bechter, Boris Klimenko and Vladimir Svarichovsky for helping to prepare the manuscript for publication.

I gratefully acknowledge the support of this project by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.

Academician Alexander Dynkin
Director
Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Russian Academy of Sciences
February 2008
ACRONYMS

GPF – General-Purpose Forces (Russia)
HEU – highly-enriched uranium
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
IAG – Implementation and Assessment Group
ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile
ICOC – International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
IMEMO – Institute of World Economy and International Relations
INF – Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)
IRBM – Intermediate-range ballistic missile
JCG – Joint Consultative Group (Europe)
MW – megawatt
MIRV – multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MOD – Ministry of Defense (Russia)
MPC&A – material protection, control and accounting
MTC – military-technical cooperation
MTCR – Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC – national ceiling
NFC – nuclear fuel cycle
NGO – non-governmental organization
NED – nuclear explosive device
NIS – new independent state
NLW – non-lethal weapons
NMD – national missile defense (USA)
NNWS – non-nuclear-weapon state
NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)
NSA – negative security assurances
NSG – Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTM – national technical means (of verification)
NW – nuclear weapon
NWFZ – nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS – nuclear-weapon state
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative
R&D – research and development
RAF – Russian Armed Forces
RCA – riot control agent
RF – Russian Federation
RM – reaction mass
RNC – Russia-NATO Council
SD – State Duma (Russia)
SDF – Strategic Deterrent Force
SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM – submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM – sea-launched cruise missile
SNDS – strategic nuclear delivery system
SNF – Strategic nuclear force
SOF – Strategic Offensive Forces
SORT – Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (between Russia and the USA)
SRF – Strategic Rocket Forces (Russia)
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (I, II, III)
TC – territorial ceiling
TLE – treaty-limited equipment (Europe)
TNW – tactical nuclear weapons
TMD – theatre missile defense
UCF – uranium conversion facility
UF6 – uranium hexafluoride
UN – United Nations
UNDC – United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA – UN General Assembly
UNSC – UN Security Council
UNSCR – UN Security Council Resolution
UNSG – UN Secretary-General
WMD – weapon of mass destruction
WMDC – Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Sweden)
WTO – Warsaw Treaty Organization
PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS

1. Back to arms control?
2. Looking forward to a world free of mass destruction weapons
3. INF Treaty: twentieth anniversary
4. Global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism
5. Arms control in Europe
6. Discussions at the IMEMO
I. BACK TO ARMS CONTROL?

Vladimir BARANOVSKY

Arms control is politically in demand again. Experts, media and politicians point to the need of returning to its agenda. This may be considered as good news, insofar as reducing military threats and strengthening stability are concerned. However, the very need for such efforts testifies to the fact that the state of affairs in the area of security is by no means satisfactory.

Indeed, the declining interest in arms control during the last 10 to 15 years was, *inter alia*, due to the perceived irrelevance of those problems that it was supposed to address. The argument, if formulated in a deliberately simplified way, runs as follows: why do one’s best and spend resources on establishing ceilings that would limit armed forces and weapons, if nobody is planning to increase their numbers anyway? It is suffice to mention that in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, global military spending decreased by 40%.

However, at the turn of the century the trend started to reverse. Military activities increased and some new qualitative features emerged.

Firstly, during the Cold War years, the military competition was primarily the consequence of the global bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as the main protagonists. Presently, in the multipolar world, the arms race also becomes multidimensional; it acquires various new facets and develops under the influence of a broader variety of factors.

Secondly, the global military build-up tends to become increasingly asymmetrical. The United States allocates to military programs as much as all the rest of the world. For instance, Russia's military budget, notwithstanding its seven-fold increase during the last decade, is 25 times less than that of the United States.

Thirdly, although military spending is becoming more and more oppressive even for the U.S. economy, the latter still has a considerable ‘margin of safety’ allowing it to sustain the burden. Indeed, although soon after the Cold War the USA was spending only 3% of its GDP for mili-
Military-related purposes, at present it has risen to over 4%. However, during the Reagan’s era this indicator amounted to 6.5%, and at the peak of the Cold War it reached 10%. This dynamics shows that for the USA the financial constraints do not yet constitute a significant inducement for slowing down the military build-up.

Fourthly, nor did American leaders operating under conditions of the neoconservative dominance see a pressing need for arms control from the perspective of ensuring military security of the country. However, it is here that the policy rejecting arms control faces the main conceptual challenge.

In the years of the bipolar confrontation, each superpower proceeded from the assumption of the existence of a real potential adversary. As the only remaining superpower with global interests and global capabilities, the USA defined its mission as ensuring security against any eventual rival who might challenge American interests in future.

In the context of the neoconservative paradigm, such mission would seem rational. Indeed, why not take advantage of the unprecedented American preponderance and consolidate it well into the future (or even forever)? But this goal, as it often happens with virtual strategic orientations, would be too ambitious, vague in terms of criteria and hardly achievable. What is even more important, this requires unlimited military build-up and is totally inconsistent with the imperatives of cooperative behavior in the area of international security.

These trends have affected adversely international arms control. Paradoxically, progress in this field had been noticeable and tangible at the time of bipolar confrontation. But in the post-bipolar period, i.e. when political atmosphere radically improved, the only serious achievement was the successful culmination of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons (which had started during the Cold War). As for the leftovers of the disarmament agenda, not only new accords have failed to materialize, but even the existing pillars of the international security regime have been damaged or destroyed.

The list of the most significant victims includes the ABM Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the START-2. Regrettably, the CFE Treaty and the INF Treaty may soon be added to this list.

One can also see the erosion of some values and basic assumptions traditionally associated with the disarmament agenda. For instance, with regard to verification, transparency, information exchange, treaty compliance and so on – the last few years have not only failed to bring anything positive or innovative, but there are also signs pointing in the direction of losing what still remains in this field (and could disappear after the START-1 expires). When the START-2 failed to enter into force, this may have heralded the end of the very phenomenon of negotiated reduction of strategic weapons. The arms control agenda seemed to be reduced to
statements of intent (as was the case with the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty). Having promised to extend the arms control to tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia only confined them-
selves to reaching a tacit understanding not to address this issue at all.
Most importantly, not only nuclear nonproliferation policy, but its phi-
losophy as well, is challenged if one considers developments involving
India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.

This is all ‘bad news. Hopefully, in recent time in the field of arms
control emerge other trends as well. These are not yet ‘good news’ – per-
haps, one can only see in this grounds for cautious optimism. We could
categorized these trends as follows: (i) the revival of traditional incentives
for arms control; (ii) the real or anticipated political impulses pointing in
this direction; (iii) the emerging (although still very limited) interest to-
wards transnational approaches in the area of military security (even if
this is expressed in a very general way), and (iv) the developments around
the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.

(i) The erosion of the international arms control regime has reached
a point when this process begins to adversely affect the security interests
of some key international actors. The START-1 is a good case in point.
The expiration of the treaty (in December 2009) may demolish the unique
system of inspections and notifications based on this legal document-
something that the responsible military, both in the USA and in Russia,
would like to prevent from happening. The year 2007 saw the beginning
of discussions on this matter, carried out with a clear aim of reaching spe-
cific decisions.

This is only one example, but it serves to highlight the issues which
might emerge with the erosion of the arms control mechanisms and re-
gimes in practically all fields. Such problems, to a lesser or larger extent,
could affect all those who had opted for protecting their security interests
by promoting cooperative engagement with potential opponents.

Thus, the United States might have had genuine arguments in favor
of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. In the same way Russia may be-
lieve that its own rationales for suspending its participation in the CFE
Treaty or abandoning the INF Treaty are no less serious. But in all these
cases the damages to security could considerably exceed the expected
gains. Suffice it to recall all the arguments that were raised in favor of
concluding these agreements.

For instance, none of the 20-years old INF-related arguments has lost
its validity at present. By targeting its missiles against the European sites,
Russia will drive its opponents to respond by similar moves threatening
Russia’s territory and increasing its strategic vulnerability even to
a greater extent than it was the case a quarter of a century ago. In other
words, the INF Treaty should be strengthened rather than invalidated. In
2007, when the participation in this treaty started to be questioned in Russian political debates, it became clear that its logic endures whereas suggested alternatives are not very convincing. To overcome this logic, one has to leave the realm of security and proceed from the priority of some other goals.

Thus, after a ‘pause’ of 10 to 15 years, the traditional advantages of arms control again proved to be valid: security can be improved by mutual constraints, monitoring the military activities, maintaining more stable structure of the military balance, and so on. When elaborating policies, these motives do not necessarily prevail over other considerations, but at least they have to be considered as important arguments.

(ii) In a broader sense, the relationship between arms control and the political imperatives deserves greater attention and provides grounds for cautious optimism.

The history of the last fifty years has shown that the relationship of these two factors is volatile and could change rapidly. There were periods when arms control in itself became a politically important objective determining the policies of Moscow or Washington in international affairs. More often, however, arms control was treated not as an asset in itself, but rather a tool for achieving other goals. Or, alternatively, something that could be sacrificed in order to promote them. Today, there are grounds for reasoning along the same lines and expecting certain dividends for arms control.

Russia, for instance, is trying to position itself as a more active international actor – in particular, by inviting other nations to resume serious consideration of disarmament issues. It is obvious that Moscow could get additional political scores by pursuing this policy – just because the support of this approach, both internationally and in domestic politics, is easily predictable. Arms control could only gain from such a pragmatic approach.

In the United States, criticism of President Bush’s international policy is primarily focused upon the Iraq war, but also includes the broader political and ideological policies of the Republican administration. The year 2007 saw, in the context of the anticipated change of the current administration, the active development of alternative approaches, including with respect to arms control. Noteworthy are radical departures from the current positions that are sometimes advocated – the ratification of the CTBT, proposals for starting new negotiations on further SOF reductions and so on. Here, the domestic political competition is undoubtedly a weighty factor, but what follows is a growing pressure upon a forthcoming administration (and even upon the current one) in favor of a more constructive approach towards arms control.

It is true that if disarmament theme is only used for instrumental purposes and does not prioritize national and/or international security, the re-
sults may turn out to be ambivalent. In some cases synchronizing the domestic political cycle with developments in the disarmament field may damage the latter. Moscow’s apparent firmness on the CFE and INF treaties in 2007 was in obvious correlation with the desire to demonstrate its ability for a more independent attitude towards the West. Leaving aside the question whether this goal is worth sacrificing the two treaties, there is little doubt that the evolving situation could result in serious damage to arms control effort.

In fact, the year 2007 proved once again that if arms control is based only on politically motivated considerations, its sustainability may turn out to be quite ephemeral. A political situation can be volatile, whereas arms control should be rather based on pragmatic security-related considerations. As in the past, the most weighty argument in favour of arms control is the one pointing to its ability to guarantee security in a more reliable and rational manner (by cost-effectiveness criteria) than through intensifying unilateral military activities or through undermining the capability of the other side.

(iii) In the arms control field, one can observe the emergence of some new proposals that would have been impracticable only a few years ago because their implementation seemed to be impossible in principle. At present, they are discussed as a matter of practical policy and it is not excluded that they herald a new development in arms control.

Serious consideration of the idea of establishing a multinational uranium-enrichment facility constitutes an important starting point. The idea emerged as an attempt to defuse international tensions around the Iranian nuclear program, but it could have a considerably broader significance for the following reasons. First, the project is in the process of practical implementation (in Angarsk, Russia) which is carried out quite speedily by any international criteria. Second, some similar ideas are under discussion as well, such as the project providing for the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Third, in question is an important principle: the withdrawal from the exclusive national jurisdiction of a matter which traditionally is very sensitive. On this question no weakening of national sovereignty seemed possible at all. But it is on this that practical schemes of trans-national or even supra-national nature are being discussed. This is spectacular evidence that such an approach is feasible in those areas that are the most sensitive in terms of state/national sovereignty.

To speculate on whether it is possible to apply this logic to nuclear weapons would be most probably premature. But it should be noted that uranium enrichment (which is to be addressed on the basis of a transnational approach) is actually not far removed from the nuclear weapons
weapons area. Controversies around the Iranian nuclear program have shown this ‘closeness’ in a quite obvious way.

Perhaps, it is worth trying to turn this negative linkage into a positive one – by looking into inter-/trans-nationalization of certain nuclear weapons connected issues. If cautiously explored, this path could lead towards reconciling the nuclear nonproliferation with the desire of NWS to preserve nuclear weapons as a factor of their security.

(iv) However, throughout the year 2007 this trend was quite vague and hardly discernable at all. As far as the nonproliferation challenges and risks are concerned, the main developments took place around North Korea and Iran.

In the former case, the collective pressure seems to have played a positive role in persuading Pyongyang to forego its nuclear ambitions in return for receiving substantial economic assistance and certain political dividends. In this respect, the year 2007 could mark a significant step in resolving the Korean nuclear problem.

In the case of Iran, the optimistic scenario should be presented in a considerably more cautious way. There are signs of Teheran’s readiness to ‘exchange’ its policies in respect of uranium enrichment for substantial political and economic compensations; but the realization of this scenario depends, inter alia, on domestic developments in the country that are not quite predictable. On the U. S. side, one cannot exclude a military option of bombing the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, however doubtful such scenario might seem in terms of military and political logic, expected results and international consequences.

By and large, the results of the year 2007 are ambivalent. The symbolic clock of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was adjusted in the direction of a nuclear doomsday, thus pointing to the increasing threat thereof. But some trends allow for hope that positive changes are possible in terms of reviving and strengthening the arms control potential.
2. LOOKING FORWARD TO A WORLD FREE OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS\textsuperscript{1}

Hans BLIX

All people need security – against hunger, environmental threats, armed force, and oppression.

The protection of human rights has a long way to go in many places but it has made strides forward. Similarly, there has been and continues to be much horrible use of armed force since the end of World War II but we should note that despite the long Cold War there has not been any direct armed conflict between big powers for 60 years. Regrettably, this has not led to a disappearance of the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

I am happy to present to you the Russian translation of a report examining how the world could tackle this threat. It was written and unanimously approved by a fourteen member international Commission that I had the honor to chair. The Swedish Government paid most of the expenses but we were left completely free in our work.

When I and the Russian member of the Commission, my friend Alexei Arbatov, presented the report in English here in Moscow last June it was suggested that it ought to be translated into Russian in order to reach a larger Russian audience. I am pleased that this has now been done. Russian participation in the efforts to move to a world free of weapons of mass destruction is indispensable.

The report is also translated into Chinese, Japanese and Spanish.

The Report notes (2006) that arms control and disarmament efforts have stagnated and it calls for a revival of cooperative security and disarmament.

\textsuperscript{1} The article is based on Dr. Blix’s presentation of the Russian translation of the Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission: \textit{Weapons of Terror. Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms} held on 17 May 2007 at the IMEMO.
After the end of the Cold War the world drew a sigh of relief that it no longer needed fear ‘a mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) - resulting from a nuclear exchange between superpowers.

However, the threats of WMD remained and there are still some 27,000 nuclear warheads in nine different countries, most of them in Russia and the United States.

Great Britain has recently announced that it will prolong its nuclear weapons program for the period beyond 2020 and the U.S. administration wants to develop a new standard nuclear weapon.

Iraq tried to develop nuclear weapons and used chemical weapons extensively in the war against Iran and also against its own people.

North Korea has tested both a nuclear device and missiles causing tensions to increase in North East Asia.

Iran is developing a program for the enrichment of uranium. Whether or not it aims to develop nuclear weapons, the program is increasing the tension in the Middle East.

There are concerns that terrorists might acquire nuclear material or make use of BC weapons.

The Report *Weapons of Terror. Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms* discusses all these threats and suggests ways of reducing them.

**The Commission on WMD and the outlook for the Report**

When I presented the Report to UNSG and UNGA President on 1 June 2006 the climate for global negotiations and agreements on arms control and disarmament was at an all time low.

In 2003 a limited alliance of willing states had taken armed action in Iraq to eliminate WMD – that did not exist. The NPT Review Conference in the spring of 2005 and the UN World Summit later the same year had failed to reach any agreement on arms control and disarmament. The UN mechanism for arms control and disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva had not been able to agree on a work program for some ten years.

Kofi Annan has said that the world is ‘sleep walking’ into new arms races. He is right.

Recently we woke up to hear about U.S. talks with Poland and the Czech Republic to place elements of the US ‘missile shield’ on their territories. The news provoked strong reactions in Russia and reminded us of the need for a cooperative approach to security.
Some time ago the Chinese action to shoot down a satellite of its own—reminded us that major powers are preparing themselves for the possibility of a space war.

If military expenses are any indication of political climate, we may note that last year they stood at some 1.3 trillion dollars—about half of it falling on the US.

Although we must register that we currently live in a Cold Peace, we should also take note of several positive developments.

There has been a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads. Even though this may be mainly the result of a wish to getting rid of redundant weapons the reductions are welcome. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between Russia and the USA will reduce deployments and we may hopefully see a more hopeful sequence to that treaty.

Earlier, during the 1990s, there was some important progress:

In 1993 the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was concluded after decades of negotiations.

In 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was prolonged without any final date set for its validity.

In 1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed—also after decades of negotiations—but it has not entered into force.

We may also note that wars used to be about borders, territory or ideology. After the end of the Cold War, we do not have such controversies between major powers.

To be sure there remain serious regional tensions and conflicts in the Middle East, Kashmir, and Africa and there are civil wars.

However, interdependence accelerates between all states: health, trade, economy, finance and communications lead to and demand cooperation and common rules and make the threat or use of armed force less likely.

Why not disarmament then? Why new generations of nuclear weapons? Can there be wars about exchange rates? About CO₂ emissions?

Competition about oil resources and about the location of pipe lines is a growing reality but is it not more likely that this competition will play out in the oil prices than in any armed contest about territory?

Is rearmament needed to meet terrorism? Hardly! It cannot be meaningful to build new nuclear weapons or air craft carriers against terrorists. Like trying to shoot mosquitoes by cannons...

**Findings of the WMDC Report**

The conclusion of the WMD Commission is that after the Cold War, disarmament can and must be re-launched.
The Commission presents 60 recommendations concerning nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and means of delivering the weapons. Half of the report and the recommendations deal with nuclear weapons.

Let me first touch upon the questions relating to biological and chemical weapons.

The biological sciences are developing very fast and biotechnology is already giving great dividends. At the same time these new human activities raise risks for the production of pathogens as dangerous weapons.

At the initiative of President Nixon the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was concluded during the Cold War, when the superpowers did not see any useful military application of B-weapons.

During the Cold War the Soviet Union refused to accept on-site inspection – which it saw as espionage – and the convention, therefore lacks verification mechanism. This enabled both the Soviet Union and Iraq to pursue biological weapons programs without the risk of detection. At the review conference in 2001, it was the United States that opposed international verification. Fortunately, no actual use has been made of biological weapons.

The Commission notes that it is important that the Convention attains universal adherence and that more efforts are devoted to ensure effective implementation. The scientific world needs be involved through ethical codes.

For chemical weapons, the Convention concluded in 1993 provides a modern, comprehensive regulation prohibiting production, stocking and use of these weapons.

Although the CWC is in reasonably good shape and has a modern inspection system there are serious delays in the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

States and the chemical industry need also pay more attention to the protection of facilities for the production and transport of dangerous chemicals. There may be lessons to learn from the nuclear industry. Recent suicide missions in Iraq show that the simple use of trucks filled with chlorine can be used to cause terror and many casualties.

**Nuclear weapons**

While the production, storing and use of biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions the same has not been achieved for nuclear weapons. An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concludes that most uses would be illegal but recognizes a limited area of legal use.
The approach taken so far is a fragmented one: Antarctic Treaty, Seabed Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and U.S.-Soviet bilateral arrangements.

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) is the central agreement. It has been—and remains—of crucial importance. Without it nuclear weapons might have spread to many more than the nine states, which have them today.

Through the Non-Proliferation Treaty a global bargain was sought:

All non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) should commit themselves not to acquire these weapons, and the then five nuclear weapon states (NWS) should commit themselves to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament.

Without the commitment of the nuclear weapon states to disarmament the bargain would not have been reached and without a confirmation of that commitment at the review conference in 1995 the treaty would not have been prolonged.

If all the states in the world had adhered and implemented their respective commitments, we would have had a nuclear weapon free world. Regrettably, we are not there! The NPT has seen both success and failure and it is today under strain.

First, the successes: no arms control treaty has attained as wide adherence as the NPT. South Africa, which had nuclear weapons and dismantled them, joined the treaty as a NNWS. The nuclear weapons on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were transferred to Russia and the three states joined the NPT.

Now to the failures: India, Israel and Pakistan never joined the NPT but acquired nuclear weapons. North Korea withdrew from the treaty and Iraq, Libya and North Korea have breached their obligations as parties to the treaty. Many fear that Iran is intent to do the same.

A failure of great magnitude is also that 37 years after the entry into force of the NPT and some 17 years after the end of the Cold War the five nuclear weapon states parties, even though reducing the number of warheads, do not appear to take seriously their obligation to negotiate toward disarmament. Many NNWS feel simply cheated.

The view is gathering support that in order to prevent further proliferation, the nuclear weapon states need to take decisive steps toward disarmament. The UK and U.S. plans to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons show a risky double standard. Preaching nonproliferation may not be successful if accompanied by the development of new weapons.
What does the Commission propose?

The Commission places highest on the list of priorities the ratifications necessary to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996.

A partial test ban treaty was concluded early during the Cold War. While it did not stop testing underground and underwater it did save the world from further radioactive fallout from weapons tests.

It took the world several decades to negotiate a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests and it has been an immense disappointment that when, at last it was achieved, the treaty was rejected by the United States Senate although it had been signed by the Clinton administration.

The WMDC urges the USA to reconsider the treaty. Ratification by the U.S. would in all likelihood lead to ratification by a number of other states and lead to the entry into force of the treaty, creating a strong legal barrier against any further nuclear weapons tests in the world.

If, on the other hand, the treaty were seen to lapse, there would be an increased risk that some nuclear or would-be nuclear weapon states might restart weapons tests, as we have seen North Korea do.

Second on the list of priorities, the Commission places the negotiation of the long discussed treaty containing a verified prohibition of the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for weapons purposes – a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The combination of a reduction in existing nuclear weapons and a verified closing of the tap for more weapons fissile material would gradually reduce the world inventory of bombs.

The Commission recommends many other measures.

Some aim to reduce the risk of a use of nuclear weapons:

Nuclear weapon states should review the role of their weapons in their national security doctrines.

Nuclear weapon states should consider how they can manage their future defense needs without these weapons – as the rest of the world’s countries must do. Reduce the range of permissible use.

Nuclear weapon states should take all weapons off hair trigger alert to reduce the risk of launchings by error and misunderstandings.

Nuclear weapon states should revert to the policy of non-first use.

Some recommendations aim to reduce deployment and number of weapons

The U.S. and Russia, which have by far the largest arsenals, should take the lead in reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from European to U.S. territory and Russian nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from forward deployment to central storages. With increasing cooperation between Russia and EU there is no justification for the current deployment.
Some recommendations seek to reduce the risk of further proliferation – to states and non-state actors. For instance:

Measures to reduce the risk of trafficking in nuclear materials, such as enriched uranium, plutonium or radioactive substances.

