RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2001
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(IMEMO)

RUSSIA:
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI
YEARBOOK 2001

Compiled and edited by
Vladimir BARANOVSKY and Alexandre KALIADINE

Moscow 2002
INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO)

IMEMO is a research institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was established in 1956. IMEMO conducts fundamental and applied research and comparative studies focusing upon contemporary economic, social and political processes in the world, Russia’s involvement in global developments, problems of arms control, disarmament and international security.

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PREFACE

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) takes pride in presenting the second issue of *Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security*. This collection of essays contains the results of research on current topics related to Russia’s policies in areas of defence, international security and arms control. All the articles were prepared at the IMEMO and included in the Special supplement to the Russian edition of *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*.

Our focus remains the same: to provide Russian perspectives on issues affecting international co-operation in conflict resolution, disarmament and security, to present facts, data and analyses on defence and foreign policy developments and to contribute to the unbiased assessment by the international community of the Russian security situation and needs. We hope that translating the IMEMO studies into English will assist foreign analysts who follow security thinking in Moscow.

Part I covers a wide range of security issues touching on national defence and foreign policy. In particular, these include efforts to combat international terrorism and improve relations between Russia and the West; implications of the USA’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; prospects for reductions in the number of nuclear weapons; the role of parliament in the field of disarmament and arms control.

The introductory essay written by Vladimir Baranovsky and Nodari Simonia examines the international political implications of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Three dimensions of the issue are explored: the potential implications of the attacks for US policies, for international relations as a whole, and for Russia. Possible fundamental shifts in the contemporary development of international politics are evaluated.

In his contribution Alexei Arbatov argues that the decision of the US Administration to withdraw from the ABM Treaty has signified a major watershed in both the strategic relations between Moscow and Washington and the overall military-political situation in the world. The author gives an assessment of a possible compromise on subjects related to BMD. If Washington agrees to a new treaty on strategic offensive arms that would suit Moscow, arrangements regulating the construction of missile defence systems could be worked out which would make it possible to carry out tests of missile interceptors and their components. The question of their deployment could become the subject of separate talks in the future, depending on the evaluation of the threats and the development of technologies.
Ekaterina Stepanova analyses the link between terrorism and inter-ethnical confrontation, religious extremism and separatism. She provides Russian perspectives on the subject of combating terrorism in the North Caucasus. As this essay acknowledges, an effective combat against terrorism requires the elaboration of an appropriate long-term strategy adequately funded and technically and juridically supported. This would not be possible without a solution of those social-economic and political problems that generate violent terrorist reactions. The government of the Russian Federation should profit from its considerable experience in combating terrorism and its understanding of the great complexity of its underlying causes to maintain a restrained and balanced approach to the situation in the region and beyond it.

The essay of Vladimir Baranovsky on the Russian perceptions of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), makes a powerful case for Russia’s involvement in this process in one form or another. In particular, the author raises the question of Russia’s participation in the implementation of the Petersberg tasks.

Alexander Pikayev’s contribution deals with the effects of September 11 on the American-Russian relations. In the view of the author the necessity to obtain Moscow’s support in the anti-terrorist military operation in Afghanistan has led to the elevation of Russia’s role in US foreign and security priorities. In 2001 the zigzags of US policy towards Russia in such key areas as the ABM Treaty and NATO demonstrated that the progress achieved in bilateral relations is not irreversible.

Alexander Savelyev explores the concept of parallel unilateral reduction of strategic offensive arms. He claims that if Russia and the USA adopt the policy of unilateral reductions of their nuclear arsenals, greater openness when carrying out these reductions should become the main feature of the strategic relationship between the two powers.

Part I is concluded by a detailed report, prepared by Galina Oznobishcheva, on the proceedings of the IMEMO Roundtable on the role of the Russian parliament in the areas of arms control and disarmament, held at IMEMO on 22 May 2001.

Part II contains commentaries on three topical issues: Russian military expenditure in 2002; the revised program for the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation; and proposed solutions for countering missile threats to Europe.

Pyotr Romashkin describes the main features of the defence appropriations in the federal budget for the year 2002. The expert concludes that defence and law-enforcement expenditure is growing, although more slowly than the expenditure side of the federal budget as a whole and the expenditure on social policies in particular.
Alexandre Kaliadine gives a detailed assessment of the Russian CW stockpile destruction program, submitted to the OPCW in September 2001. All the participants in the Russian chemical disarmament process, argues the author, will have to learn lessons from the experience of the past decade and co-operate more closely on the issue of eliminating the former Soviet CW arsenal.

The contribution of Vladimir Belous touches on the issues of a regional BMD proposed for Europe. In his view, objective possibilities exist to develop practical steps aimed at implementing this idea.

Vadim Vladimirov’s account of the presentation of the Russian edition of *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* held at the IMEMO on 22 May 2001 provides an overview of assessments of this publication by the Russian disarmament and security research community.

To assist readers who are looking for official documents, we have also included an annex containing a general review of key documents of the Russian Federation on national security, defence and arms control (2000-2001).

I believe that the second issue of *Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security* will provide a useful service for those who deal with international security problems.

I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Vladimir Baranovsky and Dr. Alexandre Kaliadine who had responsibility for complying and editing this volume. My thanks also go to members of the IMEMO staff George Bechter and Olga Maltseva who gave the necessary support in the preparation of this publication.

I am extremely grateful to Dr. Theodor Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for his support in the implementation of this project.

Academician Nodari Simonia  
Director  
Institute of World Economy and International Relations  
Russian Academy of Sciences  
January 2002
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM Treaty</td>
<td>Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972)</td>
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<td>ATC</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorist Centre</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic missile defence</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CPRF</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical weapon/warfare</td>
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<td>CWDF</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>CWDP</td>
<td>Chemical Weapon Destruction Program</td>
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<td>CWPF</td>
<td>Chemical weapon production facility</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Federal Assembly (Russia)</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Federation Council (Russia)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>IMEMO</td>
<td>Institute of World Economy and International Relations</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range nuclear forces</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LDPR</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</td>
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<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia)</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (Russia)</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NAD</td>
<td>Navy Area Defense</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>New independent states</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National missile defence</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
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<td>PJC</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Council</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
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<td>RAS</td>
<td>Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Resolution of Security Council (UN)</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>State Duma (Russia)</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<td>SNF</td>
<td>Strategic nuclear forces</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Union of Right Forces (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Theatre high-altitude area defence</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre missile defence</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS

1. Terrorist attacks in the United States: implications for international politics

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1. TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Vladimir BARANOVSKY and Nodari SIMONIA

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations has hosted several discussion panels on the issue of potential implications of the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, against the United States as regards international politics. These discussions have revealed different and even mutually exclusive opinions and assessments. Without aiming to bring them to a common denominator, the authors of this article present their own views on this problem focusing on the following three dimensions of the issue: potential implications of the attacks for the US policies, for the international relations system as a whole, and for Russia. The analysis addresses not so much certain specific solutions and alternatives as possible fundamental shifts in the contemporary development of international politics.

Potential implications for the US policies

Already at the very early stage of developing US response to the terrorist strikes, there seemed to emerge a clash within the political leadership between advocates of energetic and tough measures, on the one hand, and the proponents of a more cautious and balanced approach, on the other hand. The former aspired to compensate for the demoralising effect of terrorist attacks (“a new Pearl Harbour”) by instantaneous retribution through swift and spectacular military strikes on a large scale. The second approach put the main emphasis on the need to organise and plan a systematic long-term struggle against international terrorism, including the use of military means, but avoiding hasty, poorly thought out and ill-prepared actions that might have dubious efficacy and a high probability of negative implications for the USA.

While in the wake of the terrorist strikes the first of the aforementioned groups was setting the tone within the American leadership, later the mood seemed to change in favour of the more moderate approach. Then, the euphoria after the military victory over Taliban pushed the pendulum the other way again. By and large, the struggle between these two courses of action is likely to have its impact upon the overall US foreign and military policies in the longer term.

Both trends will be strongly influenced by the emergence of two novel elements in the American political self-identification with respect to the outside world. First, the US territory is vulnerable to attacks, and its security vis-a-vis external threats turned out to be a myth. Secondly, there
are forces in the world whose hostility against the United States has no limits and who are ready to commit the most horrifying crimes. This creates by itself powerful political and psychological preconditions for significant shifts in US policies on the world stage, which can be characterised as follows.

— US policies may acquire a more active and assertive character. Isolationist motivations that have always been latently present in US foreign policy thinking will now recede into the background. The public has seen a spectacular manifestation of the fact that the US territory is within terrorists’ reach and that isolating oneself from the outer world by the two oceans is impossible. The “syndromes” of Vietnam and Somalia are most likely to be finally overcome once and for all. Elites and the public are converging around the idea that the United States should take preventive actions rather than step aside.

— In US policies on the world stage, there will be stronger emphasis on the use of force. The mood will be more clearly in favour of a rather energetic resort to military actions in dealing with emerging crises. Psychologically, Americans will be prepared to bear significant casualties in military actions abroad. This will constitute a fundamental shift away from the assumption that was dominant until recently: that is, that the USA should carry out only actions that entail minimal casualties, or no casualties at all (as in Kosovo).

— In some time, the US leadership will have to provide the public with certain specific results of its anti-terrorist activities. This may give an impulse for broadening military operations and perhaps re-orientating them towards areas where the chances of achieving a spectacular victory are greater (as, for example, in Iraq).

— One could also expect the weakening of internal constraints as regards potential US actions in the world arena on a broader scale. In its extreme form, this approach would insist that the United States should proceed from the complete freedom of actions on the international stage and decide on their own what is to be done, without paying attention to any constraints or advice. The general indignation against the terrorist acts and the ensuing readiness to support US counteractions (or, at least, to treat them “with understanding”) will make it easier to legitimate US assertiveness and its right to intervene.

— There is yet another stereotype that may assume a disproportionate role: that is, the USA should rely on no one but itself, without excessive illusions about forthcoming support from other international actors. At the same time, the attitude of other states vis-a-vis the US response to the terrorist attack may become a sort of a touchstone defining US own attitude to these countries (“whoever is not with us is against us”).
— On the issue of strategic missile defence, the arguments of those in favour of creating an anti-missile shield will acquire more power than before. Although the terrorist strikes of September 11 have clearly shown that no missile defence whatsoever can serve as a protection against terrorism, at the same time they have convincingly demonstrated the existence of forces that see no constraints to their hatred of the United States. And given that these forces may be able to acquire nuclear weapons and missiles, the USA ought to be able to protect itself against such a threat. At the same time, these developments will put the emphasis upon defence against “rogue states”, while China and Russia will have lower priority in this regard.

— The intensification of racist and anti-Muslim sentiments and their expressions in the USA is yet another emerging trend that might result from the terrorist strikes. In the area of foreign policy, this could provide an impetus to pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian motivations in US policies vis-a-vis the Middle East, to a new wave of suspicions with regard to the states governed by unpredictable non-democratic regimes (“rogue states”), as well as to the toughening of US approach both to these states themselves and to those that are suspect of supporting them.

At the same time, as the initial stress caused by the terrorist strikes in New York and Washington will gradually recede, the more moderate line could become somewhat stronger. This line would provide a different focus for US foreign policy priorities.

— When considering means and ways of struggle against international terrorism, there will hopefully be a fairly clear awareness of the fact that American enormous military resources are not enough to guarantee by themselves a success in countering new threats. One could also expect more flexibility in the approach to the means used in the anti-terrorist struggle. In particular, this may imply more emphasis on the political and economic tools, in addition to the military ones, or even as their substitute as the main instrument.

— Raising the issue of the formation of a broad-based coalition against international terrorism means that obtaining support from many states becomes a priority. It is therefore somewhat of a counterbalance to the unilateral approach. The initial response of the US leadership to attacks almost entirely ignored the issue of legitimising the planned retaliatory action—through the UN channels, by invoking international law or by any other way; but merely within a few days this approach was subjected to a fundamental reassessment.

— The official policy is trying to offset the anti-Muslim sentiments of emotional nature, because their strengthening is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences both for domestic stability and for the US international positions. In the US Middle Eastern policies, the more
cautious line seems also to prevail. Washington tries to use the current situation to steer the conflict toward the search for a compromise among the parties involved. This is evidenced, among other things, by President Bush’s support for the idea of the Palestinian state.

— The American leadership, even if proceeding from purely pragmatic considerations, should address the issue of changing the negative international image of the United States. Indeed, one of the most significant sources of anti-American terrorism is the widespread perception of the US as a powerful but complacent and arrogant state searching to impose its norms, life-style and values all over the world without feeling the need to observe common rules and take the views of other countries into account. The overall mood prevailing today in the US does not seem to be conducive to this kind of reflection. However, the country needs serious debate on what responsible international leadership means. Some time after Americans think it through, the experience of the dramatic September events may provide the impetus for appropriate foreign policy adjustments in this direction.

One would expect that within a relatively short time the interaction and struggle among all these trends within the USA will set the stage for the final shaping of the conceptual and practical tenets of a new foreign policy and politico-military doctrine. Their external form will be that of a strategy of struggle against international terrorism. At the same time, as this strategy will be carried out, the anti-terrorist struggle may assume a de facto subsidiary role with regard to certain broader goals.

Thus, one can already discern a clear aspiration on the American part to press for the achievement of other purposes which the US views as strategically necessary or advantageous for itself, while riding the tide of the anti-terrorist struggle. Even within the framework of the more moderate approach one can expect to see a pragmatic orientation toward the achievement of those goals that are conditioned by traditional geopolitical motivations, such as strengthening of US influence in the countries of the Middle East, ensuring US presence in Central Asia, promoting political penetration in the Caspian region, setting up springboards for further pressure upon India and China, and so forth.

Probable consequences for international relations

The consequences of events in the USA for international relations will be determined by two factors: by the awareness of the serious and dramatic nature of new challenges facing the world, as well as (and more importantly) by new emphases in American foreign policy and by the responses to it on the part of other international actors. The following trends appear to be the most significant.
— The struggle against terrorism might gradually be viewed as a higher priority task compared to many others that governments set before themselves in international affairs. Admittedly, if one puts aside the immediate response to terrorist actions in New York and Washington with its inherent emotions and rhetoric, this refocusing of attention will most probably develop rather slowly. The inertia of the traditional approach, with its focus on state interests and the maximisation of state influence against a background of competition with other international actors, will remain the dominant foreign policy factor for a long time. Its erosion will occur only with the growing awareness of the fact that the very institution of the state is being threatened, which is fraught with a prospect of chaos and unpredictable consequences on the global scale.

— A more salient logic of “protecting the state” from dangerous external influences may be among the consequences of this development. This would include the toughening of the border regime, the limiting of migration flows, control over immigrants, regulation of information access, and so forth. If this does happen, the degree of the states’ openness to the outer world may decrease in the short and, possibly, medium term.

— Another potential consequence, however pointing in the opposite direction, would be a significant expansion of informational, operational and strategic interaction between states’ special services. Given that this development touches upon extremely sensitive areas, it will also be unfolding rather cautiously and only within certain limits. Yet the very fact of such a cooperative interaction would imply the emergence of a fundamentally new characteristic of international relations.

— The US forceful response may turn out to become a model for other nations’ behaviour in the circumstances that they see as a challenge to their own interests (with threats associated primarily, but not exclusively with international terrorism). Generally speaking, one could expect that these developments will result in the lowering of the political and psychological barriers as regards the use of force. This tool will be seen as less unacceptable than before. Thus, China may become more inclined toward a coercive settlement of the Taiwan problem.

— Likewise, one could see further erosion of expectations with regard to the international law and the UN-based mechanisms of international politics. The fact that they have been pushed aside in the course of the debate about the range of possible responses to the terrorist strikes clearly does not contribute to the strengthening of their authority.

— These developments may make the international system more unbalanced and vulnerable to outbursts of crisis. The task of ensuring its manageability, highly topical even nowadays, would become top priority.

— Formal or informal interaction among states belonging to the narrow circle of most powerful international actors could increasingly be
seen as the most effective tool of international governance. Their decisions, even if not formalised as international legal documents, would have a bigger practical impact than the formally institutionalised norms.

— The international system shaped by such developments would be characterised by the de facto predominance of a few states over the others—a predominance that could be accepted as legitimate and even formalised in some of its aspects. Such a system could have a certain effectiveness and prevent chaotic developments on the international stage. At the same time it would be vulnerable to internal tensions arising from inequalities in status, level of development, availability of resources and access to decision making. It is not clear to what extent it would be able to ensure the coexistence of different civilizational segments of international community. It is on this soil that the most serious crises of the 21st century would be ripening.

In a parallel way, other lines of the international developments could take place, to some extent correcting the above mentioned trends.

— Alongside with the recognition of American leadership, it is quite probable that misgivings about its unabashedly hegemonic transformation would grow, and that other international actors would strive to minimise this transformation as much as they can.

— While supporting and joining the struggle against international terrorism, many countries of the developing world may be concerned about the possibility that this struggle may target their own territories. For this reason they will pay particular attention to compliance with the norms of the international law and observance of the states’ sovereign rights in the course of this struggle.

— The dissatisfaction with the UN actions in the acute crisis situation that was generated by terrorist strikes against the United States may give an impetus to the intensification of efforts to make this institution more efficient. This may involve the increase in representation in the Security Council, the expansion of its crisis response capabilities, the drafting of new international legal norms by the United Nations, and so forth.

— The dramatic increase of attention to issues of international terrorism and the awareness of their significance will considerably affect the already acute political and societal debates over globalization. Its opponents will not fail to characterise the phenomenon of international terrorism as one of the most dramatic manifestations of the downside of globalization and will use this argument to intensify their opposition to everything that is associated with this process. On the other side, the struggle against international terrorism will by itself require the strengthening of interaction among members of the entire international community and will thus become a factor reinforcing globalization. In any
In a paradoxical way, the terrorist attacks could have painful implications for NATO. Indeed, there seemed to be all grounds for expectations of NATO surging forward as an institution of multilateral cooperation between states which has a smaller membership and is capable of more swift and efficient operations on the international stage. In practice, however, its involvement in military operations amounted to naught, the decision to activate article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty bore a purely symbolic character and the USA virtually turned down the aid offered by its allies. Most importantly, the “phenomenon of 11 September” has shown that NATO is irrelevant for responding to new security challenges in terms of its functional specificity, organisation, structure and operational mode. The Alliance needs a “great debate”, and against this background the issue of its enlargement will seem meaningless and of secondary importance. The debate over the alliance’s future agenda has to involve a number of thorny issues, including re-orientation from common defence towards peacekeeping and peace-enforcement (as in Macedonia), joint “out-of-area” operations, and the search for a new formula of interaction with Russia.

Despite all the profundity of potential consequences of the outbreak of international terrorism, some of the important trends of international political development will hardly be directly affected. The emergence of new power centres outside of the group of developed industrial and post-industrial nations (primarily India and China), as well as the stormy evolution of the Islamic world are generating their own dynamics on the international stage. These dynamics do not necessarily correlate with the aforementioned trends connected to terrorism and may even counteract them.

Possible implications for Russia

All of the above mentioned bears upon Russia in the most substantial way and confronts it with complicated issues as regards the determination of its policies.

Russia has to make its way between Scylla and Charybdis. It has a vital interest in the success of the struggle against international terrorism. At the same time it should be taken into account that Russia is potentially even more vulnerable to terrorist strikes than the United States. It is equally important (for many reasons, including those unrelated to the subject of terrorism) that Russia demonstrates its readiness for cooperative
interaction with the United States and the West as a whole—without, however, placing itself in a subordinate position and without letting relationships with the Muslim world erode, not to speak of pitting the Muslim world against Russia. Finally, Russia has to weigh the newly emerging situation against those issues and objectives that arise on the different other paths of its interaction with the outer world.

— The decision to side with the United States in the situation that developed after September 11 will have weighty and positive implications for Russia’s relationship with this nation and the West as a whole. The very fact of political support and practical assistance in the efforts to combat the initiators of the terrorist strikes has already been highly appreciated by Western counterparts of the Russian Federation who also saw it as a credible sign of the long-term direction of Russia’s foreign policy.

— The situation that has taken shape is unique and points to a fundamental change. Russia is being solicited not just as a full-fledged partner, but also as a nation whose taking part in joint activities is of key importance by a number of parameters. For Russia it is extremely important to convert this new Western demand for co-operation into the building of a qualitatively new relationship.

— At the same time it is important not to allow the erosion of these results. In particular, openly linking Russia’s stand with other aspects of its relationship with the West, however tempting this opportunity may appear, would most probably be counterproductive. Thus, by inserting the issues of NATO expansion or the ABM Treaty into the context of the new situation, Russia is most likely to elicit doubts as regards the sincerity of its approach to the joint struggle against international terrorism. In addition, for the Western partners this is likely to complicate their rapprochement with Russia’s position on these issues, since such a convergence would be seen as a result of pressure from Moscow using the “anti-terrorist” trump card to advance its selfish interests. In fact, it is quite realistic to expect the West to show increased readiness for co-operation with Russia on a broad range of issues, including the most controversial ones—but primarily as a result of the emergence of qualitatively new relations of partnership, rather than as an immediate reward for the policy stand that was taken by Russia.

— This is also valid for the set of issues related to Chechnya. Drawing direct parallels between terrorist strikes in the United States and the situation in Chechnya would appear far from thoroughly convincing. Meanwhile, Western governments have already been adjusting their positions in the light of the terrorist strikes that were committed against the United States, the unfolding struggle against international terrorism, and Russia’s clear expression of its support. For Russia, it is far more
important to see that this issue recede into the background of relationships with Western countries and that they block external financial sources, arms supplies and other forms of support for Chechnya’s secessionists.

— It is clear that Russia’s support for the United States does not mean providing Washington with the green light for all sorts of activities in combating the organisers of terrorist attacks, not to speak of the larger freedom of action. In this context, it is entirely appropriate to call for caution and for thoroughly thinking through the response, as well as for combining the use of force with preventive actions of a politico-economic nature. But other international actors—from US NATO allies to China and India—can also play an important role in constraining the expansionist drive of the United States.

— A similar approach would be appropriate in dealing with the issues of developing the legal basis for combating international terrorism. There is an objective need of doing it, and it is quite natural for Russia to play an active role in addressing this task. The problem is that effective means for countering international terrorism are needed here and now, while an appropriate international legal ground is not yet in place.

— Russia has an interest in the UN providing legitimisation for the most energetic activities in the area of struggle against international terrorism and contributing to their increased efficacy. While taking the most constructive stand in the UN Security Council, Russia could simultaneously propose to the UN to activate Articles 45–47 of its Charter and to transform the currently inactive Military Staff Committee into an Ad Hoc UN Committee on Struggle Against Terrorism, endowing it with significant operational capabilities and authority.

— In a broader context, Russia has all the grounds to stick to its policy of encouraging the UN to play a more effective role in managing the international political system and preventing its destabilisation. But this task is linked to the issue of reforming the UN and has no easy solutions. Some points, however, could be raised in the short term. These might include the expansion of permanent membership in the Security Council by including not only Germany and Japan, but also India and one of the Muslim countries; or the creation of mechanisms to offset the negative consequences of globalization through the adjustment of transnational financial flows; and so forth.

— The development of a quasi-alliance relationship between the United States and Russia does not remove the political and psychological uneasiness of the latter over a junior partner status in such an alliance. One of the important ways to offset this asymmetry would be to emphasise multilateral forms of interaction with Western countries. The NATO–Russia partnership or the trilateral configuration “Russia–EU–the United States” would have a relatively more balanced character.
Among the immediate problems of geopolitical nature that Russia faces in the new circumstances, the issue of Central Asia is of particular importance. US presence in this area may turn out to be a fundamentally new factor. There are apprehensions in Russia that this presence might be used to assert US hegemony in this area—both in the CIS countries and in Afghanistan—and to weaken Russia’s influence. As a result, Russia may find itself “locked” not only from the western side, but also from the direction of its south-eastern “underbelly”.

Russia does have political resources for energetic measures to counteract and/or limit American presence in the area. But it would pay for this with the erosion of the developing Russian–American partnership, as well as with the risk of transforming Central Asia into a stage for the new “Great Game” leading to unpredictable geopolitical and military-political consequences.

A more rational strategy could be based on different foundations, namely: (i) it would be in any case impossible to keep Central Asia as a “closed area”; (ii) for objective reasons, American presence has no chances to become a serious challenge to Russia’s influence, but it may turn into a tool of political pressure and diplomatic manoeuvring directed against Russia; (iii) it is therefore advisable not so much to counteract but to interact with the United States in this area in a cooperative manner, pursuing a coordination of both countries' objectives and efforts. In this context, it may turn out to be exceptionally important to involve the United States in combating those challenges that Russia faces on its southern borders.

A separate issue, reaching beyond the agenda of struggle against international terrorism, concerns Russia’s relationship with the Muslim world. The enormous importance of this relationship for Russia is obvious. Interests that are shaping up in this area, which are of a strategic rather than opportunistic nature, are not to be sacrificed to those motivations that emerge along the western dimension of Russia's interaction with the outer world. The “maximum goal” may be formulated as follows: not to play them off one another, but to strive to achieve an organic combination of the two, so that Muslim countries would see Russia’s participation in a strategic alliance with the West as advantageous for themselves, while the West would proceed from the awareness of Russia’s ability to play an important role in shaping its relationship with the Islamic world. It is all the more so as this line will be among the central ones in the international political dynamics of the 21st century.
2. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

Aleksei ARBATOV

The US Government’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty represented a watershed in the strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington and the whole military-political situation in the world.

The official American view is that, with the end of the Cold War, Russia and the USA have ceased to be enemies, war between them has become improbable and relations of mutual nuclear deterrence—based on the capacity by both sides to destroy each other by nuclear strikes—have lost their purpose and sense. In consequence, the 1972 ABM Treaty, which consolidates this mutual deterrent capacity by strict limitation of defence systems against strategic ballistic missiles, has lost its stabilising importance. At the same time, it is asserted, the Treaty has become an obstacle to the building of a NMD system for defence against “rogue states” (threshold countries), among whom are some who shelter international terrorism and whom the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction provides or will provide, in the future, with the possibility of delivering unhindered strikes against the great powers and, in this way, blackmail them.

As a way out of this logic, Washington proposes to give up the ABM Treaty and start building strategic missile defence systems while, at the same time, giving up formal treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START) and go over to some new form of parallel, voluntary reduction and confidence-building measures in this sphere (after all, once deterrence is renounced, why have mutually concerted limits on strategic offensive arms?)

The official Russian line, while not disputing the fact that the two powers are no longer enemies and no longer need mutual deterrence, is based on the thesis that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability and the whole system of limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons (in the first place the START–I and II Treaties and the framework agreement of START–III).

The probability of missile threats emanating from threshold countries is not denied, but it is proposed to, first, study them together and then create a common non-strategic missile defence system (theatre missile defence, TMD) for Europe by the Russian Federation and NATO, as well as to carry out a more effective non-proliferation policy for nuclear and missile weapons.
It would seem that both positions are not quite consistent or sufficiently realistic.

First about the US approach. Indeed, the Cold War is over, although a recurrence is not excluded (take, for instance, the outburst of hostile feelings between Russia and the USA at the time of the NATO air attacks against Yugoslavia in 1999). As far as deterrence is concerned, on a closer view, this concept is not quite so bad. It means, in the first place, that the nuclear weapon is not regarded as a more powerful and effective means of waging war, capable of making victory in an armed conflict more certain. (These views were dominant in the US doctrine, up to the end of the fifties, and in the Soviet doctrine, up to the end of the sixties). On the contrary, the enormous destructive power of this weapon is seen as a factor that makes a war mutually unacceptable. The main purpose of the nuclear weapon is to prevent the other side from using it because of one’s own capacity to cause unacceptable damage to a possible aggressor.

The possession of such a destructive weapon by another state constitutes in itself the greatest threat to one’s own national security. The one constant security guarantee is one’s own potential for nuclear deterrence, even if, at the given moment, the powers do not consider each other as enemies. This all the more so as the political relationship may change extremely quickly while the strategic balance requires a lengthy period for substantial change, measured in decades in view of the complexities, cost and physical dimensions of nuclear missile weapons and their infrastructure.

In this sense, we take the risk of formulating the rule that nuclear powers are doomed to mutual deterrence as being the very essence of their strategic relationship. Deterrence may move into the foreground in a crisis situation or be put on the backburner when political relations improve, but it always remains an objective reality and is invisibly always present. It is like the force of gravity that is not felt in ordinary life, but which one immediately experiences the moment one steps out of a window on the tenth floor. Mutual deterrence is the best form of strategic relations (especially, if it is regulated by a system of treaties), better than anything which has been thought of, in spite of a mass of rhetoric, embraces and toasts at summits in the nineties.

Every rule is confirmed by exceptions. In particular, there may not be relations of mutual deterrence between nuclear powers if they are military-political allies (as are the USA, Great Britain and France); if they are beyond the reach of each other’s nuclear delivery vehicles (as are Great Britain and China); if their nuclear weapons are unambiguously directed against another opponent (as France and Israel or Pakistan and the Chinese People’s Republic); if one side possesses overwhelming nuclear superiority and the potential of a disarming strike against the other
(as the USA and the USSR, up to the end of the fifties or the USA and China until recently). Finally, nuclear deterrence, in the form of its traditional model, can be rendered ineffective by building effective missile defence systems against other types of nuclear delivery vehicles by one or both sides.

The present strategic interaction between Russia and the USA does not cover any of these exceptions and remains, therefore, a system of mutual nuclear deterrence. Each side retains something in the order of five to six thousand nuclear warheads in their strategic nuclear forces (SNF). Once there are weapons, there are plans for their use, as there is a list of targets for nuclear strikes. To an overwhelming extent, these weapons are directed against each other, because, in the whole remaining world, there are simply not enough targets for the use of the available nuclear weapons. De-alerting and de-targeting of SNF do not alter the essence of the relationship and only lead to a slight delay in the launching of missiles and bombers. This will remain true for the next 10–15 years, even if both sides reduce their SNF to 1500–2000 nuclear warheads. This, of course, if one or another of the above-mentioned exceptions to the nuclear missile rule does not occur.

It is understandable that responsible politicians consider it today in bad taste to talk about this publicly. The unattractive aspect of life is left in the hands of military and technical specialists. To loudly deny this reality amounts to behaving like a child who closes his eyes and thinks that no one sees him.

On this level, the American statements on deterrence are no more than rhetoric, designed to justify in the eyes of wide public opinion the withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and building a NMD system for its territory. The US position could be taken seriously, at least to a certain extent, if it simultaneously proposed to Russia to negotiate deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, say, under a thousand warheads. Then it would be possible to assume that the greater part of these weapons will not be aimed at each other and, when both sides build missile defence systems, either separately or in a joint effort, relations of deterrence will belong to the past. The USA, however, will not agree to a new, full-blown treaty on deep SNF reductions and its vague statements on the possibility of building, together with other states, a missile defence system are hardly taken seriously even by its allies in NATO, let alone Russia.

In these conditions, the steps taken by the US towards the abrogation of the treaty-bound regime of reduction and limitation of defensive and offensive strategic weapons does not stand up to any criticism. Even if the two powers no longer consider each other as enemies and are no longer seriously preparing for war, relations of latent, mutual deterrence continue between them in as much as they are still far
from being allies. It is exactly such an intermediate position which requires more far-reaching agreements on disarmament and confidence-building measures from which, in time, something more will grow than mere partnership in regulating strategic stability. A premature abandonment of treaties may, on the contrary, engender growing uncertainty, mutual suspicion and return the powers to a state of conflict and hostility.

It seems to us that, in reality, behind a screen of rhetoric the US position is determined by other considerations. Apart from the inertia of pre-election requirements and the traditional predilection of the Republicans for ballistic missile defence (let us recall Nixon’s missile defence program “Safeguard” and Reagan’s “SDI”), the key-role in Washington’s approach to this question is played by the new position in which the USA finds itself after the end of the Cold War. In its security priorities questions of non-proliferation of nuclear missile weapons and the growth of the military-political might of China are becoming more and more dominant. As far as Russia is concerned, Washington bases itself in its actual strategic policy, as before, on the concept of deterrence and is less and less concerned with the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

Indeed, why should Washington worry about START–I, II and III if Russia, to judge by open information, has, anyway, decided to reduce its SNF unilaterally to the level of 1500 or less warheads and, in addition, restructure them in something vaguely similar to the American triad, in other words, to carry out voluntarily and without asking anything in return what the USA has tried to achieve over the last thirty years by stubborn negotiation? As to the ABM Treaty, here too, the USA has lost the stimuli for restraint—after all, in case it withdraws from the Treaty, Russia is hardly in a position to undertake anything detrimental to American security.

Ground-based ICBMs, especially mobile, have the greatest survivability before launching and the capability of being rapidly build up, both in respect of the number of missiles and warheads (by the deployment of MIRVs) in order to increase the potential for overcoming missile defence and restoring the balance of offensive forces. If this component will be abolished, as is being planned at the moment, the possibility of arming the silo-based ICBMs with multiple re-entry vehicles will not worry the USA overmuch. They are, after all, capable of maintaining without a special effort their SNF on a level which ensures a considerable superiority in numbers over the RF, leave alone the capacity of hitting all Russian silo-based ICBMs, airfields and submarine bases with a small part of its “Peacekeeper” and “Trident–2” missiles. To blame the Americans for this is as naive as it is pointless. Nuclear-missile policy is determined by the calculations and plans of pragmatic strategists and
not by the high-minded declarations of politicians and Russia would act most likely in exactly the same way if the boot was on the other foot.

Thus, the main strategic factor which restrained withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the development of missile defence systems in the seventies and eighties is losing its importance. There remain, however, aspects of a general political nature: the concern of America’s allies, the desire not to push Russia towards closer relations with China, changes of personalities in the US Senate. Washington’s activities are at present directed towards a solution to these questions. As past experience has shown, the American administration is quite capable of solving problems with allies and the Senate.

Washington is clearly keeping something essential back in respect of the missile threat from threshold countries. It is not true that it is really afraid of an unprovoked and suicidal attack by them (for which a “bomb in an attaché case” and other non-missile delivery means can be used). The fact of the matter is that the USA intends, in the future too, to resort to the use of force in crises like the Gulf War in 1991 and in Afghanistan in 2001. And the possession of missile weapons by opponents of the USA would act as a deterrent to American military activities. A pre-emptive strike on the missile complexes of “rogue states” might not destroy all the targets and, in that case, NMD would protect the USA from a limited retaliatory strike.

Even less openness is demonstrated in respect of China. Foreseeing a growth of tension and competition with the Asiatic giant, in the coming decades, the USA tries to retard the moment when Beijing acquires a full-fledged deterrent potential against Washington. The USA would like to maintain the capacity of delivering a disarming strike on the missile forces of the Chinese People’s Republic, in combination with a NMD system to repulse its weakened retaliatory strike. We have here the inexorable strategic logic that operated in respect of the USSR in the sixties, when the USA initiated the missile defence systems “Nike–X” and “Sentinel” (the latter, incidentally, was, in part, directed against China). In order to determine the technical possibilities of defence, the Pentagon wants to carry out tests on a wide range of ABM systems and components. This is hindered by the limitations, laid down in the ABM Treaty.

Whether the new American missile defence system is intended against Russia will depend, first of all, on the technical successes of the USA in building a NMD and the policy of the RF to reduce unilaterally its SNF. The dynamics of mutual deterrence, in certain cases, promote the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic weapons and, in others, operate against this. Only a radical change in Russian–American relations in the spirit of the above-mentioned exceptions to the rule of nuclear deterrence can abolish these dynamics.
Now, as to Moscow’s line on this question. In the first place, the adopted program of unilateral reduction and restructuring of the Russian SNF, which leaves far behind even the limits laid down in the framework agreement of START–III, seriously weakened the political position of the RF, both in respect of the START–II and III Treaties and of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In such a serious and complicated question as the strategic balance, one should not count on the charitable feelings of the other side and not put one’s hope only on the strength of the logic of the negotiation position. More weighty arguments are needed here. It is true that with Moscow’s logic all is not as it should be, either.

The ABM Treaty was, indeed, the cornerstone of the regulating regime and process for offensive strategic arms in the seventies–nineties. But the Treaty did not spring from the theory of strategic stability which Moscow, in the beginning, simply dismissed (this became apparent during the meeting of A. Kosygin and L. Johnson in Glassborough, in 1967). The 1972 Treaty embodied a pragmatic compromise in accordance with which the USSR limited the build up of its ballistic missiles while the USA halted the “Safeguard” program. The conditions of the ABM Treaty were adapted to the systems that at that time had already been deployed by both sides: the USSR around Moscow and the USA around its ICBM base in North Dakota. Hence the initial permission to have two missile defence sites per side (in accordance with the 1974 amendment—one per side).

In other words, the stability formula does not exclude the possibility of a certain defensive component. In the past thirty years and in the coming ten years, only one power in the world had and will have a deployed, combat-ready ballistic missile defence system—that is the USSR and its legal successor, Russia. From the point of view of the stability of deterrence, it is not the number of permitted missile defence deployment sites or missile interceptors which is important, but the general capability of the ballistic missile defence to repulse a larger or smaller part of the retaliation means of the other side. Here, in the balance between the Russian Federation and the USA, there is an overwhelming predominance of offensive over defensive means. In certain conditions, it will be quite possible to maintain this in the future while creating, at the same time, a defence against the threat from third countries. Article XIV of the Treaty permits the introduction of amendments and Article XV permits the denunciation of the Treaty if it is no longer in the national interests of one of the sides, provided six-months notice is given of this intention.

The proliferation of nuclear-missile weapons can be regarded as a legitimate reason for modifying the ABM Treaty, though its complete abolition, especially unilaterally, would clearly become a destabilising factor as long as relations of mutual nuclear deterrence continue to exist.
between Russia and the USA. By diplomatically remaining silent on the question of nuclear deterrence, Moscow weakens its arguments in favour of the maintenance of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

This does not accord with Moscow’s proposal to build a joint non-strategic missile defence. For this amounts to admitting that the non-proliferation regime is not sufficiently effective and to agreeing to the need for a system of direct protection against missiles from threshold countries even if these are not strategic, but of intermediate and shorter range. Moreover, the parameters of TMD systems, agreed upon by the USA and the RF, in 1997, are not sufficient to parry a potential missile threat to Europe, from, say, Iran and Pakistan (the range of their missiles should be beyond the 3500 km stipulated in this agreement and which constituted the reason why the US Senate refused to ratify it). The Russian argument to the effect that, so far, the threshold countries do not possess ICBMs is also not particularly convincing: Many years are needed to build a ballistic missile defence system and to wait for the time these missiles appear would amount to being much too late to take defensive counter measures.

Finally, the idea of covering only the European continent by a missile defence system is even less convincing. Russian territory is also located in Asia as are America’s allies—Japan and South Korea. To leave them without protection is unacceptable both from a political and a strategic point of view. It is clear that Moscow is led, here, by considerations of its relations with the Chinese People’s Republic and the Korean Democratic People’s Republic, but this does not make its position on BMD any more convincing. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Russian proposal for a European missile defence is regarded as an attempt to drive a wedge between the USA and its European allies and not as a consistent policy to counteract the missile threat from threshold countries.

How to unravel this tangle of not only incompatible, but contradictory Russian and American positions? How to solve the unavowed crisis provoked by US decision of 13 December 2001 on the ABM Treaty?

In the first place, the decision taken, not long ago, on the development of SNF should be reviewed, as it is extremely vulnerable from a strategic point of view. In the SNF program, the main focus should be made on that component in which the USSR and Russia traditionally were and remain ahead of everybody else and which most of all corresponds to the specifics of the military-technical development, the geostrategic position and the economic possibilities of the country—that is the ground-based missile forces. Increasing the production of the Topol–M missile would provide, in 10–15 years time, a force of 300–400 silo-based and mobile ICBMs, capable of carrying, when armed with
MIRVs, 1500–2500 warheads. It is also easier and cheaper to provide a reliable ground-space warning and command system for them. The sea- and air-based components of the SNF should be economically maintained by increasing, if possible, the service span of the existing systems.

We, particularly, want to stress that this is not a question of building up the Russian nuclear potential or of frightening the USA. The Russian strategic force will, in any case, be reduced in the foreseeable future, but its optimal structure will provide military stability under any conditions in which relations with the USA will develop around negotiations on the ABM and START Treaties. A side-effect of this policy, but not less important for all that, is that Washington’s strategic interest in solving these questions on a mutual basis is likely to grow considerably. It will then, perhaps, not be necessary, to speed up rapidly the deployment of the Topol–M system and equip it with a larger number of MIRVs.

It will, furthermore, be difficult to persuade the USA that the missile threat from threshold countries will not materialise in 10–15 years time (that is the period realistically required to build a ballistic missile defence). It is important that for the sake of getting ready to meet this hypothetical threat and the extremely vague prospects for building an effective missile defence system, the limitation and reduction regime for strategic weapons be not upset with all the political consequences flowing from this.

Here, too, a reasonable compromise is possible, in principle. If Washington agrees to a new treaty on SNF, which suits Moscow, a number of new agreements on regulating the building of BMD could be adopted which would make it possible to carry out more varied tests of ABM systems and components. The question of their deployment could become the subject of separate talks in the future, depending on the evaluation of the threats and the development of technologies.

Generally speaking, Russia itself should accord a far greater priority to the nuclear-missile proliferation threat. After all, most of the threshold countries are situated close to Russian territory and Moscow’s relation with many of them may worsen in the foreseeable future. The limits on TMD, agreed on in 1997, do not provide for a repulse of missiles from certain countries, for instance, Pakistan. That is why, the Russian concept of national security should be revised and the efforts of the RF, both in respect of the reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime and the development of a non-strategic missile defence for Europe as well as Asia, considerably intensified.

A realistic program of co-operation of the USA and their allies with Russia should be one more condition for the modification of the BMD regime. A TMD system should not necessarily be an alternative to
strategic missile defence. It could be the first phase of the introduction of multi-layered ABM systems and a testing ground for joint action in this field.

The military-technical co-operation between Russia and Iran and some other countries should not be an obstacle to providing for its principal and long-term security interests, especially bearing in mind the extremely pragmatic and mutual interest of the sides in such co-operation. India, to judge by everything, will not object to a ballistic missile defence, its nuclear missile potential will be directed neither at Russia nor the USA and its allies in Europe and the Far East.

As far as China is concerned, there can be no doubt that Russia is very interested in developing mutually advantageous economic, political and military-technical co-operation with that country. The development of relations with China, apart from anything else, serves as an important trump card for Moscow in its relations with the USA, but undoubtedly Russian national interests should always occupy the first place, including in strategic matters. Moscow has no obligations to protect the deterrent potential of China. China, on its part, too, does not consider the Russian Federation as a military-political ally and in every case clearly defends its own interests. It should be remembered that the Chinese nuclear deterrent (intermediate-range missiles) has, for the last thirty years, been entirely targeted at the North and in the foreseeable future this direction will in many respects be maintained and that the Moscow ABM complex was traditionally orientated, in the first place, towards this quarter, from which a missile attack was feared.

Denunciation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the deployment of an American NMD could incite China to build up its strategic forces more massively which would affect Russian security negatively and could provoke a chain-reaction of a nuclear arms race between India–Pakistan–Iran and so on. It is equally clear that a complete demolition of the treaty-bound system would speed up the nuclear missile arms race even more and undermine Russian–US co-operation in the field of non-proliferation. What is more, Beijing remains silent on its possible reaction to US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and shows more concern about the possible deployment of an American TMD to protect Taiwan.

A reasonable compromise between Moscow and Washington on offensive and defensive strategic arms, as well as on TMD, should on no account erect an obstacle to the development of co-operation, with China in other spheres. What is more, the maintenance of US missile defence programs within treaty-bound regulations, the further agreed and verifiable reduction of its offensive nuclear forces objectively answers Beijing’s interests far more than the complete breakdown of this regime. After all, in a more distant future, China itself may, possibly, wish to join
in limiting strategic weapons in order to be able to exercise direct influence on this process in accordance with its growing, military and political role in the world.
3. COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: HORIZONS OF THE RUSSIAN PERCEPTION

Vladimir BARANOVSKY

“We welcome the progress achieved in the common European security and defence policy”. This remarkable statement appeared in the text of the Joint Declaration summarising the results of the European Union–Russia Summit held on 30 October 2000 in Paris1. Vladimir Putin’s signature on the document meant that for the first time ever Russia, officially and at the highest political level, expressed its positive view on the ESDP2, this new and now fast growing dimension in the European Union. Noteworthy, even stronger words were used in the official text in Russian (‘we note with satisfaction…’, and not just ‘we welcome…’).3

This should be seen as something more important than just a routine diplomatic formula. In Russian political perception satisfaction with regard to the ESDP is by no means self-evident, certain and alternative-free. Furthermore, the problem of how to deal with the ESDP is a mirror reflection of some of Russia’s foreign policy key dilemmas closely related to the difficult process of searching for its national identity.

What should a fundamental “political project” of the new Russia be and how would it fit in the changing world? What foreign policy benchmarks should it be guided by and what criteria should be used to select them? How to secure for Russia a respectable place in the international arena and what does this notion of a “respectable place” mean? All these questions are still pretty much at the core of the ongoing conceptual debate in Russia. They become even more relevant when the issue of the ESDP, how it fits into the overall policy context and relates to the real or eventual interests of Russia, is introduced.

It would be quite helpful and useful to look at this problem from the historic perspective. When in the Soviet era discussions would flare up on the issue of West European military and political integration, two opposing views were usually expressed, or, to be correct, three. The first that it was a totally senseless discussion since there was no specifically European military and political integration. While, the remaining two perceptions were based on logical premises that were directly at odds with each other.

One of them stated that an evolving or eventual military and political integration, either within the framework or on the basis of the European Community (the forerunner of today’s European Union), was nothing else but a consolidation of NATO’s European base. That logic was almost genetically linked to a wary and hostile attitude towards the
phenomenon of integration in the western part of the continent as a means of strengthening the position of the West in its struggle against the USSR and the world of socialism—the struggle that was spearheaded by the United States and the US-controlled NATO. The underlying thesis of the hostile attitude towards the European Community boiled down to viewing it as NATO’s economic power base in Europe. Consequently, any attempt at military and political integration within that entity would mean creating additional military possibilities for NATO and the United States. Insofar as NATO was the incarnation of evil and under US “guidance”, any signs of Western European integration gravitating towards military and political union or even just talk about this could not but provoke Moscow’s extremely negative reaction.

Even when the perception of the integration processes in Western Europe slowly started to change, this primarily related to the economic side of this phenomenon. Soviet analysts began to highlight its objective aspect, and for that time (in the 60s) this was a genuine breakthrough in terms of the intellectual conceptualisation of integration. However, it was only in the Gorbachev era that the European Community was finally recognised as a political actor. But even his “new political thinking” did not go as far as assessing the military and political aspect of European integration—perhaps, first of all, because, at that time, the issue itself was very vague; and viewed more as a potential area of development rather than as something tangible and feasible.

There were, however, other views on the military and political side of the integration processes taking place in Europe. They were shaped within the framework of two post-Stalinist models of Soviet intellectual perception of international relations: ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘intra-imperialistic contradictions’. The first of these two models, the theory of peaceful coexistence, aimed at engaging the countries of the so-called ‘socialist camp’ in constructive co-operation with the West; the second presupposed that the West should not necessarily be viewed as a single consolidated whole. The overlapping of these two paradigms brought about a relatively logical and well-knit postulate: the negative attitude towards NATO should not necessarily determine a similar negative attitude towards eventual military and political integration with European parameters. Namely, that this integration tendency was the result of the deepening contradictions between the United States and Western Europe and means the erosion of NATO’s solidarity and a challenge to the American domination in the military and political sphere. Thus, from the point of view of Soviet military, political and foreign policy interests, it was probably not that bad.

It should be noted here that such a view was unquestionably a marginal one. At that time, the dominant idea was that it was very
unlikely for the existing contradictions between the Americans and Europeans to spread to the military and political area, that those contradictions were mostly latent in their nature and that, in any case, they were not that significant as compared with the major East-West confrontation which would eventually make them meaningless or even irrelevant. In other words, whatever the military and political integration in Western Europe might mean, it would inevitably be under the control of the United States.

It is worth keeping in mind this basic intellectual structure of Moscow’s past perceptions regarding the military dimension of Western European integration. Ironically, much of that ideology is still present in today’s Russian political thinking. The attitude towards the military and political processes within the European Union as an explicit function of the attitude towards NATO—this is the paradigm-invariant which has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This became visible as early as the beginning of the 1990s when many in Russia were in a state of euphoria about the potential prospects of a strategic partnership with the West and temporarily abandoned their suspicious and watchful attitude towards NATO. At that time Moscow in fact did not react at all to any attempts to intensify the movement to military and political co-operation in the western part of the European continent. For instance, efforts aimed at creating the Eurocorps or reanimating the Western European Union (WEU) were viewed as not worthy of any attention.

As is well known, the Russian attitude towards NATO has changed because of the decision to enlarge the organisation. However, as far as Moscow is concerned, its extremely negative reaction to the idea of NATO’s expansion eastward was not the only result of that decision. There are serious grounds for believing that NATO’s drive eastward played a considerable role in pushing Russia to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the European Union’s enlargement, viewing it as an alternative project.

In particular, this relates to the military and political aspects of the problem. One has only to compare the wary attitude towards WEU in Soviet times with the heightened interest in it generated in the middle of the 1990s. Although this interest by no means seemed reciprocal, it was steadily increasing alongside the campaign against NATO’s enlargement. Russian politicians and analysts as near as cajoled the candidate countries to join WEU hoping that it would make them change their mind about becoming part of NATO. More than that, when the three Baltic states were accorded an associated partnership status with the WEU, Moscow did not react at all—in contrast to the deep concern it felt each time someone mentioned their possible joining NATO, and with apparent
ignorance of the fact that the mutual military assistance provisions under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty (as modified by the 1954 Paris agreements) are far tougher than similar provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty.