Measures to strengthen national export controls on nuclear equipment and materials. The ease with which Mr. Khan of Pakistan succeeded to export of centrifuge technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea shocked the world and made it understand that export controls were essential everywhere and that it was not enough to have them in the industrially advanced countries.

The acceptance by individual states of the Additional Protocol of the IAEA on safeguards inspection, enhancing considerably the capability of the Agency to detect any undeclared nuclear activities.

Let me turn, lastly to the Commission’s discussion of problems related to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) – generally and in the cases of Korea and the Middle East.

It is expected that the use of nuclear power will increase in the world, as it is capable of generating vast amounts of energy without contributing much of the green-house gas carbon-dioxide. With more enrichment of uranium for nuclear fuel there may be a risk that plants will be used not only to produce low enriched fuel but also highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons.

A number of schemes have been advanced to tackle the issue.

The U.S. has devised a very ambitious project under which a few states would become the sole ‘fuel cycle states’, responsible for producing all nuclear fuel and renting to other states (a nuclear fuel OPEC?). Russia has suggested the establishment of international fuel cycle centers and offered to host one.

Other schemes suggest the creation of some common international institution or arrangement to give assurances to NNWS about the safe supply of fuel and, thereby, to persuade them to refrain from building fuel cycle facilities of their own.

The Commission suggests that these questions, which are important but hardly burning, be considered by states within the IAEA. It does, however, discuss the issue as related to Korea and the Middle East.

The two Korean states chose already in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1992 to commit themselves not to have fuel cycle installations on their territories. This was, no doubt, prompted by a concern that in the Korean environment any nuclear fuel cycle activity could raise suspicions.

It is of interest to keep this Korean arrangement in mind, when we consider the Middle East and the problems relating to Iran.

For the Middle East there have long existed proposals for agreement on a zone free of nuclear weapons or free of all weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The Commission endorses these plans accepted in principle by all states in the region. However, devising such an agreement is hardly possible until a peace settlement is being prepared.

We must note, however, that Iran’s enrichment of uranium has already created a great deal of suspicion that the country aims to make a nuclear weapon.

In this already tense climate several states in the region, including the Gulf States, Jordan and Egypt, have announced their intentions to develop nuclear power. It is not known whether these states would want to have their own facilities to enrich uranium, but it is a fact that Israel is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

The Commission raises the question whether arrangements along the lines agreed between the Korean states could be adopted for the Middle East. Like the Korean peninsula the Middle East is a particularly sensitive region, where nuclear fuel cycle activities – even if well inspected – might raise suspicions.

Would it be possible, against that background, for all the states in the region – including Iran and Israel – to commit to a verified renunciation of all fuel cycle activities – such as enrichment and reprocessing – for a prolonged period of time, while obtaining assurances about the supply of fuel needed for any civilian nuclear power.

In such a scheme Iran would be only one of several states that refrained from exercising their right under the NPT to enrich uranium. While Israel’s nuclear weapons would not be affected the country would have to forego any further reprocessing to make weapons grade and would have to accept international verification.

What prospects are there currently for proposals, like those of the Commission, on arms control and disarmament?

One year after we first published our Report, there are some modest signs that the negative tide is turning.

The excessive faith in military means to prevent proliferation has been weakened by the Iraq experience.

Very encouraging is that on 4 January an article was published in the Wall Street Journal by former US Secretaries of State Kissinger and Shultz, former Secretary of Defense Mr. Perry and former Senator Nunn advocating nuclear disarmament. A number of well known figures in the U.S. political world support the article.

I must conclude, however, that it will require much effort by civic organizations, analysts, media and, indeed, by many governments to move arms control and disarmament back on an agenda and lead the world out of the continued costly, dangerous and unnecessary retention of WMD. The United States and Russia should take the lead.
3. INF TREATY: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY

Alexei ARBATOV

Of late, representatives of Russia’s highest political and military leadership have been again and again referring to the option of the unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) signed by the USA and the USSR in 1987.

Given probable military-strategic, economic, financial, and political consequences of such a move, one should scrutinize closely all the ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ arguments.

The INF Treaty constitutes one of the few key conventions in the field of nuclear disarmament still in force despite the Bush administration’s actions to dismantle the system of international disarmament treaties. This policy is under rising criticism both inside and outside the USA and will probably be reconsidered following the 2008 U.S. presidential elections.

Retrospective view

The INF Treaty is rooted in the opposition to the deployment of U. S. medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) Pershing II with a range of up to 1800 km and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with a range of up to 2500 km, armed with nuclear warheads, in many European NATO states at the beginning of the 1980s. It was argued that the Pershing-2 and GLBM programs had been a response to the deployment of the Soviet RSD-10 IRBMs (SS-20, according to the NATO’s classification) with multiple warheads at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s.

The Soviet IRBMs were not capable of reaching the U. S. territory. Conversely, Pershing II missiles, based in Western Germany, at its maximum range could deliver nuclear warheads as far as the Moscow region.
As for GLCMs, they could deliver warheads up to the Ural Mountains. More importantly, IRBMs flying time to Moscow was approximately two times less than that of ICBMs launched from the U.S. territory. Subsonic GLCMs were much slower than Pershing II: they took several hours to reach the Soviet territory. But their flying altitude was very low and it was even more difficult to detect them by radars due to their technical characteristics.

That is why Moscow was eager to ban above-mentioned missiles by concluding a special treaty. Washington, in its turn, was in no hurry to reach agreement, but was under strong pressure from its NATO allies, which were apprehensive of a nuclear confrontation on the European continent.

After five years of complicated, sometimes disrupted, negotiations the USSR and the USA were able to conclude a treaty of unlimited duration eliminating completely three classes of missiles – two classes of ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

Actually the absolutely closed totalitarian political system of the USSR played a bad joke on the Soviet leadership. Soviet generals were trying to get a maximum gain from the campaign highlighting the threat to Russia’s national security and the need to increase spending on military programs. But by stressing the short flying time of American missiles they overplayed their hand and frightened the Communist party gerontocracy. (It was argued, that missiles’ flying time of 6-7 minutes left no time for the Soviet leadership not only to decide on the retaliatory action but even to take shelter in underground or air-based command posts).

Besides, the two sides pursued asymmetrical objectives in reaching the agreement since weapon systems under negotiations constituted a direct threat to the USSR, but not to the USA. Finally, so long as Moscow insisted on the elimination of all American missiles of the above-mentioned three classes it had to concede reluctantly to the American demand on the liquidation of all Soviet weapon systems of similar classes. But this created another problem, as the INF Treaty required elimination of 1839 Soviet missiles and only 859 US missiles. Since the Soviet military-industrial complex operated under very week political control the USSR had usually produced more weapons than the country needed.

The Soviet Union also had to eliminate 200 modern and sophisticated tactical missiles OTR-23 (‘Oka’) with slightly less tested range than negotiated limits under the INF Treaty (500-1000 km for short-range missiles and 1000-5500 km for medium-range missiles). Designers of ‘Oka’ have not forgiven the last Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for that concession. However, the deal was not too unfair: the Soviet Union gave up the OTR-23 in exchange for the liquidation of ‘Pershing I’ that could reach the Kaliningrad oblast from its bases in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Also, the USA cancelled ground-based ‘Lance
II’ tactical missiles and ‘SRAM II’ air-to-ground tactical missiles that could hit targets on the territory of Soviet allies – members of the Warsaw Pact – using ground bases in the FRG or from the aircraft. Recently, Russian military designers and engineers have had their revenge for the liquidation of the OTR-23. They have developed a new tactical dual-purpose missile system that came into service in 2007. For some unknown reason the new missile system was given a Turkish name – Iskander\(^1\).

**Motivation for the withdrawal from the INF Treaty**

The Treaty’s objectives were achieved in due time. The Treaty remains in force. However, recently the democratic and capitalist Russia, the legal successor of the totalitarian and communist Soviet Union, has raised the possibility of its withdrawal from this treaty. Art. XV.2 stipulates that each party shall have the right to withdraw from it (giving notice of such withdrawal six months in advance) if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

To begin with, there is no clarity regarding the nature of the threat to Russian ‘supreme interests’. President V. V. Putin in his speech in Munich on 2 February 2007 made the point that some countries had deployed IRBMs (Iran, Pakistan, India, China, North and South Koreas), while only Russia and the USA are banned from possessing missiles of similar class. Former Defense Minister and now First Deputy Prime Minister S. Ivanov referred to this thesis on several occasions. In his turn, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, four-star General Yuri Baluevski\(\dot{y}\) some time later linked the probability of Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty to the US plans to install elements of the American BMD system in the Czech Republic and Poland by 2012.

Leaving aside for the time being the substance of these arguments one may note that they are disconnected and differ greatly one from another. They do not clarify the motivations for such a serious departure from the established policy as quitting one of the few remaining key treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament.

One starts to ponder involuntarily whether it is appropriate for various governmental agencies and high officials of the newly created ‘executive power vertical’ to express so different ideas on such crucial subject as Russian ‘supreme interests’ since only the emergence of the threat to these interests may justify the scrapping of the INF Treaty.

---

Missile threat from third states

In many cases the production of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles by third states is not their final goal but a natural interim stage on the way to developing technology for ICBM and obtaining the ability to launch outer space satellites. However, it is quite possible that some states would not proceed with the development of long-range missiles taking into account their defense priorities or economic and technological resources.

Already some 40 states possess BMs of various classes. Five states (the USA, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, and China) have ICBMs and seven states (China, India, Israel, Iran, DPRK, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) – IRBMs (with a range of 1000–5500 km). The remaining states possess operational-tactical missiles with a range of less than 1000 km. Among those states it is appropriate to single out (in addition to the above-mentioned states) Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Turkey and South Korea, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Previously, Iraq also belonged to this category.2

IRBMs of the seven states possessing missiles equipped with nuclear warheads (among them China, India, Israel and Pakistan) are capable of reaching Russian territory whereas China, DPRK, and Turkey theoretically can hit Russia with shorter-range missiles.

In principle this situation could be considered a threat as some listed countries are far from being Russia’s allies or reliable partners. Some other states are unstable and unpredictable in their domestic political situation. A strategy of military (including nuclear) deterrence can be applied by creating reliable threat of devastating retaliation in response to a missile attack from these states. But some states (particularly those under a dictatorial regime) could be prepared to suffer huge material and human losses. Thus, the threat of retaliation cannot provide a reliable deterrence in regard to them. Therefore a threatened state might need to avail itself of air- and missile defenses and/or the capability to inflict a disarming strike with nuclear or high-precision conventional munitions to discourage those states from contemplating a missile attack. However, the question arises: what instruments Russia should use to secure the retaliatory or preemptive strike capability. Would IRBMs be optimal tools to accomplish this mission? Would the relevant Russia’s armament program justify the withdrawal from the 1987 Treaty?

Russia, according to high officials, is not intending to be drawn in ‘a missile for missile’ competition with the USA at the strategic level. Mos-

---

cow, if forced, envisages responding to the US moves in an asymmetric way. In these circumstances it would be even stranger to begin a competition with other states in building up IRBMs.

If the threat from their missiles is perceived as serious, Russia has the option to respond to it by taking more effective and cheaper asymmetric measures (even more successfully than in relation to the USA). Means to accomplish the mission are abundant: ICBMs, which can fly at shorter trajectories over medium-range distances; SLBMs; medium and heavy bombers with payload of bombs and cruise missiles equipped with nuclear and conventional warheads. Tactical air forces equipped with nuclear bombs can be used to cope with nearby targets. Naval missiles on ships and submarines armed with nuclear or conventional munitions are appropriate tools for countering threats from coastal states.

In sum, the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF) possesses currently 741 delivery vehicles and 3281 warheads in actual deployment. At least half of them can be targeted at sites in Eurasia. Data on sub-strategic nuclear weapon systems (intermediate-range and shorter-range, operational-tactical) are classified. According to non-official estimates, 2000–3000 sub-strategic (tactical) nuclear warheads can be considered as operationally deployed. At least a third of them are likely to be capable of hitting targets in the regions adjacent to the Russian territory.

In case of need it would be quite possible (at a lesser cost than developing a new IRBM) to deploy several additional regiments of ICBMs Topol-M or to design high-precision conventional warheads for existing BMs and CMs, which are not banned by the INF Treaty.

The Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, 2002) does not limit the deployment of Topol-M with a single warhead or multiple warheads (nuclear or conventional). The SORT’s ceilings for warheads (1700-2200 units) provide enough room for the deployment of this weapon system. Some problems could arise with regard to the 1991 START-1. In particular, the definition of ICBMs of new types and the limitation on the partial removal of the MIRVed warheads could pose problems. But the START-1, in all likelihood will not be extended in its original form beyond 2009. In any case it is likely that the parties would amend this treaty.

In September-October 2007 Russia together with the United States proposed at the United Nations to impart to a global character to the obligations set forth in the INF Treaty. The proposal is attractive as a goodwill gesture. However, as a precondition of Russia’s continued participation in the INF this move raises serious doubts both with regard to the substance

---

of the proposal and the likelihood of its acceptance by missile capable states.

First, the INF treaty deals foremost with Soviet and American nuclear delivery systems. Among other states possessing similar classes of missiles only five states have nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices: China, Israel, India, Pakistan and DPRK. All other states would, almost certainly consider such treaty as unfair, since it would deny them conventional delivery systems.

Second, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and DPRK are also certain to be skeptical as the acceptance of Moscow’s initiative would deprive them of most, if not all, nuclear delivery systems with a range over 500 km. At the same time Russia and the USA will continue to possess hundreds of ICBMs and SLBMs armed with thousands of nuclear warheads capable hitting targets both at intercontinental and medium-range distances.

Response to ballistic missile defense

The need to respond to the planned deployment of the BMD system in Europe including a radar station in the Czech Republic and a base of 10 missile-interceptors in Poland, is portrayed as a key argument in favor of abandoning the 1987 INF Treaty and bringing back IRBMs. First of all, Russia has not yet missiles for the interception by the US BMD to be stationed in the Czech Republic and Poland, except ICBMs, but the BMD in Eastern Europe would be extremely ineffective against these ICBMs. On the other hand, if Russia quits the INF Treaty and develops new IRBMs, in theory they could constitute targets for the US BMD in Europe. But in that case everything would depend on the numbers of missile-interceptors and their technical characteristics.

Apart from developing new IRBMs, another option to counter the US BMD in Europe is under discussion officially: the stationing of one unit of new operational-tactical missiles ‘Iskander’ in Kaliningrad special military district and other two-three units in the Northern Caucasus military district. It is asserted that the range of this missile system can be increased up to 500 km and more. ‘Iskander’ missiles will be able to hit the BMD bases in Georgia and Poland with nuclear and, probably, conventional warheads. Of course, the deployment of this weapon system would not be consistent with obligations assumed under the INF Treaty. At first glance, there is some military sense in the option in question. But if the issue is considered more closely from a logical strategic perspective this option appears to be irrational.

---

In theory the capability to attack BMD bases in Europe is a rational option, to prevent the interception of Russian ICBMs. It is implied that Russian ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads are to be launched in a retaliatory or preemptive manner (as is provided by Russia’s contemporary military doctrine) after the USA (NATO) have attacked the Russian territory with nuclear weapons. One wonders whether it makes sense under such hypothetical conditions (constituting nuclear engagement) to try to hit the BMD targets only with high-precision conventional munitions. It would be much easier, cheaper and more reliable to destroy these targets using strategic or tactical nuclear forces, mentioned above.

The impression is created that it is not the weapon system that is considered for performing a specific military missions, but, on the contrary, the ill-conceived mission is proposed as justifying the deployment of a new missile system. It may also be that such a mission is devised to conceal some purely political motivations for abandoning the INF Treaty.

Thus, the withdrawal from the INF Treaty would not provide an adequate response to the threat which the U.S. BMD in Europe may pose to Russia.

One should consider the issue of this threat and the response to it in a broader perspective. First of all, Russian ICBMs ‘Topol-M’ can be targeted on the BMD sites in Europe in case of need. This has been officially acknowledged by the High Command of the Russian SNF.

By the way, even a medium-range test-flight of ICBM at a medium-range distance would not formally violate the INF Treaty. According to Art. VII, the range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested.

In future if the USA proceed with building up its BMD in Europe and elsewhere the need may arise to carry out a broad range of asymmetrical counter measures starting with steps to strengthen the ability of the Russian SNF to overcome BMD and concluding with various systems designed to hit directly BMD assets, including their ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based echelons.

BMD or IRBM?

Another, non-official, argument against the BMD in Europe is worth mentioning. American missile-interceptors with a range up to 4000 km can be used as offensive medium-range missiles, particularly because they are silo-based. In this respect Art. VII. 3 of the INF Treaty directly stipulates that if a IRBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply. In other
words, ground-based interceptors (GBI) do not violate the INF Treaty. Modern strategic anti-missiles are also silos-based (including those in Russia). On the contrary, IRBMs have been already based on ground mobile vehicles since the 1970-1980s and will most probably use the same type of delivery vehicles in future if the INF Treaty ceases to operate.

Sober view on U. S. plans for missile defense in Europe: no need to abandon the INF Treaty

The symbolic military-political punishment of those Europeans states that currently promote the U. S. BMD in Europe or can do it in future may constitute the only argument in favor of Russia’s move to abandon the INF Treaty and revamp IRBM programs. But we believe that possible positive effects of such a move will be outweighed by a number of negative consequences for Russia’s security and international stability. We would like to offer five major arguments in favor of this view.

First. Poland and the Czech Republic may like to please Russia and to gain favor with the USA. But it should be kept in mind that the USA is behind the drive to install the BMD in general and in Europe in particular. If Moscow revives IRBM projects after the annulment of the INF Treaty, Russian IRBMs would target Europe and Asia, not the USA, because they can not reach the American territory. That’s too much as an asymmetrical response: to ‘punish’ for U. S. policy Germany, France, Italy and other European states, which maintain good relations with Russia and do not advocate the BMD deployment.

Quitting the SORT (2002) would be a more fitting response both from the political and military perspective. In defiance of the initial Russian-American arrangement Washington went back on its commitment to come to an agreement with Russia on counting rules for warheads on strategic vehicles, as well as on verification measures and elimination procedures. Moreover, U.S. plans for the BMD deployment in Europe are not compatible with the spirit of the Moscow declaration signed in connection with the SORT.

Second. Research, development, testing, production and deployment of a new IRBM system would require huge funds. Probably, it’s what some military-industrial corporations are seeking. But to recall a famous Lomonosov’s formula – ‘if something somewhere is added, something diminishes in some other place’. In other words, other programs would suffer, those related to the SNF development, or technical improvement of conventional forces, or raising standards of living for military personnel, or transition to the contract system, or housing construction for military personnel, or increasing standards of combat readiness.
All these expenditure items are much more important to the country’s security than IRBMs. In case additional funds become available, it would be better to use them, for instance, for the expansion of the Topol-M deployment from 5-6 units to at least 10-20 units per year. Moreover, this missile system is capable of accomplishing all IRBM missions and at the same time such a move would strengthen strategic deterrence.

Third. In a chess game a quality of any chess player is judged by his ability to anticipate moves of the opponent: the more moves and options a chess player can calculate – the higher quality he has as a player. In the case of the deployment of Russian IRBMs in the European part of the country (if installed in Asia they would target China, and that would be a too exotic move), the other side would be likely to take countermeasures. One could expect the revival of the cruise missile and Pershing-2 programs or the emergence of new, more advanced U.S. IRBM systems and their stationing in Europe. New NATO members might welcome such developments enthusiastically.

The IRBM deployment in the beginning of the 1980s was perceived by the Soviet Union as an enormous threat. With the revival of the IRBM threat to its security Russia would face much more severe challenges. The current balance of nuclear and conventional forces is much less favorable to Russia. One should also take into account the changes in the configuration of the military alliances and the new geostrategic situation.

In the 1980s Pershing II missiles could hardly reach the Moscow region. At present, similar missiles, being deployed on the territory of new NATO states would be able to hit the whole European Russia up to the Ural Mountains and even far beyond them. That would pose a real threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear potential compared to the BMD deployment in the Czech Republic and Poland. In addition, such developments could force Moscow to completely restructure the SNF, its warning and command systems and increase defense expenditures.

Fourth. Russia’s move to withdraw from the INF Treaty would strengthen NATO’s cohesion on an anti-Russian basis, including such issues as NATO expansion to the post-Soviet space, increasing military spending and coordination of development of offensive and defensive weapons, and, possibly, BMD development.

Fifth. Washington’s efforts to dismantle the system of nuclear disarmament conventions are currently under severe criticism on the part of the majority of the UN member states, above all states parties to the NPT. The ABM Treaty, CTBT, START II, START III framework agreement, the Agreement to delineate strategic and tactical BMD, FMCT and similar arrangements have fallen victim to this policy.

The withdrawal from the INF Treaty would inevitably make Russia ‘a scapegoat’, guilty of undermining international security. A more favor-
able international environment would be created for the U. S. administration to pursue its current policy. Moreover, the NPT regime would be further undermined. Russia’s move would be seen as a direct violation of NWS’s obligations on nuclear disarmament assumed under Art. VI of the NPT. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would undermine Russia’s national security since the areas of instability are situated much closer to its territory than to the territory of the USA and its European allies.

Apparently, for some above-mentioned reasons Pentagon has responded absolutely calmly to the probing statements of Russian officials on the INF issue. It is likely that the current U.S. administration would even secretly welcome Russia’s move.

Let us hope that the arguments cited above will be considered carefully by the authorities before making up their mind on the INF Treaty.
4. GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Alexandre KALIADINE

Act of nuclear terrorism is an offence linked to the illegal acquisition, possession and use of nuclear or other radioactive materials\(^1\) by non-state entities\(^2\) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or the environment in order to intimidate population, state authorities or an international organization. The greatest direct threat for the foreseeable future stems from the possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to nuclear explosive devices or nuclear materials.

Civilian nuclear facilities have been frequently threatened by terrorists. (A successful attack on a civilian nuclear power reactor could have an impact similar to the Chernobyl accident). In 1995 Chechen a package containing radioactive caesium was deliberately left by Chechen terrorists in one of the Moscow parks. After the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the U. S. forces found documentation, including radiological bomb designs, at an al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul\(^3\).

---

\(^1\) According to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, ‘radioactive material’ means nuclear material or other radioactive substances which contain nuclides which undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by emissions of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron particles or gamma rays) and which may, owing to their radiological or fissile properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or the environment. ‘Nuclear material’ means plutonium and uranium, enriched in the isotope 235 or 233.

\(^2\) UNSCR 1540 defines non-state actor as individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any state in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. UNSCR 1540 deals with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

It was documented that a Japanese religious sect Aum-Sinrike attempted to acquire fissile and radiological materials (in particular in the Republics of the former Soviet Union).