All this can logically lead to only one conclusion—as was the case before, the differentiation between ‘Atlantic’ and ‘European’ parameters of the military interactions within the continent is still the cornerstone of Moscow’s policy. Sometimes this approach is openly highlighted as almost an official position. But more often it appears at the subconscious level shaping politicians’ discourses and analysts’ theorisation. It is interesting to note that political and conceptual issues that are concurrently being debated are basically the same as before. It should be also added here that many of them are surprisingly similar to those debated by western analysts and politicians when they discuss the ESDP.

Occasionally, discussions give rise to clearly exaggerated perceptions of the ESDP’s objectives and possible developments in the foreseeable future. In such cases lack of knowledge about the real state of affairs brings about an image of a “united Europe” which is about to acquire a fully-fledged military mechanism. The overall impression is that few in Russia realise that the question is about creating crisis management instruments to implement the so-called “Petersberg missions” rather than carrying out a full-scale “European army” project of the 1954 type and moving from national to “European” means of ensuring military security.

Sometimes it is the other way around—traditional scepticism based on half a century of monitoring European integration gains the upper hand: how serious is all this and isn’t there too much ado about nothing? In particular, it is absolutely clear that is a long way from common policy to common defence whereas its ultimate point may turn out not to be attainable at all.

Even greater is another uncertainty relating to the correlation of the EU’s military dimension to NATO’s one and how Russia should view this dilemma. As was the case before, one can easily foresee the emergence of two camps here: the camp of “euroenthusiasts” and the camp of alarmists. The former will talk about the emerging military and political potential that would have a certain independence from the United States and NATO—which could be very attractive for Russia. This vision will be especially attractive for carriers of the allergic instincts towards NATO—instincts either inherited from Soviet times or acquired because of events in Kosovo. And again, as before, this approach will be rejected by those who put a strong emphasis on very close links between the ESDP and NATO and suspect that the former is just an additional tool of the latter.
“Euroenthusiasts” will logically favour the establishment and development of relations with the fledgling military structures of the EU believing that they will push NATO into the background. The so-called “alarmists” will probably view these attempts with scepticism. Or they will try to make the possibility of Russia’s co-operation with those structures conditional on the ESDP’s radical break with NATO. Senior officials within the Russian military establishment were disarmingly candid in this regard: we stand for co-operation with the ESDP but not with the one that has been shaping so far because we are against the EU’s security forces becoming “an appendix to NATO’s military machine”.

However, there may be a new interesting element in all this. Those who politically or intellectually stand for prioritising Russia’s relations with NATO and the United States may explicitly or implicitly oppose Russia’s interaction with the EU in the area of the ESDP because for them favouring the development of military and political relations with the EU would mean to be against NATO and the United States. According to this logic, this can only be done by hawks from the Ministry of Defence or General Staff as well as by anti-American and anti-NATO “civilian strategists”.

As a result, red-hot anti-NATO people, on the one hand, and passionate pro-NATO activists, on the other hand, unexpectedly find themselves in one and the same camp. Both argue against any co-operation with the emerging mechanisms of military interaction on the basis of and within the European Union. Of course, there is a certain simplification in distinguishing these two categories; however, one can not but notice the extreme polarity of arguments and motives that in fact point in the same direction. But in one case, co-operation with the ESDP is rejected due to its complete ‘subordination’ to NATO while in the other case a potential Russian co-operation with the ESDP is viewed as leading Russian policy astray from its major would-be direction.

One can assume with a fairly big measure of certainty that the enthusiasts of military and political co-operation of Russia with the EU who are guided primarily (if not exclusively) by anti-NATO, anti-American logic are bound to be somewhat disappointed. If Moscow vigorously starts to offer itself to the EU as a contracting party for the ESDP, stressing—as has already been done a couple of times by Yeltsin—that the Europeans should be dealing with their affairs themselves, the effect would be directly opposite: instead of attracting the Europeans, Moscow will scare them off. Indeed, in this matter, the EU member states have a lot of troubles to deal with even without ‘the Russian factor’. The nervousness of the United States about the ESDP pushes Washington to use every opportunity to remind that the EU’s military dimension should be shaped only within the framework of the Atlantic system of
coordinates and through close co-operation with it. It is one of the major priorities for the Europeans—to remove the US concern that the ESDP may weaken or marginalize NATO. To emphasise this particular theme, when offering Russian ‘support’ to the ESDP, is like pouring oil into the fire. This will almost certainly make the EU extra cautious about the idea of partnership with Russia in this area.

Yet, a certain degree of confusion and lack of clarity about the ESDP is not an exclusively Russian policy monopoly. In any case, even for the EU the problem of its own military correlation with NATO is extremely sensitive and, in some respects, controversial. And the questions arising within the EU are similar to those that Russians are asking themselves. For instance, what will be the impact of a “common European security and defence policy” on the status of neutral countries that are members of the European Union but are not part of NATO (such as Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland)? If the ESDP is going to be closely linked to NATO, will it result in those countries drifting towards membership at the Alliance (even if it is de facto rather than de jure)? Will their neutrality become formal or not?

Then, there is another uncertain aspect of the problem: where does the EU intend to use the crisis management mechanism it is presently developing? It is clear that the first and obvious choice would be the Balkans—in case the instability there persists or even becomes greater. But what else will be within the ESDP’s scope? If it is considered applicable in Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia or the Transdniester area (but never in Ulster, the Basque country or Corsica), would it not mean that the set of instruments being developed now will be exclusively (or mainly) oriented towards the post-Soviet geopolitical space? If this is so, then many in Russia will get the impression that Russia is being squeezed out of the regions vital to its national interests—and this impression, on top of everything else, will be directly linked to the ESDP.

Another issue that may not be indifferent to Russia concerns the impact of the ESDP on the nature and scale of military preparations. They will inevitably have to alter in terms of scale and qualitative characteristics if the EU intends to acquire an independent military capability. The EU member-states will have to focus seriously on restructuring their armed forces and spend more on purchasing modern military hardware, so as not to face again a situation similar to the one in Kosovo where Europe’s participation was more than modest (whereas the US Air Force, for instance, accounted for 80 per cent of all combat sorties). Meanwhile, the intensification of military preparations in the EU countries may be taken by Russia as not a very reassuring sign—especially against the backdrop of uncertainties as to how the ever-increasing capabilities are going to be used.
AlARMIST PERCEPTIONS IN THIS REGARD COULD ACQUIRE ALMOST HYSTERICAL PROPORTIONS. ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, THE ESDP MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN NATO. A QUOTATION ILLUSTRATING THIS APPROACH READS AS FOLLOWS: “BEHIND ALL THE EU’S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEED TO MAKE A MILITARY CHOICE THERE IS ONLY THE IDEA OF CREATING A POWERFUL EUROPEAN STRIKE FORCE ENTRUSTED WITH FUNCTIONS THAT GEOGRAPHICALLY WOULD GREATLY EXCEED NATO’S CAPABILITIES. […] AS WAS THE CASE OF NATO IN THE BALKANS, AN ARMED EUROPEAN UNION WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN DESIRE WHILE THE UN AND ITS PEACEKEEPING CONTINGENTS WILL BASICALLY BECOME IRRELEVANT”.

But even if such extreme approaches are put aside, the question about the ESDP’s long-term prospects still remains. There may be wide-ranging views on this point in Russia. To make things simpler, the question may be formulated in the following way: could a militarily strong, ‘united Europe’, even if independent in its decisions from the United States, become a political challenge to Russia as NATO was considered to be in Soviet times? Or turn into an existential challenge, like the one represented by China?

It is clear that all these theoretical speculations can vary significantly. That is why some analysts in Russia think that it would be prudent to wait until things become clear and not be in a rush to define the country’s position. However, there is another point of view: Russia should intensify its efforts to be involved in the ESDP. And it should act quickly while this policy and its modus operandi are still being shaped—because when this process is completed and the rules of the game are set it will be very difficult to change them afterwards. In other words, there is still a possibility today for Russia to influence the final outcome of ESDP developments while tomorrow it will be too late and Russia will be forced to adapt to what has been created without its involvement and participation.

Perhaps this approach contains somewhat exaggerated expectations with regard to Russia’s leverage on the process of shaping a “common European security and defence policy”. However, it is important to stress here a principled orientation towards cooperative interaction between Russia and the ESDP. But it is imperative to take this orientation out of the context of Russia’s negative complexes concerning its relations with NATO. It should be also recognised that under the present circumstances military and political co-operation with the EU is simply not feasible without restoring relations with NATO and, even more so, as an antithesis to it.

In that case, co-operation may prove to be quite worthwhile for both parties. In any case, Russia could offer its European partners something quite tangible and attractive—for instance, the possibility to
use its military transport aircraft in solving the tasks defined by the ESDP. In this context, joint implementation of the “Petersberg missions” by Russia and the European Union in no way belongs to the category of ‘unthinkable scenarios’.

In a broader context, it would be the best guarantee against the suspicions, mistrust and concerns mentioned above. Russia’s involvement in the system of military and political relations in Europe, which is presently being shaped around and on the basis of the EU, is even more important than cultivating a somewhat flimsy image of a “common European architecture”.

The importance of a principled decision on this subject taken at a political level is obvious. However, if everything comes down to a political solution only, the idea will soon be diluted and even discredited. It is important to fill it in with specific content and define the prospective objectives, practical tasks, institutional mechanisms and organisational forms of the potential interaction between Russia and the EU in this area. Efforts should be concentrated precisely on identifying these specific issues.

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1 The Joint Declaration was signed by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the Chairman of the European Council Jacques Chirac, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU Javier Solana and the President of the Commission of the European Communities Romano Prodi.

2 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

3 For the text of the Joint Declaration in Russian, see Sovevremennaya Evropa, no.4, October-December 2000, p.120-123. For the text in the EU official languages, see the EU Council documents 12779/00, 12780/00.

4 The Speaker of the State Duma Gennadiy Seleznev writes: “With the collapse of the USSR the world has actually become unipolar and the balance of power and influence on our planet has shifted to one single point—which is not only unfair but just plain dangerous for mankind. Under these circumstances one can understand the search by many states for some counterbalances. The EU’s ambitious desire to create another pole of global importance which would stand out not only by its economic clout but by having global and regional components of influence is understandable and justified.” See Gennadiy Seleznev, ‘Zolushka v Yevrope. Skolko escho Rossii ostavatsa v etoy roli?’ (‘Cinderella in Europe. How long Russia has to stay in this role?’), Evropa (Moscow), no. 5, 2000, p. 9.

5 This is indirect quotation of remarks made at the conference on the EU and Russia held in Moscow in February 2001. See Georgiy Bovt, ‘Filosofiya pridatkov NATO’ (‘The philosophy of annexes to NATO’), Izvestia, 16 Feb. 2001, p.3.
A befitting comparison could be made with the criticism by some Russian analysts of Moscow’s offer with regard to European non-strategic anti-missile system. They view this initiative as resulting from the deliberate intention of ‘hawks’ to lead the whole discussion to a deadlock by creating an illusion that it would be possible to solve the problem without reaching agreements with the United States on BMD. The critics of the idea of Russian interaction with the ESDP proceed from similar logic.


It looks as if the official policy of Russia is evolving exactly in this direction. For instance, the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010 officially presented by Vladimir Putin at the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki in October 1999 contained the provision that the co-operation with the EU in the area of security ‘could become, inter alia, a counterbalance to NATO-centrism in Europe’. A year later, at the above-mentioned EU-Russia summit in Paris, the Russian president did not even mention the issue. It was also absent in the Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation adopted in June 2000—this document only impassively stated that the evolving EU’s military and political dimension ‘should become the subject of special attention’.
4. RUSSIA AND THE COMBAT AGAINST TERRORISM IN LOCAL REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Ekaterina STEPANOVA

The tragic events resulting from the unprecedented terrorist attack against the USA on 11 September 2001 have pushed the problem of combating international terrorism to the foreground of world politics. In view of the fact that fighting terrorism has for some time occupied an important place in Russia’s national security priorities, Russian experience in this field, acquired in recent years, deserves particular attention. Article 3 of the Federal Law “On the Combat Against Terrorism” defines terrorism as “violence or the threat of using it against physical persons or organizations as well as the destruction (damaging) of material objects, that create danger to human life, cause considerable damage to property or have other dangerous public consequences, carried out in order to violate public security, terrorize the population or influence the decisions taken by the authorities to the advantage of terrorists or meeting their interests”. It should be noted that “countering terrorism” is not limited to combating it (to direct suppression of planned or accomplished terrorist acts), but implies a whole complex of legal, ideological, information, organizational, administrative, and other measures designed to counteract terrorist activities, especially those carried out by terrorist groups and organizations.

In accordance with the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation “the illegal activities of extremist, nationalist, religious, separatist and terrorist organizations and bodies”, directed at the violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the destabilization of the domestic political situation in the country”, are second on the list of internal threats, while “organized crime, terrorism, smuggling and other illegal activities on a scale threatening the military security of the Russian Federation” occupy the fourth place. “International terrorism” comes last on the list of external threats to the Russian security, formulated in the Military Doctrine. Until recently, this hierarchy fully corresponded to the situation in the rest of the world where, in the last decade of the 20th century, “internal terrorism” was more widespread than “international terrorism”. As a result of the end of the Cold War and the improvement of the international situation, in the last decade of the 20th century, the number of international terrorist acts has decreased in the world as a whole (!): starting from 1987, when 665 terrorist acts were committed, their number decreased, reaching its lowest figure in 1996 (300 terrorist acts). Although from 1996 on, the yearly
number of international terrorist acts began to grow slowly (in 2000, for instance, 423 international terrorist acts were carried out, in comparison with 392 in 1999), it remained, nevertheless, substantially lower than in the 1980s. It is important, however, to note that while the number of international terrorist acts and total number of victims decreased in the 1990s, the death toll caused by terrorist acts was steadily rising: in 2000, 405 people were killed and 791 injured as a result of international terrorist acts (compared to 23 killed and 706 injured in 1999). A typical terrorist act of the last decade of the 20th century was no longer, as in the 1980s, the seizing of a group of hostages, but rather the blowing up of buildings, resulting in the death of tens, if not hundreds, of people.

At the start of the new century and millenium, the synchronized terrorist attacks of September 2001, in which several thousand people in New York and Washington lost their lives in one blow, became the culminating moment of this dangerous tendency.

One of the main sources of terrorism in general and “international terrorism” in particular are the numerous local and regional conflicts, where terrorism is used as the confrontational tactics, in combination with other forms of violence. In this context, the link between terrorism and inter-ethnic tensions, religious extremism and separatism acquires particular importance. For Russia, the zone extending along the Southern borders of Russia itself and its Southern neighbors, member states of the CIS, remains the main hotbed of terrorism linked to separatism and religious extremism.

**Combating terrorism in the North Caucasus**

The main source of terrorism on the territory of the Russian Federation during the 1990s was the conflict in the Chechen Republic and the situation in the North Caucasus, as a whole. The fight against terrorism became the most important goal of the second campaign of the Federal forces in Chechnya, conducted since 1999, and officially known as the “counter-terrorist” campaign. According to data supplied by the Directorate for the implementation of laws by the agencies of the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service and the Main Directorate of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the North Caucasus, in 2000 alone, 191 terrorist acts were registered (with 162 of them committed in Chechnya), the largest of which were the explosions in Pyatigorsk and Nevinnomysk (6 October), in the Pyatigorsk market (8 December), and in the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, in the Urus-Martan district in Chechnya (9 December). On the territory of Chechnya itself, the militants continued to hold 875 hostages in 2000. A significant number of criminal cases were filed on
charges of terrorism. In the first 6 months of 2001 alone, 136 terrorist acts were carried out with the use of explosives on Chechnya territory.

One of the principal specifics of the combat against terrorism in Chechnya in 2000 was that it was conducted in the course of continuing armed confrontation. As the large bands were being routed, the separatists increasingly resorted to guerrilla warfare. The main methods were mining operations against the Federal forces, diversions and individual acts of terrorism, mainly against officials of the Republic, loyal to the Federal government (in 2000 alone, 35 leading officials and employees of the republican and district administrations of the Republic of Chechnya and members of their families were killed or injured). Every day attacks were carried out on the rear and communications of the Federal forces, checkpoints and the interim authorities were fired upon, and main roads and railways were mined. As the militants turned to subversive and terrorist activities, the Federal forces too changed their tactics: starting from 2000, the main emphasis in the operations of the Federal forces was put on complex, special operations aimed at exterminating the bands and their leaders.

In a local conflict, the main problem in the fight against terrorism is that anti-terrorist activities are closely linked to the tasks of establishing and maintaining public order and security, and of creating a relatively safe environment for the local authorities and population in the conflict zone. It is extremely difficult to implement these tasks even in the intermediate stage between the cessation of hostilities in a conflict zone and the complete normalization of the situation (the restoration of authority, law and order), let alone at the stage of full-scale armed confrontation. From the point of effectiveness of counter-terrorist activities, the moods predominant among the local population become a key factor. This can be fully demonstrated by comparing the situation in Dagestan, after the aggression by Chechen bands in August 1999, where it was the active support on the part of the local population which enabled the Federal forces to resolve, in a relatively short time, the problem of repulsing the terrorists, with the guerrilla war in Chechnya, where the degree of mutual mistrust between the Federal forces and the local population remained considerable in 2000–2001.

This situation is frequently linked by observers to the problem of human rights in Chechnya. If terrorism denies the fundamental human rights, in principle, a number of counter-terrorist measures that include the use of force are inevitably accompanied by restriction and, at times, direct violation of human rights, especially in the course of an ethno-political conflict. Among such violations in the course of the Chechen conflict, in January 2000, the Special Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has noted the following: the use of heavy
arms in densely populated districts; arbitrary arrests and detentions among
the civilian population; crimes committed by representatives of the
Federal forces in respect of civilians, etc. The difficulty of solving this
problem is clearly demonstrated by the example of one of the main types
of counter-terrorist activities in Chechnya—the so-called “zachistka”
cordon and search) operations, i.e. special operations to carry out total
passport control (identity check) in a given populated area, after it has
been completely blocked by internal troops and/or army units. On the one
hand, “zachistka” has become almost the main prophylactic police
measure used in Chechnya to detect terrorists and to forestall their
operations. Even lacking solid operational intelligence: cordonning off an
area in advance by troops that can be reinforced, if necessary, prevents the
militants, in case they are discovered, from escaping without fighting. On
the other hand, “zachistka” operations could have serious political
repercussions, especially in the sphere of human rights (among recent
examples, highlighted by the mass media, were “zachistka” actions in the
course of special operations in Sernovodsk, Assinovskaya and Kurchaloi
in July 2001).

It should be noted in this regard, that the crime level in the group
of Federal troops in the North Caucasus, at least according to official
statistics, was twice lower than the average level on Russian territory. (By
August 2001, the Prosecutor General’s Office filed 293 criminal cases in
connection with crimes committed against the civilian population in the
course of anti-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic for the period
between 1999 and 2001. 82 criminal cases were filed in connection with
crimes committed by the military, including 30 for murder and more than
50 for crimes committed by the Ministry of the Interior employees).

Measures taken by the Federal bodies to improve the human
rights situation in the course of counter-terrorist operation included:

— the revocation, as a result of strong criticism from both inside
and outside Russia, of restrictions, imposed by the Joint Group of Federal
Forces on the crossing of the Chechen–Ingush administrative border by all
men aged from 10 to 60;

— the extension up to 15 May 2000 of the Amnesty for “persons
who have committed socially dangerous acts” during the conflict in the
North Caucasus;

— improvement of the custody conditions for members of illegal
armed formations in the Chernokozovo detention facility;

— creation of the post of Special Representative of the President
of the Russian Federation for observance of human and civil rights and
freedoms in the Chechen Republic;
— return of the Group for Good Offices of the OSCE to Chechnya in June 15, 2001 (the Group had to leave the Republic in December 1998 for security considerations), etc.

The erosion of the boundary between military and security/police functions, as the number of armed groups’ members was constantly changing, with many of them kept in reserve for large-scale operations, presented a serious obstacle in the fight against terrorism in Chechnya in 2000–2001. That is why, even after the military (the so-called “troop”) stage of the operation was declared to be completed, the tasks of searching and destroying terrorists could not be implemented by special services and law-enforcement agencies alone and required the involvement of internal troops and the Armed Forces. That is why the deployment of the 42nd mechanized rifle division, with a total strength of more than 15000 men and the internal troops 46th brigade for permanent stationing in Chechnya became a factor of great importance. Although, as compared with the first Chechen campaign (1994–1996), certain progress has been made in dividing responsibilities between the various force structures, the problem of lack of coordination within the security bloc remained unsolved, thus making anti-terrorist measures less effective. Given the internal character of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, the search for the optimal balance between the various security components has acquired critical importance (with use of the Armed Forces and the internal troops limited only to cases of extreme necessity). This was, for instance, demonstrated by the transfer of the chief operational command and responsibility for the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya from the Ministry of Defense to the Federal Security Service, in accordance with Presidential Decree no.61 of 22 January 2001 “On measures to combat terrorism in the North–Caucasian region of the Russian Federation”, as well as by the reduction of the strength of the Joint Group of Forces since March 2001.

The fight against terrorism in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus is also considerably complicated by the link between the latter and religious extremism. Despite the almost interchangeable use of the notions of “international terrorism” and “Islamic extremism” (in the form of “North Caucasian Wahhabism”) in the Russian political lexicon, the connection between the spread of Wahhabism and the growth of terrorist activities in the North Caucasus is much more complicated than causal. The spread of Wahhabism in the North Caucasus in the 1990s was most evident in the Eastern part of the region (in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan), which was also the area of the most acute social-economic, political and inter-ethnic crisis on the territory of the Russian Federation. The spread of North Caucasian Wahhabism, especially among the young people, was not only the result of well-organized propaganda and financial assistance for the Wahhabi communities from abroad, but also a
form of social and religious protest. In an environment marked by social-economic hardships, unprecedented corruption and incompetence on the part of the local authorities, the social doctrine of Wahhabism, propagating patriarchal equality and the erosion of the social hierarchy, became particularly attractive.

North Caucasian Wahhabism can be divided into moderate and radical wings. If moderate Wahhabits try to avoid open conflict with the authorities and the traditional Muslim bodies\(^{10}\), there are no doubts about the participation of the North Caucasian Wahhabi radicals and their leaders (for instance, Emir Abdurrahman) in terrorist activities, particularly in kidnapping, declared by them to be a form of “jihad”\(^{11}\). In the course of the conflict in Chechnya, radical Wahhabism has in fact become a political instrument in the hands of various extremist forces (nationalists, criminal elements and others), having little in common with Islam.

In 2000–2001, terrorism in Chechnya and the North Caucasus was increasingly seen by the Russian leadership as “a clearly orchestrated game, imposed by international extremist forces”\(^{12}\), receiving considerable financial and organizational support from abroad. The first foreign mercenaries had already appeared in the North Caucasus in the spring of 1995 when the “Jamaat Islami” group, led by the Jordanian Khattab, was formed; among the group’s members were subsequently well-known rebel leaders, such as Yakub al-Gamidi and Jafar al-Yemeni. The total number of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya has not, however, exceeded a few hundred and could not decisively affect the outcome of the armed confrontation with the Federal forces neither in the first nor in the second Chechen campaign. (According to information, presented by the Chief of the Directorate of internal affairs of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, major-general S. Arenin, at an operational meeting of the heads of criminal militia departments and departments combating organized crime, held in Vladikavkaz on 5 July 2001, the total number of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya amounted to about 300 men). Among the foreign organizations and foundations, accused of financing, training and transporting foreign mercenaries to Chechnya, are the Islamic Foundation of the Two Holy Places (“Al-Kharamein”), “Tablighi Jamaat”, “the Muslim Brothers”, “Jamaat-i-Islami”, etc.; the Chechen Diaspora also plays an important role in these activities. Special operations to cut off these financial flows have become the most effective of the Russian special services’ activities, allowing Director of the Federal Security Service Nikolai Patrushev, to state in May 2001 “that the financial flows from abroad have been cut down”\(^{13}\).

Even successful counter-terrorist measures, including special operations to detain and exterminate the leaders of the militants\(^{14}\) cannot,
however, provide an effective solution to the problem of combating terrorism in Chechnya and the North Caucasus as long as its social and ideological foundations have not been undermined. An important step in this direction have been measures to create normal living conditions for the population of Chechnya and to rebuild the state structures in the Republic: in June 2000, the Chechen Administration headed by mufti Akhmad Kadyrov was formed. The Commission for social-economic and political stabilization in the Republic of Chechnya, set up by the Russian Government, developed a program of measures designed to provide for a normal functioning of the economy and social life in Chechnya. In 2000, top priority measures were launched to rebuild the oil industry and the gas supply system, the work continued to rebuild the healthcare system and, as from 1 September 2000, the education system started to function again. It was at solving the top priority social and economic tasks that the new stage in the counter-terrorist operation was directed; apart from carrying out special operations, the emphasis was put on measures to stabilize the political and social-economic situation in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus as a whole. This was, for instance, reflected in establishing the Government of the Chechen Republic in February 2001 and moving it from Gudermes to Grozny at the end of April, as well as in continuing the formation of local self-government structures. Despite some positive results (in 2001, good grain-crops were raised in the republic; the electrification process has entered its final stage, etc.), the overall implementation of the 2001 special Federal Economic Reconstruction Program for Chechnya, however, “was going badly”, as stated by the Minister for coordination of the activities of the Federal authorities in Chechnya V. Yelagin15. Rebuilding industrial production, housing and municipal services proved to be particularly problematic. The difficult social-economic situation in Chechnya, persisting as a result of a number of objective and subjective factors: the prolonged decade-long social-economic and political crisis, availability of only part of funds allocated for reconstruction programs, the waste of the available funds, the ineffectiveness of inter-agency coordination, the weakness of the local authorities, etc. did not contribute to eroding the social conditions for banditry and terrorism, especially in the central and southern regions of the Republic, including Grozny itself.

Combating terrorism in Central Asia and the situation in Afghanistan

In 2000, the situation in the Central Asian region remained unstable. For the second year running, the territories of several Central Asian states have been the object of incursions by extremist groups. In late July–early August, militants of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) moved into the mountainous part of the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan from Tajik territory. In August–September, several armed bands, based in the mountainous areas of Tajikistan since the times of the civil war in that country, repeatedly intruded into Kyrgyzstan in a number of separate incursions. At the August meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian states in Bishkek, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergey Ivanov stated that “the activities of armed bands are acquiring a chronic character”.

In this context, Russian and Central Asian governments were particularly concerned with the situation in Afghanistan, dominated by the Taliban movement, accused by the international community, including Russia and the US, of supporting and exporting terrorism to other countries and regions, including the CIS Central Asian republics. As early as in April 2000, speaking in Dushanbe at the working meeting of the Heads of Security Councils of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty member states, Sergey Ivanov, while answering a question about the possibility of preemptive strikes against international terrorist bases in Afghanistan, did not exclude such a possibility “in theory”, if the situation in the region “became threatening and if aggressive incursions acquired a large-scale character”16. Among the practical measures, taken by the Russian government against the Taliban regime, Presidential Decree no.786 “On sanctions against the Taliban movement, or the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)”, effective as of 11 May, should be noted. The Decree ordered all organizations within Russian jurisdiction to fully implement the demands of UN SCR no.1267 of 15 October 1999, banning anyone from giving permission to take off or land to the Taliban-owned aircraft and freezing all accounts of the “IEA”, including real estate and other financial resources.

The series of military victories of the Taliban in August–September 2000, which brought them to the border with Tajikistan, guarded by Russian border troops, again raised the questions of whether the Taliban posed a threat to the neighboring countries, including Central Asian states, how great the movement’s expansionist potential was and to what extent it threatened Russia. It should be noted that throughout the recent decade, the radical Islamic group of the Taliban, set up in early 1990s with support from Pakistan and the US, has turned to a combination of Sunni fundamentalism and Pashtun nationalism. Since the mid–90s, the military victories of the Taliban could be largely explained by the fact that many ethnic Pashtuns, making up 60% of the country’s population and up to 80–85% of the personnel of the former Afghan armed forces, fought on the Taliban’s side. It is the predominantly Pashtun character of the Taliban movement that has enabled it, to a large extent, to get control over most of the country’s territory. At the same time, it was the ethnically Pashtun
character of the movement that set objective limits to the Taliban’s advance. As soon as Taliban forces would move to territories populated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks, the Pashtun factor would start to work against them. From this perspective, a far more realistic threat to regional security is posed by the potential re-ignition of the so-called Pashtun problem. At the root of this problem lies the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan about who controls the territory between the Afghan–Pakistani border and the river Indus, populated mainly by Pashtuns. In this context, the Taliban were more interested in strengthening rather than undermining Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states.

For Russia, vitally interested in maintaining the secular character of the Central Asian regimes, the greatest challenge, however, was not an unlikely cross-border military attack by the Taliban against the southern CIS republics. Rather, it was the potential of Taliban domination of Afghanistan to stimulate the rise of radical Islam in Central Asia, thus aiding such radical movements as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb-ut-Tahrir) in challenging local regimes. According to statements made by senior Russian officials, the events in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, in the North Caucasus and elsewhere are “links in one chain, linked in place and time, coordinated and directed from one or few centers, that are united by one ideology and financed from the same sources”. Long before the September attacks in the US, leaders of Russia and some Central Asian states saw the Taliban-dominated part of Afghanistan as one of the hotbeds of terrorism, accusing the Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, who was granted asylum by the Taliban, and his organization “Al-Qaeda” of coordinating terrorist activities and giving assistance to terrorists both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. These fears were confirmed by the infiltration of IMU groups into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the summer–autumn of 2000 that fully demonstrated the pertinence of the creeping-aggression scenario for the Central Asian states, as well as by granting political asylum to the IMU leader Jumah Namangani by the Taliban, etc.

Under these circumstances, Russia had to pursue its own policy of countering extremism and terrorism in the region in several directions at once. A question was raised on the need to put forward the CIS–wide set of measures aimed at combating terrorism and to coordinate the efforts of the CIS member states in this field. On 25 January 2000, the Council of the Heads of CIS states had already decided to work out an inter-state Program for the fight against international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism for the period up to 2003, and to set up a joint Anti-Terrorist Center (ATC). Participation in joint counter-terrorism operations was also envisaged as one of the main missions of the CIS
collective security forces (an agreement on the status of these forces was signed in Bishkek on 11 October 2000). “Southern Shield—Commonwealth–2000”, joint command and staff anti-terrorist exercises were conducted in the Ferghana valley in April 2000, with participation of 10 000 troops from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well as of the 201st Russian division and units of the 10000–strong group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan. The presence of these forces in Tajikistan continues to play an important stabilizing role from the point of security of the entire region. Ensuring better cooperation between anti-terrorist units of the CIS countries was the goal of other special exercises, held in Kyrgyzstan in April 2001.

The second important direction of Russia’s policy has been providing assistance not only to the Central Asian states, but to the leaders of the anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan itself, in view of the negative effect which the defeat of the Northern Alliance, made up mainly of Tajiks and Uzbeks, could have had on the security of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, including potential influx of refugees. These issues were, for instance, discussed at the Dushanbe meeting between the Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev and the leader of the Northern Alliance Ahmad Shah Massoud in October 2000. Although the latter’s death in a terrorist attack in September 2001 has somewhat complicated the situation for the Northern Alliance, it was far from hopeless, especially in view of the preparation and implementation of a massive anti-Taliban military campaign by the US in response to the September terrorist attacks.

As the tensions along Russia’s southern borders intensified as a result of the US retaliation for the terrorist attacks, the Russian government had to consider at least two circumstances. First, the task of combating terrorism, especially international terrorism, is complicated by its fragmented character, vagueness, its often non-state nature, its frequent use in concert with other forms of extremism, the predominance of horizontal networks over vertical-hierarchical structures, etc. Against this background, the easiest way of “fighting” the new world evil is to search for a single mastermind, an international center for the coordination of terrorist activities. For the time being, this role has been effectively played by the “Al-Qaeda” terrorist network, headed by Osama bin Laden. While presenting the problem in such a simplified way could be justified from both political and propagandistic point of view, it cannot make up for the lack of a comprehensive international approach to the fight against terrorism in local and regional conflicts, well exceeding the limits of special operations or even large-scale military actions.

Secondly, it should be realized that, apart from the apparent effect of the Taliban military advances, an upsurge of activity on the part of radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian states is generated at least as
much by internal factors as by outside influences. Extremism, which mainly takes a religious form, finds fertile soil in social discontent arising out of disastrous economic conditions, impoverishment, the semifeudal nature and repressive policies of local regimes. That is why the counter-terrorist focus of Russia’s policy aimed at building a security system along its southern borders, will hardly produce the desired effect, if the internal sources and causes of instability in the CIS Central Asian republics are not fully taken into account.

Russia’s position on the fight against terrorism in the Balkans and in the Middle East

Russia has also consistently maintained its firm stand against terrorism, including international terrorism, in managing local and regional conflicts beyond the borders of the CIS states. In this context, the conflicts in the Balkans (in Kosovo, in the Southern provinces of Serbia, and in Macedonia) and in the Middle East (the Palestinian–Israeli confrontation) deserve particular attention. In view of its special responsibility for the maintenance of international stability, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, takes an active part in the process of settling both conflicts, being directly involved in the NATO and UN operations in Kosovo and acting as a co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process.

In the process of the NATO Kosovo force (KFOR) deployment, the KFOR command and the UN interim administration were confronted with the task of exercising all administrative functions, in fact, it amounts to establishing an international protectorate in the province. Officially, KFOR’s chief mission was to create the basic security environment in the province; in the UN SCR no.1244, NATO forces in Kosovo were designated as “international security forces”22. Apart from the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and the Serbian police forces from Kosovo, SCR no.1244 called for disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Albanian armed groups23. As long as the KLA controlled the situation in Kosovo to a large extent, it was unrealistic to expect it to surrender its arms voluntarily while disarming it by force could lead to confrontation with the Albanian extremists and losses by the NATO forces. That is why KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) adopted a non-confrontational approach to the KLA and legalized parts of the illegal armed formations by turning them into the so-called Kosovo Defence Corps which in fact has never become a civilian agency for emergency situations, but continued as a paramilitary extremist organization.
For the purpose of maintaining public order, the NATO forces cordoned off certain areas, established checkpoints, conducted regular patrols and guarded particularly important facilities. These measures remained fairly ineffective: although the total number of murders declined, the continuing kidnapping of people in the province directly contradicted the statement made by the Head of the UN Mission in Kosovo Bernard Kuchner in March 2000 that this form of crime had been rooted out. While a functioning judicial system developed very slowly, KFOR mainly resorted to the temporary detention of the armed gangsters, which, at least, should have “reduced the number of people with guns freely walking the streets of Kosovo.” Similarly, “demonstrative” measures to protect ethnic minorities were clearly insufficient and did not stop the Serb and other-non-Albanian populations from fleeing the region. According to some assessments, by the beginning of 2001, i.e. a year and a half after the KFOR operation was launched, the number of Serbs in Prishtina, that amounted to 30,000 in June 1999, did not exceed 50–100 people. Overall, during the first year of the KFOR operation, about 20,000 Serbs, Gypsies and representatives of other national and ethnic minorities fled Kosovo.

One of the main tasks of NATO forces in Kosovo should have been preventing the renewal of armed confrontation, the escalation of violence and, especially, its spread beyond the province. At first, the KFOR Command and the UNMIK leadership considered “the subversive activities” of the Serbian special services and illegal armed bands as the most likely potential source of escalation of violence in Kosovo and in the neighboring areas; these actors were declared responsible for the destabilization of the situation in Kosovska–Mitrovica, where a fairly compact Serb minority continued to live. The deteriorating situation in the Southern regions of Serbia, bordering Kosovo (Preshevo, Medvedja, Bujanovac), was also initially explained by the “harassment of the Albanian population of these districts”, forcing KFOR to come to their defence. Gradually, however, the emphasis shifted: a year after the operation began, the KFOR Command already accused the extremist Liberation Army of Preshevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac of escalating tension in the “security zone” between Kosovo and the Southern regions of Serbia.

The Command of the NATO forces in Kosovo insisted that it did not support the activities of the Albanian extremists and was ready to take steps to prevent violations of the border regime and Kosovo from becoming a source of violence for the neighboring areas.

The measures taken by the KFOR, including mobilization of public support for those political forces in Kosovo, that could exert a moderating influence on the extremists, and the establishment of closer
contacts with the local Serb police in the districts of Preshevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac have not led to a weakening of tension in the south of Serbia where the situation continued to deteriorate. At the same time, the October 20 municipal elections in Kosovo, in which only the Albanian population took part, provoked an intensification of the struggle for power between the various Albanian groups and led to a renewed outburst of violence in the province. UNMIK’s and KFOR’s policy of supporting moderate political forces and trying to improve the security situation in Kosovo without openly confronting Albanian extremists, has in fact led to the expulsion of a considerable part of them from Kosovo and to an outburst of Albanian extremism not only in southern parts of Serbia, but also in the northern regions of Macedonia, which, in 2001, became the arena of another inter-ethnic conflict in the Balkans. In order to somewhat stabilize the situation, NATO had to agree to the return of units of the Yugoslav army to the buffer zone on the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia and on the Kosovo stretch of the Macedonian–Yugoslav border, as well as to prepare for yet another operation in the Balkans, this time in Macedonia.

On the international arena, it was Russia that came out as the principal advocate of intensifying the fight against terrorism and extremism in Kosovo and around it, including suppressing the “illegal activities” in the security zone on the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia. At the meetings of the UN Security Council, Russia repeatedly drew attention to the need for the consistent and full implementation of SCR no.1244 and stressed that any decisions on Kosovo, taken behind the back of the Security Council and the Yugoslav authorities, could not be tolerated. Russia has also demonstrated its commitment to fight terrorism and extremism in Kosovo in practice. For instance, in the part of the US sector “East”, controlled by the 31st tactical group of Russian peacekeepers, not a single case of massive incursion by Albanian extremists in the direction of Serbia has occurred. However, with the Western states dominating in the Kosovo peace process (and now in the Macedonian one as well), all efforts undertaken by Russia, which has remained virtually the only great power consistently stressing the need to implement SCR no.1244, could not lead to a decisive break-through in the situation around Kosovo. Overall, the international presence in Kosovo has turned out to present a case of an extremely ineffective way of combating terrorism and extremism, as well as of the lack of either political will or interest in tackling these tasks on the part of the NATO forces. Incapable of either providing security for the non-Albanian population of Kosovo or stop the spread of violence beyond the borders of the province, KFOR bore the primary responsibility for the fact that the international protectorate of Kosovo could with full justification be called
“a hotbed of terrorism and extremism”. However, there are grounds to assume that after the September terrorist attacks, the US and its NATO allies will take a more firm stand against Albanian extremism and terrorism.

In 2000–2001, the problem of terrorism has again become the focus of yet another conflict—the Palestinian–Israeli confrontation. In September 2000 it seemed that the leaders of both sides were closer to a compromise than ever before. However, with public opinion in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as well as influential forces in the Arab–Islamic world, not ready to accept such a compromise, the artificial intensification of the negotiation process, forced by the Clinton Administration on the eve of the November presidential elections in the US, resulted in its collapse. The visit by the leader of the Israeli right, Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, following the refusal of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to approve the compromise on the status of Jerusalem, provided a pretext for a new spiral of confrontation. As part of the resumed Intifada, resulting in the deaths of about 300 Palestinians and 60 Israelis in the last three months of 2000, radical Palestinian groups have actively used terrorist methods, such as explosions in public places carried out by suicide bombers, attacks on Israel settlements, etc. These numerous terrorist attacks served the goal of destabilizing the situation in Israel itself and gradually forcing out the illegal Israeli settlements from Palestinian territory. Despite the extremely tough counter-terrorist measures (blocking up the territories of the Palestinian autonomy, the physical extermination of the leaders of several terrorist groups, the inevitable “retaliation” in response to each terrorist attack, preemptive strikes against terrorist bases), the Israeli security forces have not succeeded in reducing the wave of terrorist acts, with their numbers steadily growing throughout 2001. The impact of the terrorist attacks in the US and their consequences on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict might be ambiguous: on the one hand, the threat of a full-scale war in the region have forced the leaders of both sides to announce the temporary halting of the armed confrontation, on the other hand, in case of massive US strikes against states of the region, Israel becomes one of the primary targets for retaliation acts by various radical Islamic groups.

Speaking on the new round of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, President Putin had already stated in October 2000 that Russia was ready to contribute to crisis management efforts, “but only in case such an involvement is welcome by both sides”33. At the same time, Russia’s absence from the US–mediated October 2000 negotiations in Sharm-ash-Sheikh, that failed, demonstrated Moscow’s unwillingness to play the role of an extra in the Middle East peace process.
Attempts by the Israelis to emphasize the anti-terrorist aspects of cooperation with Moscow and draw a parallel between the Israeli fight against Palestinian terrorism and the Russian counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya were not welcomed by the Russian government. Such parallels can not be justified, as the differences in the nature and type of both conflicts are fundamental. In contrast to the internal conflict in Chechnya, the conflict in the Middle East is an international conflict about the right of the Palestinian people to have its own state with a capital in Jerusalem as envisaged by the UN resolutions\textsuperscript{34}. While strongly condemning terrorist acts by Palestinian extremists\textsuperscript{35}, Russia, at the same time, insists on full implementation by Israel of the UN resolutions.

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The task of combating domestic and international terrorism has become an important component of Russia’s policy on local and regional conflict management long before the recent outburst of international terrorism in the form of the September 2001 attacks in the US. These terrorist attacks mark the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in world politics in general and in the fight against terrorism, in particular: from now on, the problem lies not just in the spread of international terrorism, but in its “globalization”.

As a brief survey of the anti-terrorist aspects of Russian policy on local and regional conflict management shows, an effective combat against terrorism, that requires the implementation of a comprehensive long-term strategy, with adequate funding, technical and legal support, is not possible if those social-economic and political problems that provoke violent reaction in the form of terrorism remain unsolved. That is why the task of fighting terrorism cannot be confined to countering certain tactics of the armed resistance. The strategy of combating terrorism should be directed at solving its underlying causes.

\textsuperscript{1} “On the Combat against Terrorism”, Federal Law “, no.130 of 25 July 1998. See also art. 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which defines terrorism as “explosions, arson or other acts that create danger to human life, cause considerable damage to property or have other dangerous public consequences, if these acts are carried out in order to violate public security, terrorize the population or influence the taking of decisions by the authorities, as well as threats to commit such acts for the same purposes”.


4 In contrast to the 1980s, when the number of victims of international terrorist acts amounted to about 5000 people, in the 1990s, this number decreased almost twofold.

5 On the situation in Chechnya. Arguments of our parliamentarians in reply to the demands of the Council of Europe, in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4 April 2000.


8 As demonstrated, for instance, by an opinion poll held among representatives of the Russian elite by ROMIR in November 2000, “international terrorism” and “Islamic terrorism” were seen as serious threats to the security of the Russian Federation (only corruption, economic problems, the unstable political situation and NATO policies were cited as more serious threats). See: ROMIR’s Recent Studies: Russia’s elite on the principal threats to the Russian security. RIA–OREANDA, 5 December 2000.

9 Wahhabism—a movement of the followers of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (18th century), an extreme version of the radical Hanbalite mazkhabe (school-of-thought) in Sunni Islam. One of the varieties of Islamic fundamentalism or “salafism” (literally, “following the example of the first generations of Muslims”). The adherents of Wahhabism are known for their strict observance of the principle of monotheism, ban on worshipping Muslim Saints and Holy Places, extreme fanaticism and extremism in religious and social matters, especially in the fight against opponents, and commitment to the idea of “jihad” both against non-believers and apostate Muslims. The strictness of organizational principles often turns Wahhabi communities into militarized religious-political organizations.

10 In Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, the so-called traditional Islam is mainly represented by the Sufi orders of Nakshbandiya and Kadiiriya.


12 From the statement of the Russian Minister of the Interior V. Rushailo, cited by TV-6 Novosti, 21 April 2000.
14 Among the field commanders, killed or arrested in the course of the counter-terrorist operation were K. Israpilov, A. Ismailov, L. Dudayev, A. Barayev, A. Bakuyev, Abu Umar, S. Raduyev. T.A. Atgeriyev, a.o. All efforts to apprehend or kill the chief leaders of the extremists, Basayev and Khattab, have failed so far.
17 No Afghan government, including the Taliban, has ever recognized the present Afghan–Pakistani border, drawn along the so-called Durand line.
18 RIA-Novosti, 3 February 2000.
19 Confirmed by the decision of the CIS Heads of State on 21 June 2001. Although initially, only information and analysis tasks were assigned to the ATC, it was expected to become a permanently functioning specialized agency of the CIS, designed to coordinate and initiate joint action of the competent agencies of the CIS member states in combating international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism. (The final decision on launching the ATC and on its funding was taken at the CIS Minsk summit on 1 December 2000, with Russia initially agreeing to provide most of the funding for the Center).
23 Ibid., Par. 9b. 15.
24 KFOR/UNMIK Press Briefing, 23 March; 12 June 2000, etc.
27 Ibid., 21 March 2000.
28 For instance, deploying 100 British army personnel to stay with Serb families in Prishtina in the spring of 2000.
31 For instance, on 19 December 2000 the UN Security Council received an official statement of the President of the Council, who, at that time, was the Russian representative to the UN Sergey Lavrov, strongly condemning the acts of violence on the part of Albanian extremist groups in the southern regions of Serbia.
34 In particular, with SCR no.242 and no.238.
35 As President Putin stressed at his talks with A. Sharon in Moscow on 4 September 2001, “nothing can justify terrorist attacks against the civilian population”. 
5. THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AND RUSSIAN–AMERICAN RELATIONS

Alexander PIKAYEV

Already before the events of September 11, 2001, the new Republican administration had started a partial reassessment of US policy towards Russia. It seemed, that Washington was gradually abandoning the priorities of the 1990s, aimed at preventing the restoration of the Soviet Union. In accordance with those priorities, the United States have consistently acted against Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space in attempts to reduce Moscow’s influence and encourage the Newly Independent States (NIS) to redirect their policy away from the Russian Federation.

By 2001, a part of the US establishment had begun to realise, that the restoration of the USSR was no longer possible and that a further weakening of Russia was not in US interest as it could lead to geopolitical chaos in the post-Soviet space, as well as to unpredictable developments in respect of Russia’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The disappointment in the ruling classes in the post-Soviet states also played a role. Part of them became deeply involved in corruption and misappropriation of Western assistance, and failed to secure sustainable, stable and pro-Western development of their states. Apart from this, the need to improve relations with Moscow was imposed by the fact, that a significant element inside the US administration considered China as a potential opponent, enable to challenge US leadership in world affairs. The controversial nature of the relationship between Washington and Beijing was clearly the result of an incident involving the seizure by China of a US reconnaissance aircraft in April 2001. In these circumstances, the Chinese–Russian rapprochement which led to the establishment of the Shanghai Organisation for Co-operation and the signing of a treaty between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, in June, provoked increasing suspicion on the part of the United States.

Washington also nervously watched the policy of the European Union aimed at developing its political and military potential. It feared that this might weaken NATO and, consequently, US influence in Europe. The rapprochement between Russia and the EU and, especially, Germany, which has become evident since 2000, created an increasingly favourable environment for the gradual consolidation of the European political and military institutions. Disagreements between the United States and the Western European nations over the Kyoto Protocol, a verification regime of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the fate of the ABM
Treaty and further US participation in peace-keeping operations in the Balkans, all this forced the Bush Administration to de-freeze the dialogue with Moscow in order to maintain a field of manoeuvring for its diplomacy in Europe.

The improvement in Russia’s economy also played a role. It made the US business world more interested in expanding economic cooperation with Russian enterprises. Finally, Moscow’s decision to service its foreign debt fully deprived the West of its strongest bargaining chip which was earlier used to obtain concessions on military-political issues from Russia. As a result, Washington was confronted with an independent foreign and security policy by Moscow, which, along with Putin’s active diplomacy has helped to consolidate Russia’s positions in both Europe and Asia.

At the same time, until September 11 the principal interest of the White House in improving relations with Russia was focused on the need to obtain Russia’s agreement on the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Without such an agreement, it faced serious complications in pursuing its policy on the ABM Treaty, which was rejected by both the opposition inside the United States, and the majority of its key European allies. However, Washington was not ready to take any practical steps to meet Moscow half way.

By November 2001, the first results of the Quadrennial Nuclear Posture Review indicated, that the Bush Administration had failed to overcome the resistance from the Joint Chiefs to the idea of fixing a ceiling below 2,000 deployed, strategic nuclear warheads. The levels and schedule of reductions, within a decade, to 1700–2200 warheads announced by President Bush during the US–Russian summit in November, were similar and differed by only 10 percent from the earlier ceilings of 2000–2500 warheads, which the US military had accepted as a result of the previous Nuclear Posture Review in 1997. According to American analysts, this demonstrated that a large-scale campaign in favour of deep nuclear reductions, which was launched by the Republicans in 2000, has so far failed to produce any significant revisions of the US nuclear doctrines and plans.