The 11 September 2001 coordinated suicide attacks upon the USA by al-Qaeda (often referred to as 9/11) have made a deep impact on general perception of the terrorist threat by the world public and enhanced concern over the possibilities of the terrorist use of nuclear means of mass destruction. It is true that attacks themselves on that date did not involve the use of nuclear devices or materials. However, those who planned the 9/11 originally considered the option of attacking a nuclear facility, though finally dropped this target.

‘The 9/11 phenomenon’ has heralded the emergence of non-governmental actors, including militant suicide bombers, possessing considerable financial and material resources and willing to commit most bloody offences against humanity involving the use of mass destruction weapons.

**Risk-increasing factors**

Concerns over the physical security of nuclear weapons and fissile and radioactive material have grown due to a number of developments undermining international peace and stability. These include reports of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials; claims that terrorist groups are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and worries of the possibility of terrorist attacks at civilian nuclear facilities.

Transnational terrorist nets, black market operators and traffickers are getting better equipped technically. Globalization has exposed nations to new risks such as the potential use for terrorists to exploit cyberspace.

Global civilian and military stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) each consists of nearly 2000 metric tons (plutonium – 1855; HEU – 1900). The growing stocks of radioactive materials are held under various systems of control and accounting, not always well protected from theft and abuse.

The total of both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons is estimated to be close to of 27 000. Some 12 000 remain in active service (deployed).

Russia and USA, and also Great Britain, China and France possess considerable stocks of the nuclear warheads and fissile material. In addition, at least four states - Israel, India, Pakistan and Northern Korea have mastered nuclear weapon technology.

---


5 Ibid. p. 36.
The disintegration of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process feeds the trend towards proliferation of nuclear weapons not only to new states, but also to non-state entities and raise the danger of terrorist use of nuclear explosive devices and nuclear materials.

According to the estimate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\(^6\), approximately 30 additional states, including unstable ones exposed to high level of terrorist activity, can in a relatively short time acquire nuclear weapons, if dissemination of potentially dangerous nuclear technologies is not placed under effective international control.

Renewed interest in nuclear energy is leading to the stockpiling of increasing quantities of spent nuclear fuel around the world, including the countries not possessing sufficient expertise in handling such materials and vulnerable terrorism\(^7\).

Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, the Persian Gulf states, Indonesia and some other states, which have difficulties in managing problems posed by terrorist groups, announced plans to build nuclear power facilities.

The trend toward the erosion of governance, in particular in the security sector, in some regions is a most disturbing development. The world community has recently been confronted with the phenomenon of failed states, incapable of adequately controlling their own territory and resources and of complying with nuclear nonproliferation obligations which make them critically vulnerable to nuclear terrorism.

An extensive area along the Pakistan – Afghani border is actually not under any governmental control. It would be a nightmare if supporters of the Taliban and religious fanatics come into power in the neighboring nuclear Pakistan torn by internal strife.

It is appropriate to note that problems of safety and security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and the prevention of their trafficking are not fully resolved in stable states, either. In the year 2006 alone the IAEA registered 252 reported cases of radioactive materials that were stolen, missing, smuggled or in the possession of unauthorized individuals – a 385 percent increase since 2000. Of the 252 cases, about 85 involved thefts or losses and all material was suitable for use in a weapon\(^8\).

Thus, a number of trends lead to the broadening of the composition of potential users of nuclear and other radioactive materials. In the future

\[^6\] The IAEA is endowed by its status to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy and ensure that nuclear activities are not used to further any military purpose.

\[^7\] Global stocks of non-processed spent nuclear fuel amount to 165 000 tones. Geographically they are distributed in the following way: the USA – 53 %, Western Europe – 23 %, Eastern Europe – 8 %, Asia and Pacific region – 15 %. Annually 12 tones of spent fuel are unloaded from nuclear reactors, 800 – from the Russian ones. According to the experts’ forecasts, in a decade the quantity of non-processed spent fuel in the world will increase approximately twice. <http://www.tvel.com.ua/news/1543> (accessed April 17, 2007).

\[^8\] International Herald Tribune. 2007. 29 November. (Paris).
the world community may face not only spontaneous criminal elements or
gangs of non-professionals, but also well organized terrorist groups capa-
ble of dealing sudden and extremely painful blows at world civilization
centers.

These alarming trends underline the urgency of bringing to light and
of neutralizing terrorist groups seeking nuclear means of mass destruction
and of developing relevant national and international capabilities to pre-
vent them from gaining access to nuclear explosive devices or fissile ma-
terial. To achieve this, much more intensive and broad preventive meas-
ures are urgently needed to maintain fully effective accounting and control
of all stocks of fissile and radioactive material and other radiological
sources worldwide.

Shaping effective global strategy

Of late, a number of international legal instruments on various as-
pects of combating nuclear terrorism have been worked out under the aus-
pices of the UN system.

The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism. On 13 April 2006 the UN General Assembly at its 91st plenary
meeting adopted by consensus this basic document in the sphere of global
nuclear security9. The Convention was open for signing on 14 September

The Convention has been elaborated within the UN framework on the
initiative of the Russian Federation. It has become the first legal counter-
terrorism instrument adopted by the international community preemptively
that is before an act of nuclear terrorism occurred. The Convention is the
first universal treaty specifically designed to prevent terrorist acts involv-
ing WMD. Its purpose is to create legal frameworks for effectively coun-
tering acts of nuclear terrorism, for their prevention and suppression and
to provide antiterrorist protection both for peaceful and military atom.
This international treaty provides for areas of broad cooperation between
states for the purpose of detecting, preventing, suppressing and investigat-
ing acts of nuclear terrorism. The Convention serves not only to combat
international terrorism but also to consolidate the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.

The Convention identifies actions by individuals (or groups) that are to
be considered as criminal offences and requires states to develop the meas-
ures necessary to establish those offences under its national law and to
make them ‘punishable by appropriate penalties’ that take into account their

---

9 UN document A/RES/59/290.
grave nature. Focusing on the prevention of the use of radioactive materials for terrorist purposes, it contains a detailed list of the acts (by individuals or groups of persons), which are qualified as criminal offences (Art. 2).

One should stress, in particular, the significance of provisions designed to ensure the inevitability of the punishment for these offences: any person who participates in nuclear terrorist acts is to be brought to justice on the basis of the principle aut dedere aut judicature (‘either extradite or prosecute’). Under this principle the parties to the Convention are required to take measures in accordance with their national legislation to punish the offenders. Under Art. 14 states parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of offences set forth in Art. 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

By 7 July 2007 (that is on the date of the Convention’s entry into force) 115 states signed the treaty and 22 states ratified it.

By closing the gaps in the sensitive sphere of global security the Convention laid the legal foundation for successful struggle for the prevention and liquidation of nuclear terrorism.

At the same time, the international legal and judicial procedural framework of combating the threat of nuclear terrorism is still in the formative phase. It is pertinent in this connection to note that the following name ‘international convention on the prevention and elimination of nuclear terrorism and the struggle against it’ would have adequately answered the purpose of suppressing nuclear terrorism by exposing more precisely the document’s logic, its orientation not only towards forestalling and suppression of individual nuclear terrorist acts and overcoming their after-effects, but also towards total eradication of this evil.

The world community has not yet come to deeply grasp the extent of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Less than 30 states have ratified the Convention (that is only 15 % of the UN membership). Thus, it is still far from gaining universality. To all appearance in a number of states the general recognition of the threat of nuclear terrorism by the UNO has not yet been transformed into the understanding that it directly affects their own security.

The interstate interaction in this area is not developing smoothly, as has been demonstrated by the British-Russian diplomatic conflict over the so called “Litvinenko case”.

On 23 November 2006 Alexander Litvinenko, a former employee of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSS) died in one of the London hospitals. The British authorities declared that the death was caused by radioactive Polonium-210 and accused Russian businessman Andrei Lugovoy in poisoning Litvinenko. In the beginning of November Lugo-
voy who had met the latter in the bar of Millennium Hotel to discuss some affairs. The British investigators alleged that there Litvinenko received a fatal dose of Polonium 210. (Its origin has not been determined). London demanded to extradite Lugovoy. Moscow turned down this demand pointing out that the Russian Constitution prohibits extradition of Russian citizens. At the same time the Russian procurator’s office indicated its willingness to cooperate with the British investigating institutions and proposed to conduct criminal proceedings against Lugovoy if it is provided with documents proving his guilt. However, such documents have not apparently been provided and the cooperation in investigating this crime was not pursued. On 16 July 2007 the British Foreign Office announced the expulsion of four Russian diplomats, the introduction of other diplomatic sanctions and termination of cooperation with Russia in the counter-terrorist field. Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs responded ‘symmetrically’.

It remains unclear as yet whether Litvinenko became a victim of a criminal plot or of careless handling of smuggled radioactive substances. (According to one of the versions Litvinenko death was the result of the latter’s participation in attempts to fabricate ‘a dirty bomb’, a radiological explosive device).

No matter how one qualifies this tragic episode from a formal point of view, one cannot overlook the evidence relating to illicit and deliberate acquisition, transportation and use of radioactive materials, that is to criminal acts containing essential elements of corpus delicti of the offence of nuclear terrorism.

This diplomatic conflict has resulted in the suspension of the bilateral British-Russian interaction on matters of combating international terrorism and in general worsening of bilateral relations.

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The UN General Assembly adopted the Strategy by consensus on 8 September 2006. The Strategy is in the form of a resolution with an annexed plan of action. This plan includes the following basic elements: I. Measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; II. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; III. Measures to build the states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; IV. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

In particular, the UNGA recommends the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to continue its efforts in helping states to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear or other radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities and to respond effectively

\[10\text{ UN document A/RES/60/288.}\]
in the event of attack using such materials. States are urged to step-up na-
tional efforts and bilateral, regional and international cooperation to im-
prove border and customs control, in order to prevent and detect the
movement of terrorists and prevent and detect the illicit traffic in, inter
alias, radiological weapons and materials.

The United Nations is invited to improve coordination in planning
a response to a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological weapons or
materials, in particular by reviewing and improving the effectiveness of
the existing intra-agency coordination mechanisms for assistance delivery,
relief operations and victim support so that all states can receive adequate
assistance. In this regard the General Assembly and the Security Council
are invited to develop guidelines for the necessary cooperation and assis-
tance in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction.

Member states, the UNO, other relevant international, regional and
subregional organizations that deal with countering terrorism are urged to
assist in implementing the Strategy, including by mobilizing resources and
specialists.

The UNGA decided to examine in two years progress made in the
implementation of the Strategy and to consider updating it to respond to
changes, recognizing that many of the measures contained in the Strategy
can be achieved immediately, some will require sustained work through
the coming years and some should be tested as long term objectives. With
this Strategy the General Assembly has concretely reaffirmed and en-
hanced its role in countering terrorism, including its nuclear mode. Its
adoption has indicated progress in the perception of the threat of nuclear
terrorism by the international community.

Resolution 1540 of UN Security Council. As the principle organ of
the United Nations invested with primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security the Council is empowered to ad-
dress the full range of security threats posed by nuclear terrorism. The
Council is the only international body with a legal writ to serve as the ul-
timate enforcement authority of the world community. Under Chapter VII
of the UN Chapter (Art. 25) states are obliged to accept and carry out its
decisions. To give affect to them the Council is authorize to take action
‘as it deems necessary’. Of special importance is the Security Council’s
adoption of resolution 1540 in April 2004. In this resolution the Security
Council affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security and points out with grave concern that the threat
of illicit trafficking in such weapons and related materials adds a new di-
mension to the issue of proliferation and also poses a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.
In order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge the Council decided that all UN member states should adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery in particular for terrorist purposes\(^{11}\). Moreover, the resolution established machinery to supervise the implementation of the required measures: the Committee of the Security Council (Committee 1540) was established (initially for a period of two years, later extended) to report to the UNSC for its examination on the implementation of this resolution. States were called upon to report no later than six months from the adoption of the resolution on steps they had taken to implement it. The submission of national reports contributed to the development of respective national laws as well as to the formation of international machinery for monitoring national nonproliferation regimes, in particular, export controls, monitoring and verification by the UNO, IAEA and other relevant international organizations\(^{12}\). Sustained implementation of the provisions of Resolution 1540, regular reviews of its compliance record and exchange of experience would strengthen the UN role in deterring terrorist acts with the use of mass destruction weapons. The resolution may serve as a model for subsequent UNSC actions conducive to building up its capacity to enforce nonproliferation rules covering non-state entities.

On 27 April 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1673, which extended for two years the mandate of the Committee 1540 (until 27 April 2008). The UNSC decided that Committee 1540 should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all states of Resolution 1540 through an appropriate work program. In particular, the Council encourages the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between Committee 1540 and states on the full implementation of Resolution 1540, including on further actions needed from states to this end. The Council also invited Committee 1540 to explore with states and international, regional and subregional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learnt in the areas covered by the Resolution 1540. Much has been done in this area but a lot is still to be done.

The adoption of unified global norms for the punishment of companies and individuals guilty of offences posing a threat of nuclear terrorism (as crimes against humanity) stands as an important task.

A logical next step after adoption of resolutions 1540 and 1673 would be to strengthen Committee 1540 established to collect and evaluate state reports documenting their implementation of national nonproliferation legislation and remedy existing deficiencies. The Committee

---

\(^{11}\) UN document S/RES/1540 (2004).

should be bolstered with an executive director and a staff directorate to manage reporting and to strengthen the ability of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation and public awareness.

The effective exercise of the Security Council’s broad powers is of utmost importance for containing the risk of the use of materials and weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes. The Security Council may inter alia require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, inspection and verification; require member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation of specific rules or measures; and decide on the use of economic sanctions or military enforcement measures. However, it is especially important that binding decisions are preceded by consultations to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the UN and will be accepted and respected. It should be noted that some states members are doubtful about the need to extend the UNSC’s role to law-making in the areas of nonproliferation and combating nuclear terrorism.

The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) opened for signature on 3 Mar. 1980 and entered into force on 8 Feb. 1987. In July 2005 the Diplomatic IAEA Conference on the Review of the Convention adopted a set of amendments to the Convention strengthening the security provisions of the Convention and significantly extending its sphere of application. The name of the convention was changed to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. The amended convention obliges states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport (not only while in international transport but also within the territories of the states parties). The amended CPPNM establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of domestic offences linked to nuclear material. It also envisages expanded international cooperation in order to speed up the location and recovery of stolen or smuggled nuclear material and to reduce the impact of acts of sabotage.

The amended Convention forms one part of a nuclear security framework that also includes published technical standards that can be used by operators on a voluntary basis and non-legally binding codes and guidelines that have been endorsed by states.

The IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004) contains safety and security standards as well as guidelines that indicate how to meet some of these standards. Any state may apply the standards contained in the Code of Conduct and its widespread use would promote consistent international approaches to radiation protection, safety and security.
The implementation of the Code of Conduct by the states is called upon to contribute to the affirmation of the sustained international approaches to the problem of safety and security of nuclear materials.

The IAEA prepared a number of working papers and adopted several resolutions on measures specifically directed against nuclear terrorism. Since 2006 the IAEA is engaged in implementing the three-year plan of measures in the nuclear security and safety field. The IAEA activities cover such areas as elaboration of physical safety standards, accounting and control of nuclear materials, rendering assistance to states members in enhancing their nuclear security.

**Russian-American initiative**

The conventions and resolutions, mentioned above, have advanced legal frameworks for various multilateral bodies involved in facilitating the interaction of states in the field of the prevention of nuclear terrorism such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)\(^\text{13}\), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)\(^\text{14}\), the Global Partnership Program against the Spread of Weapons and materials of Mass Destruction\(^\text{15}\) and lately – the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

The decision to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear terrorism was taken jointly by the President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the President of the United States George Bush at their meeting held prior to the G8 St. Petersburg Summit in July 15-17, 2006. It was announced in the Joint Statement adopted on 15 July 2006\(^\text{16}\).

The two leaders called upon like-minded nations to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis by taking steps to improve participants capabilities to: ensure accounting, control and the physical

---

\(^{13}\) The NSG coordinates national export controls on nuclear materials. NSG members: 44 states.  
\(^{14}\) The PSI is an informal international arrangement currently involving some 80 states (including Russia) to carry out joint measures to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and its components. PSI documents state that partners in the PSI seek to create a coordinated and effective foundation for work in accordance with the relevant international rules and institutions, including the UN Security Council. As a part of this partnership’s work more than 20 training exercises in inspecting cargoes at borders, in airports and on board ships were conducted in 2003 – 2006 with the aim of improving each nation’ capacity to prevent the illicit transport of WMD and their components. The PSI possesses considerable potential for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.  
\(^{15}\) The GP Program was adopted at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002. It aims at contributing to the solution of tasks in the field of disarmament, WMD nonproliferation, nuclear security and combating terrorism.  
The Joint Statement emphasizes that the Global Initiative builds on international law and national legal authorities. The two presidents expressed willingness to work with all those who share their views to strengthen mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral cooperation to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism with a view to practical implementation of measures provided for in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other relevant international legal frameworks. Other important legal bases include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and the UNSCR 1540.

The first multilateral diplomatic meeting to discuss the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was held at Rabat (Morocco) on 30-31 October 2006. Beside delegates from 12 nations (the G8 states, Australia, China, Kazakhstan and Turkey), the IAEA attended the meeting as an observer.

The partner nations to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism agreed to explore possibilities of improving accounting of existing radioactive and nuclear materials and of establishing more effective mechanisms of detecting such materials to prevent trafficking in them. The meeting focused on establishing framework for future work. The participants adopted two basic documents – the Statement on Principles and the Terms of Reference for Implementation and Assessment.

The following principles have been agreed:
- develop, if necessary, and improve systems of physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and substances;
- strengthen physical safety of civilian nuclear facilities;
- improve capabilities to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and substances;
- improve capabilities of the Initiative’s participants to search for, confiscate and establish reliable control over unlawfully retained nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances and facilities using them;
- deny safe haven, economic and financial resources to the terrorists seeking to acquire and use nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;
- ensure sufficiency of the relevant national legal authority and norms to implement appropriate criminal and, if necessary, civilian responsibility in regard to terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;
- improve capabilities to respond, mitigate the consequences and investigate terrorist acts with the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances, including development of technical means for detecting nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances.

The second document states that the Initiative is open to other nations who are actively committed to combating nuclear terrorism. States are expected to confirm their participation in the Initiative by endorsing its Statement of Principles and sending a written endorsement to the Co-Chairs of the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) established by these terms of reference. Participating states are expected to perform specific activities based on voluntary participation in the Initiative as a whole and its separate components and on the individual responsibility of each participant for the steps taken within its jurisdiction. These activities may include encouraging other states to endorse the Statement of Principles; working to improve capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism; participating in or hosting expert-level scenario-based exercises to test capabilities, develop new operational concepts, and enhance preparedness, as well as expert-level workshops to share best practices and develop means for the rapid exchange of technical and operational information among participating states from relevant departments and ministries regarding progress in implementing the Statement of Principles in their respective area of responsibility; reviewing and, if necessary, strengthening their relevant national legal authorities to implement the Statement of Principles. The document contains the following proviso: none of the activities involves the military programs of the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. Either these activities meant to affect access to legitimate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The document outlines functions of the Implementation and Assessment Group. The IAG is an informal advisory body of partner nations, which is to coordinate and organize activities necessary for the implementation of the Initiative.

The initial IAG participants are Russia, the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Russia and the United States are the initial Co-Chairs of the IAG.

11-12 June 2007 Kazakhstan hosted in Astana the third meeting of representatives of partner nations. In addition to observers from the IAEA and the European Union nearly 40 states sent delegations. By June 2007
51 states endorsed the Statement of Principles for the Global Initiative. (Pakistan was the most recent nation joining other 50 nations in the partnership). The participants focused on fleshing out a plan of work extending in 2008. The identified priorities included participating nations ability to detect, search for and prevent trafficking in nuclear materials needed for bomb making and denying safe haven for terrorists or the financial resources they need to explode a weapon, known as the ‘dirty bomb’. Participants in Astana meeting discussed also how to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian nuclear facilities and considered the ways to develop appropriate national laws to prosecute illegal trafficking. Another focus was on timely sharing of intelligence information and expanded law enforcement cooperation, especially along borders.

The Global Initiative is an expanding multilateral partnership. Within one year the number of its participants increased five times. One should note the far-reaching cooperation projects covering interaction of law enforcement agencies, exchanges of intelligence information, in essence, envisaging the establishment of some sort of inter-agency partnerships. The Global Initiative has been instrumental in broadening the group of nations involved in the thorough discussion of the practical ways of preventing and suppressing nuclear terrorism and of building relevant capabilities.

The Global Initiative focuses on operative and technical issues related to suppressing acts of nuclear terrorism, including the protection of nuclear materials and facilities, responding to emergencies, etc. Of special importance is evolving bilateral cooperation between Russia and the USA within the framework of the Global Initiative in various areas (economic, political, law enforcement, intelligence, etc.)

It should be taken into consideration that the GI-partnership is still in its formative stage. Many contemplated measures are yet to be put into practice (expert-level scenario-base exercises, expert-level workshop to share best practices, rapid exchange of technical and operational information, regular reporting from relevant departments and ministries, participation of the private sector in the efforts to deny terrorists’ access to nuclear technologies, etc.).

Surprisingly, the founding documents of the Global Initiative do not contain provisions for establishing formal and operational link with the UN Security Council. Such decoupling is regrettable since some of the measures planned under the GI partnership may need to rely on the authority of the UNSC.

---

17 As of 10 October 2007, 62 states agreed to cooperate within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 60 states have officially notified Russia and the USA, Co-Chairs of the IAG, that they endorsed the Statement on Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
It is also odd that the GI-documents contain no reference (even in a general form) to the need to eliminate all existing stocks of nuclear weapons or to move forward in this direction and negotiate relevant bilateral (Russian-American) and multilateral (involving all the nuclear weapon states) treaties on nuclear disarmament. Such negotiations are critical since only general nuclear disarmament under effective international control would remove concerns over the possibility of nuclear warheads falling into the hands of terrorists.

**Assessments and initiatives originating from the expert community**

The prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism is a long-term transnational global challenge requiring cooperative approaches and concerted actions of the members of the world community.

A successful large-scale terrorist attack at a nuclear civilian facility would have affected many nations and most likely forced to review the role of the nuclear power in electricity generation.

Fortunately, terrorists have failed, till now, to break open barriers blocking up access to nuclear civilian facilities or nuclear means of mass destruction. Apparently, both improved material protection, control and accounting measures taken recently by states and international institutions and also, possibly, casual factors of luck have played their role.

The primary responsibility for the prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism lies with individual states. But national capabilities may be insufficient to address effectively this threat. Interaction of states in the sphere of ensuring national and global security acquires greater ever importance. The UN system and above all its main bodies – the Security Council and General Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency, closely linked to the UNO, as well as various multilateral informal partnerships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are playing critical roles in coordinating national efforts.

The evolving international legal regime in this sphere includes UNSCR 1540, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Initial steps have been made towards interaction of states in various delicate areas of nuclear security.

Nevertheless, international cooperation in combating nuclear terrorism remains a debatable subject in international relations. This process is affected by contradictions and disagreements existing between the participants in the global counter-terrorism coalition, above all, between nuclear weapon states, which hamper collective response. This sphere of world
policy is greatly influenced by interstate contradictions at times unrelated to specific issues of combating nuclear terrorism. Policies of mutual nuclear deterrence, as well as geopolitical rivalry continually reproduce suspicions and distrust hindering cooperation in combating nuclear terrorism.

Russian and American political elites are still far off from reaching accommodations on key issues of strategic stability directly related to the tasks of suppressing nuclear terrorism (further deep reductions of strategic offensive armaments, general nuclear disarmament, ballistic missile defense). These controversies are keeping up general negative background for cooperation on sensitive issues of common nuclear security.

The unity in the world community and the line for deepening interaction within the framework of global counter-terrorism coalition are being undermined by arbitrary uses of military force, by concepts aimed at tackling the matters through the isolation of one party or another, by imperial ambitions and attempts to use counter-terrorism rhetoric to topple unfriendly regimes and uphold unilateral political interests, etc.

Some actions of great powers look obviously counter-productive, wasteful and senseless from the perspective of countering nuclear terrorism (plans to deploy elements of the U.S. BMD system in Eastern Europe, resumed flights of Russian strategic bombers towards North Atlantic, the establishment of American military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, dismantling the conventional arms control regime in Europe, etc). At the same time such actions vividly demonstrate current priorities of the security policies of the great powers.

The differences of opinions on the methods of countering the threat of nuclear terrorism are reflected in Russian-American controversies about the ‘global strike’ concept envisaging attacks at suspected terrorist bases; about advantages of refitting some carriers of nuclear strategic offensive arms with conventional warheads. One may mention also different views on preemptive coercive operations against the non-state actors suspected in preparing attacks with the use of nuclear materials, as well as on the desirability of the use of nuclear mini-nukes to destroy terrorist targets sheltered deeply underground. There exist also differences in the assessment of the role of legal instruments in reducing existing nuclear forces.

Considerable problems arise in managing the issues of responding to possible threats of acts of nuclear terrorism, especially when such a situation directly affects two or more states\textsuperscript{18}. It is pertinent to note in this respect the UNGA and the UNSC have not yet worked out guidelines of necessary cooperation and assistance in the event terrorist attacks with

\textsuperscript{18} Highly-placed military commanders in Russia and the USA spoke on several occasions in favor of inflicting preventive strikes at international terrorists where they happen to operate with no regard for existing international legal limitations on the use of military force. Different opinions on this subject exist in the world community.
the use of mass destruction weapons. Such issues have not been sufficiently elaborated from the international legal perspective. It is closely linked to the theme of preemptive use of military force to prevent terrorist attacks with the use of nuclear means of mass destruction. In what way should the states facing terrorist nuclear blackmail respond to resolve successfully the situation? The UN Security Council is the only international body empowered by the international community to take decisions on enforcement, including preventive and coercive measures. But how should it exercise these powers in the situation of an imminent terrorist nuclear threat in order to avert it? Are the existing procedures of decision-taking adequate to deal effectively and timely with contingences of imminent terrorist nuclear threat?

Regrettably, efforts undertaken within the UN framework to find answers to these questions have not been successful. The UN Security Council has chosen not to act on the recommendation contained in the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Penal (2004)\(^{19}\) regarding the need to work out a set of guidelines for authorizing the use of military force to ensure speedy implementation of enforcement measures in responding to new challenges, in particular, to threats posed by nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism and in the event of imminent threat of nuclear attacks by terrorists. The international experts suggested that the UNSC should adopt in advance a special resolution containing basic criteria of legitimacy in considering whether to authorize the use of military force. However, the General Assembly’s 2005 World Summit Outcome Document considered that the relevant provisions of the UN Charter are ‘sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security’. Consequently no expansion of the powers of the UN Security Council was considered necessary to combat either WMD proliferation or WMD terrorism or both\(^{20}\).

Sustained multilateral effort at a global level is needed to handle effectively the challenge posed by nuclear terrorism. Recent disturbing developments in the sphere of nuclear proliferation and terrorism vividly demonstrated the importance of the adoption by the world community of new far-reaching measures to fill the gap in the global nonproliferation regime by addressing the challenges posed by non-state actors. A wide range of measures is already available to the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation by non-state actors. The universalization of international legal instruments dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism by expanding the membership of multilateral counter-terrorism conventions and ensuring their stricter compliance is vital.

The prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism demands a qualitatively different level of mutual trust in the sensitive areas of national, regional and global security than exists at present between the key participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

In this connection it is appropriate to draw attention to recommendations of independent international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC)\textsuperscript{21} headed by Hans Blix, a distinguished Swedish diplomat and scholar and well-known public figure, a former Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2006 the WMDC published a report covering both general and specific issues of freeing the world of nuclear, biological and chemical arms\textsuperscript{22}. In this report the WMDC presents 60 recommendations on which the world community – national governments and civil society – can and should do.

The WMDC advocates stricter enforcement of international legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction. From the WMDC standpoint, international enforcement action should be taken only after credible investigation and authoritative findings of non-compliance with legal obligations. Pointing out to the obligations of national governments to prevent terrorists from getting access to nuclear weapons, the WMD Commission indicates that they must maintain fully effective accounting and control of all its stocks of fissile and radiological material and other radiological sources on their territories. They should ensure that there is personal legal responsibility for any acts of nuclear terrorism or activities in support of such terrorism. They should expand their cooperation through inter alia the sharing of information, including intelligence on illicit nuclear commerce. They should also promote universal adherence to the International Convention or the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Significantly, the experts link the counterterrorism with nuclear arms control imperatives. The report presents arguments in favor of a broad range of nuclear disarmament moves. The final recommendation of the WMDC on nuclear matters – Recommendation 30 – deserves to be quoted in full. It states ‘All states possessing nuclear weapons should start planning for security without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions benchmarks and transparency require-

\textsuperscript{21} The Commission’s task is to identify desirable and achievable directions for international cooperation and present realistic proposals aimed at the greatest possible reduction of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. The commissioners are from 14 countries (including Russia) in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and America.

ments for nuclear disarmament’. Recommendation 59 of the WMDC advocates convening a World Summit on disarmament, nonproliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, to meet after thorough preparation. This World Summit should also discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN disarmament machinery.

The WMDC recommendations were discussed and endorsed by the International Conference on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe (24-26 May 2007, Luxembourg). The participants of the Luxembourg forum, fifty seven independent experts in global security, arms control and disarmament from fourteen countries, adopted the Declaration. It states ‘In view of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism much more intensive and broad preventive measures are urgently needed to enhance physical protection, accounting and control of fissile materials worldwide, and to accelerate disposition of highly-enriched uranium by its conversion to low-enriched uranium and application to peaceful purposes …. Additional, and if necessary international cooperative measures to protect nuclear power plants, research reactors and nuclear weapons storage sites should be undertaken’.

The Conference proposed a roadmap embracing a number of initiatives, including further enhancement of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards; enhancing the role of the UN Security Council in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, improving the efficiency and ensuring compliance with international law of counter-proliferation measures regarding nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; reaffirmation of nuclear-weapon states’ commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Governments, and first of all, governments of the nuclear weapon states, should heed the assessments and initiatives of the expert community and readjust accordingly their respective security policy priorities.
The year 2007 witnessed qualitative changes in Russia’s stance on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). Most importantly, the same goes for an evolution in the whole range of Russia-West relations: a serious malfunction in the dialogue with the European Union and the USA, a nervous reaction to plans to deploy elements of the U.S. BMD system in Europe, calls for abandoning the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles (INF Treaty), a ‘suspension’ of Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty, and resumed flights by Russian strategic bombers towards the North Atlantic.

Relations that have been on a downhill slope between Russia and NATO states do not allow considering CFE-related developments out of the overall internal and external context of the political class’s sentiments and the Russian leaders’ relevant actions. Some analysts in NATO states have regarded the aforementioned specific steps as Russia’s resolve to opt for ‘self-determination, up to and including secession’ from the Western world.

First of all, the way Washington made its decision on deploying BMD sites in Europe does not accord with a partnership model in respect of Russia. Ever since the U.S. plans came out into the open, Russian officials have stated that they consider them threatening Russia’s security. In his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (2007) President Vladimir Putin emphasized that ‘it is for the first time that elements of U.S. strategic weapons may appear in Europe. For us, for Russia, it is tantamount to placing Pershings there. The threat is absolutely the same’

The prospective deployment of the elements of the U.S. BMD system on the European continent has been the final straw for Moscow. Adding to a number of complaints and concerns such a move provoked substantive changes in Russia’s stand toward the USA and other NATO states. In the context of present-day military-political relations between Russia and NATO, the ‘BMD crisis’ that broke out has pushed back still further the likelihood of implementation of the CFE that has not yet been ratified by most countries. Apart from the ‘linkage’ of these issues in the Russian perception of the overall picture of US ‘unfriendly actions’, there is another aspect, however: Washington’s unwillingness to effectively influence its allies in favor of CFE Treaty ratification. As a matter of fact, in the 1990s it was Washington that used its leverage to get its Western partners to meet larger flank limits for Russia which Moscow had been pushing for.

In the spring of 2007 the Russian side put together its complaints and concerns into a single package. It declared to the West that while Russia ‘fully’ honored the CFE Treaty, the USA was filling Eastern Europe with new armaments, establishing new bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and was going to set up a BMD site in Poland and install a radar facility in the Czech Republic. These actions have been assessed by the Russian side as a new twist of the arms race. Under these conditions, Russia actually confronted its negotiating partners with an alternative: either you shall ratify the treaty and put it into effect or we shall withdraw from it ourselves.

The desirability of a moratorium on Russia’s implementation of the CFE Treaty was announced by Russian President in April 2007 in the abovementioned Annual Address to the Federal Assembly. In the Address the head of state also unequivocally declared for the first time that there exists no legal link between the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Moldavian bilateral arrangements (1999), on the one hand, and the CFE Treaty, on the other (the ‘failure’ of Russia to comply with the bilateral arrangements was used by Western partners as a pretext for refusal to ratify the treaty).

The substance of differences

It is to be recalled that the signing of the bilateral arrangements mentioned above was really a ‘historical casual occurrence’. In fact, Russia did not commit itself to withdraw its forces from the territories of the republics. Thus, the Joint Russian-Georgian Declaration merely points out, among other things, that during the year 2000 the parties shall finalize ne-

---

2 The Adapted CFE Treaty has been so far ratified by the parliaments of only 4 out of 30 states — Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia.

negotiations on the terms and procedure of the operation of Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalcalaki and on Russian military facilities on the territory of Georgia. Amid tense relations between Russia and Georgia, Russian representatives could not have succeeded in agreeing with Tbilisi on the procedure and terms of Russian military personnel’s withdrawal from the bases, though Russia has carried out reductions as a whole under the CFE Treaty in the region.

In the Moldova case, similar to the Georgian situation, Russia has completed the withdrawal of its CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) items in all categories. Under the bilateral document signed in Istanbul, Russia also did not assume specific obligations but promised ‘to consider the subject’ of the arms stockpiled on the territory of the self-proclaimed Transdnestrian Moldavian Republic (these stockpiles had been left in Moldova since the break-up of the Soviet Union).

Nevertheless, Russia has done a great deal to withdraw its military property but an extra funding is needed to complete the process. There are also political obstacles. The Transdnestrian Republic views these ammunition stocks as a kind of bargaining chips in its negotiations both with Moldova and Russia. Besides, the population of the region perceives the Russian military personnel (about 1000 servicemen) who remain there to guard the warehouses as ‘guarantors of their security.’ The problem there cannot be resolved in the absence of a comprehensive political settlement. Western partners that link the bilateral arrangements agreed at the 1999 Istanbul Summit and the CFE Treaty have refused for eight years now to ratify the treaty. The task of moving to a qualitatively new stage of arrangements on the CFE has been made dependent on legally insignificant provisions.

**Attempts to solve CFE problems through negotiations**

The Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, signed in Istanbul in 1999 (or, so-called, CFE-2, which replaced the original CFE Treaty signed in 1990) is a new type of arrangement based on ‘non-bloc principles’ of calculations. It provides for conventional arms ceilings to be set in Europe whose territory, for the purpose of compliance with the Treaty limits, is to be conditionally divided into areas. The ‘overflow’ of armaments from one area to another (as a temporary deployment or emergency deployment) shall be allowed only in small number and with advanced notification of the sides. It will be very difficult to warrant such actions and obtain relevant permission from the member countries.

Thus, this arrangement would meet the highest security standards. No matter how some politicians and experts might be concerned about NATO’s
military potential, this organization physically, without violating the treaty, would not have ‘capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations’. The entire CFE process aims at eliminating such an option.

However, relations between Russia and NATO states have not reached, notwithstanding the declared partnership, a level of confidence to enable them to trust each other’s statements about peaceful intentions unless the statements are backed with practical action. It is for this reason that Russia, as regards the CFE Treaty, has been increasingly concerned about the failure of efforts to ensure ratification of the 1999 Adaptation Agreement by all the states that signed this agreement. Besides, within the basic 1990 CFE Treaty NATO has been building up its military potential as new states joined it (in any case, with regard to the quotas), though the parties agreed from the outset that the CFE Treaty (even in its original 1990 ‘wording’) would have a non-bloc character. Moreover, partnership between NATO and Russia was declared and documented way back 10 years ago in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (the Founding Act).

Among complaints addressed to the Treaty partners the Russian side cited initially four fundamental critical comments.

First, a complaint was raised about the ‘absurd’ situation that had occurred when new NATO members from among the former parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were still listed as the Eastern group of states, countervailing, as it were, along with Russia the military potential of the 16 NATO member states in 1990.

Second, attention was drawn to the violation of the existing CFE Treaty, as a result of the second ‘wave’ of NATO’s enlargement, particularly, after Bulgaria and Romania joined it. This process has led to a ‘huge’ excess of the treaty flank limits for the NATO group.

Third, a reference was made to the planned basing of TLE items by the USA on the territory of Bulgaria and Romania as factors aggravating the violations.

Fourth, attention was drawn to the anomalous situation around Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the context of arms control in Europe. As a matter of fact, these former Soviet republics, have not signed the adapted CFE Treaty, although they joined NATO.

Certainly, the situation could have appeared not so dramatic had it been analyzed in a partnership context. For instance, official statements by the Baltic states that they are ready to accede to the adapted CFE as soon as it will be ratified could be taken into account. The military potentials of Bulgaria and Romania are not large indeed, though flank limits had really been exceeded.

Russian representatives became more critical of their CFE Treaty partners after the President of Russia announced the moratorium. Never-
theless, diplomats have been trying to soften Russia’s stance, pointing out that the moratorium ‘would stay in effect until all states parties ratify the Adaptation Agreement and start to implement it strictly’.

Due to the exceptional circumstances that arose in relation to the Treaty, Russia requested an Extraordinary CFE conference. The Conference was held on June 12–15, 2007. At the conference, Russia’s complaints were integrated into six sets that actually elaborated on the points made earlier. First, the list of ‘countries-violators’ – was extended to include Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic that ‘shrank from formalizing changes’ as part of the groups of states parties since they had acceded to NATO.

Second, the negotiating partners were accused of having exceeded, agreed treaty ‘group’ limits as a result of the alliance’s enlargement. It was also noted that there is ‘an appropriate provision implying that NATO members in case of the alliance’s enlargement’ should observe the original CFE Treaty’s group levels.

Russian delegates reminded their counterparts that this provision had been incorporated into the Founding Act in 1997 on the insistence of the Russian side. (It should be noted that such provisions are only implied in the document that reads, among other things, that the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, while the term ‘enlargement’ as applied to NATO is not mentioned therein at all).

Third, it was pointed out once again that the planned basing of US conventional weapons in Bulgaria and Romania negatively affected these countries’ compliance with the CFE Treaty’s group limits.

Fourth, (it was a new generalized item), Russian representatives drew attention to the failure of a number of states parties to fulfill the political obligation adopted in Istanbul for a speedy ratification of the Adaptation Agreement.

Fifth, it was noted that the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia failed to comply with the obligations adopted in Istanbul for lowering their CFE Treaty’s regional limits.

Sixth, a reference was made to the negative impact of non-participation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the CFE.

If one proceeds from the CFE-1 obligations, the so-called Western group has exceeded agreed arms ceilings. Thus, as estimated by Russian representatives, within the area designated in the CFE (Art. V), i.e., ‘flank

---

4 <http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/6786f16f9aa1fc72432569ea0036120e>.
5 Among exceptional circumstances, Russia cited, in particular, serious problems that had arisen in implementing the Treaty by NATO countries as a result of the alliance’s expansion and their delay in starting the ratification of the CFE Adaptation Agreement signed in 1999.
area’, NATO countries held in fact, as of 1 January 2007, the following numbers of TLEs: 5954 battle tanks, 8591 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), and 7590 artillery pieces, exceeding the holdings permitted by the CFE Treaty (Art. V, Par. 1) by 1254 tanks, 2691 ACVs and 1590 artillery pieces6.

The subject of flank limits, so painful to Russia, was also mentioned. Since the RF was the only country that observed such limits, the Russian side called for a political decision to be made to annul them.

**Reciprocal efforts are indispensable**

To find a way out of the existing situation Russia suggested on 1 June 2007, a ‘road map’ in the form of ‘Basic Provisions of the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe’ that the Russian delegation was seeking to get endorsed at the conference. It was suggested, first and foremost, to mend the situation in the areas stated above.

The document called for the states that had signed the adapted CFE or joined NATO to start implementing the CFE provisions. It was also suggested to adopt measures needed for formalizing the inclusion of the NATO newcomers in an appropriate group and for formalizing the Baltic countries’ participation in the CFE Treaty as part of that group of states parties. Accordingly, adjustments were to be made to the arms ceilings of these states, taking into account their ‘new affiliation’. If the CFE Adaptation Agreement would not have become effective by 25 June 2008, the states parties were to make a decision on its temporary (with certain exceptions) application starting 1 July 2008, pending the CFE officially coming into force.

The conference, however, failed to reach a compromise solution to the issues. Of great concern is not simply the ‘skidding’ with the negotiation process but rather a ‘rollback’ that happened to conventional armed forces reduction in Europe. The sides actually reverted to viewing Europe as two opposing groups of states. They had been driven to it by the lack of a new effective treaty that was called upon to virtually confirm the new ‘non-bloc’ configuration of Europe in military terms.

A ‘slide’ such as this towards old geopolitical thinking is particularly paradoxical because there is no longer the USSR or the WTO. The parlance of the original 1990 Treaty was molded without mentioning (it was

---

a political decision) the two military-political blocs existing at that time. But in reality, as was noted by Russian representatives, it was clear to everyone who remembered those times that the agreement had been concluded not between some abstract groups of states formed according to geographical or historical principles but precisely between the then two really existing military-political alliances – the WTO and NATO.

During the adapted CFE ratification procedure in Russia in 2004, Russian diplomats emphasized the absolutely new and ‘non-bloc’ principles of limiting military potentials in Europe.

NATO countries’ reluctance to ratify the treaty against the backdrop of the alliance’s eastward expansion has brought Russia back to its earlier perception of the world surrounding it and the military-political objectives pursued by its neighboring European countries and the USA. The moratorium imposed by the decree the President of Russia issued on 14 July 2007 – «suspension» of Russia’s compliance with the CFE – which was to go into effect in 150 days after official notification of the depositories (that is on 12 December 2007), was evidence of changes in Moscow’s attitudes. In addition to internal reasons, these changes have been most seriously prompted by the policy pursued for many years now by NATO states that did not take into account Russia’s fundamental concerns (above all, NATO’s stubborn eastward expansion, aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, and the policy aimed at Kosovo’s cessation).

Like Russia’s reaction to the US plans to deploy its BMD system in Europe has demonstrated fragile partnership with the USA and the persistence of factitious deterrence policy postulates, CFE-related developments have clearly shown ephemeral partnership with NATO. This organization is being perceived again by most Russian politicians and experts as a bloc posing a real military-political and even military threat to Russia. Words cannot substitute actions. The sides should bring their military potentials in line with their declarations and intentions – otherwise trust cannot be restored. The Adaptation Agreement approved in Istanbul, wherein no hint is made about anyone’s affiliation with some blocs or ‘groups’ of states is, undoubtedly, a landmark down the road.

The suspension announced by Russia is a less tough measure than the ‘complete’ withdrawal of the USA from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. Politically it testifies to Moscow’s reluctance to burn bridges and slip back to confrontational policy. As we see it, Russia that has noticeably gained weight in recent years on the international arena and started to acquire elements of economic stability and self-assurance could use the potentials of ‘economic diplomacy’ and ‘package decisions’ to get its partners on its side so as to swing them in favor of ratification of the adapted CFE.
While declaring ‘suspension’ of implementing provisions of the CFE and related documents (including quantitative ceilings on Russia’s conventional arms, on-site inspections, information provision, etc.), Russia has clearly left the door open to its coming back to the arms control regime on the European continent. It has also been explicitly stated that during the period the suspension will be in effect no action should be taken to hinder the resumption of CFE operation. Russia’s actions are to be viewed as the ‘last argument’ in its efforts to restore the viable conventional arms control regime in Europe.

Russian representatives have sought to allay the concerns of world public opinion. Moscow has no intention to bring about additional armament in Western regions (a matter of acute anxiety for Europe). This has been oft-reiterated by the President, the Defense Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and other senior military officials. According to them, ‘the suspension’ does not absolutely mean that the RF is about to build up forces in the Western direction\(^7\). Further Russian moves will stem, of course, from a political decision-making dependent on many internal and external factors. But we would like to see Russia’s steps help adequately reflect a really lower level of military danger on the European continent and a partnership character of relations between Russia and individual states and their associations in Europe.

A great deal in this respect depends on the policy of the West whose leaders could perceive and accept with a better understanding the complex transformation period Russia is going through, do not treat it as a ‘vanquished power’ and more adequately assess the impact of their own policy on the situation within Russia and its international course.

\(^7\) Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 2007. 19 July.
6. DISCUSSIONS AT THE IMEMO

Vadim VLADIMIROV

Presentation of the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2006

The presentation was held on 9 November 2007 at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. The meeting was attended by Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman of the Governing Board of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as well as researchers from Russian civilian and military scientific institutions, officials of federal governmental agencies, representatives of mass media and foreign diplomats.

In his welcome address Academician Alexander Dynkin, Director of IMEMO, highly appreciated IMEMO and SIPRI efforts in producing Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbook since 1993. In assessing the latest edition A. Dynkin highlighted objectivity and impartiality of the published volume.

He noted that the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2006 came out at a time of worsening international climate related to the U.S. drive to deploy elements of the American ABM system in Poland and Czech Republic. Moscow suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty. Considering the West responsible for the deterioration of the political situation in Europe, Russia for all that left the door open for honest and fair negotiations.