The September 11 attacks have temporarily elevated the place of the Russian Federation in US security calculations. On the one hand, the provisional, diminishing domestic and international criticism of the US missile defence policy had reduced Washington’s interest in gaining Russia’s consent to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as a counterweight to the opposition from the Democrats in the US Senate and key NATO allies. On the other hand, the necessity to obtain Moscow’s support in the anti-terrorist military operation in Afghanistan led to a significant growth of Russia’s role in US foreign and security priorities. The rapid reaction of
the Russian leader to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington has also created a more favourable emotional environment for a US–Russian rapprochement.

The United States especially sought to utilise Russia’s influence in Central Asia. It was particularly important, since inconsistent US policy in the region, in the last decade, has led to the inability of Washington to maintain a sustainable security presence there. Partially, this was the result of the pro-Taliban policy, which the United States conducted until mid-1998. In Central Asia, a unique collective security system involving Russia and China, had started to form. In those circumstances and, especially, in view of Beijing’s clear concern over a US military presence in the region, Washington could not expect to gain the much needed access to military facilities in Uzbekistan and, especially, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, without the green light from Moscow. For the United States, the situation was aggravated by a lack of contact with the anti-Taliban opposition forces inside Afghanistan. In the 1990s the opposition was supported by Russia and Iran and was quite suspicious of the United States in view of its favourable attitude to Pakistan, the major international sponsor of the Taliban. Therefore, in the anti-terrorist coalition, which was formed after September 11 around the military operation in Afghanistan, Russia became of key importance for the United States.

Moscow’s positions were consolidated even further, when a few hours before the US–Russian summit in Washington and Crawford, the forces of the Northern Alliance, consisting mainly of ethnic Tajiks and equipped with Russian-made tanks and Kamaz trucks, seized Kabul, the Afghan capital. The return to Kabul of Burhanuddin Rabbani and others, supported by Russia and Iran, secured Moscow’s role as an essential factor in the successful completion of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and a post-war settlement there. Thus, during the Crawford summit, the Russian delegation established perhaps its strongest positions since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The necessity to gain Russia’s support during the war in Afghanistan had led to practical shifts in Moscow’s relations with key Western institutions. NATO, finally, agreed to commence consultations with Russia on missile defence. For the first time, in November, Russia’s representative took part in a NATO conference on armaments. There are hopes, that a continuation of this process may open up markets in NATO countries for the Russian defence industry. An agreement has also been reached to establish a permanent think tank, which will analyse relations between the Alliance and Russia.

Due to a certain crisis within NATO, caused by US preference for ad hoc coalitions in the conduct of Afghan-type wars, the bureaucracy in
Brussels, together with some of the “old” members, started in the Fall of 2001 to look more constructively at co-operation between Russia and the Alliance. For instance, on November 16 2001, Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, sent a letter to the leaders of the other 18 NATO nations and Russia containing a proposal to transform the existing Russia–NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) into a body, where 20 countries (the NATO Allies and Russia) could make common decisions together on combating international terrorism, WMD non-proliferation and the conduct of peace-keeping operations. The main idea of the message was to give Moscow the right to participate in the decision-making mechanism inside the Alliance on a limited number of issues, while preventing its access to main NATO institutions, first of all, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Blair letter represented an important step, indicating a gradual realisation that a real transformation, if not the very survival of the Alliance, depended to a considerable degree on its ability to establish close relations with Moscow. At the same time, it showed, that NATO was not ready yet to see Russia among its member states.

Friendly gestures from NATO met a dual reaction in Moscow. Some analysts evaluated the idea of establishing the new Russia–NATO Council as a trick by Brussels aimed at weakening Russia’s opposition to the Baltic States accession to the Alliance, expected at the NATO summit in Prague, scheduled for November 2002. In their view Russia should distance itself from the Alliance since NATO faces not the best of times and in order to maintain its role in the new security situation, the Alliance needs to establish special relations with Russia probably far more than Russia with the Alliance. Consequently, keeping the Russia–NATO relations cool may contribute to the marginalization of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The other viewpoint is that Russia must capitalise on the new favourable environment and press for a more prominent place in the NATO decision-making mechanism. If the Alliance sincerely wants to establish a better relationship with Moscow, it would be more logical not to set up new bodies instead of the PJC, but to involve Russia in decision-making on a variety of topics inside the NAC. Only by participating in this Council, Russia will feel confident that the members of the Alliance do not reach separate agreements between themselves before discussing a subject at the new Russia–NATO Council. In addition, Russia’s participation in all the NAC meetings as an observer would help to establish the necessary transparency, and alleviate Moscow’s concern that the Alliance was secretly planning policies aimed against Russia’s interests.

Establishing a permanent mechanism of co-operation between Russia and the key Western nations could contribute to better co-
ordination of their activities during anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Apart from the Russia–NATO relations, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington helped to move forward another important relationship—that between Russia and the European Union. In 2000, the Kremlin proclaimed the European Union to be Russia’s key strategic partner, and among other things, expressed its interest in cooperating closely in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Until the Fall of 2001, the EU was reluctant to take significant steps towards expanding its relations with Moscow due to fear, that this might trigger suspicions in the United States. After September 11, along with a rapid progress in Russia’s relations with both the US and NATO, this obstacle has been removed. In October, the European Union agreed to conduct regular monthly consultations between the CFSP and Russia on issues of mutual interest. Earlier Brussels had postponed for a year a decision on the possibility of such consultations.

Progress in a dialogue with the EU is especially important in advance of its enlargement towards the Russian borders. It is expected, that in 2004 ten new countries will probably be invited to join the European Union, many of which possess common borders with Russia and are important economic and political partners. As a result, more than half of Russia’s export will be directed to the EU. In addition Moscow shares some important parallel political interest with other key European powers. For instance, on the European side of the Atlantic Ocean much higher priority is given to international institutions and multilateral regimes, which are considered as the main tool for regulating relations between states.

In the area of the US–Russian strategic dialogue, closer bilateral relations prevented the Bush Administration from capitalising on the new, more favourable domestic and international environment and withdrawing unilaterally from the ABM Treaty in the Fall of 2001. However, by late November, Washington perceived that its operation in Afghanistan was close to successful completion. This removed the key, self-restraining factor in the post-September 11 environment—the need to maintain Russian support for the Afghan campaign. Not surprisingly, the White House immediately decided to make use of the unique coincidence of factors and, on December 13, it notified the Russian side of its intention to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty.

At the same time, the positive momentum in the US–Russian rapprochement was not eliminated by this decision. Moscow decided not to overreact, although it qualified the US intention as a mistake. On its part, the United States has not changed its decision on the need for a
document codifying bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions, announced earlier during the US–Russian summit in November. In December, the sides agreed to commence new strategic arms reductions talks in January 2002 to discuss such problems as the reduction levels, transparency and verification measures.

In a similar way, during the NATO meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Brussels on December 6–7, the United States, together with some “new” members defended a more cautious approach towards the new Russia–NATO Council than the one initially proposed by the United Kingdom. The decision to establish the Council was postponed until the next NATO ministerial meeting, scheduled for May 2002 in Reykjavik. The proposed name of the new council—Russia–North Atlantic Council (R–NAC)—was also turned down allegedly because in French—the second official language of the Alliance—it sounded quite controversially. Finally, and most importantly, Washington has blocked the idea to discuss a predetermined set of questions at the new council and to give Russia the right of veto over its decisions. Instead, the United States want the topics to be discussed there to be determined on an ad hoc basis, and, if a decision cannot be reached at the council, to be referred back to the North Atlantic Council.

In its turn, the Kremlin expressed its aversion to join the long line of Central and Eastern European countries, seeking NATO membership. This reflects an understanding of the possibility that, immediately after Russia applies for membership, its example would be quickly followed by many other post-Soviet states. Some of them might have a greater chance of being invited to join the Alliance than Russia itself. At the same time, Moscow decided to accept a dialogue with NATO on institutionalising their relationship in the hope that this might help real Russia participation in the decision-making process in the Alliance. In any case, the debates around the NATO–Russian relationship will be difficult and one cannot expect that they will be successfully completed within months. Therefore, as long as this interesting dialogue, which could bring many benefits for all the participants, continues, the sides should refrain from provocative moves, capable of reversing recent positive developments.

In 2001 the zigzags of US policy towards Russia in such key areas as the ABM Treaty and NATO demonstrated that the September 11 attacks had not made the progress achieved in bilateral relations irreversible, albeit improved their environment. As long as the operation in Afghanistan is not completed, the United States will postpone a decision on solving the most difficult questions in its relations with Russia until the outcome of the campaign will be clear. But the decision to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty, taken immediately after the fall of the Taliban, indicates that, despite first hints of a long-term revision
of US policy towards Russia, it was the broad parallel, bilateral interests
in Afghanistan which largely determined the high level of mutual
understanding registered in the Fall of 2001. Completion of the campaign
and the final US withdrawal from the country will reduce the need to
maintain a good relationship with Moscow. Moreover, a possible target
for the next US-led, anti-terrorist operation could pose a difficult dilemma
for Russia if the target would be a country with which Moscow is engaged
in active economic co-operation. The future of US–Russian relations will
be determined, therefore, by the ability to capitalise on the favourable
environment which emerged after the attacks of September 11 and to meet
adequately the difficult challenges the two countries still face.
6. HAS THE IDEA OF UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS A FUTURE?

Alexander SAVELYEV

The idea of unilateral reduction of strategic offensive arms, i.e. without the signing of a corresponding treaty, was articulated by the newly elected US President, George Bush, as one of the main elements of US security policy for the foreseeable future (and, possibly, for a more distant one). By itself this idea is based on common sense and is strikingly simple: in as much as Russia and the USA are no longer “potential enemies”, the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, accumulated in the years of the Cold War and, in the main, aimed at each other, could be sharply reduced without, in any way, harming the security of the sides. To achieve this through negotiations is regarded as outmoded and no longer in keeping with the present level of the strategic relationship between the sides. It is argued that negotiations are too lengthy, costly, complicated and, in practice, unable to “catch up” with the rapid changes in Russian–American relations in their progress from confrontation to cooperation.

It should be admitted that, at first sight, this approach is not without its merits. Why, indeed, should states, declaring the era of confrontation ended, build their strategic relations on mechanisms, elaborated to define the “rules of the game” between potential adversaries? Real strategic partners, such as the USA and Great Britain, do not need bilateral agreements on the control of nuclear arms, which lay down the level of these arms, their control and production systems, ways and means to eliminate them, “accounting rules” for strategic offensive arms, etc. This was mentioned, in particular, by the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, at a meeting with Russian experts in Moscow, in August 2001.

At the same time, when looking at this question more closely, not everything is so simple and straightforward that Russia and the USA could immediately adopt this new form of their strategic relationship. It is not only a question, here, that Russia looked with some suspicion at the new American Administration’s initiative, but also that this administration itself, evidently, did not appreciate, from the very beginning, all the possible consequences of President Bush’ idea.

We should like to point out, in the first place, that of the whole range of treaties in the sphere of arms control which have been concluded over the last twenty or more years between the USSR (Russia) and the USA (if one takes as departure date 26 May 1972, when the START–I Treaty was signed, and up to January 1993, when START–II was signed), the USA is most “dissatisfied” with the ABM Treaty which strictly limits
the activities of the two powers in the field of developing, testing and deploying strategic systems and components of ballistic missile defense (BMD). As to the bilateral and multilateral agreements on the control of strategic arms, intermediate and shorter-range missiles and conventional arms, the USA did not state a clearly formulated position, a fact which reinforced Russian suspicions that the main purpose of US policy in this sphere was the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, something the American Administration did not particularly try to hide. In this connection the notification of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which was made by President Bush on 13 December 2001, did not come as a big surprise for the Russian side.

So far, the Russian government is not ready to accept the US President’s idea. This is shown by the talks (or rather consultations), both at the highest level and at that of the experts of both countries. In the course of these contacts, the Russian side tried to get an answer to the question of the specific parameters of the future forces, which would remain after the reductions. (President Putin proposed, in November 2000, to fix the level of strategic offensive forces at 1500 nuclear warheads for each side and even lower)\(^1\). Moscow also expected specific US proposals on suggested amendments to the ABM Treaty. As is known, these expectations were not justified, although the USA, in the course of these consultations, has not stated that its aim was the complete lifting of all limitations on ABM systems and, in general, the abrogation of the whole “inheritance” of the Cold War. In other words, at a certain stage one could get an impression that the US Administration did not fully exclude the possibility of maintaining treaty limitations on these weapons, which was not possible without the continuation of the “traditional” dialogue in this sphere.

As a result, one may, to begin with, observe not only quite considerable differences in the future intentions of the sides in respect of strategic arms, but also the absence of a firm position on the part of each side on which form the strategic relationship between the two sides should, take in the future—preservation of the “traditional”, contractual relations or transition to unilateral action.

Such uncertainty, naturally, opens up wide possibilities for a variety of assessments of the development of the situation in this sphere. As we see it, all these assessments can be reduced to three main scenarios, namely: an end to all further negotiations and the start, if not of a new spiral of confrontation between Russia and the USA, at least, of the implementation of independent nuclear policies; continuation of the traditional dialogue on strategic arms control and the “exchange” of amendments to the ABM Treaty for a treaty on more radical reductions of strategic arms, down to 1500 warheads for each side; the introduction of a
new form of strategic relationship which does not fully reject all the achievements of the period of “traditional” arms control, but introduces new elements of predictability and trust, leaving the door open for unilateral reductions of strategic forces by Russia and the USA, in the course of the next 10–15 years.

It should be noted, that Russian policy on arms control was “drifting”, in the course of 2000–2001, from the first variant to the second of the above proposed three scenarios. As has already been pointed out, at first, Russia adopted a fairly rigid stand on the ABM Treaty and the possibility of introducing any amendments to it. But from the second half of 2001, having, evidently, come to the conclusion that in this way Russia leaves the USA no alternative but a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Russian government gave the American side to understand that it is ready to consider the US proposals on amendments to this Treaty. As has already been noted, the most desirable variant for the USA, however, would be Russia’s agreement to abrogate the ABM Treaty rather than to “modernise” it.

It would seem that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty does not so much demonstrate self-assurance on the part of the American Administration that it can dictate its conditions to Russia (as certain Russian experts think), but the exact opposite—uncertainty whether the planned ABM system will “work” at all and which components exactly and in what quantities this system will need in order to repulse single launches of missiles more or less effectively. Specific amendments to the ABM Treaty (for instance, permitting the deployment of two missile defence sites with a hundred or more interceptors each), may prove “not sufficient” to accomplish the tasks. On a political level, it will be difficult for the USA to raise, once more, within a short period of time, the question of additional amendments to the Treaty, i.e. to render the process of its revision practically continuous.

The above, in our view, leads to only one conclusion—the United States are, once more, “running ahead” as was already the case with the SDI program. The uncertainty surrounding the technical possibilities of the missile defence system is “compensated for” by active propaganda of the need for such a system and specific political steps to create the legal and international conditions for its deployment. Meanwhile, no guarantees exist that the USA will be able to develop and test a sufficiently reliable, strategic defence system, in the foreseeable future, which could be recommended for deployment. In any case, so far, no technical “break through” in this field has been observed.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, resulting in enormous losses in human life and destruction in New York and Washington, have had dual consequences from the point of view of the problem of BMD and
the prospects for the ABM Treaty. On the one hand, the sceptics have pointed out that no strategic missile defence could have prevented the high-jacking of passenger planes and, the delivery with their aid, of strikes on administrative buildings in the largest cities of the USA. On the other hand, these tragic events have demonstrated the reality of the threat, emanating from international terrorism and this has given a powerful impulse to the adoption of all kinds of measures to strengthen the defence of US territory.

In the light of the above, the variant, when the sides go over to some new kind of strategic relationship, is more and more likely to be adopted rather than return to confrontation or a continuation of the “traditional” dialogue on arms control. Bearing in mind the relative passivity of Russia as far as proposing new ideas and approaches is concerned (except for the proposals on deep reductions of strategic offensive weapons and the retention of limitations on defence systems), the USA is likely to become the moving force in elaborating and implementing these new ideas.

It is difficult, today, to predict the final shape which the strategic relations between Russia and the USA will take, in the future. It is also difficult to answer the question of whether the practice, determined by the classical theory of strategic stability, will be relegated to the past, when new agreements on arms control and national programs for modernisation or unilateral reductions of strategic forces are being worked out. In our view, such factors as nuclear deterrence and the strengthening of strategic stability will lose their influence on decision-making in this sphere, both in the USA and Russia, though, possibly, for different reasons.

If the USA starts on a real reappraisal of its nuclear strategy, this will find expression in specific changes in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). In particular, if the USA decides to remove facilities on Russian territory from the list of targets for its strategic weapons, both the quantitative and qualitative requirements of its arsenal could change radically. All this may not only lead to a sharp reduction of the real military requirements of the USA in offensive strategic nuclear arms as far as quantity is concerned, but also to a considerable diminishing of the demand for their enhanced invulnerability, the yield of their warheads, the speed of operational reaction and some other characteristics. A number of these changes can be regarded as “destabilising” from the point of view of strategic stability.

As far as Russia is concerned, changes in the quantitative and qualitative component of the country’s strategic forces will, in the first place, depend on economic and military-technical factors which determine a sharp lowering of the level of strategic forces, in the coming 10 years, in view of the fact that weapon systems which have completed their service
life will be decommissioned and it will prove impossible to replace these losses by the production of a comparable number of new strategic systems.

It would seem that, today already, questions of strengthening strategic stability are moving into the background in Russian security policy as a result of the above-named factors. This is confirmed, in our view, by the statement by the Russian government that one of the principal steps which Russia may take, in response to the deployment by the USA of a national missile defence (NMD) system, is equipping the “Topol–M” ICBM with MIRVs. In other words, Russia is ready to respond to a destabilising action on the part of the USA (the deployment of a NMD system) with another destabilising action (the arming of single-warhead ICBMs with MIRVs). This will, in no way, add to strategic stability, as a whole, however much representatives of various political groups and directions, in contemporary Russia, may talk about this.

On the whole, if further deep cuts in strategic offensive arms on the part of the USA may be regarded as gestures of “good will” or, at least, “rational thinking”, on the part of Russia this is, to a large extent, dictated by “bitter necessity”.

If the adoption by Russia and the USA of a policy of unilateral reductions of their nuclear arsenals becomes a reality, its main feature, which determines the prospects of the strategic relationship between the sides, should, in our view, become the level of their openness when carrying out these reductions. This may constitute the most important indicator of their mutual trust. After all, it is not the fact of reducing surplus nuclear arsenals which determines the nature of the strategic relationship between the Russia and the USA, but the ultimate aim and atmosphere in which these reductions are carried out. If we are talking of getting rid of the inheritance of the Cold War, openness, predictability and transparency may become the instruments which will help the sides to achieve this.

In this connection, many Russian and Western researchers and experts are of the opinion that it is necessary to develop, or, at any rate, not lose those mechanisms which have been elaborated for providing the sides with the assurance that the obligations, assumed in the agreements on arms control, are carried out. It is considered that, even if these obligations take the form of unilateral action, the control and verification mechanisms should continue to function if not to their full extent, at least in a sufficiently large measure.

It should also be borne in mind that the control mechanisms laid down in the START–I Treaty continue to function until the year 2009. At the same time, the verification system within the framework of START–I, can hardly be applied in full measure when Russia and the
USA go over to unilateral reductions. One of the principal requirements of the control and verification procedures clearly presupposes the need for these procedures to correspond to the aim of concluding a specific treaty on arms reductions. In other words, any action on the part of the two, outside the framework of the START–I Treaty, is, theoretically, not subject to the control mechanisms, envisaged in this Treaty (if, of course, this action does not contravene the obligations, assumed by the sides in this international agreement).

That is why, in our view, questions relating to the strengthening of confidence-building measures, in case of the adoption by the sides of independent measures in the sphere of further cuts in the accumulated, nuclear arsenals, should be decided separately.

Some Russian researchers are of the opinion that, in that case, the sides could conclude a separate agreement on confidence-building measures and control of the implementation of the unilaterally assumed obligations in this field. Others suppose that, when going over to unilateral action, the control and verification system cannot be mandatory, since this would, in fact, contradict the very spirit of such an approach.

On the other hand, the absence of contractual obligations on control and the implementation of corresponding measures (invitation of observers, exchange of information, various kinds of demonstrations etc.) would contradict the domestic legislation and this would create a serious obstacle to the implementation of such measures. In any case, this direction requires further study and the elaboration of practical recommendations, taking into account the above-mentioned factors.

Taken as a whole, each of the approaches to arms control, considered here—contractual relations and unilateral measures—has both shortcomings and substantial advantages.

Russian experts point to the following factors as positive elements of unilateral action on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons:

— each of the sides, acting out of its own interests and capabilities, decides for itself on the time table, volume and structures of the reductions envisaged;

— depending on the development of the situation, one side can independently of the other, without lengthy concert, effect alterations in the planned reductions;

— modernisation of the strategic arsenal can be carried out independently and in keeping with one’s own requirements and without the restricting factors which exist in treaties on arms control;

— there is no “burden” of inspection, control and verification;

— the possibility exists to determine independently the procedure for eliminating and modernising the weapon system, thus avoiding
measures for enhancing the reliability of the control procedure within the framework of arms control agreements;

— the side which initiates unilateral reductions of its forces takes up an active position with which other countries have to reckon, including by adopting similar programs.

The shortcomings of a unilateral approach to arms reduction, Russian experts consider:

— the lack of confidence that one’s own initiatives in this sphere receive an adequate response by other states;

— the abandonment of the reliable control of strategic nuclear arsenals, when deep cuts are effected and the level of nuclear confrontation is considerably lowered, may give rise to unnecessary suspicion in the relationship between the nuclear powers;

— the absence of restricting factors and obligations on the part of the other side (for instance, in respect of BMD, ICBMs with MIRVs etc.);

— difficulties in planning possible action in respect of the modernisation of one’s own forces, in case of unforeseen measures by the other side (for instance, when it deploys a new weapons system).

As to the traditional method of strengthening security by negotiation this, too, has its shortcomings as well as its advantages. The advantages are:

— the creation of a favourable, political climate and the establishment of co-operation and mutual understanding;

— the possibility of solving security problems, not by modernising one’s own nuclear arsenal, but by establishing a balance of forces on a treaty basis;

— the possibility of controlling the development of the strategic arsenal of the other side, which creates conditions for greater predictability of one’s opponent’s actions in the strategic sphere;

— the possibility of direct control and verification of the implementation of the conditions, laid down in the concluded agreements;

— the prospects of third states joining the disarmament process.

As to the shortcomings, they are:

— the length of the negotiation process, which may not succeed in catching up with the changes in the military-strategic situation in the world and, as a whole, puts a break on the political determination of the leaders of states to reach agreement in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction;

— the need to make certain concessions to one’s opponent in order to reach agreement, which may lead to conflict situations within the military-political leadership of the country as well as between departments;
— an excessively complicated system of verification of the implementation of the treaty’s conditions, the elimination procedures and the modernisation of the weapon systems which may lead to additional expenses;

— exclusion of individual weapon systems from the framework of the treaties in view of the difficulties of control and the unwillingness of one of the sides to extend to these systems the corresponding limitations (for instance, sea-launched cruise missiles);

— accumulation of unsolved problems which complicate the reaching of subsequent agreements and create an atmosphere of mistrust between the sides (the elimination of nuclear munitions, the problem of the “reconstitution potential”);

— the linking of agreements already concluded with other security problems as was done by the Russian legislators in respect of the ratification of the START–II Treaty. This makes agreements in the sphere of arms control the hostages of a wide range of problems not directly connected with them (as, for instance, the expansion of NATO).

It is, of course, fairly difficult to “weigh up” the above positive and negative aspects of these two approaches to the reduction of strategic offensive arms against each other and draw a conclusion as to which is the best. This all the more so, as still other factors can be adduced, both of a positive and negative nature. In any case the principal role, when choosing one or the other of these approaches, will be played by the decision of the Russian and US governments on the form of a future strategic relationship between the two countries, including the problem of strategic arms control—both offensive and defensive.

It would seem that, the international situation has taken on a turn which opens up possibilities and prospects for a substantial break-through towards the establishment of relations of true partnership between the two states—at first, in the military-political and, later, in other spheres. The main thing is that the two governments should not miss such a favourable and, possibly, unique opportunity.

1 President Putin also stated that Russia is ready to reduce nuclear weapons “together or parallel” with the USA. This constituted grounds for some experts to affirm that Russia, in fact, agreed with the American approach of unilateral action in the sphere under consideration.
2 After a number of rigid statements by Russian senior officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I. Ivanov, which rejected out of hand the possibility of introducing any amendments in the ABM Treaty, Russian diplomacy began to show a certain “flexibility”, declaring that Russia is not against amendments, but favors only those which strengthen and not undermine the Treaty.

3 In any case, for a long period, the evaluation of the consequences of the deployment of new strategic weapon systems has been conducted in the light of the influence of this measure on strategic stability. A characteristic example of this were the lengthy debates on the deployment mode of the MX ICBM.

7. PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. PROCEEDINGS OF THE IMEMO ROUNDTABLE

Galina OZNOBISHCHEVA

On May 22, 2001, at a Roundtable session held at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, of RAS, the main paper was delivered by Alexei G. Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma. Nadezhda K. Arbatova (IMEMO), Sergey V. Chugrov (Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya), Alexandre N. Kaliadine (IMEMO), Viktor I. Kamyschanov (Federation of Peace and Concord), Alexander A. Konovalov (Institute for Strategic Assessments), Vassily I. Krivokhizha (Institute for Strategic Studies), Ida N. Kuklina (IMEMO), Andrey Yu. Malov (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament), Alexander I. Nikitin (Center of Political and International Studies), Robert Nurick (Moscow Carnegie Center), Sergey K. Ozbobishchev (Institute for Strategic Assessments), Alexander G. Savelyev (IMEMO), Ivan A. Safranchuk (PIR–Center), Mikhail P. Slepin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Disarmament Center of the Diplomatic Academy), Roland M. Timerbaev (PIR–Center), Tatyana D. Zhdanova (McArthur Foundation), Pavel S. Zolotarev (Inter-Regional Public Foundation of Support for the Military Reform) joined in the discussions on the paper. The Roundtable was chaired by Vladimir G. Baranovsky, Deputy Director of IMEMO, and Adam D. Rotfeld, Director of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).

A. ARBATOV. The subject that we have before us today is indeed very broad and situated at the crossroads not only of domestic and foreign policy, but also of different processes within our society. First of all, it is a question related to the development of the democratic system (or its curtailment?), because from this standpoint the parliament is central and serves as a kind of indicator of what is going on in the country.

Meanwhile, every parliament, especially a young one like the Russian, has an external side—namely, its outlook on the parliaments of other countries and its self-perception in this environment. The Russian State Duma often serves as a butt of TV broadcasts, mockery, and various shows; having spent there seven years, I can say that much of it is well founded. Yet we often judge ourselves too severely, while forgetting that similar situations occur in the parliaments of other nations as well. If we take a look at what is going on in the last several years in the US Congress, we can see what a destructive position it takes on the issues of security, disarmament, on all those subjects that for a long time have been
at the centre of international politics, as well as on US–Soviet and US–
Russian relations. So that, it is encouraging to note that, as compared to
the US Congress, our State Duma does not look all that bad, both from the
point of view of its general tenor and as regards its awareness of the most
complex issues of security and armaments.

The role of the parliament comprises two big areas. The first is in
the sphere of law, meaning those legal constitutional powers which form
the framework within which it can influence state policies. The second is
political, and relates to the specific situation in the country at a given
moment, to the specific factors that determine the parliament’s work, and
to the kind of political relationship between the parliament and other
branches of government at the regional and federal levels. These two areas
taken together are central to the parliament’s activities.

Yet another broad domain directly relates to the subject of our
discussion: that is, issues of security in general, but primarily issues of
arms control and disarmament. This area, as no other, is at the crossroads
of foreign, military, budgetary, and, in a certain sense, domestic politics,
since we are speaking here about the relationship between the Executive
and the Legislature within the country.

What do I start with? First is the expertise of the previous and
current State Duma deputies in the area of international security,
disarmament and strategic policy. That level is not very high, although
there are people with a vast amount of military experience in the area of
disarmament who play a very constructive role. One of them is Andrey
Nikolaev, Chairman of the Defence Committee. In spite of a large number
of principled disagreements between us, for the sake of objectivity I must
say that on disarmament issues his role is not only constructive but also
very important, since, having a professional view on military issues, he
makes points that are respectfully received both at the Ministry of
Defence and in the State Duma. But Nikolaev is an exception rather than a
rule. Other military men and many deputies, who believe that they
understand these issues, do not possess the kind of the general culture of
military and strategic thinking that is so well developed in the US and
West European countries. Unfortunately, we in Russia still lack a long
experience in debating these issues in the open, in a free exchange of
opinions, at least within the confines of what is called the strategic
community—that is, academics, military people, politicians, and
journalists who have many years of professional experience in these issues
and access to a large amount of information. Our practice in this regard is
still at an embryonic stage, which is reflected in our general parliamentary
culture.

Next, as we all know, in public and academic discussions, issues
of disarmament are inextricably linked to the issues of military policy. To
view them as separate, means to relegate them to the sphere of ideological debates and declarations. In the area of government policy and military development, the military budget and negotiations on disarmament are not just inextricably linked, but are the two sides of one phenomenon, that is, state policy in the area of national and international security. In this regard, the State Duma has doubtlessly to consider both the legal and the political components.

As for the legal one, the role of the federal legislature in the area of foreign and military policies is, on the basis of the 1993 Constitution, extremely limited. This was done deliberately and with a purpose—this constitution was designed, if one may say so, to cope with the irreconcilable opposition in the country, that was represented by nationalist parties, such as LDPR. I would like to remind you that in the 1st Duma, the LDPR had more than 80 votes and was the largest party (now, it has only 12 seats). Together with the CPRF, which, along with its spin-offs, such as the Agrarian Party and others, had a simple majority, they could determine the outcome of the vote virtually on all issues. From this standpoint, the 1993 Constitution played into the hands of the so-called reformers, led by Boris Yeltsin, so that they could formulate policy by themselves, both in respect of home and foreign affairs, without paying much attention to the parliament. For this reason, in the course of the 1990s, the State Duma played both a rather limited and negative role, in particular on issues related to international politics, disarmament, and security. The parliament was aware of the fact that the Constitution had been designed to deny it as much as possible legitimate authority in this area. This awareness exacerbated its irreconcilable stand with regard to everything done by the Executive and the chief of state. So foreign and domestic politics were entangled and the Duma viewed most of the foreign policy actions of President Yeltsin through the prism of developments inside the country.

In this way, the State Duma was dominated by the irreconcilable opposition that, because it did not accept Yeltsin’s domestic policies, rejected outright everything constructive he did in his foreign policy and relations with the US and the West Europeans in particular.

The role of the parliament was also influenced by other factors, such as the Duma’s rather limited impact on the formulation of defence policy and the military build-up, where the budgetary process is central. Without the budget, these are purely theoretical debates on strategic issues for the budget is the beginning and the end of every practical discussion. The budgetary process in the State Duma is designed in such a way that the parliament has no means to influence defence policy and the military build-up in a significant way which is reflected in the yearly budget appropriations. The most that it can do is to add a little money (no more
than 2 to 3 percent, 5 percent in the more successful years) and determine the use of these additional funds. But as regards to changing budgetary appropriations within the section “National Defence” (e.g., the division of these funds among such items as the maintenance of the armed forces, R&D, military procurement—not to speak of knowing the details of military procurement, i.e. whether they are destined for the general-purpose forces, or the strategic nuclear forces), the State Duma has very limited powers.

This is the result both of the organisation of the budgetary process and of the operation of the Law on State Secrets that was adopted in 1997. This law classifies virtually everything that is even remotely related to national security and military policy. It serves as the basis for the criminal proceedings against a number of scientists and researchers, some of whom are already in jail. All these factors act as severe constraints on the deputies’ ability to influence developments. Recently the situation has become even worse. All our efforts to amend the Law on State Secrets, so as to disclose the military budget at least on such items as personnel allowances, R&D, military procurement have so far been fruitless, because both the Duma and the Executive are against it.

Let me say something about the political situation during the three Russian Dumas and on its impact upon the Duma’s role in the state policy on disarmament.

In 1993–95, the Duma was dominated by nationalist groups plus the communists, who effectively blocked everything that Yeltsin tried to do, even in his inconsistent and disorganised fashion. In the 1995–99 State Duma, the CPRF and its affiliates set the tune, but nationalist parties represented by the LDPR also had a fair amount of votes and, together with the CPRF, were able to block any treaties and agreements on disarmament. The arithmetic is simple: according to the Law on International Treaties, the ratification of disarmament treaties by the Duma requires a simple majority. Thus, 226 votes are enough to pass or turn down the ratification of any agreement. In the US, the recommendation to ratify is passed not by the entire Congress, but only by the Senate, by a two-thirds majority. This difference in the arithmetic between the State Duma and the US Congress has fairly important political implications.

While there can be different opinions on this subject, let me note the following. The fact that the voting in the Russian parliament requires a simple majority (we are speaking of the Lower House, as it looks as if the Federation Council will not play a major role in the foreseeable future) defines the character of the Executive activities in the process of ratification of certain important treaties on disarmament. In the US, as a rule, the distribution of forces in the Senate is not known in advance, and
given that two thirds of the votes are required, everything depends on 10–20 key senators who determine the fate of a specific treaty. If there is a controversy and the senators in question need to be persuaded, as opposed to merely striking a bargain with them in a totally different area, the Executive works hard with this group who is well informed and understands the issue, but is still undecided at a given stage. Both the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defence deem it appropriate to visit them with their staff and spend several hours in persuading them that the Executive is doing the right thing.

In the Duma these problems are resolved in a completely different manner. Since we need a simple majority of 226 votes, nobody comes and nobody tries to persuade them. The reason is that neither one individual deputy, nor even 10 or 20 deputies have a decisive say, and the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature is settled differently. The question is resolved through inter-party combinations. The meetings are conducted with those factions that are deciding on their stand. Since every faction has a maximum of three individuals who understand the gist of the issue, everything is decided on a political basis: through striking bargains on other issues, such as the Land Code, tax reform, issues of privatisation of large enterprises, restrictions on natural monopolies, and so on. It is on the basis of these unpublicised deals with the factions that the required majority is obtained.

Having outlined this general picture, I must qualify it by saying that, first, this process has not always worked, and, second, even now is not so straightforward. It is only the general model that distinguishes the Russian parliament from the US Congress in their decision making roles, including on security issues. But there have always been exceptions. Thus, under President Yeltsin, all the Executive’s efforts to persuade the 2nd State Duma (1995–99) that it was necessary to ratify START–II failed. I believe this was because the Executive did not want to yield to the Communists on those important issues of domestic politics that were of much greater importance to them than START–II. But for the Executive and President Yeltsin too these domestic policy issues, related in particular to the policy of macroeconomic stabilisation, were more important than START–II. Yeltsin and his team did not want to sacrifice these more important issues to a treaty that they viewed as a kind of symbol of their good relations with the West.

As far as I am concerned, I can say with full confidence, that if in 1994–95 the Executive had decided that START–II was important to it and was worth compromises in other areas, it would have been able to get it ratified in the State Duma. But it did not do it either then or in the late 90s, when the communists held a majority, because the ordering of the Executive’s priorities was different.
What then do we see now?

After the election of the 3rd Duma in 1999 and a change of the Executive, very serious work was done on START–II, but this was work of a rather peculiar nature. There were several Duma hearings, including closed ones. Deputies were provided with a huge amount of information, including “strictly classified” and even “of special importance” information. In this way, the Executive was able to get the START–II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, both of which had been suspended for a long time, speedily ratified in April 2000. Nobody believed that they would ever be ratified.

How did the Executive achieve this?

First of all, this happened because the line-up in the new State Duma, unlike its two predecessors, was much more favourable for the ratification of these agreements. The 1999 elections have been conducted in such a way that the Executive can always rely on a majority in the State Duma, based on the pro-presidential parties which, though merger processes, will soon command even more votes in the Duma. Now that the Fatherland–All Russia, the Unity and Russia’s Regions have declared their plans of uniting, the Executive controls more than 50 percent of the vote and can pass any law and any agreement through the Duma by relying on this centrist majority and, depending on the issue, either on the right or on the left wing as well. Only if it needs two thirds of the vote it will have to seek somebody else’s support. On such simple issues as ratifications, however, it can already ignore both the right and the left wing, because it controls the necessary 50 percent plus one vote.

As a result, the aforementioned treaties were guided through the Duma by the Executive with support of the pro-presidential majority, already, then represented by the Unity and a whole range of other deputies’ groups—whose political mood is of course not favourable to the West as a whole, or to the issues of disarmament and security. But they obeyed the instructions received from the Executive and voted in solidarity as they had been told to do.

Further, let us look, for example, at how START–II was discussed. In the US, when a disarmament treaty is being debated, its adoption is justified by the fact that the threat has diminished, confidence in the negotiation partner is on the rise, and the treaty is designed precisely to strengthen this confidence and mutual security. In the Duma, the arguments for START–II were exactly the opposite. There was mention of the growing threat and of the fact that Russia will have to cut its strategic forces anyway, due to financial constraints. In this connection, START–II was defended as a necessary instrument to oblige the US to cut their strategic nuclear forces (SNF). Otherwise, it was said, there would be a disequilibrium of forces that would present a threat to Russia’s security.
That is, the treaty was necessitated by the probable threat. There was no talk about confidence. Instead, it was said that the treaty would allow us better to control the US strategic nuclear forces. The reason was that nuclear deterrence, which remains the basis of our relationship, would have been undermined if the US were to preserve their SNF at the present level, while Russian nuclear forces would be cut because of chronic underfinancing. Finally, it was said that the ratification of START–II was necessary to reinforce the ABM Treaty.

To sum up, let me draw three conclusions.

First, the Duma’s role in disarmament issues, its ability to control state policy in this field will be determined by the direction of the general developments in our country as regards democracy, separation of powers, political pluralism, and the freedom of speech. Recent developments in this area and the ones that are likely in the near future are not encouraging: the reason is that both freedom of speech is diminishing and the parliament’s role is being further restricted through a number of laws that are to be adopted by the State Duma. In particular, the Law on the Parties, that is about to be passed in the near future, will severely restrict the role of the parliament, because it is made up primarily of parties, and these will become much more dependent on the Executive under the new law. Let us also add the Law on State Secrets which drastically restricts access to information and the opportunities for public organisations and academic centres to discuss security issues in the open, relying not on rumours or Western information but on information that is provided by informed Russian sources. Therefore, on the basis of all this, to me the near future does not look very promising.

Secondly, given that the role of the Executive, and of the Presidential Administration, in particular, has increased even further, its policies will define Russia’s stand in the area of disarmament and security to a very large extent. The parliament may exert its supplementary influence within clearly defined limits only and will become the object of heightened activity on the part of the Executive. But I don’t expect the parliament to play a significant role that will be different from that of the Executive, as was the case in the previous Duma where there was a strong opposition. As for the direction of the Executive’s policies on security, it is, I believe, very constructive, in spite of all the grievances I may express on domestic issues and some aspects of foreign policy. And if it will stick to this, there will be correspondingly more treaties, more agreements, as well as more interaction with other nations on disarmament and security, and the parliament will be linked to this process, at least because it has the authority to ratify treaties. That is, one can view these developments as positive.
Thirdly, the position of the West in this area, and, first of all, of the US, as the nation that largely defines Western policies in the area of security, strategic stability, and disarmament, will play an important role. If these policies are constructive, they will exert a beneficial influence both on the policies of the Russian Executive and on the parliament’s role in decision making on these issues, as well as, I am sure, on general democracy-related developments in Russia. Presently the West has every opportunity to exercise a positive influence on these developments. The question is whether it will seize these opportunities at a moment when Russia aspires to the development of partnership with the West and Western Europe remains the priority of Russia’s foreign policy. However, if in the response to this Russia will be pushed toward partnership with completely different nations, such as China, Iran, North Korea, not only will constructive co-operation with the West on disarmament and security be wrecked, but domestic developments also will be catalysed to move in a direction opposite to the building of a democratic civil society and market economy. The reason is that, unlike Chile, Russia will not be able to combine these three elements—a market economy, a totalitarian political regime, and good relations with the West. In Russia, this is not possible under any conditions, and, therefore, let me repeat that both the international situation and the development of the Russian Federation itself will depend on the West’s policies toward Russia.

R. TIMERBAEV. In the US, the ABM Treaty is the subject of stormy discussions. The Democrats will not object to the NMD directly, but will point to its deficiencies, especially on technical flaws and large financial expenses. Do we have similar debates in the respective committees of the State Duma? And what is it that the Duma could do to help the government to develop the right policies?

A. ARBATOV. Yes, we do have such discussions. Recently, in connection with the ratification of START–II, we had hearings with the participation of the military and deputies. The debates were extremely heated when we discussed the plan of development of the SNF and the prospects of the ABM, START–I and START–II treaties.

**Question:** Could Russia propose some variant to modify the ABM Treaty?

A. ARBATOV. I believe that our Foreign Ministry and the highest leadership should have a better policy as regards missile defence. There is room for improvement. It is wrong to reject outright any modifications to the ABM Treaty, as was done last year, because Article 114 of the Treaty itself provides for the possibility of modifications and additions. Secondly, there should be some internal logic and consistency in one’s own policies. If we say that, on the one hand, the ABM Treaty is a guarantee of strategic stability, in spite of all the threats
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coming from the so-called rogue states, and then, on the other, we immediately propose to build together with NATO a theatre missile defence against those same rogue states, the question is: where is the logic? If we make this proposal, we agree that non-proliferation policies and other measures are insufficient by themselves and we need to defend ourselves directly. If this is so, the issue of global defence has to be on the agenda. But then who are the nations we have to defend ourselves against, and in what way?

Our policy of unconditional refusal was wrong, and I believe needs to be changed. But to go to the other extreme, and rush to the Americans with proposals to modify the ABM Treaty right now is wrong. This is so for two reasons. First, we don’t know how to do it, because the Americans themselves have no idea about the kind of missile defence that they are going to build. Second, nobody knows what kind of technology will work. It is up to the US to put forward its proposals. Our task is to consider them thoroughly, without rejecting outright everything that contradicts the ABM Treaty, which is not a holy writ, but a treaty belonging to a certain period, and we may soon have a different attitude towards it. But we have not heard specific proposals from the American side. They are not there yet. I think that when they arrive we should adopt a constructive approach and try to get concessions from the USA on a whole range of other issues that are important to us, including in the area of offensive strategic weapons, in exchange for our agreement to some acceptable modifications of the Treaty.

Question: The issue of arms control is deadlocked, and has been so for too long. One has to admit that we already seen such periods in the history of arms control, and this problem was resolved to a significant extent precisely by unilateral measures. I would like to hear your opinion in this regard.

A. ARBATOV. Unfortunately, we cannot “sell” our unilateral measures to anyone, because everybody knows that we have already planned a deep unilateral cut in our strategic nuclear forces. If we had begun negotiating with the Americans before that, while reserving for ourselves the possibility of deep cuts, then we could have received a lot. But, as I already said, the plan to cut already exists. Beside budgetary and objective strategic realities, these changes in military policy stem from an intra-departmental struggle within the Ministry of Defence which has involved both the Executive and the Legislature. I believe that the result is very bad, because, among other things, we will not be able to “sell” anything to the Americans.

V. KRVOKHIZHA. The contemporary system of weapon creation has several aspects. One of them is economic. It has clearly given an enormous impulse to economic development, the development of
nuclear energy and contributed to the emergence of new technologies. But will the implementation of a space-based missile defence provide the same economic benefits as accompanied the nuclear program in previous decades?

Secondly, there is the legal aspect. It is pointless to deny that the United States are legally entitled to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The big question is: what should Russia do about it? Should it close its eyes, as before, and while formally abiding by the Treaty, simultaneously aim at creating some counterweights to the US activities, through the further development of strategic armaments (something that would not fit neatly into its earlier obligations)? Or should it take the path that was repeatedly proclaimed, saying that the violation of the ABM Treaty means the rejection of the system of agreements? One could argue that independent of whether we resolve this issue or not, the whole system of agreements will recede into the past, since the system of international relations will be shifting.

A. ARBATOV. As regards the changing role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s policy, we clearly see that this role will change from a political, as under the Soviet Union, to a purely military one. This means minimal deterrence, calculated to contain the nuclear threat. Under these circumstances, it is of course completely unrealistic to claim, as does the official doctrine, that our nuclear weapons deter a conventional war as well, a claim that implies, in fact, nuclear superiority.

S. OZNOBISHCHEV. A democratic civil society cannot exist without open debates on the issues of national security. The example of other countries suggests that debates among experts and the public at large allow for a significant adjustment of those excessive demands that are often voiced by interested government agencies. But whether military budget is classified even for the Duma deputies themselves, this perverts the very idea of civilian control.

The parliament, as an element of civil society, can play an important autonomous role in arms control, by speedily resolving emerging problems in this area through parliamentary diplomacy. And there can be a significant functional division of labour between government institutions in this area.

Thus, there are no obstacles to creating joint Russian–American groups of legislators and experts who would work to clarify the gist of our differences. I’d like to stress that I don’t mean negotiations (which is the competence of diplomats) but rather the clarification of disagreements and the search for a ground for future compromises.

This should in no way be a parallel diplomacy, but rather a mutual clarification of positions, constraints, opportunities and readiness to search for solutions. At the final stage, there could be a joint hearing and its
conclusions could be presented to the Executive as a background for further actions. In the course of such a discussion it would become clear that the best thing would be to act together, thus creating an objective basis for co-operation. But at the moment such an assessment could only be initiated and conducted under the aegis of the presidents.

If the “fundamental” approach to bilateral relations were to prevail, then both the building of the missile defence and NATO expansion will turn out to be merely secondary issues in the context of a joint provision of security.

I. SAFRANCHUK. I would like to get back to the story behind the ratification of START–I. As was very clearly presented in the paper, on one hand, the parliament after the 1999 elections was subservient, but, on the other, the Executive was actively conducting consultations and hearings in the Duma. And this mode of operation was causing some surprise. Weren’t then all these activities by the Executive a sort of imitation of those debates that Mr Arbatov correctly envisioned in his paper? And if so, weren’t the efforts undertaken by the Executive to lobby for START–II in the Duma, even though everything had already been decided anyway, a sign that the authorities understand the problem of the lack of debates, of free information exchanges, and so on—but they don’t know how to resolve it?

Another question is also about the background of the START–II ratification. It was very much on target to say that the Treaty was being “sold” in the Duma (to use the American phrase) as a treaty on disarming the USA. When was it approximately that these changes in argumentation about START–II occurred?

A. ARBATOV. Everything that preceded the ratification of START–II was not choreographed, though the Executive tried to implement all the procedures related to the ratification, debates, and hearings. Even President Putin came and spoke. This was right, and a good sign. While the present Executive is vulnerable to criticism in many spheres, it recognises the fact that there are certain procedures, principles and norms that have developed in the country and that have to be observed.

Why was so much attention focused on this issue, in spite of the fact that the State Duma has become far less opposition-minded and more loyal? It seems to me that, with all the chaos that we often see, the Executive was acting in accordance with its inner logic.

President Putin is a man who, to a certain extent, represents the interests of the Great Power party. In this context, it was not easy for him to call upon the Duma to ratify a treaty that had always been viewed as one that subverted Russia’s security and been declared unbalanced as putting Russia in an unequal position. For this reason, the President had to
justify clearly why he was advocating the ratification of this document. And he was quite successful in doing this.

Of course, the shift toward such a rather conservative and hard argumentation and not at all in the spirit of détente had begun much earlier. It was primarily connected with the fact that the funding of the Russian strategic forces had been decreasing and plans for their unilateral cuts been drawn up. It was therefore impossible to call for the ratification of a treaty that established ceilings above those that Russia expected to have in ten years. Hence the need for serious arguments proving that this treaty was specifically designed to cut US strategic nuclear forces.

A. SAVELYEV. We are talking of the parliament’s role in the area of arms and disarmament. This role is constructive, and, after all is said and done, the parliament arrives at the right conclusion, by whatever means. But can we imagine a destructive role of the parliament in the future? We all know that the law on the ratification of START–II has been adopted which envisages many points that are linked to the ABM Treaty.

Let us imagine that the USA announces its withdrawal from this treaty. Who will be the destructive force insisting on the implementation of these provisions of the START–II ratification law? Should the President obey and declare automatically that, bound by the law, Russia withdraws from START–I, START–II, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, CFE Treaty, and so on? I believe that the Executive is not ready to make such a statement. I wonder how would the Duma behave in this case? Would it pressure the Executive to announce withdrawal from these treaties, or would it wait for the decision to come “from above”?

A. ARBATOV. There is no automatic trigger in the law on ratification. The law mentions, among other things, US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as a development that can be considered a threat to the national interest. However, under these conditions the law recommends the President to report to the State Duma and take steps directed to the defence of Russia’s interests and compliance with START–I and START–II that are linked to the ABM Treaty.

Question: What would you yourself recommend if the USA were to announce their withdrawal?

A. ARBATOV. It is very easy for me to answer this question, because at the moment the US does not advocate the preservation of the treaties on strategic offensive weapons. Their viewpoint is that the Cold War and nuclear deterrence are receding into the past, therefore, we need neither the ABM Treaty, nor the treaties on strategic offensive weapons, because our strategic forces allegedly are not directed against each other. They say: “Let us not continue these exhausting negotiations and debate all those petty technical details. You have scheduled your own cuts, and that is right. On our part, we will also make cuts. Let us only preserve the
elements of transparency, so that we know what each of the powers is doing. But we don’t need any formalities.” Therefore, if the USA really pulls out of the ABM Treaty with a 6-months advance notice, as stipulated by Article 15, they would not expect us to comply with START–I and START–II. Russia’s withdrawal from these treaties would be a purely technical matter. I will be in favour of it.