Alexander Pikayev, Head of the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department at the IMEMO Center for International Security, informed the audience about IMEMO – SIPRI teamwork on the 14th issue of the Yearbook in Russia. He drew attention of the participants to the fact that although SIPRI Yearbooks were being translated into several languages, the Russian edition had a unique feature. It includes the Supplement containing contributions written by Russian scholars (mainly by re-
searchers from the IMEMO Center for International Security). These supplements are also regularly translated into English and published in separate volumes. The intention is to acquaint English-speaking researchers abroad with the views of Russian scholars on critical issues of disarmament and international security.

**Alexandre Kaliadine**, principal researcher at the IMEMO and co-editor of the Supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2006, pointed to the fact that the Russian edition came out later than the original, English one. Thus, contributors to the IMEMO Supplement had an opportunity to pursue their analyses beyond the chronological limits of the English language edition (as of 1 January 2006). The contributors to the IMEMO Supplement have examined important developments in 2006, in particular, the proceedings and results of the G8 St. Petersburg Summit, controversies around the CFE Treaty as well as challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The trends in Russian military policy, as reflected in the 2007 Defense budget, have been scrutinized, too.

**Alexei Arbatov**, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the IMEMO Center for International Security, argued that the translation of the SIPRI Yearbook is of particular significance for Russia since a considerable number of Russian experts in security do not have good command of English language. On the other hand, publication of the IMEMO studies in English in separate volumes helps to bring Russian views on topical arms control and security issues to the attention of international public.

**Rolf Ekéus**, Chairman of the Governing Board of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, presented a concise overview of the institute’s 40 year-long activities. He characterized SIPRI as a unique international research institution advancing independent judgments on peace and international security issues. The idea to create the institute was a response to the need ‘to build bridges’ between the West and the East. From the late 1970s the institute put the accent on the need to ensure the adequate perception of military-political issues between the USSR and the USA as well as of tasks of the prevention, management and resolution of international conflicts. In the late 1970s – early 1980s SIPRI paid much attention to the processes related to the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles SS-20 as well as of American missiles ‘Pershing’ and cruise missiles in Europe.

The launching of the Helsinki process had stimulated SIPRI studies into conventional arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe. After the end of the Cold War the research agenda had been extended to include issues related to the NATO enlargement, Yugoslavia’s disintegration and emergence of new independent states, as well as problems of national and ethnic minorities.
During the late decade the institute is emphasizing research in international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons.

Currently, SIPRI is focusing on measures impeding the proliferation of armaments. The institute is involved in analyzing and interpreting data related not only to military but also dual-use technologies. SIPRI researchers assess their development, transfer to other nations, implementation of the export controls, the issues posing most serious challenges to international security.

**Debating issues of arms control and WMD-terrorism**

Ambassador Rolf Ekéus addressed a number of problems in responding to the questions raised after his presentation.

The spread of nuclear technology conducive to the acquirement of the capability to develop nuclear weapons. Russia and the USA are in a position to hold back the proliferation of nuclear weapons by cooperating in the effort to hinder uranium enrichment and production of weapon-grade plutonium in the proliferation-prone states.

**Iranian nuclear challenge.** Rolf Ekéus highlighted the argument that the European Union was not in a position to address the challenge related to the Iranian threat without engaging both the USA and Russia.

**NATO enlargement to the East.** The speaker expressed understanding of Russia’s concern over NATO enlargement. Having mentioned his negative attitude toward the idea of Sweden’s accession to NATO, he noted that this question is far from being settled.

**The CFE Treaty.** Citing the terrorist threat on the Russian southern borders Rolf Ekéus recognized the validity of Moscow’s concern over the constraints established by the CFE Treaty on the movements of the forces inside Russia and expressed hope that issues connected with the flank limitations would be resolved in the course of negotiations.

**WMD-terrorism.** The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists would have catastrophic consequences. At present it is difficult to imagine terrorists obtaining access to the strategic nuclear warheads. However, one cannot exclude completely the possibility of terrorists acquiring tactical nuclear munitions. The risk of chemical terrorism is extremely high. There is a need to increase the number of on-site inspections carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Russia and the USA should also exercise stricter control over biological weapon disarmament to respond effectively to changing scientific and technological challenges to human security. Radiological weapons pose also a grave
danger but opportunities of their use by terrorists are still constrained by the difficulties involved in securing means of delivery.

**Alexei Arbatov** addressed issues of European security and Euro-Atlantic partnership. He argued that NATO enlargement harms both international security in general and cooperation between Russia and Western nations in particular, above all, in such areas as nuclear nonproliferation and combating terrorism. NATO expansion to the East is perceived in Russia as violation of ‘the contract’ under which Moscow agreed to the unification of Germany. Elements of anti-Americanism in Russia are mainly related to NATO enlargement, which is perceived by many as posing a threat to Russia’s security. Russian attitudes to the issues of antiballistic missile and the CFE compliance are being shaped against this background.

Referring to the future issue of the SIPRI Yearbook, **A. Arbatov** considered it useful to devote one of its sections to problems of ‘catastrophic’ terrorism (above all nuclear terrorism). Stressing the need for deeper cooperation in this area he argued that current strained Russian – Western relations could be improved against the background of such cooperation.

**Vladimir Nazarov**, Assistant Secretary to the Security Council of the Russian Federation mentioned the Security Council’s active cooperation with the IMEMO and other scientific and research institutions. He also treated with respect SIPRI as an international research institution renowned for its objectivity impartiality and the quality of research.

Referring to the CFE Treaty **V. Nazarov** noted that the main collision consists in the fact that this treaty had factually established constrains only for Russia on movement of its forces within its national territory. Russia has for the time being suspended its participation in the CFE regime but it is willing to conduct negotiations to ensure the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty by all its participants.

Addressing the ABM problem in Europe **V. Nazarov** reminded the audience about Russian proposals regarding the use of the Gabala Early Warning Radar and the radar being constructed at Armavir. In his opinion, negotiations on the ballistic defense issues should include security and strategic stability problems in the broad sense. The stagnant situation in the field of reduction of strategic armaments generates serious concern and complicates the resolution of nonproliferation problems. Unilateral approaches to the proliferation challenge have no prospects. The progress achieved in the resolution of the nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula has confirmed the validity of cooperative political-diplomatic efforts.

International public opinion is concerned over the Iranian nuclear problem. Referring to this problem **V. Nazarov** stressed that attempts to secure nuclear nonproliferation by ‘toppling hostile regimes’ will inevitably compromise the very idea of nonproliferation. The objective and unbiased approach to this problem advocated by SIPRI deserves support.
Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Chairman of the PIR-Center, highlighted the need for further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. The work in this field, closely related to both vertical and horizontal nonproliferation, is proceeding inefficiently. The prospects for a new accord are unclear. This subject is expected to be a key one at the next NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Natalie Kalinina, principal researcher of the IMEMO, disagreed with the interpretation of nuclear terrorism as the main threat of WMD-terrorism. In her opinion the greatest direct threat stems from the possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to biological warfare agents which are more difficult to control than nuclear weapons.

Alexandre Kaliadine expressed concern that nuclear terrorists will most likely attempt to use some variety of conventional explosives stuffed with radioactive substances. In his view, there exists considerable underestimation of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Leading military powers, including the USA, Great Britain and China, are not in a hurry to ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. As of 2 October 2007 this Convention has been ratified by only 29 states.

Sustained multilateral effort at a global level is needed to handle effectively the challenge posed by nuclear terrorism. Recent disturbing developments in the sphere of nuclear proliferation and terrorism vividly demonstrated the importance of the adoption by the world community of new far-reaching measures to fill the gap in the global nonproliferation regime by addressing non-state actors.

The prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism demands a qualitatively different level of mutual trust in the sensitive areas of national, regional and global security than exists nowadays between nuclear weapon states.

Summing up the discussion Vladimir Baranovsky, the Deputy IMEMO Director, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, concluded that IMEMO – SIPRI cooperation helped to focus attention on most critical issues of international security. Both institutes intend to adhere to this position henceforth, in particular, in preparing the next Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook.

Recognizing the complexity of the raised problems and the lack of prompt answers to them, V. Baranovsky cautioned against adopting decisions – politically spectacular but not sufficiently well elaborated on the expert level and which may prove to be counterproductive from the perspective of the needs of international and national security. In particular, while debating recommendations for the withdrawal from the INF Treaty in connection with the plans to deploy elements of an American BMD system in the Czech Republic and Poland one should keep in mind the precedent that took place over two decades ago in connection with the deployment of Soviet SS-20 and American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in
Europe. The problem was resolved by the agreed decision to dismantle all American and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Motivations, which at that time led Moscow to this arms control arrangement, have not lost validity nowadays. Political situations are volatile, and there is no reason to sacrifice arms control imperatives to them. If we are guided by the logic inherent in pragmatic foreign and security policy, let us not forget that the major advantage of arms control consists in its capacity to guarantee security in a more reliable and rational manner than through intensifying unilateral military activities or through undermining the capability of the other side. Both IMEMO and SIPRI are guided by such conviction in conducting research. This mutual concern has been conducive to developing fruitful cooperation between the institutions for a considerable period of time already.
PART II. EXPERT INSIGHTS

7. Prospects and problems of developing the Russian-American cooperative missile warning system
8. Russia-NATO Council: fifth anniversary
9. Elimination of CW stockpiles in Russia
10. Chemical non-lethal weapons
11. Russia and CANWFZ
   Synopsis of Federal Law no. FZ 198 (2007)
Currently we witness another crisis in Russian-American relations caused by the U.S. plan to deploy a radar in the Czech Republic (and, according to some sources, also, may be, in the Republic of Georgia) for tracking and targeting Iranian missiles and guiding interceptors against them and a base of 10 missile-interceptors in Poland by 2011-2012.

There have been a few such crises or serious tensions in the history of Soviet/Russian-American relations.

The first one took place at the end of the 1960s when the USSR pioneered the deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) system (A-35 system) around Moscow. The USA was quite concerned with that development and responded with the deployment of the Sentinel-Safeguard BMD systems and new ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple warheads. Later anti-missile systems were limited under the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty, 1972).

The second crisis happened at the beginning of the 1980s when President R. Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), so called ‘Star War’ program.

Aggravation of the American-Russian relations, which occurred in the mid-1990s, was provoked by the U. S. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) program. The issue was settled by the agreement on strategic and theater missile defense systems (1997).

The fourth crisis arose from President George W. Bush administration’s decision (2002) to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to start deployment of the BMD system with its first bases in Alaska and California.

Thus, we have now the fifth crisis of this kind.
Without any doubts the plan to deploy radar and missile-interceptors in Europe is highly provocative for Russia, but rather in the political than the military sense. (It cannot be excluded that some initiators of this project, particularly in Poland, pursue the very goal of political provocation). Washington did not even take the trouble to consult Moscow on the plan in advance of acting in violation of the spirit of the 2002 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States. This declaration unequivocally provides for cooperation between the two powers in developing such weapons system. Strangely enough, the Russian authorities have avoided mentioning this commitment for unknown reasons. Looking at technical and military aspects of the American plan and taking into account intended number of missile-interceptors and their technical characteristics (as well as that of the Radar) it would be fair to say that a new BMD system will affect the Russian deterrence capability in a very limited way.

Most of Russia’s ICBMs launching sites are situated far away from Poland to the Northeast (it is even fairer to say so about Russian SLBMs of the Northern Fleet). ICBM flying routes are programmed to use northern azimuths crossing the Arctic Circle. Due to the curvature of the earth the ‘Czech’ Radar will not be able to track (in the interest of intelligence gathering) missile tests and in any case will not improve capabilities of the already existing radar in Norway. The American ground-based interceptors (GBIs) to be based in Poland are not capable of intercepting ICBMs on an active (boost) stage of their trajectory.

T. Postol and G. Lewes, American liberal experts, opposed the Administration’s BMD project, arguing that missile-interceptors could catch ICBMs when they are launched from the sites in Western or Southern parts of Russia and if ICBMs are launched towards targets on the East Coast of the United States (Boston, New York, Washington). In other words missile interception is possible but only theoretically and under very favorable conditions. Missile-interceptors were never tested in the manner of ‘chasing’ the warheads and only small numbers of the Russian ICBMs are deployed in Western and Southern parts of the country.

But this does not mean that Moscow should disregard moves to deploy BMD complexes in Europe despite their irrelevance against the existing Russian Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF). The fact is that the current BMD program is ‘open-ended’. Washington and its allies do not provide any guarantees that this program will be limited only to the radar and the base with 10 GBIs. It cannot be excluded that a number of GBIs will reach 100 or 1000 over some time and they will be moved closer to possible trajectories of the Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, GBIs can be supplemented with new systems to intercept ballistic missiles on the active
(boost) stage of their trajectories and with sea-, air- and space-based layers of BMD, including systems based on new physical principles (laser, etc.).

Furthermore, in 2000–2001 some strategic mistakes in planning for future development of the SNF were made: spending on the SNF has experienced overall reduction and state orders for ICBMs ‘Topol-M’ have been meager. At the same time ballistic missiles, deployed in the 1980–1990s, will no longer be in service in the next 10-15 years and a new submarine system ‘Yuri Dolgorukii/Bulava’ has some technical problems to overcome. Therefore the Russian deterrence capabilities will be relatively shrinking in the next 10-15 years. On the contrary, the USA maintains and improves its robust offensive forces (even despite the reduction of warheads number to 1700-2200 units under the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, SORT). That is why the U. S. plans for BMD deployment have been perceived by Moscow so painfully, though the system will be extremely ineffective against the Russian SNF.

The reason is that NATO eastward expansion taught Moscow a lesson to respond unambiguously and in advance to suspicious moves. That expansion started in 1997 as a one-time act affecting only three Central European countries. But later the process of expansion has engulfed seven more states and membership in NATO for Ukraine, Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is under consideration. This development and possible deployment of more BMD bases on the territory of new NATO’s members had a serious negative impact on the perceptions of BMD deployment.

Of course, a considerable expansion of BMD system would take decades. But counteractive military-technical measures will also require time and money. Politically it is better to state clearly and firmly Moscow’s attitude towards the BMD program at the very beginning. A lot of time has been lost in this respect. The matter demanded reaction back in 2002 when the USA abandoned the ABM Treaty. But at that moment Moscow responded to this move with restraint. Moreover, the two nations concluded the SORT, which politically ‘gave the go-ahead’ for the U. S. BMD program. (The Russian Government took this stance despite attempts by the liberal ‘Yabloko’ faction in the State Duma ‘to raise the alarm’, while other political groupings opposed those attempts, particularly the Parliamentary faction of the nationalist Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party).

Both the threat and the response to BMD should be considered in a broad perspective. First of all, in case of need ICBM ‘Topol-M’ (with multiple warheads) can be targeted at the BMD sites. This contingency is envisioned by the high command of the Russian SNF. In future, if plans to expand the U. S. BMD in Europe and elsewhere are approved, it will be necessary to consider a wide range of asymmetric retaliatory measures.
beginning with increasing capability of the Russian SNF to overcome BMD and ending with the deployment of various systems capable to destroy directly possible air-, sea- and space-based layers of BMD.

The BMD deployment issue is very complex but it can be solved with good will on both sides and the ability to organize effective negotiations.

Proposals made by V. Putin in summer 2007 could lay a foundation for an agreement on BMD. The President suggested to use the Gabala Early Warning Radar (Azerbaijan) as an alternative to the American arrangement for tracking missile launchings from the southern direction (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India could be included in this sector, after some correction of direction of radar’s radiation). The Gabala Radar could be linked to the Joint Data Exchange Center established under the 1998 Russian-American agreement, but in fact its operation was later ‘frozen’. V. Putin proposed to supplement the Center’s functions to make it capable of operating in ‘real-time regime’, in other words after detecting a missile launch the Center should be informed about this immediately. The offer was followed by the suggestion to include in this system a radar of a new generation – Voronezh Class Early Warning Radar (currently under construction near the city of Armavir), and to establish another Joint Data Exchange Center in Brussels to give to the system a multilateral format bearing in mind cooperation with NATO.

Putin’s initiatives have shown some new serious assumptions in Russian security policy. First, it is acknowledged that there is a serious threat of a missile attack from the south, without mentioning a specific country as a source of threat (by the way, the Gabala Radar does not see Israel). Second, for the first time willingness was expressed to cooperate with the USA and NATO in the post-Soviet space on a critical issue of military security. Earlier, any western military presence in this area was not welcomed by Moscow, to put it mildly. And, third, an idea of developing early warning missile attack system in cooperation with the USA implies a strategic partnership of new quality as well as departing from the relationship of mutual deterrence, and is contrary to the current policy to rely on such deterrence as a foundation of Russia’s defense capability (taking into account a conventional preeminence of Russia’s potential adversaries).

The USA has responded, quite naturally, evasively to above-discussed proposals. Washington has not declined them but reiterated its arguments in favor of BMD deployment in Europe. Understandably, Bush administration cannot abandon the BMD deployment in Europe for political considerations. The USA does not want to make its BMD program depended on Russia and does not take seriously Russia’s word of warning (to implement counter-measures against the BMD deployment), especially when the country’s military budget is 25 times less than that of the USA, and when the Russian Armed Forces receive only 6-7 ICBM ‘Topol-M’ annu-
ally and a construction period of strategic submarine ‘Yuri Dolgorukii’ has exceeded for ten years.

Besides, if one is to take a threat from future Iranian missiles seriously, as it arises from Moscow’s proposals on the Gabala Radar, it is quite clear that radars themselves cannot provide defense against missile attack. They are only capable of giving a warning on attack. Finally, early warning and missile tracking can be executed by Gabala and Armavir radars only at the initial stage of the missile trajectory. Tracking missiles on the next stages and guiding at them interceptors would require additional radars capable ‘keeping in sight’ the midcourse stage of missiles trajectory.

Until Iran has medium range missiles capable of threatening Europe and, even more, ICBMs reaching the U.S. territory, any unilateral deployment of BMD by the USA or NATO in Europe will be interpreted in Moscow as the first phase of the program directed against Russian deterrent capability.

On the other hand, BMD deployment of limited capability is a many-year process – to begin building missile defenses at a time when Iran obtains long-range missiles will be too late.

Moreover, BMD is not a bad thing in itself. When Russian representatives express their outrage at the possible undermining of nuclear deterrence by BMD, it sounds somewhat hypocritical. Russia is currently the sole possessor of deployed and biggest combat BMD system in the world with nuclear interception capability (in other words – BMD system designed to repulse nuclear attack from other nuclear weapon states). On the contrary, the U. S. BMD system had been closedown for several decades.

Nonetheless, it is possible to unravel the current knot of contradictions concerning the BMD deployment.

The Russian authorities should not present their proposals in an ultimate form, as an unconditional alternative to the U. S. BMD deployment plan. They should not create the impression of being a propaganda exercise aimed at provoking U. S. rejection of Russian offers and resulting in higher political tensions between the two nations. Otherwise, they will not be considered seriously either politically or strategically. It could be a repeat of the mistake made at the end of the 1990s, when Moscow declined to come to an agreement with the USA on amendments (allowing for broader BMD deployment) to the ABM Treaty hoping that Washington would give up its BMD program. But instead the Republican administrations abandoned totally the ABM Treaty.

Simultaneously, in the process of reaching a compromise the USA has no reason to establish fixed dates for finalizing the construction of the Czech Radar and the base for interceptors in Poland independently of the emergence of the Iranian missile threat, unless Washington envisage BMD against the Russian SNF or as a provocative move.
Both nations should have started with agreeing on the joint use of the Gabala Radar, reviving the agreement for the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow and extending its functions to make it capable of receiving and processing information from the Gabala Radar (and possibly from the Armavir Radar) in ‘real-time’ regime. Simultaneously, Moscow and Washington might agree on continuing the program related to the transportation and assemblage of the Radar in the Czech Republic, provided the Radar is linked to the Moscow Joint Data Exchange Center and later on to a new center of the same kind in Brussels if it is established. Then Moscow will receive guarantees that the new installations will not be used for monitoring Russian missiles.

Finally, as the base for BMD interceptors will also require a long time to be built it would be possible to reach an agreement for the construction of base infrastructure under condition that interceptors would not be deployed in the launchers unless Iran tested medium or long-range missiles.

In that case Moscow will be assured that BMD is not designed to threaten Russian deterrent. It will also stimulate the Russian authorities to use all leverages they have to persuade Iran to reconsider its missile program.

The package of suggestions set forth above would help to unravel the knot of political and strategic contradictions between Russia and the USA. It is, of course, not the only way to resolve them. But accepting or declining the package or similar schemes will be a clear test of the seriousness of approaches of the USA, NATO and Russia towards missile (or nuclear-missile) proliferation as the priority threat for international security. Genuine cooperation of the great powers is needed to neutralize the threat. Otherwise, constructive Moscow’s proposals will play only a role of a short-lived bargaining chip in a new phase of military-strategic rivalry between the USA and Russia.
8. RUSSIA-NATO COUNCIL: FIFTH ANNIVERSARY

Vladimir BELOUS

Moscow was in June 2007 the venue of the Russia-NATO Council Ambassadorial Meeting co-chaired by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Those in attendance at the meeting marked two commemorative events: the fifth anniversary of the Russia-NATO Council (RNC) and the tenth anniversary of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (Founding Act). The participants were unanimous in their opinion that to address current international security issues a more elaborate structure has to be established for enhancing the ability to ensure peaceful development and stability under the complex conditions of growing globalization. This complicated problem can be resolved only by promoting international cooperation and joint action of the entire world community not only in the military sphere but also in economic, political, diplomatic and environmental areas.

Radical changes that had taken place in the geopolitical situation the world over after the disintegration of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) made it imperative to renounce military confrontation and to build a new type of mutual relations in Europe. This necessitated primarily a change in relations between the new Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance. Resolution of the problem has been largely compounded by the stereotypes of mentality deeply entrenched during the Cold War period, causing much-delayed action, not only among politicians but also millions upon millions of people on the opposite sides of the demarcation lines. Meanwhile, the then developments urged a review of former military-political postulates, renunciation of bloc mentality, and search for ways to respond promptly and efficiently to threats and challenges that kept emerging in the security sphere.

Notwithstanding noticeable modifications undergone by NATO in recent years, the Alliance is still a robust geopolitical and military factor.
Over the period, the Alliance stepped up its crisis-management, counter-terrorism and peace-keeping activities.

NATO’s transformation since the end of the Cold War has been evidenced by a number of practical steps taken by the Alliance’s leadership. Highly symptomatic was the elimination of the «linear defense» system aimed at direct confrontation with the WTO. Military command structures have been slashed significantly – there are now only 20 headquarters instead of 65 that existed earlier. The bloc’s military potential has been cut down by 17 000 units of heavy armament. The arsenal of its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) has been reduced by 85 %. (About 400 units of US air-launched nuclear ammunition remain now on the territory of six NATO member states: Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). There have been substantial quantitative reductions in the armed forces of a number of the Alliance’s member states. Nearly 150 000 US servicemen have been withdrawn from Europe, making up about 60 % of their numerical strength there in the early 1990s. This was telling confirmation of Western countries having come to understanding that there is no real threat to them arising from the new Russia.

Over the same period, Russia steadfastly made reductions in its armed forces: after 1991, army and naval personnel has been cut nearly by half. (At present Russia’s military personnel amounts to 1 100 000). All heavy weapons, except those in units that maintain constant readiness, have been taken beyond the Urals.

Despite differences between Russia and NATO on a number of security issues inherited from the Cold War, both sides gradually transformed mutual relations, considering it desirable to gradually move in the near future to partnership cooperation. As a result, in 1991 Russia became a founding state of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and in 1994, acceded to the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP). The Founding Act signed in Paris 27 May 1997 has constituted the basis for developing long-term partnership relations. The document provides for a package of mutual commitments that take into account the interests of all members of the European security system. The document also laid groundwork for the establishment of a Joint Permanent Council (JPC) that offered certain prospects for conducting regular consultations on urgent security issues, for exploring and discussing specific ways of cooperation. Russia’s diplomatic mission to NATO was established in Brussels in 1998 and a NATO Information Office – in Moscow soon afterwards to facilitate fulfillment of a wide range of relevant tasks. The latter has sought primarily to explain NATO’s objectives and help step up the sides’ cooperation in the disarmament sphere.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were a bitter reminder of the need for comprehensive and concerted actions by the countries of the
RUSSIA-NATO COUNCIL

world community to prevent and counter threats posed by international terrorism. In October 2001, President Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson discussed in Brussels possibilities of deepening cooperation between Russia and NATO. Subsequent contacts provided ground for putting forward an initiative that Foreign Ministers declared at the JPC meeting in December 2001. The initiative was aimed at establishing a new structure for executing joint actions.

At the JPC session in Reykjavik in May 2002, Foreign Ministers approved Declaration ‘Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality’. The Declaration was signed that same month by the heads of state and government, and the Alliance Secretary General at the Russia-NATO summit in Rome. Building upon the Founding Act, it was envisaged to establish a permanent Russia-NATO Council (RNC).

Unlike the JPC, the RNC has been called upon to become a more effective and flexible mechanism for joint analysis, decision making and action. Most importantly, it operates on the principle of consensus of NATO member states and Russia.

The establishment of the RNC reflected the recognition by Russia and the Alliance member states of a wide variety of common security problems. The Rome Summit document on setting up the RNC includes basic principles of cooperation: decision making by consensus; maintaining constant political dialogue on the entire spectrum of international security issues; participation of the Council members on the basis of their territorial-national quality; joint actions and decision making with general and individual responsibility for their implementation; cooperation based on international law, the UN Charter, and other normative documents.

The RNC mechanism includes the Preparatory Committee, ad hoc working groups, as well as committees and experts. RNC sessions are held at least once a month at the level of ambassadors and military experts, and twice a year – at the level of Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of General Staff, and, if need be, at the higher level.

The joint work program encompasses all areas of activity of mutual interest, as set forth in the Founding Act. These include the fight against terrorism, prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, arms control, confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense (TMD), military-to-military cooperation, military reform, and cooperation in emergency situations and in peacekeeping.

Ensuring operability of forces and assets is an important aspect of military cooperation given the need for the RNC members’ military units to have the capability to act as part of joint organizational and command structures of multinational forces in conducting various operations (counterterrorism, peacekeeping, crisis management).
Training courses organized at the General Staff’s Military Academy in Moscow have been practical steps in tackling the task. Senior NATO commanders delivered reports there.

After the Russian nuclear-powered submarine ‘Kursk’ sank in August 2000, suffering the loss of 118 crew members, cooperation was launched in search and rescue operations at sea. In February 2003, Russia and NATO signed a framework agreement on the rescue of submarine crews in case of emergency.

Russia was involved along with NATO members in peacekeeping operations on the UN mandate. The Russian peacekeeping operation that started in Croatia in 1992 lasted for 11 years.

Close cooperation between Russia and NATO states in the Balkans played a significant role in promoting understanding and empathy among servicemen of partner states. It contributed to developing a standard concept of conducting joint peacekeeping operations. The concept set forth common approaches and actually laid groundwork for consultations, planning and promptness of decision making in case of a crisis, and joint preparations and conduct of operations\(^1\).

As part of the Alliance’s transformation since the end of the Cold War, a military slant (not necessarily against Russia) has been in the focus of the bloc’s leadership. Evidence of this is, in particular, the initiative known as the Prague obligation concerning improvement of military potential. The initiative was adopted by the NATO leadership at its summit in Prague in November 2002. In compliance with the initiative, the bloc members assumed obligations to improve their military programs in more than 400 specific areas. The Prague summit underscored nevertheless that NATO member states and Russia had started to work together as equal partners in the frame-work of the RNC and had made certain progress in such areas as peacekeeping, military reform, combating WMD proliferation, as well as in search and rescue at sea, counterterrorism, and TBMD.

At the meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, the Foreign Ministers of the RNC member states summed up the results of two years’ work under the RNC program and reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives and principles set forth in the Founding Act. They also reaffirmed their resolve to jointly counter common threats. The Ministers welcomed Russian representative’s statement that Russia was involved in counterterrorism naval operation *Active Endeavor* for vessel observation and patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ministers highly appreciated the command-staff exercises conducted in Colorado Springs in March 2004 and the completion of the first phase of the TBMD interoperability study project. As a result, a decision was made to extend the project.

---

The Ministers welcomed Russia’s suggestion that NATO observers take part in Avaria-2004 (Emergency-2004) exercises. The exercises were conducted in early August 2004 and attended by 50 NATO observers. During the three-day exercises, military units performed simulated operations to protect a nuclear weapons transport column from terrorists. The drills were held 100 km off Murmansk and were the first ever nuclear weapons safety exercise carried out in field conditions under the RNC auspices.

In June 2006, Russian and NATO experts took part as observers in CAPEX-06 simulated exercises to address the fallout from a nuclear ammunition accident. The drills were conducted in a military base close to Cheyenne (Wyoming, USA). The attendance of representatives of RNC member states at the exercises contributed to expanding practical cooperation and common understanding of threats that may arise and of actions to prevent them and handle their aftermath2.

Relations between Russia and NATO in and around Afghanistan have been developing quite positively. This is primarily due to the coincidence of the two sides’ political interests there. Russia has been active in contributing to Afghanistan’s recovery and assisting its government. Russia is involved along with Germany and France in ensuring transit to Afghanistan. Combating Afghan trafficking in narcotics and the training of personnel to eradicate the evil have occupied a prominent place in cooperation with NATO.

During the NATO meeting in Riga (November 2006) the heads of state and government underscored that partnership with Russia remains a strategic element of promoting security in the Euro-Atlantic region and welcomed the progress made in this area over the period since the RNC had been established.

However, the participants in the meeting acknowledged that the RNC had not made full use of its potential and expressed readiness for further strengthening and deepening cooperation in the RNC framework.

In the opinion of Russian politicians, the RNC has proved its usefulness. Most substantive issues arising in the process of the two sides’ cooperation have been fruitfully discussed within its frame-work.

According to Alexander Grushko, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, notwithstanding differences in the assessment of the RNC’s role by a number of Russian experts, the RNC plays, on the whole, a positive role, especially in establishing military-to-military contacts. Russian representatives work at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at its Staff in Mons. This is an important step forward, though the RNC cannot substitute the OCSE, all the more so the UNSC, or other formats of international coop-

---

2 Novosti NATO, 2006, no. 2 [NATO News, 2006, no. 2].
eration because the RNC performs specific functions. A. Grushko also highlighted the fact that the efficiency of RNC operation largely depends on the nature of NATO’s further transformation and on the extent of the Alliance’s basic policy taking into account Russian interests^3.

The positive assessment of the RNC’s role as a whole in a wide spectrum of cooperation ranging from political dialogue on security issues to practical implementation of military-to-military cooperation measures does not mean playing down the substance of differences. At present, most acute differences between Russia and NATO are in the picture in areas such as the Alliance’s expansion and its drawing nearer to Russian borders, trespassing the bounds of the bloc’s traditional zone of responsibility; NATO states’ refusal to ratify the 1999 Agreement on adaptation of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Agreement on Adaptation); plans of the USA and some other NATO countries to deploy elements of the U.S. BMD system in Europe.

After seven countries of the ‘second wave’ – three ex-Soviet republics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, three WTO member countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, and an ex-republic of Yugoslavia: Slovenia – joined NATO, its membership grew to 26. At present, North Atlantic Alliance member countries have a total area of 23.4 million sq. km. with a population of 843 million. They produce more than 64% of world industrial output and account for nearly 73% of world military expenditures.

When pursuing in peacetime a planned military assimilation of the territory of the Alliance’s new members, special attention is given to their strategic position in regard to Russia. This has been clearly exemplified by the Baltic countries that have relatively modest armed forces but hold a very important strategic position, ‘hanging’ over the North-West region of Russia. They also have many military facilities of the former USSR on their territory, including about 100 airfields. What is more, up-to-date military infrastructure facilities are being built along the Russian borders. That being so, NATO doctrinal documents provide, in particular, for deployment, following the decision made by the bloc’s top leadership, of additional armament groups, including nuclear weapons, on the territory of any of its members.

NATO’s top political leadership cannot but be aware that the Alliance’s enlargement cannot appear a friendly action in spite of all peaceful assurances from the West. This was frankly acknowledged by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on the eve of the RNC anniversary meeting in Moscow^4.

---

^3 Grushko A. U Moskvy ostayutsya voprosy k NATO [Moscow Still Have Questions to NATO]. Vremya novostei. 2007. 2 July.

^4 Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2007. 26 June.
There is, however, another serious problem in relations between Russia and NATO. The problem is associated with the deplorable destiny of the CFE Treaty regime and is inseparably linked to NATO’s plans for the bloc’s further expansion.

U.S. plans to deploy some elements of its global BMD system on the territory of East European countries have put partnership relations to a severe test.

Meanwhile, in the opinion of Russia’s leadership, a certain compromise is possible to reach. Efforts should be made by the bilateral Russian-American interdepartmental delegation (Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry) and within the RNC framework so as to help contribute to achieving positive results.

The RNC exerts a positive impact as a whole on shaping a contemporary European security system. Its substantial potential should be brought to bear to contribute to the creation of an environment of genuine trust and truly partnership cooperation between the two sides with a view to preventing crisis situations and addressing their aftermath and promoting broad cooperation on security issues.

In the opinion of experts, RNC member states should focus their efforts on deepening practical cooperation, seeking to enhance its effectiveness and ensuring accommodation of interests of the parties concerned. Priority should be given to combating WMD proliferation, terrorism and drug-trafficking. In doing so, the partner states ought to refrain from unilateral actions, especially those that upset the existing military balance and can seriously aggravate the military-political situation.
9. ELIMINATION OF CW STOCKPILES IN RUSSIA

Alexander SAVELYEV and Vladimir KOUMACHEV

The year 2007 saw two important events in chemical disarmament. Ten years ago, one of the most comprehensive international treaties on the prohibition of an entire type of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) – entered into force. The second date – April 29, 2007, was the deadline for the completion of the second stage of chemical weapon (CW) stockpile destruction in Russia. Twenty per cent of the accumulated arsenal of these WMD in Russia, making up 8000 tons in absolute figures, had to be completely eliminated by the date.

Worthy of note is that skeptics’ pessimistic forecasts notwithstanding, Russia has completely fulfilled the relevant obligations it had assumed. As many as 8553.4 tons of CW stockpiles\(^1\) were destroyed to meet the deadline. A third stage lies ahead. It provides for the destruction of 45% of CW stockpiles in 2009 and, in the long run, for the complete elimination of CW, making up a total of 40,000 tons, in 2012.

In Russia, CW destruction has been carried on since 1995. For this purpose, the Federal special program (FSP) ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation’ was passed. Serious difficulties occurred at the first stages of its implementation, among others, due to the lack of funding. Consequently, the program has repeatedly been modified. Its second version was approved in 2001, and in 2007 other amendments were made to some of its provisions.

The total funding of CW destruction in the Russian Federation, scheduled till 2012, is to amount to 170 872.48 mn roubles (at 2004 prices). Of that sum, 161 365.94 mn roubles are to be allocated from the budget. The

---

\(^1\) Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. 14 June.
remaining part is expected to come from foreign assistance funds\(^2\). Russia spent 11 bn roubles on CW destruction in 2005, 20 bn – in 2006, and 28 bn – in 2007\(^3\).

The FSP provides predominantly for:

– Implementation of federal policy in the field of government scientific and technical, economic and environmental regulation of CW elimination, demilitarization or destruction of CW production facilities (CWPF), and in the field of social protection of citizens who are involved in CW destruction and of citizens who live or work in the zones of proposed CW destruction;

– Construction and operation of specially designed and equipped chemical weapon destruction facilities (CWDF);

– Demilitarization or dismantling of CWPF within the timeframe established by the CWC, and elimination of the aftermath of their operation;

– Conduct of R & D in CW disarmament;

– Establishment and employment of highly effective and reliable environmental monitoring systems, and providing conditions for the health protection of citizens who are involved in CW destruction and of citizens who live or work in the proposed CW destruction zones;

– Provision of information for citizens and legal entities, including public associations, on chemical disarmament and related issues.

The FSP provides for building capacities and infrastructure for seven CWDFs and their infrastructure. It also stipulates that after the elimination of the CW stockpiles CWDFs are to be converted to produce civilian goods in demand on the market. It should be noted that the FSP’s previous version oriented itself predominantly to a substantial gratuitous foreign assistance that had been promised to Russia by a number of states. Among them are Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and the European Union.

As of mid-2007, out of the promised assistance $2450 mn, Russia received, according to official data, some $450 mn\(^4\). For instance, the United States promised to provide 75 % of all funds needed for building an industrial zone for a CWDF in Shchuchye (the Kurgan oblast). The funds Russia received at the initial stage were spent on designing the facility, and the construction of the industrial zone began. But afterwards, for three years the United States did not allocate resources for the project. Hence, only a fifth of what had been planned originally was done by 2007. For this reason, the commissioning of the facility was put off to

\(^2\) [http://news.sarbc.ru/print.phtml?id=51715].

\(^3\) Speech delivered by Sergey Ivanov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, in the Bryansk oblast (region) on 3 May 2007.

\(^4\) Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. 14 June.
Nevertheless, as Russian officials see it, what has been done so far at the arsenal will allow to destroy all CWAs there by 2012.

Great Britain declared that it would provide no less that 100 mn pounds to Russia for chemical disarmament, but has allocated so far only 5.6 mn. Of the 750 mn euros promised by France, Russia has received nothing at all till now. Italy promised way back in 2003 to start funding the construction of a facility in Poche (the Bryansk oblast) and earmarked 360 mn euros. But funds for the construction of the facility has not yet been provided (prior to it a small amount of funds was received for the further development of industrial infrastructure in Shchuchye)\(^5\).

For the whole of 2007, international assistance provided to Russia by states parties to the CWC made up only 1.9 bn roubles. According to the Russian Audit Chamber’s verification, the sum is 4.2 bn roubles below the requisite assistance indicator scheduled for 2007. It may put the timeframe for the commissioning of three CWDFs slated for 2008 at risk\(^6\).

It is worth noting that CW destruction assistance to Russia is most urgent in the 2007–2009 period, when basic capacities are to be built for the destruction of the remaining CW stockpiles. However, the assistance has not been backed with any legal obligations. On the other hand, Russia’s failure to comply with its CWC commitments may entail sanctions affecting sales of chemicals on the world market, in particular, fertilizers – an important item in Russia’s exports.

Hence, the latest version of the CW destruction program provides for a kind of safety net: if assistance does not come from outside, appropriate funds will be allocated from the federal budget. Another source of financial resources may also possibly appear. It is likely to be obtained from the sales of arsenic derived from the treatment of part of the reaction mass (RM) that is formed after the detoxification of toxic agents and from the sales of about 600 000 tons of metal (chemical munitions carriers, shell and bomb casings, and CWA storages).

The fulfillment of CW destruction tasks on the Russian territory has been entrusted to the Federal CW Safe Storage and Destruction Directorate. The tasks include:

- Organization of work to ensure CW safe storage, transportation and destruction;
- Destruction of chemical munitions, in case of an accident, in their storage sites;
- Construction of CWDFs;
- Cooperation with foreign delegations on the issues within the jurisdiction of the Federal Directorate;

---

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) PRIME-TASS with reference to the Audit Chamber of Russia, 12 Dec. 2006.
– Participation in organizing personnel training for work at CWSFs and CWDFs;
– Provision of information for the population and NGOs in regions (areas) where CW storage and destruction facilities are located on matters of ensuring safety for the population and environmental protection when conducting CW destruction work.\(^7\)

As for CWA destruction techniques, they still rest on a two-step process. First the detoxication of CWAs extracted from shells and storages, and then the reaction mass that is thus formed is treated. However, the detoxication of VX gas-filled air chemical munitions that are stored at the Maradikovsky (the Kirov oblast) and Leonidovka (the Penza oblast) arsenals will be done in a different manner. Reagents will be pumped directly into the casings of big pieces of munitions. In three months’ time CWAs will lose their combat characteristics. It has been envisaged to destroy nerve gas (organ phosphorus) CWAs’ reaction mass obtained after detoxication at the same facilities where they are stored.

During CW destruction it has not been envisaged to transport CWAs from one facility to another. According to calculations, it is cheaper and safer to build CWDFs directly at CWA storage sites than to transport them over long distances. Otherwise, it would take to develop reliable and safe transport routes (given Russia’s conditions, these would be railroads to detour in some cases big cities). This is how the optimal decision has been made after mulling over various options. Meanwhile, the new program has been acknowledged by experts as realistic and giving hope that Russia’s CWC obligations will be honored.

As to storage techniques, Russia is to eliminate three categories of CW. The first one is composed of CWA stockpiles in storages, including big ones, which are nowhere to relocate. The second category includes CWAs in artillery pieces. And the third category comprises air chemical munitions. All of them have their own specifics and differ in design by size and CWA make-up. This fact was also a weighty reason for building a CWDF at each arsenal. Consequently, this has required building technological lines for each category of chemical weapons to ensure their destruction within the timeframe set by the CWC.

The CWC provides for CW destruction on Russian territory in four stages. The first stage stipulated the destruction of 1% of CW stockpiles. Russia has successfully fulfilled this obligation. As a result, the CWSF in Gorny (Saratov oblast), one of seven such facilities in Russia, has ceased to exist.

The utilization of the reaction mass obtained at the CWDF in Gorny and of lewisite dry salts that will be brought from a similar facility in

\(^7\) Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. 28 April.
Kambarka will be continued there till 2012. Besides, during the detoxification of 1143.2 tons of CWAs that were stored in Gorny the amount of the reaction mass produced there was four times bigger than originally expected. Now the facility is engaged in the utilization of the reaction mass. Each type of the RM has been treated in its own way, with each of them having a different make-up because different CWAs – mustard gas, lewisite and their double and triple mixtures – were initially utilized. For instance, high-temperature treatment has been applied to the RM of mustard gas in special German-made furnaces.

The reaction mass obtained after the detoxication of mustard gas and lewisite mixtures is generally ’rolled up’, in experts’ parlance, into bitumen. A bituminization unit was put into service there in June 2007. The RM placed into bitumen will be stored in specially designed cars at the test site built near the facility. According to facility specialists, though scientists are certain that such storage techniques are safe for the environment, the further ’conduct’ of the RM will be subsequently under control by means of special technology. Air samples will be taken regularly from the cars through special channels.

It has been decided to treat the RM of lewisite by electrolysis. Construction and assembly work is now in progress at the facility to build an electrolysis line for the RM of lewisite. The line was designed by the Giprosyntez Institute in Volgograd. An installation for dry salts treatment is to be built and commissioned in 2008-2009. A total of 3 to 4 bn roubles are to be spent on building a lewisite salts treatment complex.

During the second stage of the implementation of the CW destruction program, work was done mainly at the CWDFs in Kambarka (the Udmurt Republic) and in the settlement of Maradikovsky. In Kambarka (the facility was put into service in March 2006) 3300 tons of lewisite was stored. Some 3200 tons of lewisite were destroyed by the stated deadline. All CW stockpiles stored there are to be destroyed by late 2008 in compliance with Russia’s CWC obligations. It should be noted that a good deal of assistance in building the facility in Kambarka was provided by foreign partners, above all, Germany, and the European Union, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland.

Air chemical munitions filled with category 1 CWAs – organ phosphorus, as well as mustard gas and lewisite mixtures – weighing a total of more than 4000 tons, were stored in Maradikovsky. Work at the facility was most difficult because it was organ phosphorus CWA destruction techniques – the safest CWD technology – that began to be used there for the first time. This kind of technology helps greatly reduce a likely occurrence of emergency situations. At the first stage, hydrolysis – CWA detoxication – is made within munitions casings. This allows minimizing

---

8 Khimicheskoye Razoruzheniye [Chemical Disarmament]. 2007. 22 June.
a risk during the destruction of VX gas, a most dangerous CWA. At the second stage, a relatively safe reaction mass is extracted from air bomb casings and other munitions for further treatment and utilization.9

Russia is entering the third stage. At this stage, 45% or 18,000 tons of the country’s category 1 CW stockpiles (including category 1 CW already destroyed at the facility in Gorny)10 are to be destroyed by December 31, 2009.

Under the 2008–2010 Federal Budget, 75 bn roubles11 are to be allocated for CW stockpiles destruction as provided for by the FSP.

The fulfillment of the planned measures will be facilitated by the commissioning of new CWDFs, in particular, in Shchuchye (category 1 CW, all types of tube and rocket artillery munitions filed with organ phosphorus substances and lewisite) in 2008. Around that time, facilities under construction now are to become operational. Among them will be Pochep (category 1 CW, organ phosphorus CWA) and Leonidovka (category 1 CW, organ phosphorus substances) facilities. At the latter, a pilot destruction facility is to go online in mid-2008. A facility in Kizner is to be commissioned in 200912.

An important role in helping fulfill obligations at the third stage of CW destruction has been assigned to the Maradikovsky CWDF that has been in operation since 19 August 2006. The functioning of the facility was initially limited to filling reagents in air chemical munitions casings to neutralize category 1 (VX) CW. The projected amount of neutralizing agents was filled in munitions by February 2007. These are 19,657 air chemical munitions, accounting for 4,013.5 tons of VX as a total. The last piece of CW munitions was destroyed at the arsenal on 20 April 200713.

Apart from CW destruction at the Maradikovsky facility, it has been planned to destroy the reaction mass there. Work is now in progress to build a section for the thermal destruction of the reaction mass. The section is to start operating at design capacity by 2008. Besides, an irreversible deformation of munitions casings after CWA decontamination has been started there. Each piece of munitions after CWA recovery is also referred to as a CW but the one of CW category 3 – as an empty casing. But this category is also to be destroyed. It is only after it that the destruction of a piece of chemical munitions is considered to be complete.

Parallel to the destruction of CWAs stored at the arsenals, chemical weapon production facilities are being eliminated as part of efforts to fulfill CWC obligations. Out of 24 CWPFs, 16 are to be converted. Seven

---

9 Data released by the Kirov Regional Center for State Environmental Control and Monitoring.
10 Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. 28 April.
11 Khimicheskoye razoruzheniye [Chemical Disarmament]. 2007. 9 June.
13 Vse Rossiya (All Russia), no. 72 (1865). 2007. 25 April.
out of eight CWPFs have been destroyed physically. The last facility of this kind still remains to be eliminated\textsuperscript{14}.