I believe that in conditions of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (even though I have big doubts that they will really manage to create a working missile defence) Russia must take appropriate measures to guarantee its security. We speak of an issue of major importance, and we cannot swim with the current. Therefore, we could say that in general we intend to abide by the spirit of these treaties, but we will not comply with certain articles that stand in our way. In particular, in START–I there is a limitation on the deployment of new types of missiles, and the main prerequisite of START–II is not to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (ICBMs with MIRVs). These issues can be quite easily resolved. And I believe that the Americans wouldn’t mind. For us, this would be important from the point of view of re-evaluating the entirely misguided program of development of strategic nuclear forces that has been adopted of late and that envisages their reduction which in my opinion is totally unfounded.

A. MALOV. I would like to dwell on the mechanism of foreign policy decision-making. We sometimes are much more burdened by the need to coordinate inter-agency positions than, say, by our relationship with the Legislature. Of course, the process of inter-agency coordination, the mechanism of decision-making in foreign policy, has not been thought through. In this regard, how does the Legislature evaluate the coordinating role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? How successful is it in carrying out this function?

A. ARBATOV. In the State Duma, the attitude toward the MFA is now incomparably better than it was under Andrey Kozyrev. The respect for the Ministry especially increased during Yevgeniy Primakov’s ministerial tenure and it remained high afterwards. But it was quite undermined by the events in Yugoslavia, by the 1999 war on the Balkans. Today in the Duma only the International Affairs Committee (and even there, as far as I understand, only Dmitry Rogozin and Konstantin Kosachev) are aware of the MFA’s coordinating function on issues of security and disarmament. Deputies in general, pay more attention in respect of these issues to the views of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. There is a prevalent opinion in the State Duma that MFA will always support any treaty because it drafts them and represents Russia in the negotiations, and that these treaties are not always helpful to
us. Therefore we should listen to the military people. In general, this is the present approach of the deputies to the coordinating role of the MFA.

A. NIKITIN. I believe that the parliament’s role in arms control is not limited to the issues of strategic nuclear arms. I would like to draw your attention to such important aspects as parliamentary control over the dispatch of the Russian troops abroad, and over the export of arms.

As of today, about 12,000 Russian troops are stationed out of the country, and they are there with a significant amount of armaments. In Tajikistan alone, there are thousands of armoured vehicles, which periodically enter and leave the country, are added to and replaced. Until the mid-1990s, this process was not in the least regulated by law. In 1995, a law was adopted on parliamentary confirmation of the dispatch of troops to participate in peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices. This law is not bad, but is limited in scope and regulates only the participation and sending of personnel abroad in accordance with mandates of the UN Security Council. As we know, the personnel stationed in Georgia and in Tajikistan do not fall into this category. Therefore, the practice of renewal of the political mandates authorising the presence of our troops abroad and the sending of Russian armaments there is very loosely construed. Most of the mandates are renewed once every six months, and sometimes even less often. It was only once that the parliament became speedily involved, and that was when the decision was taken to send Russian troops to Abkhazia.

Let me briefly dwell on the issue of parliamentary control over arms sales abroad. In the course of an international project which we recently implemented, we reviewed the experience of the Swedish and British parliaments, precisely as regards the organisation of a strict parliamentary control over the national policy on arms sales. It appears that this experience, especially the Swedish one, is worth very serious study and should be adopted by our country, because the problems that are facing these countries in arms exports are analogous to those existing in Russia, though our problems are much more numerous. Suffice it to recall that about 90% of weaponry purchased by China these days is Russian-made. To what extent do arms sales to a certain number of countries fit into the foreign policy direction of our country? This is a question to be addressed not just to the Executive, but also to the legislators, who, generally speaking, should set the general framework of Russia’s political strategy on the international stage.

I would like to refer to the process of drafting and adopting the CIS model laws, as a practical mechanism that could be used to advance the development of parliamentary control over the military organisation of the state and over the process of disarmament.
Two years ago, a draft model law for the CIS on parliamentary control over military agencies was worked out by experts, including those from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the debates that included consultations with the parliaments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Georgia, our counterparts from the CIS countries proposed some very interesting mechanisms, which were later incorporated in the articles of the draft law that is currently under review by the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. In particular, I would like to draw your attention to three points that were discussed then. One of them touches on the budgetary activities of the parliaments; the other on the parliaments’ stand on openness and transparency; and the third one on parliamentary regulation of the dispatch of troops abroad.

On the first point, the following principle can be proposed in the area of budgetary financing: the parliaments should focus not only on the drafting of the budget, but also on control over its implementation. The Executive’s reports to the parliament on the financing of the military should be produced on an annual basis. The reason is that none of the CIS parliaments has official information channels on the implementation of the budgets; they even don’t have constitutional rights to solicit information on the actual spending and the amount of appropriated funds. For all the CIS parliaments, this was their Achilles’ heel. This is precisely where the setting up of budgetary control mechanisms should be helpful.

The second proposal is on openness and transparency. It was suggested to establish a parliamentary rule entitling the national parliaments not just to pass laws on state secrets, but also to determine by law the list of military-related information. Such a list would be subject to mandatory annual publication. The reason is that certain parameters of military agencies have to be legally open and transparent. That is, a specific mechanism can be set up compelling the Executive to publicise the data on the personnel strength, the scope of financing of the military bodies, etc., on an annual basis.

Third, as regards the parliament’s role in the issue of sending troops abroad, a number of specific mechanisms has been suggested for the use by the national parliaments in legislating the regulation of these issues. Without the awareness of the parliament, not a single soldier, not one unit of military equipment should be found outside the borders of a given country on obscure military missions, which are poorly controlled by the political authorities and the parliament of the nation that has sent them there.

Thus, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that an interesting proposal currently at the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly could assist the Russian parliament in defining the specific mechanisms
for improving control over the military sphere and the limitation and reduction of armaments.

A. KONOVALOV. START–II cannot enter into force, because the two documents that have been ratified are different. And the problem is not just that our law on ratification has a linkage to the ABM Treaty: it also includes the New York Protocols of 1997 which differentiate between strategic and theatre missile defences. Strictly speaking, these protocols have no treaty status and do not need ratification. And, as far as I can see, the US Senate is not planning to ratify them.

However, the Russian parliament has a certain opportunity to undertake a number of initiatives with regard to its counterpart in the US and try to figure out what to do next. As a matter of fact, this is a choice between two possible strategies. Either we focus upon the search for a political compromise which would allow for the mutual harmonisation of the START–II ratification laws so that they could enter into force, or we leave START–II aside and move to discussions on START–III that would envisage far deeper cuts of strategic nuclear arsenals. The alternative to these aforementioned strategies, in case they collapse, would inevitably be the re-nationalisation of defence policies as regards the approach to nuclear and conventional armaments. Perhaps, in today’s world such a scenario would not be so scary, but there is one “but” here.

I have heard many times from highly placed members of George Bush’s team (when he was not president yet) that the US would be ready to undertake very deep and even unilateral cuts of their strategic nuclear forces, but that they would deploy their NMD under any conditions. In general, the blueprint of the US strategy looked as follows: we will undertake cuts of our strategic arsenals to the level of 1 000 warheads, but we shall abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy whatever system we deem necessary. And in response, Russia can increase its nuclear arsenals to whatever size it likes, even 10 000 warheads, if it has no other ways of spending money.

In my view, what is important here is not the issue of the quantity of warheads deployed by each side within its strategic forces, but the fact that the structure and quantity of warheads were subordinated to the rigorous logic of strategic stability. And, no less important, bilateral negotiations were accompanied by a detailed and exceptionally effective system of mutual control. If we now move to unilateral actions in the area of strategic nuclear arms reduction, the system of control and confidence-building measures could easily be destroyed and lost. The quantities of tanks and nuclear warheads are not as important today for strategic stability as the perceptions about the true intentions of the sides and of the ways in which our counterparts are going to act. And this can be
ascertained only through a control system. And I think that this is a more weighty factor than the quantitative indicators themselves.

A. ARBATOV. If we shift to unilateral measures, as proposed now by the Americans, it is possible that it will be easier for us on both the financial and the technological side to guarantee our security—in terms of maintaining the acceptable balance in offensive strategic weapons, sustaining our ability to overcome any missile defence system and securing our nuclear deterrence capability. But something important that was linked to the regime and process of negotiations as a whole would be lost. And here, while giving their due to the transparency system, to confidence-building and co-operation measures, I would not prioritise them. I would prioritise the fact that in the course of this process which has been going on for more than thirty years, and under the impact of the logic of these negotiations, our strategic forces were being reoriented toward response only, toward a retaliatory strike—in accordance with the strategic stability model. And, in the framework of negotiations and even signed documents defining the principles of strategic stability and many of the specific parameters of all the agreements in this area, beginning with START–I, the two sides were moving toward a stable strategy of a retaliatory strike, rather than a first strike. If we now let everything flow with the current and let the defence ministries of both the USA and Russia determine the level, the structure and character of the strategic forces by themselves (leaving information exchange only), I am certain that military agencies would prefer to entirely different structures and systems that would be cheaper and more efficient from the military perspective. They would be primarily oriented toward first strike, especially since this is officially presumed in the doctrine, and, secondly, toward speedy actions pre-empting the first strike, or at least toward a response to the first strike. This may turn out to be very risky in a situation when tensions rise. The military are inclined to this.

The plan of restructuring of Russia’s strategic forces that has been adopted leads to making them extremely vulnerable. American experts, including military experts, with whom I discussed the US behaviour under these circumstances, say: “This is your decision, all Russia’s strategic forces will be concentrated at two hundred locations and can be hit by a strike from two Trident submarines. Everything can be annihilated.” Under such a circumstance, the military cannot do otherwise but plan for a first strike. They are professionals. And this military logic can be channelled toward different concepts, only through negotiations on banning and limiting some systems and preferencing others, through settling upon certain ceilings. I think this is the most important, and openness, transparency, information exchange are secondary issues.
I. KUKLINA. I would like to touch upon the question of civilian control and speak about the opportunities for strengthening the parliament’s influence on Russia’s policy.

In the new Duma, there has been indeed a drastic reduction of civilian control over military expenditure, arms, disarmament, etc. Military issues have disappeared from the agenda. The defence budget is represented by a few unclassified articles which are completely insufficient to inform society about military developments. The law on the budget classification in which the public in our country is interested in order to restore budgetary control and which raised so much hope in fact does not work. This is related not just to the Law on State Secrets, because even under this law the previous Duma undertook certain steps in this area, declassifying at least part of the military expenditure. As of now, the law on the budget classification is just irrelevant in respect of military issues. And the worst news is that the law on civilian control that has been debated over several years has been entirely removed by the Duma from its agenda.

I think that as regards the establishment of effective civilian control over the military sphere the present State Duma has taken an enormous step backward and has negated all those modest achievements of the previous period. With the adoption of the law on parties, even the formal separation of powers will disappear and the parliament will turn into a Supreme Soviet, fed now and then by the Executive and voting automatically in favour of every thing the latter proposes.

Everybody is aware of the fusion of the Duma with the government on issues related to the establishment of civilian control in the military sphere. This may be good, but for whom? In any case, it is entirely counter-productive both for the country and for society. This is because in this way the powers-that-be become totally detached from society and put the Duma into the position of a body that does not depend on elections (since we know how all this is done in the election of the “party of power”), not to speak of dependence on society.

It seems to me that the Duma and all its factions, including Yabloko, SPS (Union of Right Forces), and others, absolve the Executive of its sins in advance, so to speak, assuming that it will keep acting not just in its own interests, but also in the interests of society. This is a big mistake. Such an advance to the Executive on the part of the more-or-less opposition parties, as regards its future actions, will play a negative role in the subsequent development of the parliamentary system in our country. It will also have an adverse effect not just on decision-making in the area of disarmament and security, but also in other fields, including the entire set of issues related to the domestic policy of the Executive.
As for the West, which may be making many ill-considered moves, I don’t believe that it could have a great impact on the institutionalisation of our parliamentary system, as well as on the general developments in our country. I also disagree about the impossibility of combining authoritarian rule, market economy, and good relations with the West. It seems to me that the West is beginning to understand that, in the final analysis, given the negligible share that Russia now occupies in its foreign policy aspirations, it could be quite satisfied by a relatively mild authoritarianism, with all the democratic decorations preserved for the sake of decency, in combination with a market economy.

There is another difficulty. Will the Executive be able to keep itself on the edge of a mild authoritarianism? Will it not slide further, which may create danger not so much for the West as for Russia itself?

Besides, I would like to say that the nationalist patriotic trends in society are rather exaggerated. The nationalist patriotic issues are cultivated by those who are primarily interested in controlling the financial flows which go in this direction. One simplest example: the program of patriotic education for youth. A lot of money is involved here. This is an area of interest of powerful government agencies, various representatives of regional corporations, and others. And I believe, on the basis of my work in an NGO, that, as for the bulk of the population, in spite of all its alienation from the authorities, its lack of information or one-sided information, these nationalist patriotic sentiments exist only on the surface. The bulk of the population supports neither anti-American sentiments, nor the strengthening of the role of military corporations, nor the trends toward authoritarianism and the dilution and destruction of the parliament in our country, and so on.

P. ZOLOTAREV. I would like to ask our esteemed presenter two specific questions. In your opinion, how good is the existing budget classification? Is it true that the possibility to control defence issues and military policies through the process of budget formation and control over its implementation is inhibited by two obstacles: the Law on State Secrets and the flawed budget classification?

A. ARBATOV. The present budget classification, according to which over 130 items from the military budget should be declassified and delineated, is a constructive element in our legislation. But the Law on State Secrets means a closure of this budget classification.

What is the flaw of the Law on Budget Classification? The present law which has 132 items under the national defence article, allows for a detailed control over the implementation of the budget. The State Duma can exercise this control, although not by itself (it has no oversight functions) but through the Auditor General’s Office. This a controversial, indirect and lengthy procedure, but it is feasible. But as regards the initial
decision-making over the allocation of funds, this cannot be done by the Duma. This requires amendments to the Law on Budget Classification. The Yabloko faction has already drafted such amendments. We envisaged to do this in two stages: at the first stage, the Law on Budget Classification would present the allocation of funds among the service arms and independent military corps. Then the deputies, when making their decision, would be able to figure out how much is allocated to the navy, how much to the air force, how much to the space forces. Thus, they would approach the voting on the appropriation of these funds with greater awareness than now, when we vote on the basis of general categories (utility expenditure, money allowances, arms purchases, etc.) The second stage would be the most important. That is, we would have a third dimension representing this same expenditure, namely: how much is spent on the nuclear deterrent, on defence, on naval theatres, on strategic mobile vehicles. In order to make decisions with full awareness, the deputies need to know, how much money is allocated this year to nuclear deterrence. We don’t know whether these amendments are going to pass, but they are absolutely necessary.

V. KAMYSHANOV. I would like to dwell on those aspects that are related to the ability of social movements to contribute to the developments in the sphere of security and military co-operation. Over many years, there has been a dialogue between the public of the Soviet Union and the US, of Russia and the USA. Now this has ceased to exist. Meanwhile, today’s discussion has shown that the need to restore this dialogue, restore information exchange has ripened. This is needed so that both sides can equally have an idea of the mood and trends among the public opinion of their partners in international co-operation. Of course, we need to build such a bridge not only between Russia and America, but also pay attention to the dialogue with the European Union and with our East European partners.

The establishment of the NGO Council in the State Duma, headed by its chairman Mr Seleznov, confirms the fact that, in principle, the demand for such a dialogue exists.

In your opinion, how could the creation of the NGO Council be used to enhance the interaction on the most salient issues between the non-governmental organisations—the public sector—and the deputies?

A. ARBATOV. The NGO Council holds a promise, and a significant one at that. But everything depends on how it will behave. It may remain a purely show agency organising extravagant annual events. But if this Council identifies some specific topics for itself, if it establishes contacts with the corresponding committees and with factions, it engages in active work, as non-governmental organisations are supposed to do, then, I believe, it may play a very important role in
decision-making on many issues related, for example, to the military draft, to the professional army, and to the international security.

M. SHELEPIN. I would like to focus your attention on the issue of conventional weapons. At the end of 1999, at the OSCE summit, the new Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe was signed. This was a well-balanced document that suited the interest of guaranteeing Russia’s security. Unfortunately, due to a whole range of foreign and domestic causes, it was not really taken note of in Russia, and if mentioned at all, then with a fair amount of scepticism.

Mr Arbatov, would you please tell us how things stand with regard to the ratification of this treaty in the Duma, and whether there is any intention to ratify it this year or in the foreseeable future? It is already a year and a half since the Istanbul meeting. Since then, at the OSCE in Vienna we observe a very clear and unambiguous trend: the issues of military politics cease to dominate at the OSCE. From my point of view, this happens, among other things, because Moscow cannot define its policy on a number of issues.

What, in my opinion, lies on the surface of this? Obviously, one can go further along the path of modernisation of the Istanbul agreement itself. Why is it that Poland can now have 1700 tanks on the basis of this treaty, rather than 1200—especially given the fact that it now enjoys NATO security guarantees? Or, why is it that Russia has about 6500 battle tanks in its European part, rather than, say, 5000?

Further, the Istanbul treaty envisages limitations in five categories. Why? Why, for example, do limitations only affect the artillery of more than 100 mm calibre, rather than 75 mm? Clearly, there is room for further work in this direction.

Finally, why is it that we never put forward a coherent and elaborate draft concept of European security for all the OSCE members? We have been talking about this for many years, but have not advanced an inch! Perhaps, it is worth considering a project of a treaty on a system of collective defence for all the OSCE member countries, including, among others, the Baltic states, the Central Asian states and the new states that have emerged on the territory of former Yugoslavia? And in the context of such an agreement the process of NATO expansion would be accepted much more quietly.

In this connection, could the Duma take the initiative to advance this idea?

A. ARBATOVA. In my view, the lack of interest in the Istanbul treaty is related to the fact that it is extremely conservative, that is, it does not presuppose any real bold moves that reflect the post-Cold War situation in Europe. The treaty is adapted to the eastward expansion of NATO and it establishes territorial and national limits that will soften this
threat or its perception to some extent, say, in Russia. If this would mean a radical cut in conventional weapons for everybody, say, by 50%, it would attract a lot of attention.

This would unquestionably serve our interests, given that the Russian forces are going to be reduced in any case, and thus the Western forces are passively acquiring a superiority in this area. I believe that in this regard the Ministry of Defence showed an excess of conservatism, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no opportunity to take the initiative.

But in the 1990s, when there still was a totally different atmosphere in the relations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO, when it was not yet overshadowed by all the subsequent developments, we would have been able to agree on far more radical measures in this area. Indeed, why does NATO need 17,000 tanks and 6,000 aircraft after the Cold War? If this is an alliance that is restructuring to conduct peacekeeping operations, what kind of operations are these if they require such an amount of military equipment?

The political situation has deteriorated significantly however. This treaty has a marginal influence, while there is no political will, no confidence and no longer the atmosphere that existed to allow for a radically new treaty. This is why the interest in it among Duma members is close to zero.

As for the treaty on collective security, in principle this is a very good and interesting idea. The problem is that almost everything has already been said in the Helsinki Act and in other OSCE documents that have already been adopted. If we want not just to determine the norms of inter-state relations which exist in contemporary international law but are most grossly violated, as in the NATO action on the Balkans in 1999; if we want to move further and make the OSCE and the collective security treaty into effective tools of resolving security problems in post-Cold War Europe, this will require much effort.

First of all, it is necessary to change the situation in which Russia always remains in a minority within the OSCE. For us to take the initiative of restructuring the OSCE upon ourselves, we need to figure out why it is that on most issues all OSCE states (and there are over 50) take positions that are different from Russia’s. Then we would not be afraid of being in a minority and of having decisions imposed on us against our will, while the OSCE would become a more efficient agency than it is under present conditions. The same refers to the collective security treaty.

S. CHUGROV. The appointment of a civilian head at the Ministry of Defence who is able to renounce the traditional isolation of the military which leads to excessive secrecy, corruption, and so forth, may be considered a serious symptom of change.
My question to Mr Arbatov is about this: not so long ago, Sergey Ivanov became the first civilian in post-Soviet history to be appointed Minister of Defence. He has made his first moves in his new position. Do you think that these moves make it possible to speak of a certain radical revision of approaches to the reforms in the military sphere, a turn toward more openness?

A. ARBATOV. In my opinion, the appointment of S. Ivanov, as a civilian, a man who does not come from the military in the conventional sense, even though he has served in the Federal Security Service, is a positive step. But this is just a small first step, because many other things are needed beside the presence of a civilian in the office of the Minister of Defence. There is the need to alter the division of responsibilities between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, to change the role of the parliament. The Minister of Defence ought to have his own independent staff so as to do an efficient job in assessing the positions of different armed forces rather than merely being a toy in the struggle for budget appropriations, authority and influence. Unfortunately, we don’t have any of this yet. There ought to be civilian control which implies a whole system of measures beside the appointment of a civilian minister.

A. KALIADINE. It was already implied here that the inter-factional struggle and attempts to exploit the resolution of specific problems to advance narrow party interests are among the factors that weaken the Duma’s influence. Does it constrain the parliament’s opportunities to influence government policies?

According to the law on international treaties, Duma deputies, as members of the legislature, can initiate by themselves legislative acts on Russia’s international obligations in the area of disarmament. To what extent do they use this right? I would like to mention, in particular, the laws on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and of START–II. These laws include a rather broad range of powers for the deputies and the Federal Assembly as a whole. Are these powers somehow used by the deputies, or are they assuming a largely passive role?

A. ARBATOV. The inter-factional struggle in the State Duma is in no way different from the same struggle in the parliaments of other countries—Germany, France, or the US. The system itself is somewhat different across all these countries, but the party struggle and party interests always have an impact on the decisions being made. This is a normal mechanism of operation of any parliament.

As for the legislative initiatives, they are being proposed. It seems to me that those hearings that were held recently on the law on ratification of START–II produced a considerable impression upon the representatives of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, because
the deputies were against the line of the top officials (although those hearings were closed to the public).

**V. BARANOVSKY.** Our discussion has illustrated that the problems we raised are very serious in both a theoretical and practical sense. I mean the specific conditions in which we live and in which our parliamentary system, our civil society and our government are developing. We all know that our civil society is in its embryonic state. Hence the parliament, however flawed it may be, remains the only institution that under the given conditions has a more or less visible connection with society. This is the institution capable of carrying out the interaction between society and government, of influencing the authorities, the official policy. Thus, our parliament is just of the same kind as our society. But this is not the time to dwell on this thesis.

I would like to draw your attention to those problems that are closely connected with the issue we are discussing today. Let us take the assertion of Mrs Kuklina that there is no anti-American mood in Russia, that this is really an exaggeration. I cannot agree with this. In my opinion, in our society there are sentiments that are acutely felt and could be defined by many of us present here as alarmist or negative, that are cause for concern. There is another question: where do they come from? One could say that sometimes they are fuelled by the Executive and sometimes by the media. What is the share of responsibility of our foreign partners for the existence of these sentiments? To what extent were these sentiments influenced by the Kosovo conflict and the problem of NATO expansion? This debate may go on forever, but it seems to me that at the level of the mass conscience there are fairly alarmist sentiments. In this regard, my question is: should the parliament give expression to these sentiments? Or should it try to minimise the negative developments that emerge in the public consciousness and try to orient the authorities toward conducting such a policy that would not be of a purely populist nature?

As we know, international issues are not particularly popular in Western countries. As a rule, domestic politics and the economy take precedence. The issues of international life cause great public and political interest only in case of some acute crisis situation. Taking this into account, should our parliament follow this trend as well and pay minimal attention to happenings in the outside world? And yet, what to do, for example, with the issue of nuclear non-proliferation or, on the contrary, proliferation? It is my impression that our society has developed a very low sensitivity to this problem. We have already forgotten the times when we were intimidated (or intimidated ourselves) by the possible repercussions of such an intensive development of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We barely pay attention to the happenings in Pakistan, India, etc. In this context, should the parliament increase the
sensitivity of our society and try to raise this problem to a higher level? And is it capable of doing this. These are some emerging questions that we have to put to ourselves, because this is a subject not just of political, but also of purely intellectual consideration.

Take, for example, the parliament-government nexus. We often used to hear the old and well-known motto which, I believe, goes back to Pushkin’s time, that the government is the only European we have in our country. It is paradoxical that even those who have many claims against the present authorities, have to admit that in the area of international security, on issues related to arms control, the government conducts fairly constructive policies, more so than could be expected if one takes into account the public mood or the mood that exists in the parliament.

In my view, speaking in a very general way, for any state the enlightened absolutist model may be better for foreign policy—so that the state can conduct an effective policy in its relationship with the outside world. Democracy complicates all these things to a great extent. Democracy requires taking different and often contradictory interests into account. When democracy is imperfect and when it is in a state of formation, there are a lot of side effects. And we know all this very well, but in theory. What about in practice?