\* \* \*

Summing up what has been described above, the fulfillment by Russia of the second stage of CW destruction in due time should be noted as a positive fact. Meanwhile, the process has not always gone ahead smoothly, and in an easy and simple manner. There have been difficulties both due to the lack of funding of the relevant programs (above all, on the part of the foreign partners) and legal regulatory disagreements that have arisen at times. Thus, as we have already pointed out a long-term delay in the United States providing declared funds for the construction of a CWDF in Shchuchye in the Kurgan oblast. Russia succeeded at the second stage in overcoming obstacles caused by a long delay in commissioning the facility, whereas the lack of appropriate support may affect the rates of CW destruction during the implementation of the CW destruction program at the third stage. Most importantly is that it is at the Shchuchye facility that the reaction mass from the arsenal in Kizner is to be destroyed. There are still unresolved problems related to the RM disposal (techniques for its final disposal and disposal locations are still being sought). The development and application of environmental improvement methods (cleansing the polluted soils and waters) after CW destruction is still a serious problem. Especially if we bear in mind that the pollution occurred, for the most part, prior to the signing of the CWC, while treatment of CWAs was not always safe for the environment.

At the second stage, legal regulatory problems kept arising at times in the process of international cooperation. Thus, for example, as compensation for providing CW destruction assistance Western countries, first of all, the United States, put forward demands about these countries’ inspectors be entitled to the monitoring and control of not only CWA storage and destruction facilities but also of a number of other military facilities, nuclear ones included, on Russian territory. Though these problems seem to have been removed today, they had in the past a quite adverse effect on progress in fulfilling the special federal program of chemical weapon destruction.

\textsuperscript{14} Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2007. 11 May.
Arms control efforts cover a broad spectrum of warfare means, ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to certain types of conventional armaments. A number of bilateral and multilateral agreements in this field have been signed over the past few decades contributing to international security and stability. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) is of special importance. The CWC provides for the complete elimination of this category of WMD worldwide by mid-2012.

However, freeing the world completely of chemical warfare means still remains, as we see it, an unresolved problem. As a matter of fact, the CWC does not stipulate the destruction or prohibition of the production, acquisition and deployment of a huge group of chemical agents that are generally referred to as non-lethal weapons (NLW).

Directive no. 3000.3: ‘Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons’, approved by the U. S. Defense Secretary in 1996, defines NLW as weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.

In recent years, increased interest has been displayed in NLW. It is now held that such agents can be used to effectively solve specific problems in police and peace missions. Several factors, in the opinion of Western experts, enhance interest in NLW. These factors include growing concern over fatalities among civilians in military actions and attempts to develop technologies and techniques of waging a ‘bloodless and humane’ warfare.

In addition, since many of ‘non-lethal’ technologies can be of dual use, progress in this area has been made due to government-sponsored

---

programs conducted by appropriate ministries and agencies (in particular, Defense, Interior, Energy Ministries, etc.) and investment by private companies having a stake in this kind of ‘dual’ use.

As for the development of NLW, especially of certain categories, chemical components included, there is obviously the lack of open information. In our view, it testifies to the importance that has been attached to such research. Thus, Neil Davison, a Bradford University researcher and an expert on NLW, mentions the controversial nature of research in this area and involvement of the military in it².

Generally speaking, NLW are not limited to equipment and tools that have long been known – rubber or plastic bullets, encasings, irritants and their sprays, electroshock devices and the like. There are also new types of NLW, including acoustic and microwave, laser and biochemical substances. Among them chemical NLW hold a place of their own.

It should be noted that the use of certain types of NLW, chemical agents, among others, can entail a number of negative consequences. Some ‘non-lethal’ technologies have considerable potential not only for suppressing civil disobedience but also for population control. (They are sometimes referred to as ‘political control technologies’). Serious anxieties have also been expressed about the trend to undermine existing international agreements, in particular, the CWC. Besides, NLW may appear in the arsenal of terrorist organizations.

As regards the targets they hit, chemical NLW can be divided into personnel incapacitants and agents affecting communications, transport, infrastructure facilities, food and fuel stocks, etc.

This paper deals with personnel chemical non-lethal incapacitants. Among them are riot control agents (RCA).

The CWC defines RCA as any chemical not listed in the Schedules, capable of rapidly causing in human organism physical disorder that disappear within a short while after their effect ceases³.

A more specific definition of RCA is given in the U. S. Army Textbook of Military Medicine. It says that RCA are chemical agents that cause a temporary restriction of man’s natural abilities by eye irritation (causing lacrimation or eyelid spasms) and upper airways irritation. These CA agents are often called ‘irritants’ or ‘irritating substances’ and are popularly referred to as ‘tear gas’⁴.

RCA can be delivered by means of various containers, grenades and sprays.

---


International law forbids the use of RCA in military actions. Thus, the CWC (Art. I) reads: ‘Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare’.

However, the U. S. supreme military command has approved the use of RCA in military operations, involving peace missions, hostage rescue, embassy-security operations, to mention but a few.

During the 2003 Iraqi campaign, RCA were brought to the territory of Iraq. U.S. field commanders were authorized to decide at the spot whether to use relevant agents or not. Addressing hearings of the House Armed Services Committee on 5 February 2003, the then U. S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cited circumstances under which U. S. military personnel were authorized to resort to RCA in Iraq. He said that they may employ them if Iraqi troops use local people as a ‘human shield’, or if Iraqi troops are in concealments together with women and children. To all appearances, the United States did not use such agents in the Iraqi campaign. Nevertheless, prior to starting the war Washington was hashing out outlook for a revision of the CWC so as to legitimize the use of RCA in the theatre of operations.

Of late, there has certainly been interest in another type of chemical NLW – incapacitants also known as ‘calmatives’, ‘gases making a person sleepy’ or ‘agents making a person motionless’.

The 2003 report issued by the U. S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) indicates that studies into incapacitants are being conducted at the U. S. Army Edgewood chemical and biological center … after ten years’ interruption in R & D. One of such projects was tasked to produce a device for slinging derivative fentanil5.

In regard to calmatives, the 2004 report ‘Future Strategic Strike Forces’ released by the Special Commission of the U. S. Defense Department Science Board noted, in particular, that incapacitants can be regarded as agents to be used in various complicated situations, in which neutralization of individuals can ensure the final success of a mission. That being so, the report also stated that a fundamental technicality was to maintain a balance between effectiveness (that is, a given target has really been ‘calmed down’) and the safety factor (that is, avoiding an excessive impact on and, as a result, the death toll of neutral persons)6.

Worthy of note is that incapacitants differ from chemical RCA in their mechanism of operation. RCA are chemical agents that cause a local eye or mucosa irritation. Unlike them, incapacitants affect central nervous system cellular receptors, causing various human organism reactions. Such reactions are generally manifested in altering the mindset, physical condition, cognitive and physical abilities. They cause disorientation, un-

5 http://www.nap.edu/books/0309082889/html
6 http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/fssf.pdf
consciousness and even result in death. In this case the border between chemistry and biology becomes eroded, because substances that exert an impact like that on cellular receptors can be both of chemical (so-called toxic chemicals) and biological (so-called bioregulators) origin. Mark Wheelis, an expert of University of California in microbiology, called the substances a potential biochemical weapon.

These substances are found somewhere in between ‘traditional’ chemical toxic agents (TA) (nerve gas and blistering agents) and ‘traditional’ biological pathogenic substances (bacteria, viruses and intracellular parasites). The use of toxic agents that are to be found on the border between chemistry and biology are subject to prohibition both under the CWC and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC). The uses of synthetic toxic chemicals are prohibited by the CWC. However, the border between synthetic toxic chemicals and ‘bioregulators’ and ‘toxins’ is very vague. According to M. Wheelis, analogues of bioregulators and toxins are banned under the BTWC. He argues that synthetic chemical analogues (that is, medicine and pharmaceutical agents) that affect human body cellular receptors in the same way as corresponding bioregulators do may also be considered as subject to prohibition under the BTWC.

Moreover, a report issued by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) states that incapacitants can be used to conceal chemical lethal weapons programs. The report also argues that a synergic pair of incapacitants can be possibly used and, when used together, they will produce a lethal effect.

The reversibility of impact coupled with the absence of long-term pathogenic changes in a victim’s organism can be regarded as a key specific feature of any NLW targeted against humans. However, some studies into incapacitants have proved that their existing types do not meet these criteria and that the mortality rate in case of their use may approximate the mortality rate when some types of conventional armaments are used. It has also been noted that even the use of an ‘ideal’ substance (having a high potential and a high degree of safety for a person’s health) may lead to fatalities because of people’s different age groups and health condition and also due to an overdosing that may possibly occur or an uneven concentration of the given substance when being sprayed.

---

8 Ibid. p. 52.
The FAS working group on CB weapons developed a mathematical model for assessing fatalities that may occur when incapacitants are used. According to their model-based conclusions, the mortality rate may reach at least 10%. The researchers concluded that such a rate is comparable with that of traditional ‘lethal’ technologies. Thus, they noted, for instance, that in military actions fatalities caused by small arms are about 35% of the total death tolls, by artillery fire – 20%, and by grenades – 10%.

According to another research, some chemical agents referred to as NLW are in fact more toxic than ‘traditional’ TA in the sense that to achieve effect a small quantity of the given substance will be sufficient. For instance, lophentanil (derivative of phentanil) is much more toxic than nerve gases. As little as 0.025 mg per kg of a human’s body can put a person under anaesthesia, that is, hundreds of times less than a lethal dose caused by VX gas.

The staff of the Applied Research Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University who worked for several years together with the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) released the findings of their research into potential incapacitants. They provide a definition of NLW which says that these are substances with capability to suppress or hinder a person’s central nervous system functioning. Furthermore, according to their study, these can be sedative-hypnotic substances, anesthetics, miorelaxants, opiate analgesics, anxiolytics, antipsychotic substances, tranquillizers and some types of narcotics. The study describes a number of substances that have a high potential to serve as a basis for producing incapacitants.

The same study recommended the establishment of partner relations between armaments developers and the pharmacological and biotechnological industry to identify new incapacitants. Research focus-groups in the pharmaceutical industry conduct research in developing more effective medicines for treatment of various mental diseases. Many types of receptors under their investigation are of interest for incapacitants developers.

Recommendations to further develop research in incapacitants and the means of their use were also given in the U.S. National Research Council’s report commissioned by the JNLWD.

The objectives outlined in the Investment project concerning the JNLWD include the need to determine achievements in the pharmaceutical industry and other industries with a view to a possible non-lethal use; organize round-table discussions among the military to map out a range of desired effects in operations; establish an information basis of potential

12 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/cbwhcb61.pdf
13 http://www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/psucalm.pdf
14 http://www.nap.edu/books/0309082889/html
candidate-businesses; and present a list of prospective candidates to the chief of the military justice directorate for preliminary legal consideration. European countries also began to display interest in incapacitants. The 3rd European Symposium on NLW in 2005 considered the document ‘Pharmacological Non-Lethal Weapons’. Dr. Josef Fusek of the Military-Medical Academy of the Czech Republic’s armed forces in Gradets Kralov has been one of the authors. He has also been the Czech Republic’s representative in the group to study the Human Effects of Non-Lethal Technologies (HFM-073) at NATO’s Research and Technology Organization.

The work was funded by the Czech army under Defense Ministry project 03021100007. True, the paper indicates that the new chemical weapons can be widely employed by police, while its use for military purposes goes against international law. Nevertheless, the fact that studies like those have been funded by the military was not overlooked by researchers.

The study conducted in the Czech Republic examined substances such as dissociated anesthetics (ketamine), benzodiazepines (midazolam), alpha2-adrenoreceptor agonists (dexmedetomidine) and opiates (phentanil analogues). In other words, the same agents that had been dealt with in the work by the scientists of the Applied Research Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University. In their work Czech scientists focused on the means and techniques for the use of these substances. A traditional technique is spraying when agents get into a person’s organism through upper airways. In addition to this, Czech experts suggested a different technique – use of dimetilsulfoxide to facilitate the agents’ absorption through skin.

The use of chemical non-lethal agents in peace-keeping and similar operations poses a challenge. It should be noted that the United States is the only state party to the CWC that contemplates the use of such agents on foreign territory. Such actions, if undertaken, can only lead to the aggravation of the situation in conflict zones and will in no way help strengthen regional and international security. This danger was emphasized by the Council on Foreign Relations (USA). The Council indicated that studies in biology and medicine related to NLW would lead to scientific accomplishments that might promote development, production and use of lethal, and even more so, of non-lethal chemical and biological agents applicable for military purposes. The Council also added that studies into NLW will bring nearer a day when materials like these are avail-

17 http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/BNLWRPResearchReportNo8_Mar06.pdf
able not only to the American agencies but also to those who can use them against the USA\textsuperscript{18}.

All of this may also lead to an arms race in NLW. It may provoke other countries to build their own arsenals of chemical NLW. Moreover, it may adversely affect the outlook for disarmament and arms control as a whole, and open up new channels for arms proliferation.

Judging by information from open sources, Russian Defense Ministry does not develop chemical NLW and has no plans to use them in military actions. As for fighting terrorism within the country, the use of such agents is considered permissible, provided it does not contravene the norms of international and Russian law.

Nevertheless, as we see it, after the Dubrovka hostage crisis in October 2002, the chiefs of the Russian special services have become more cautious when it comes to their use. It should be stressed that ambiguities and lack of transparency in these matters (even as compared to the information practices in the West), are not consistent with efforts to strengthen the CWC regime.

\textsuperscript{18}http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Nonlethal_TF.pdf
11. RUSSIA AND CANWFZ

Vladimir SOTNIKOV

On 8 September 2006 Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan’s Ambassador signed in the city of Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) the Treaty on Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ)\(^1\). The signing ceremony crowned over 10 years of negotiations under the UN auspices.

On 6 December 2006 the UN General Assembly at its 61st session adopted the Draft Resolution submitted by the delegation of Uzbekistan on behalf of all five Central Asian states. 141 member states voted in favor of it\(^2\). Resolution 61/68 ‘Establishment of Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia’ was supported by Russia, China, newly independent states as well as by Latin American countries and the majority of Asian and African states. Three states – the USA, Great Britain and France voted against it and 36 states abstained from voting.

Resolution 61/88 states that the establishment of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on the basis of agreements concluded between the states of the region on a voluntary basis, represents an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, encouraging cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy and ecological rehabilitation of the territories suffering from radioactive contamination as well as towards strengthening regional and international peace and security. The resolution also emphasizes that the CANWFZ is an effective contribution to the fight against international terrorism and to the prevention of nuclear materials and technologies falling into the hands of non-state actors, in the first place, of terrorists.

\(^1\) Some political scientists include into the term ‘Central Asia’ the five post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistan. In the author’s view the term ‘Central Asia’ covers five independent states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

The main provision of the document coincides with the principal obligation of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) – parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Semipalatinsk treaty prohibits the testing, development, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices (NED) by Central Asian countries.

The Treaty also deals with issues of environmental safety and associated measures. Under Art. 3 ‘Each Party undertakes not to allow the dumping of radioactive wastes of other states in its territory’\(^3\). Art. 6 obliges the parties to ‘promote any efforts on environmental rehabilitation of the territories contaminated as a result of past activities related to the development, production or storing’ of NW or other NEDs.

The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is allowed (Art. 7). Under this provision Kazakhstan, in particular, may carry out its plans involving the construction of atomic power facilities.

The participating states undertook to observe provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)\(^4\) and conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA and adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol\(^5\) (Art. 8). Besides, they undertook to apply physical protection measures to their nuclear materials and facilities at least as effectively as the measures required in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear material\(^6\)

---

\(^3\)According to the proposal of Kazakhstan, the Treaty allows to import and make disposals of wastes of low and medium level of radioactivity (under the observation of standards and procedures adopted by the IAEA). Kazakhstan intends to make amendments in its laws for the purpose of allowing disposals of radioactive wastes in accordance with its commercial interests. This is confirmed by the submission of a Draft Environmental Code in September 2006 to the Kazakhstan’s Parliament. According to Art. 311 of this Draft the Government provides for imports of dangerous wastes to the territory of Kazakhstan ‘with the aim of its use (utilization, reprocessing, recycling) and disposal’: Kutnayeva N, Akhtamzyan I, ‘On the signing of the Treaty of Nuclear- Weapon- Free Zone in Central Asia’; Security Index, no.1 (81), Volume 13, 2007, p. 135.


and in the recommendations and guiding principles, developed by the IAEA (Art. 9). Thus, the Semipalatinsk Treaty serves counter-terrorist objectives as well.

Under a Protocol to the treaty China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty.

Russia favors the CANWFZ as an initiative strengthening regional security and consistent with the existing international practices in creating nuclear-weapons-free zones.

The area of the operation of the treaty. Russia has advocated the participation of all states of Central Asia in the zone. Russian experts emphasized the requirement that the zone should constitute a unified space without any lacunas in it.

Transit of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The solution of this question remains at the discretion of the participating states.

Negative security assurances. Russia is willing to provide negative guarantees to all the participants of the CANWFZ. The scope of these guarantees is subject to negotiations. They should be co-related with the guarantees of other nuclear powers and the military doctrine of the RF.

CANWFZ and the issues of the Caspian Sea. Prior to the resolution of issues involved in the Caspian Sea statute it should not be included in the area of the operation of the Semipalatinsk treaty. If in the future all interested parties reach agreement on the partition of the sea surface, the national waters of the Central Asian states may be included into the CANWFZ.

CANWFZ and the Collective Security Treaty (CST). The 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security provides for military-political guarantees (including nuclear ones) to its members. It remains to be seen how these guarantees could be made consistent with the commitments under the CANWFZ.

Participation of the contiguous states in the non-nuclear-weapons zone. Russia is in favor of retaining the option for such states to join the CANWFZ. Some Russian experts argue that is important that the statute of military denuclearization of Central Asia is respected by such states as India and Pakistan.

Entry of the Semipalatinsk treaty into force. Russia believes that the treaty should enter into force after its ratification by all parties and the ratification of the Protocol by all recognized NWS.

---

convention was changed to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.

7 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan alongside with Russia, Armenia and Belarus are parties to the CST.

The signing of the Semipalatinsk treaty is an important stage on the way of establishing CANWFZ. The next stage is the ratification of the treaty in accordance with each party’s legislation. Among five Central Asian states the treaty was ratified by Kyrgyzstan (22 March 2007) and by Uzbekistan (2 April 2007).

With regard to the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on CANWFZ by the ‘nuclear five’ two scenarios are possible.

*The first* (the most probable): Russia and China would sign the Protocol after the ratification of the Treaty by all five Central Asian states. While the USA, Great Britain and France, apparently, will stall on signing and insist on the necessity of holding consultations in the format of all NWS and between them and the Central Asian states parties to the Semipalatinsk treaty.

*The second* scenario (less probable): ‘the nuclear five’ would sign the Protocol to the Semipalatinsk Treaty after its ratification by all the parties. However, such a development would become possible only in the event of the overall world political situation getting better and greater willingness of the Western NWS to seek compromises. About 2009 the Semipalatinsk treaty might be ratified by all states parties to the CANWFZ. As far as the signing of the Protocol is concerned much would depend on the relations of the Western NWS with the Central Asian states and their ability to effectively promote their interests in Central Asia without antagonizing Russia and China.
SYNOPSIS OF FEDERAL LAW NO. FZ 198 (2007) ¹

Pyotr ROMASHKIN

Table 1. General Characteristics of the Federal Budgets for 2007–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Domestic Product</strong></td>
<td>31 225 000.0</td>
<td>35 000 000.0</td>
<td>39 690 000.0</td>
<td>44 800 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rate of increase, %, 2007=100.0)</td>
<td>(112.1)</td>
<td>(127.1)</td>
<td>(143.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget receipts</strong></td>
<td>6 965 300.0</td>
<td>6 644 447.4</td>
<td>7 465 446.8</td>
<td>8 089 965.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rate of increase, %, 2007=100.0)</td>
<td>(95.4)</td>
<td>(107.2)</td>
<td>(116.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget receipts from oil and gas revenues only</td>
<td>2 383 112.8</td>
<td>2 351 908.0</td>
<td>2 348 434.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Share in total receipts, %)</td>
<td>(35.8)</td>
<td>(31.5)</td>
<td>(29.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total budget expenditures</strong></td>
<td>5 463 500.0</td>
<td>6 570 297.7</td>
<td>7 451 153.8</td>
<td>8 089 965.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rate of increase, 2007=100.0)</td>
<td>(120.2)</td>
<td>(136.4)</td>
<td>(148.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas transfer</td>
<td>2 135 000.0</td>
<td>2 103 570.0</td>
<td>2 016 000.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Fund</td>
<td>3 500 000.0</td>
<td>3 969 000.0</td>
<td>4 480 000.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Internal Debt (target)</td>
<td>1 824 700.7</td>
<td>2 275 764.8</td>
<td>2 856 847.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State External Debt (target)</td>
<td>43.3 bn dollars (32.1 bn euros)</td>
<td>43.9 bn dollars (32.3 bn euros)</td>
<td>45.0 bn dollars (33.0 bn euros)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate (%)</td>
<td>8.0-8.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget balance (+/-)</td>
<td>+1 501 800.0</td>
<td>+74 149.7</td>
<td>+14 293.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Some indicators have been upgraded to main characteristics of the Federal budget: a magnitude of oil and gas revenues; a magnitude of oil and gas transfer; a magnitude of the Reserve Fund; State internal and external debts limits. Rates of increase for budget expenditures will exceed significantly rates of increase for budget receipts. As a result a budget will be balanced by 2010. A magnitude of oil and gas revenues will stay approximately at the same level and that is why their share in total budget receipts will go down from 35.8 percent in 2008 to 29.0 percent in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures, incl. Disclosed part of total expenditures (according to Supplements 10 and 12 to the Federal Law)</td>
<td>5 463 479.9</td>
<td>6 570 297.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>7 451 153.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8 089 965.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 781 045.0 (88 % of total expenditures)</td>
<td>6 549 282.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7 068 971.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>808 196.5</td>
<td>828 777.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>899 842.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>963 098.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense (total), incl. Disclosed Expenditures (according to Supplements 10 and 12 to the Federal Law)</td>
<td>822 035.9</td>
<td>446 742.6 (54.3 % of total defense expenditures)</td>
<td>509 102.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>566 741.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>596 187.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security and Law Enforcement Disclosed Expenditures (according to Supplements 10 and 12 to the Federal Law)</td>
<td>662 867.2</td>
<td>521 841.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>642 614.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>693 509.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economy</td>
<td>497 229.5</td>
<td>702 319.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>789 623.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>528 553.1</td>
<td>-33.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Continuation of Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Communal services</td>
<td>53 024.5</td>
<td>54 559.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>42 396.3</td>
<td>-22.3</td>
<td>44 980.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>-15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Protection</td>
<td>8096.5</td>
<td>9 329.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10 208.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10 963.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>277 939.3</td>
<td>307 194.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>313 636.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>339 854.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Cinema Industry and Mass Media</td>
<td>65 109.7</td>
<td>83 813.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>73 008.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>67 579.0</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare and Sport</td>
<td>206 373.5</td>
<td>211 686.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>245 224.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>295 356.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>215 565.8</td>
<td>270 863.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>342 671.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>396 542.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-budget Transfers</td>
<td>1 844 346.5</td>
<td>2 281 558.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>2 423 119.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2 720 972.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Expenditures on ‘National Defense’, ‘Culture, Cinema Industry and Mass Media’, ‘Social Services’, and ‘Inter-budget Transfers’ will rise at highest rates. The new Federal budget law (compared to previous laws) provides in Chapters 1 and 2 the total sum of real federal expenditures and in budget supplements 10 and 12 gives only a sum of disclosed expenditures. But the supplement with expenditures on chapters and sections has been removed.

It should be taken into account that expenditures on some chapters are divided between various Ministries and agencies. For example, expenditures on ‘National Defense’ are spread among the Ministry of Defense (the main recipient), the Ministry of Industry and Energy, the Rosatom, and others. On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense receives outlays from other than ‘National Defense’ chapter like ‘General Government’ (Section of ‘International Relations and International cooperation’), ‘Housing and Communal Services’, ‘Education’, ‘Culture, etc.’, ‘Healthcare, etc.’, and ‘Social Services’
### Table 3. Expenditures on ‘National Defense’ (mn roubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Defense, incl. Disclosed Expenditures</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>822 035.9</td>
<td>446 742.6</td>
<td>(54.3 % of total exp.)</td>
<td>509 102.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>566 741.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>596 187.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the RF</td>
<td>02 01</td>
<td>370 800.0</td>
<td>419 920.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>478 932.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>513 738.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization and Reserve Forces Training</td>
<td>02 03</td>
<td>5900.5</td>
<td>5243.7</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>5759.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6223.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>02 05</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied Defense R&amp;D</td>
<td>02 08</td>
<td>120 465.4</td>
<td>9070.5</td>
<td>(total approved exp.)</td>
<td>8444.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8321.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Defense Expenditures</td>
<td>02 09</td>
<td>79 054.4</td>
<td>74 783.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>73 520.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>67 777.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 02 01 ‘Armed Forces of the RF’ includes expenditure on the day-to-day duty of the Armed Forces (pay for military personnel and wages and salaries for civilian personnel; expenditure on subsistence and material supply for military personnel; combat training; special fuels and lubricants; transportation and communications; communal services), and also on special federal programs related to the National Defense.

Total sum of disclosed expenditures on this section is 419 920.9 mn roubles in 2008, 478 932 mn roubles in 2009 and 513 738.6 mn roubles in 2010, including:

- Combat training: 2008 – 22 300.8 mn roubles, 2009 – 23 252.2 mn roubles, 2010 – 23 685.6 mn roubles (2007 – 17 000.0 mn roubles);
- Material and technical supply: 2008 – 100 172.9 mn roubles, 2009 – 104 001.8 mn roubles, 2010 – 114 095.9 mn roubles;
- Military formations (organs and units): 2008 – 270 589.6 mn roubles, 2009 – 318 307.2 mn roubles, 2010 – 339 225.4 mn roubles, including:
  - Pay for military personnel (including top military officials): 2008 – 165 979.0 mn roubles, 2009 – 206 422.7 mn roubles, 2010 – 215 556.7 mn roubles (122 794.7 mn roubles in 2007);
  - Subsistence supplies: 2008 – 2185 6.2 mn roubles, 2009 – 238 27.4 mn roubles, 2010 – 273 76.2 mn roubles;
  - Material supply for military personnel (clothing, footwear, etc.): 2008 – 8207.9 mn roubles, 2009 – 8698.2 mn roubles, 2010 – 9262.3 mn roubles;
  - Additional and compensation payments to military personnel and personnel with equal status, and retired personnel: 2008 – 462 4.5 mn roubles, 2009 – 465 2.5 mn roubles, 2010 – 465 2.5 mn roubles;
- Mortgage-housing system for military personnel: 2008 – 8270.0 mn roubles, 2009 – 11 747.7 mn roubles, 2010 – 14 228.7 mn roubles;

Section 02 03 ‘Mobilization and Reserve Forces Training’ includes expenditures on military commissariats activity (medical examination and initial registration of civilians eligible for military service and implementation of conscription, and also a short-term up-grade training for civilians-in military reserve forces): 2008 – 5243.7 mn roubles, 2009 – 5759.3 mn roubles, 2010 – 6223.5 mn roubles, including:

- Activity of the military commissariats (medical examination and initial registration of civilians eligible for military service and implementation of conscription): 468.7 mn roubles for the period of 2008 – 2010;
- A short-term up-grade training for civilians – in the military reserve forces: 2008 – 4775.0 mn roubles, 2009 – 5290.6 mn roubles, 2010 – 5754.9 mn roubles;


Section 02 08 ‘Applied Defense R&D’. Disclosed expenditures: 2008 – 9070.5 mn roubles, 2009 – 8444.5 mn roubles, 2010 – 8321.8 mn roubles. The Section includes (among others) expenditures on R&D related to an implementation of international treaties and obligations for arms limitations and reductions, and confidence building measures, and also related to elimination of chemical weapons (2008 – 1014.9 mn roubles, 2009 – 221.0 mn roubles, 2010 – 230.9 mn roubles)

Section 02 08 ‘Other Defense Expenditures’. Disclosed expenditures include special federal programs, investments in building and constructions, which are not a part of special federal programs, military formations (agencies, units), utilization and liquidation of ammunitions and military equipment, implementation of international treaties and obligations for arms limitations and reductions, state administration of national defense: 2008 – 74783.5 mn roubles, 2009 – 73520.8 mn roubles, 2010 – 67777.1 mn roubles (2007– 79 054.4 mn roubles).

Expenditures on special federal programs: 2008 – 38153.1 mn roubles, 2009 – 39429.5 mn roubles, 2010 – 34536.5 mn roubles, including:


- ‘State borders of the Russian Federation’: 2008 – 102.5 mn roubles, 2009 – 102.5 mn roubles, 2010 – 122.9 mn roubles;


‘Federal budget investments in capital construction projects other than included in special federal programs’: 2008 – 27 517.6 mn roubles, 2009 – 23 377.3 mn roubles, 2010 – 24 594.7 mn roubles, including:
- Building and construction of general purpose objects (including residential construction): 2008 – 10 389.1 mn roubles, 2009 – 3207.7 mn roubles, 2010 – 2824.9 mn roubles (we can see a quite clear trend: investments are planned to go down);


‘State administration of National Defense’: 2008 – 5713.9 mn roubles, 2009 – 7261.1 mn roubles, 2010 – 5011.3 mn roubles, including:
- Subsidies to federal military-industrial enterprises: 2008 – 1730.0 mn roubles, 2009 – 2266.7 mn roubles;
- Subsidies to strategic military-industrial enterprises in order to prevent bankruptcy: 2008 – 3500.0 mn roubles, 2009 – 4500.0 mn roubles, 2010 – 4500.0 mn roubles.

Total budget expenditures on capital constructions within the chapter ‘National Defense’: 2008 – 51 861.7 mn roubles; 2009 – 44 208.8 mn roubles; 2010 – 41 757.5 mn roubles. As a result these expenditures will be cut by 19.6 % in 2010 compared to 2008.

Expenditures on special federal programs (SFP) in the chapter ‘National Defense’:


Chapter 01 'General Government' (Section ‘International relations and cooperation’): 2008 – 4.3 mn roubles; 2009 – 4.4 mn roubles; 2010 – 4.4 mn roubles.

Chapter 05 ‘Housing and Communal services’: 2008 – 31 157.6 mn roubles; 2009 – 28 408.8 mn roubles; 2010 – 31 110.5 mn roubles. Expenditures under this chapter are aimed at providing housing for military personnel.

Chapter 07 'Education': 2008 – 32 561.3 mn roubles; 2009 – 36 251.2 mn roubles; 2010 – 38 488.4 mn roubles. The funds are planned to be spent on general and special military education.

Chapter 08 ‘Culture’: 2008 – 1728.8 mn roubles; 2009 – 2571.3 mn roubles; 2010 – 2744.7 mn roubles (the purpose of expenditures is to support military cultural centers and mass media).
Chapter 09 ‘Healthcare and Sport’: 2008 – 23 126.1 mn roubles; 2009 – 26 134.4 mn roubles; 2010 – 30 937.3 mn roubles. Funds will be spent to support a functioning of hospitals and other medical service facilities.

Chapter 10 ‘Social services’. Expenditures under this chapter include pensions and other payments (including various compensations) to retired servicemen and members of their families, and also some social benefits: 2007 – 88 105.6 mn roubles (pensions for retired servicemen – 80 541.9 mn roubles); 2008 – 102 658.2 mn roubles (94 892.8 mn roubles); 2009 – 2537.4 mn roubles (359.8 mn roubles); 2010 – 2182.1 mn roubles (the Ministry of Defense will not be responsible anymore for pensions for retired servicemen giving up this duty to other government departments).

Chapter 11 ‘Inter-budget transfers’: 2007– 1060.0 mn roubles; 2008 – 1504.0 mn roubles; 2009 – 1605.4 mn roubles; 2010 – 1965.1 mn roubles. The funds under this section are to be spent on initial selection of persons who are eligible for military service in territories where there are no military commissariats.

***

According to official data, provided to the State Duma by the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, a share of defense outlays in the total federal budget expenditures will reach in 2008 – 14.6 %. In 2009 it will amount to 14.2 %, and in 2010 – 14.7 %.

Taking into account these figures expenditures on the National Defense in 2008 will rise to 859 263.5 mn roubles (rate of increase compared to 2007 amounts to 4.5 %), in 2009 – to 1 058 063.8 mn roubles (+23.1 % compared to 2008).


Despite growing national defense expenditures, some experts express concern over the quantity and quality of the purchased armament and military equipment and question the effectiveness of defense investments¹.

¹ Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no.3, 2007.
ANNEX. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL (JANUARY – DECEMBER 2007)¹

Tamara FARNASOVA

1. LEGISLATIVE ACTS


Passed by the SD on 16 February 2007; approved by the FC on 21 February 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 3 March 2007.

The Agreement was signed in Paris on 7 November 2003.

Federal Law no. FZ 99 of 7 June 2007 ‘On the Ratification of the Agreement between the States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty and Other States Participating in the «Partnership for Peace» Program, on the Status of their Forces and on the Supplementary Protocol to it’

Passed by the SD on 23 May 2007; approved by the FC on 25 May 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 7 June 2007.

The Agreement was signed in Vilnius on 21 April 2005. The Supplementary Protocol to it was signed in Sophia on 28 April 2006.

¹ The unofficial translation. The source: Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossii [Statute Book of the Russian Federation].

List of abbreviations: FZ – federalnyi zakon [federal law]; SD – the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; FC – the Council of the Federation (Federation Council) of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
Passed by the SD on 23 May 2007; approved by the FC on 6 June 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 19 June 2007.

Passed by the SD on 15 June 2007; approved by the FC on 22 June 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 5 July 2007.
The Protocol was signed on 15 June 2006.

Passed by the SD on 6 July 2007; approved by the FC on 11 July 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 24 July 2007.
The law entered into force on 1 January 2008.

Passed by the SD on 14 September 2007; approved by the FC on 19 September 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 2 October 2007.
The Additional Protocol was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000.

Passed by the SD on 7 November 2007; approved by the FC on 16 November 2007 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 1 December 2007.
Russia formally suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty from the night of 12-13 December 2007. In reality the suspension means tem-
porary termination by Russia of the provision of data to its Western partners on numbers and location of the forces in the western part of the country and on the reception and carrying out of inspections.

2. NORMATIVE ACTS

Decree no. 115 of the President of the Russian Federation of 31 January 2007 ‘On the Introduction of the Changes to the List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies which Can be used in the Development of Chemical Weapons and which are Subject to Export Control Approved by Decree no. 1082 of the President of the Russian Federation of 28 August 2001’

The changes are listed in the Supplement attached to Decree no. 115.

Decree no. 119 of the President of the Russian Federation of 5 February 2007 ‘On the Federal Agency for the Supply of Armaments, and Military Special Equipment and Materiel’

The Decree provides for the creation of the Federal Agency for the Supply of Armaments, and Military Special Equipment and Materiel which is to serve as a state customer on the state defense order for the total nomenclature of armaments, military special equipment and materiel.


The Decree states that all state institutions, and industrial, commercial, financial, transport and other enterprises, and firms, banks, organizations, and other legal and physical persons under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation shall proceed in their activities from the injunction of 14 October 2006 and until a special directive prohibits the following activities: transit transport through the Russian territory, export from the territory of the RF as well as beyond Russian borders with the use of naval ships and airplanes under the Russian flag the following items independently from the country of their origin: combat tanks, pieces of large-caliber artillery systems, war planes, combat helicopters, ballistic missiles, rockets and rocket launchers; all items, materials, equipment, goods and
technologies, defined by the UN Security Council and by the Committee of the UNSC, which could contribute to the implementation of the DPRK programs related to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and which are in the Lists of equipment, materials and relevant technologies used for military purposes and which are subjected to export control, approved by corresponding Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation.


The Ordinance approves the following documents: 1. Regulation for the Employment of Weapons and combat equipment by RAF for addressing the threat of a terrorist act in the air space for the suppression of such a terrorist act; 2. The regulation for the employment of weapons and combat equipment by the RAF to manage the threat of a terrorist act in the internal waters, in the territorial sea and on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation and ensure security of national naval navigation, including in the underwater space; 3. The regulation on the employment of weapons and combat equipment and special means by the RAF participating in carrying out a counter-terrorism operation. The full text of these regulations is attached.

The Ordinance also approves the Status of the Military-Industrial Commission and its composition.


The Ordinance approves the draft of the Agreement submitted by the MOD.


The Agreement was signed in Kiev on 28 February 1997.

ligations of the Russian Federation in the Field of Chemical Disar-
mament’

The Ordinance approves the Regulations regarding the stated differ-
entiation. The full text of this document is attached.

Decree no. 872 of the President of the Russian Federation of 13 July
2007 ‘On the Suspension by the Russian Federation of the Operation
of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and of the
Relevant International Treaties’

The Operation of the Treaty and of the related agreements is sus-
pended with reference to extraordinary circumstance pertaining to the
contents of the CFE Treaty of 19 November 1990 and affecting security
of the Russian Federation.

Directive no. 927-p of the Government of the Russian Federation of
13 July 2007 ‘On the Signing of the Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kyrgyz
Republic on the Preservation of the Specialization of the Enterprises
Participating in the Production of Items of Military Assignment’

Ordinance no. 456 of the Government of the Russian Federation of
19 July 2007 ‘On the Approval of the Regulations of Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities, and Nuclear Materials
Storage Sites’

The regulations take into account international obligations of the
Russian Federation and IAEA recommendations related to the physical
protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. The full text of the
corresponding document is attached.

Decree no. 1030 of the President of the Russian Federation of
6 August 2007 ‘On Amending the List of Equipment, Materials and
Technologies, which Can be Used in Developing Rocket Weapons and
which are Subject to Export Control’

The Decree is supplied with an attachment containing amendments
to the mentioned List.

Directive no. 1155-p of the Government of the Russian Federation of
3 September 2007 ‘On the Signing of the Memorandum on Mutual
Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation
and the Government of Indonesia in the Field of Cooperation in
Combating Terrorism’

The Directive contains the draft of the mentioned memorandum
submitted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Directive no. 554 of the President of the Russian Federation of 6 October 2007 ‘On the Signing of the Treaty between the States Participants in the Community of Independent States on Combating the Legalization (laundering) of Criminal Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism’

The Directive approves the Government’s proposal regarding the signing of the mentioned treaty.

3. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA

Draft

Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects

The States Parties to This Treaty,
Reaffirming that outer space plays and ever-increasing role in the future development of humankind,
Emphasizing the rights to explore and use outer space freely for peaceful purposes,
Interested in keeping outer space from turning into an arena for military confrontation, in assuring security in outer space and safe functioning of space objects,
Recognizing that prevention of the placement of weapons and of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,
Desiring to keep outer space as a sphere where no weapon of any kind is placed,
Noting that the existing agreements on arms control and disarmament relevant to outer space, including the bilateral ones, and the existing legal regimes concerning the use of outer space play a positive role in exploration of outer space and in regulating outer space activities, and should be strictly complied with; although they are unable to effectively prevent the placement of weapons and an arms race in outer space,
Recalling the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, where, inter alia, a conviction was expressed in the need for examination of further measures in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Have agreed on the following:

**Article I**

For the purpose of this Treaty:

a) the term “outer space” means space beyond the elevation of approximately 100 km above ocean level of the Earth;

b) the term “outer space object” means any device, designed for functioning in outer space, being launched into an orbit around any celestial body, or being in the orbit around any celestial body, or on any celestial body except the Earth, or leaving the orbit around any celestial body towards this celestial body, or moving from any celestial body towards another celestial body, or placed in outer space by any other means;

c) the term “weapons in outer space” means any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them;

d) a weapon will be considered as “placed” in outer space if it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving this orbit, or is stationed on a permanent basis somewhere in outer space;

e) the “use of force” or “threat of force” means any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.

**Article II**

States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states or international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by the treaty.

**Article III**

Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to prevent any activity prohibited by the treaty on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
Article IV

Nothing in this Treaty can be interpreted as impeding the rights of the states parties to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law, which include but are not limited to the charter of the United Nations and The Outer Space Treaty.

Article V

Nothing in this Treaty can be construed as impeding the realization by the states parties of the sovereign right for self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of The Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI

With a view to facilitate assurance of compliance with the Treaty provisions and to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space activities the States Parties shall practice on a voluntary basis, unless agreed otherwise, agreed confidence-building measures. Measures of verification of compliance with the Treaty may be the subject of an Additional protocol.

Article VII

When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the application or the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall first consult together with a view to settling the dispute by negotiation and cooperation. When the parties concerned do not come to an agreement after consultation, the disputed situation that has arisen may be referred to the executive organization of the Treaty along with provision of the relevant argumentation. Each State Party shall undertake to cooperate in the settlement of the disputed situation that has arisen with the Executive organization of the Treaty.

Article VIII

To promote the implementation of the objectives and the provisions of the Treaty, States Parties shall establish the Executive organization of the Treaty which shall: a) receive for consideration inquiries by any State Party or a group of States Parties related to the grounds that have arisen to believe that the violation of the Treaty by any State Party is taking place; b) consider matters concerning the compliance with the obligations taken by States Parties; c) organize and conduct consultations with the State Parties with the view to settle down the situation that has arisen in connec-
tion with the violation of a State Party of the Treaty; d) take measures to put an end to the violation of the Treaty by any State Party.

The title, status, specific functions and forms of work of the Executive organization of the Treaty shall be the subject of an Additional protocol to the Treaty.

**Article IX**

International intergovernmental organizations may take part in the Treaty. Provisions defining variants and modalities of their participation in the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to the Treaty.

**Article X**

Any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. Upon the request of at least one third of the States Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference to which all States Parties shall be invited to consider the proposed amendment.

Any amendment to the Treaty shall be approved by a majority of the votes of the States Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all the States Parties in accordance with the procedures of the entry into force of the Treaty.

**Article XI**

The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall notify the Depository in written form of the decision taken six months in advance of the withdrawal from the Treaty.

**Article XII**

The Treaty shall be opened for signature by all States at the United Nations headquarters in New York. Any State which did not sign the Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time.

The treaty shall be subject to ratification by Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional norms. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the Depository of the Treaty.
Article XIII

The Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty states, including all permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

Article XIV

The Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian And Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of The United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to all signatory and acceding States.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Information and Press Department
Web-address: www.mid.ru

“Basic elements of an international legally-binding arrangement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range (ground-launched) missiles, open for broad international accession”

Preamble

The States Parties to this Arrangement,
Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability both globally and regionally,
Convinced that the measures set forth in this Arrangement will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict international control,
Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
General Obligations

1. Each State Party to this Arrangement upon entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter shall not produce or flight-test any intermediate-
range and shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, as well as all support structures and equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, being in its possession or ownership, or being located in any site under its jurisdiction or control, under categories subject to an agreement, so that no later than the agreed date after entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support structures and equipment shall be possessed by each State Party.

**Article II**

*Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*

Provisions for Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles are subject to an agreement.

**Article III**

*Limitations on Stationing and Transit of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*

Provisions for stationing and transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are subject to an agreement.

**Article IV**

*Exchange of an Information Related to the Obligations*

Provisions for exchange of information under categories of data, related to the obligations provided for by this Arrangement, are subject to an agreement.

**Article V**

*Elimination Procedures*

Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures which are subject to an agreement.

**Article VI**

*Rules of Compliance Verification*

Rules of compliance verification are subject to an agreement.
Article VII
Definitions

Definitions of the terms "ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)", "cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)", "GLBM launcher", "GLCM launcher", "intermediate-range missile", "shorter-range missile" and others may be based on the definitions set forth in Article II of Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and are subject to an agreement.

Article VIII
The Organization for Implementation of the Arrangement

The States Parties to this Arrangement shall come to an agreement about mechanism of implementation of the subject and the objective of this Arrangement.

Article IX
Duration of the Arrangement

This Arrangement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article X
Amendments, Signature, Accession, Ratification, Entry into Force, Reservations, Depositary, Authentic Texts

Amendments, signature, accession, ratification, entry into force, reservations, depositary, authentic texts are subject to an agreement.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Information and Press Department
Web-address: www.mid.ru
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

ARBATOV, Alexei – Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Director of the IMEMO Center for International Security

BARANOVSKY, Vladimir – Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Deputy Director of the IMEMO

BELOUS, Vladimir – Cand. Sc. (Mil. Sciences), Leading researcher at the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department of the IMEMO Center for International Security

BLIX, Hans – Dr. Sc. (International Law), Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Sweden

FARNASOVA, Tamara – Senior researcher at the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department of the IMEMO Center for International Security

KALIADINE, Alexandre – Dr. Sc. (History), Principal researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security

KOUMACHEV, Vladimir – Senior researcher at the Department Strategic Studies of the IMEMO Center for International Security

OZNOBISHCHEV, Sergey – Dr. Sc. (History), Senior researcher at the Department of Strategic Studies of the IMEMO Center for International Security

ROMASHKIN, Pyotr – Cand. Sc. (Technical Sciences), Senior researcher at the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department of the IMEMO Center for International Security

SAVELYEV, Alexander – Dr.Sc. (Political Sciences), Head of the Department of Strategic Studies of the IMEMO Center for International Security

SOTNIKOV, Vladimir – Cand. Sc. (History), Senior researcher at the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department of the IMEMO Center for International Security

TSELITSKY Sergey – Researcher at the Department of Strategic Studies of the IMEMO Center for International Security

VLADIMIROV, Vadim – Senior researcher at the Disarmament and Conflict Management Department of the IMEMO Center for International Security