We deal with the kind of government, with a political leadership that are pursuing a constructive course in international affairs. However, we naturally get anxious about what may happen tomorrow or the day after if there is a sudden change in priorities, a change in some of the directions of the political leadership.

What may look today as advantageous and positive in the course of decision-making on issues of international security and arms control may have extremely negative consequences from the standpoint of long-term strategic interests. How one can avoid it? I have no answer ready to this question. One could offer a certain ideal formula: we need to form our civil society, ensure a fairly efficient separation of powers, which will result in a positive impact on decision-making, including vital issues related to international security. But how do we move from the present to this ideal condition? I would be interested to address these questions to our esteemed presenter.

A. ARBATOV. It is known that absolute monarchy is the most efficient form of rule, but only on condition that the monarch is a good, enlightened man, and that the people who give him advice and his personal valet who attends to his needs will also be good people. Since this does not happen in real life, it seems to me that such efficiency is a kind of short-term, tactical necessity that is incompatible with the long-term, strategic efficiency of the state. This is why monarchies fall apart, collapse, suffer defeats, while in the long term democracies exhibit a far
greater stability. The same refers to the ongoing developments in our country. And therefore a [monarchical] path, despite all its illusory simplicity, logical coherence and conformity to the Russian traditions is in reality a throwback to the past. And under the present conditions of the information age, of globalization, this is not just a throwback to oblivion, to nowhere, it is not even a path to Chile, but rather a path to Congo.

N. ARBATOVA. I have a very short comment to make on Mr Baranovsky’s contribution.

We cannot speak about our country in the abstract. Russia has a specific history, it is too large for the developments that are currently acquiring their own inertia to be stopped exactly where they should be and exactly at the right moment. For this reason, I believe that, however dismal it may be to deal with the parliament, the separation of powers is the only, or one of the few major achievements that serves as at least some kind of a guarantee against our sliding into the abyss.

As regards authoritarianism, it will be very difficult to prevent this development altogether from going further on. In my view, the West has made its choice, having become tired of our fairly contradictory “democratic” development over the past decade. It has opted for stability over democracy, and this is the West’s big error, ensuring that the developments that are now acquiring inertia will produce a boomerang effect. This is because in our country—we know this from the Soviet experience—a restricted democracy cannot exist without an image of an external enemy, without spy hunts and everything that, in fact, we observe now. And if these developments go further, they will inevitably have an effect on the relations between Russia and the West.

The only proper conclusion is that we never had problems with authoritarianism, but always with it being enlightened.

A. ROTFELD. First of all, I am deeply impressed by everything I have heard in this audience, because it shows, as a matter of fact, that Russia has the foundations for creating a civil society. It may be that there are no strong institutions, but there are very competent professional people who speak in a very balanced way and with a lot of responsibility.

Secondly, since Russia had no democratic institutions, Western policies were oriented toward individuals. That is, the West invested great political efforts into supporting first Mikhail Gorbachev and later Boris Yeltsin. Now, as regards Vladimir Putin. In my opinion, Ms Arbatova was right in saying that the choice was made in favour of stability rather than democracy. Although ideally it would be good to have both. But if there is no democracy, then at the very least we need some stability. The West is confident that the new generation of politicians that is represented by Vladimir Putin and Sergey Ivanov, the new Defence Minister, will be more predictable.
The point is that democracy is based on institutions, norms, procedures and mechanisms. Individuals are, of course, very important, but they come and go, while institutions remain. From this viewpoint, I have the impression that, unfortunately, the prevailing element in today’s Russia is that of a democracy imposed from above. It is called managed democracy: that is, the authorities know better what the people need. But the point is that this power today is in the hands of people who are looking through a keyhole, so to speak. That is, they do not see the general picture, the ongoing developments as a whole.

In this context, I have a minor comment to make on Mr Shelepin’s contribution. It seems to me that the age of the big treaties is gone. I mean the expectation that a collective security treaty in Europe would solve certain problems. Perhaps it would, but the problem is how to persuade the 54 nations to decide to join this treaty. We now live in the age of a pragmatism of sorts, when one has to coordinate and implement specific kinds of proposals.

I am in full agreement with those who believe that unilateral disarmament is dangerous in that this process is somehow uncontrollable. And it also seems to me that today control is more important than the process of disarmament itself, because armaments will be cut anyway. It looks as if the treaties, as international legal instruments, will not play as important a role in the near future as they played in the past. I would like to refer to a book that our institute has published this year (“A Future Arms Control Agenda”, SIPRI, 2001). This book presents three schools in American thinking. One is the school of Richard Perle who believes that arms control is a thing of the past. The second is the school of William Perry. In his opinion, arms control makes sense, but it needs to be filled with a number of other elements related to the ongoing developments. The third school is the school of James Goodby who is an advocate of negotiations. Thus, we see that in the United States, as in Russia, there are many different perspectives on the same problem.

Some have spoken here about the advent of a president in the USA who is an amateur in foreign and security policy, and about US policy swinging from one side to the other, from a rejection of Russia to inviting it as a partner. It should be noted, however, that in the USA there are institutions that shape the country’s policy, and therefore it is fairly predictable. The point is that the direction of US policy will not be determined by summits: they have a largely symbolic significance. Developments inside Russia are the principal determinant of its relations with the outside world, including the USA. I would like to say that a great many people in the West are interested in maintaining businesslike relations with Russia and take into account its involvement in the European and global security systems.
PART II. COMMENTARIES

8. Appropriations on defence in the Federal budget for 2002

9. Prospects for the elimination of the world’s largest CW arsenal

10. The Russian initiative on building a joint non-strategic ballistic missile defence system in Europe

8. APPROPRIATIONS ON DEFENCE IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR 2002

Pyotr ROMASHKIN

General features of the Federal budget for 2002

On 14 December 2001 the State Duma adopted the law “On the Federal budget for 2002”. On 26 December this law was approved by the Federation Council.

These are the main indicators of the budget for 2002:
- Gross domestic product (GDP) – 10 950 billion roubles;
- Revenue – 2 125 718.2 million roubles;
- Expenditure – 1 947 386.3 million roubles;
- Profit – 178 331.9 million roubles.

In comparison with indicators of the Federal budget for 2001, the indicators for 2002 grew:
- GDP – 1.413 fold;
- Revenue – 1.781 fold;
- Expenditure – 1.715 fold;

The sections of the principal expenditure of the Federal budget have changed in the following way (see table 1).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of the federal budget</th>
<th>Correlation between expenditure in 2002 and that in 2001</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure of the federal budget</td>
<td>1.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State administration</td>
<td>1.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial branch</td>
<td>1.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International activities</td>
<td>1.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defence</td>
<td>1.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-enforcement</td>
<td>1.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental research and promotion of scientific-technical progress</td>
<td>1.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, power production and construction</td>
<td>1.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment protection</td>
<td>2.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, road construction and maintenance</td>
<td>2.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and elimination of emergency situations</td>
<td>1.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, art, cinema industry</td>
<td>1.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>1.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and sport</td>
<td>1.441</td>
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The conclusion may, therefore, be drawn that defence and law-enforcement expenditure is growing more slowly than the expenditure side of the Federal budget, as a whole, and the expenditure on social policies, in particular.

**Expenditure under the section “National Defence”**

Expenditure under the section “National Defence” has been fixed at 284 157.8 million roubles which constitutes 2.6% of the GDP and 14.6% of the total expenditure of the Federal budget. Of this expenditure 263 863.8 million roubles are assigned to the subsection “Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. In this subsection expenditure is distributed in the following way: the Central bodies of the military administration – 956.9 million roubles; allowances for military personnel – 112 355.4 million roubles; combat training and material-technical provision of the forces – 48 182.7 million roubles; departmental expenditure on education and health care – 2 103.3 million roubles; insurance guarantees for military personnel – 1 006.8 million roubles.

It should be noted that in the Federal budget for 2001, expenditure on “National Defence” constitutes 2.66% of the GDP and 15.06% of the total expenditure of the Federal budget. In 2002 the total expenditure has grown – 1.715 fold, as compared to 2001, and the expenditure on national defence 1.323 fold. This is one of the lowest indicators of growth in the Federal budget. The conclusion may, therefore, be drawn that this expenditure does not constitute a high priority for the Russian government.

So far the Directive of the President of the RF to the effect that the expenditure on “National Defence” should constitute 3.5% of the GDP has not been implemented. If this is done and expenditure on “National Defence” will amount to 373 billion roubles, it will be possible to increase expenditure on:

– raising the salaries of military personnel to bring them up to the level of Federal functionaries;
– raising the pay of other ranks and NCOs on contract service in order to make military service more attractive as one of the steps towards transition to professional Armed Forces of the RF;

– the gradual transition to fully professional Armed Forces;


– increasing the subsistence provisions for military personnel in order to fully satisfy their requirements in this respect;

– the payment for and storage of fuel and lubricants in order to ensure full combat preparedness of the troops;

– the procurement of armaments and military equipment, the repair of armaments and military equipment as well as on capital construction work in order to ensure the gradual transition from a correlation of 70:30, between expenditure on the maintenance of the Armed Forces and investment, to one of 55:45. The increase in the budget for 2002 will make it possible to ensure a correlation of 65:35.

In table 2 the dynamics of the change in the share of expenditure in the GDP and the total expenditure in the Federal budget under the section “National defence”, based on the confirmed budgets for 1994–2002, are shown.

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<tr>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>19.76</td>
<td>17.32</td>
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<th>1999</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>16.29</td>
<td>16.45</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>14.60</td>
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It should, at the same time, be noted that in the developed countries (USA, Great Britain, France) the share of expenditure on national defence constitutes 3.5–4.5% of the GDP while in such countries as Turkey, South Korea, China and certain other countries this share constitutes 8–10%.

Apart from this, it would be expedient to transfer the following heads of expenditure from the section “National defence” to other sections of the Federal budget:

– expenditure on participation in providing collective security and peacekeeping operations to the section “International activities”;
– expenditure on providing for the activities of branches of the defence industry to the section “Industry, power production and construction”.

This will be in accordance with the Federal law “On the Budget Classification of the Russian Federation”.

In the course of the debates on the Federal budget for 2002, the Dept. Chairman of the Defence Committee A. Arbatov, Deputy from the “Yabloko” fraction, introduced an amendment aimed at declassifying all target items in the section “National Defence”, as well as the socially important expenditure under the subsection “Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (money allowances for military personnel, salaries for civilian personnel, subsistence, clothing, medical and transport provisions) as well as all target items and forms of expenditure under the subsection “Utilization and destruction of armaments (including implementation of international treaties)”.

The secrecy surrounding such expenditure leads, when implementing the budget, to the transfer of expenditure from one item to another and the possibility occurs that the money is not used for the purpose for which it is assigned. During the examination of the draft law, on fourth reading, the Government agreed to the declassification of socially important expenditure under the section “Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. On the other hand, the target items and forms of expenditure under the section “Utilization and destruction of armaments (including implementation of international treaties)” remains classified. This causes surprise as all data on the funding of the implementation of international treaties is submitted to international organizations. In this way, this information is closed to Russian public scrutiny only.

It would be desirable to broaden the list of target items and forms of expenditure in the section “National defence” which are open to public scrutiny.

That is why, a group of deputies worked out a draft Federal law “On introducing changes and additions to the Federal law “On Budget Classification of the Russian Federation” (in the part on expenditure of the Ministry of Defence).

In accordance with the Federal law “On Budget Classification of the Russian Federation”, at present in force, departmental expenditure of the Ministry of Defence is spread over 128 different sections, subsections, target items and forms of expenditure. All the information is presented as referring to the Ministry of Defence, as a whole, without being divided according to service arms of the Armed Forces or independent military corps.
At the same time, when debating the draft law on the Federal budget in the Federal Assembly, the deputies of the State Duma and members of the Federation Council did not have a clear idea of how the different service arms of the Armed Forces and military corps will be financed and which priorities there will be in the development of the Armed Forces, in the next financial year. Apart from this, after the Federal budget has been passed, the right of distributing the funds between the service arms of the Armed Forces and independent military corps belongs exclusively to the Ministry of Defence, without any control on the part of the Federal Assembly, the Auditor General’s Office or the public. It should be remembered that it is a question, here, of sums to be paid out to specific service arms of the Armed Forces and independent corps which sometimes exceed the expenditure of an entire section of the Federal budget.

The proposed draft law envisages expanding the list of departmental expenditure of the Ministry of Defence, not only to include the Ministry, as a whole, but also the service arms of the Armed Forces and independent military corps: the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Land Forces, the Air Forces, the Navy, the Parachute troops and the Space Forces. This expands the list of departmental expenditure to 850 subsections and will make it possible to approach the process of voting the budget in a more professional way as well as to exercise more effective control over its implementation, both by the Federal Assembly and the public. The structure of the itemization of the sections, subsections, target items and forms of expenditure have not been changed by the authors of the draft law, as compared to the Federal law “On Budget Classification of the Russian Federation”, at present in force. It is proposed to debate the draft law in 2002.

**Expenditure under the section “Utilization and destruction of armaments”**

In the Federal budget only the total expenditure under this section and the subsections: “Utilization and destruction of armaments (including implementation of international treaties)” and “Utilization and destruction of armaments (excluding international treaties)” are open to public scrutiny. All the target items and forms of expenditure have been classified by the Russian government.

It would be desirable to increase expenditure under this subsection by 1.7 billion roubles, after transferring it to subsection “Utilization and destruction of armaments (excluding international treaties)”, in the part on expenditure on the utilization of nuclear-power installations, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, representing
radiation danger, capital construction of storage facilities of radio-active waste. This would make it possible to decommission more rapidly atomic submarines which have completed their service life.

**Expenditure under the section “Military reform”**

A group of deputies has proposed to increase expenditure under the section “Military reform” by 3.7 billion roubles and use this sum to provide all personnel discharged from the military service with full discharge allowances and with professional retraining.

The Federal budget envisages an almost fourfold increase of expenditure on “Military reform” (from 4.2 billion to 16.5 billion roubles). This indicator shows that the Government is serious in its intention to carry out military reform.

Analysis shows that the volume of expenditure in the budget on the construction of housing for discharged military personnel corresponds to the real needs, but that expenditure on money allowances is clearly insufficient.

Calculations show that, for the money allocated, about 30 000 apartments for discharged military personnel can be built, but that only about 10 thousand military personnel can be provided with discharge benefits, while, in all probability, at least 50 000 officers and NCOs, who are eligible for these benefits, will be discharged.
9. PROSPECTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST CW ARSENAL

Alexandre KALIADINE

On 5 July 2001 the government of the Russian Federation approved a revised version of the 1996 Special federal program “Destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation”. This document (further referred to as the Program, CWDP) provides for an extension of 5 years of the final destruction deadline for Category 1 chemical weapons (CW) and contains other significant modifications of the original plan.

Under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a party may request the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to extend the final destruction deadline for Category 1 CW. Such a request must be submitted not later than 9 years after the entry into force of the CWC. To such a request an extension of up to 5 years may be granted. If the extension is granted the party must submit a report to the Executive Council on its destruction activities (in addition to the detailed annual destruction plans which are required, regardless of whether or not an extension has been granted).

In accordance with the requirements of the CWC Russia presented the revised CWDP to the EU at its 26th meeting in September 2001. A final decision on this proposal is expected at the Seventh Conference of the States Parties of the OPCW, which is scheduled to take place in 2002. International support for the current plan would facilitate the development of a constructive relationship between Russia and the OPCW, the strengthening of the global regime for chemical disarmament and non-proliferation and enhance chances for progress in other disarmament areas.

After the demise of the USSR in December 1991, its successors inherited a Soviet chemical weapon stockpile totalling 40 thousand agent tons. None of them was pleased with such an acquisition. Actually, the international community has been burdened with an unprecedented problem of a global scale—the task of destroying the CW arsenal created by the defunct superpower.

As far as post-Soviet Russia is concerned, chemical weapons were not assigned any role whatsoever in its national security system (be it for the purposes of deterrence, threat of massive retaliation or direct use in a
Among former Soviet republics only Russia volunteered to bear the costs of CW destruction in line with its financial capabilities. At that time responsible officials in Western governments realised that the interests of international security and CW non-proliferation would be served by helping Russia to destroy the former Soviet CW stockpiles. In 1992, as a result of international consultations, a basic political understanding was reached on sharing costs among the states concerned. Russia agreed to join the CWC and fulfil the requirements of the CWC related to the destruction of the former Soviet CW arsenal, while other interested states parties to the CWC pledged to provide gratuitous financial and technical assistance for this purpose on a long-term basis. Thus, the costs of the CW destruction were to be shared among the parties to the CWC. In other words, from the very outset the destruction of the former Soviet CW stockpile became essentially an international co-operative project.

Efforts have been made to implement the agreement. Russia proceeded with the realisation of the Special federal program “Destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation”, approved by the government in March 1996, its main goal being the destruction of the CW stockpiles in accordance with the CWC requirements. Some states parties to the CWC (USA, Germany, etc.) have initiated assistance projects related to Russia’s chemical weapon destruction program.

However, policy makers both in Russia and in the West have underestimated the complexity of the problems involved in moving forward the CW destruction program and failed to show sufficient persistence and purposefulness in the pursuit of the common objective.

As far as Russia is concerned, the record of the Yeltsin era in this field has been spasmodic. The Program was too optimistic for a number of reasons. The protracted economic crisis, shortfalls in the federal budget, exacerbated by the August 1998 financial collapse, and interruptions in the flow of foreign assistance, promised to Russia, posed difficult questions for Russian policy makers. Nevertheless, Russia made efforts to meet the requirements of the CWC. It enacted domestic enabling legislation allowing full implementation of the CWC tasks. CW destruction technologies were developed. Sites for CW destruction facilities (CWDF) were selected, personnel trained and a complex technical effort launched. Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge that quite often questions related to the CWC remained on the periphery of the cares of the frequently changing governments of this epoch. The CWDP has been starved of funds for years. For the period from 1993 through to 2000 the financial requirements of the Program amounted to about $1.5 billion, while the state orders provided $115.6 million for this purpose. But in
fact, only $60.5 million were allocated, that is about 3.2% of the necessary funding.

Absence of a precise and effective federal system for the management of the chemical demilitarisation process, entrenched bureaucratic interests and a lack of interdepartmental co-ordination tended to frustrate progress. Bureaucratic red tape and irresponsibility cancelled out correct administrative solutions, made in the field of chemical demilitarisation. Decisions on financial, administrative and other problems, not exposed to sufficient public scrutiny, led to errors of judgement.

International assistance for Russian chemical disarmament has been more modest than originally expected and unimpressive when contrasted with the magnitude of the tasks to be solved. Moreover, in the late 1990s the situation in this area tended to get worse. In October 1999 the USA (a major contributor to the chemical demilitarisation projects in Russia) suspended funding for the construction of the largest Russian CWDF at Shchuchye. (In FY 2000 and FY 2001 the US Congress prohibited funding for the CWDF in Russia). Other states were not in a hurry to fulfil their pledges to provide assistance to Russia either. Hampering the flow of foreign funds further undercut Russian efforts to get its CWDP underway.

Owing to such negative developments, the majority of the goals, set out in the 1996 CWDP, were not achieved. By the middle of 2001 the Program was already four years behind schedule. This situation necessitated the radical revision of the original plan and extension of interim deadlines as well as the convention’s final deadline, in 2007, for destroying all chemical weapons.

Election of a new president in Russia and subsequent general positive changes in Russian–Western relations, undoubtedly, improved prospects for the implementation of the projects related to the elimination of the former Soviet CW arsenal. The 2001 federal budget raised six times the level of funding for chemical disarmament, to over 3 billion roubles—the biggest boost in federal spending on chemical disarmament. According to Krasnaya Zvezda (“The Red Star”) newspaper (13.12.2001), appropriations for the CWDP in the current (2002) year have been doubled. A new state customer for the Program was appointed: the civil governmental agency — the Russian Munitions Agency — took over these responsibilities from the Ministry of Defence and was given the lead role for CW destruction. The system of implementation of the CWC underwent other major changes. The concept of CW destruction was reconsidered. The interaction between Russia and other states parties to the CWC in the solution of the common tasks related to the destruction of the CW stocks on the Russian territory has been revitalised. The new
version of the Program, approved by Government Ordinance no. 510, on 5 July 2001, reflects these favourable developments.

Both the original plan of 21 March 1996 and its modified version of 5 July 2001 provide for the full implementation of the CWC. The new document reiterated Russia’s commitment to the objective of complete chemical disarmament and the government’s readiness to comply with the requirements of the CWC. At the same time the revised Program offers in many respects new solutions and approaches to overcoming technical difficulties in implementing the CW destruction plan. They cover destruction timetables, the technological maturity of the CW destruction processes, cost estimates for the overall program, some specific program measures, the role of international assistance and the mechanism of the realisation of the Program. The modified Program contains stronger provisions related both to safety of residents and protection of the environment as well as to the safe storage, transportation and elimination of CW.

Modified destruction deadlines

Taking into account the state of the Russian economy and the need to define more accurately the volume of the required resources, the government chose to make use of the possibilities provided by the convention and requested the extension of the final destruction deadline up to 5 years. In addition, the document provides for the modification of intermediate deadlines for the destruction of Category 1 CW. The amount of CW which must be destroyed and timetables are as follows: 1% (400 tons) by 29 April 2003; 20% (8000 tons) by 29 April 2007; 45% (18 000 tons) by 29 April 2008 and 100% (40 000) by 29 April 2012. (Destruction timetables under the convention are as follows: 1% of the CW stock by 29 April 2000; 20% by 29 April 2002; 45% by 29 April 2004 and 100% by 29 April 2007).

As to Category 2 CW (munitions equipped with phosgene) and Category 3 CW (unequipped munitions and devices, and any equipment which is specifically designed to be used directly in connection with the use of chemical weapons), their destruction should occur within the original CWC timetables. Category 2 CW are to be destroyed at the Shchuchye CWDF in 2001. Category 3 CW must be destroyed by 29 April 2002. Russia began its destruction operations with the elimination of Category 3 CW at Maradykovsky, Kirov region, and Leonidovka, Penza region, in early 2000.
The CW destruction strategy

In order to reduce the cost, the Russian government dropped its earlier plan for the construction of seven expensive and cumbersome CWDFs (one in each of the seven regions of the CW storage). The Munitions Agency plans to build only two full-scale facilities, thus cutting costs considerably. It is planned to complete the pilot CWDF (a small blister agent CWDF) in Gorny (Saratov region) and to destroy there (beginning in 2002) 700 tons of mustard, 230 tons of lewisite as well as 224 tons of the mix of the two (2.9% of total agent stockpile).

One full-scale blister agent CWDF will operate at Kambarka, Udmurt Republic, based on the experience gained from Gorny. It will operate from 2005–2011 and destroy 6300 tons of blister agents stored in bulk.

The second full-scale CWDF will be built at Shchuchye, Kurgan region. It is envisaged to destroy 5500 tons of organophosphorus CW agents—mostly filled artillery shells, stored there. In addition, chemical weapons (artillery shells) stored at Kizner, Udmurt Republic, comprising 5680 tons of VX, sarin and soman, are also to be destroyed at the Shchuchye CWDF. The Munitions Agency is working on being able to transport chemical weapons for destruction to just a very few sites as opposed to the many that once had been planned.

A different scheme is proposed for the CW stocks stored at Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Pochep (Bryansk region). These stocks consist of organophosphorus agents (sarin, soman and VX) in air-delivered munitions, amounting to 17360 agent tons (43% of total agent stockpile). The Program envisages the construction in these regions of three small-scale demilitarisation and detoxification facilities. (They will begin operating in 2006.) In other words, it is not supposed to accomplish the full disposal cycle at these facilities. The neutralised agent will be destroyed or re-used in civil facilities (chemical industry enterprises).

By applying new conceptual provisions the government hopes to accomplish a number of positive results. In particular, to lessen the risks, which the CW storage and elimination pose for local communities, to put into practice more secure and economically acceptable CW destruction processes and new technologies, to rationalise expenditure and implement the CWC in a more effective way.

Yet, questions arise in connection with some aspects of the construction and operation of the CWDFs. It is not clear, how the destruction by 2012 of over 11 000 agent tons of chemical weapons stored at Shchuchye and transported from Kizner (and, possibly, from other places) is going to be achieved. The planned total tonnage of annual destruction at Shchuchye is supposed to be about 1200 tons a year.
According to the modified Program the facility at Shchuchye (a US funded pilot destruction facility) is scheduled to begin operation in 2005 while, according to official US sources, the completion date for its construction is likely to extend beyond the 2008 deadline. Besides, the construction of the facility will require authorisation from the US Congress.

**The Program of measures for destruction or conversion of CWPFs**

The new document fills a serious gap, inherent in the 1996 Program, by including the Program of measures for conversion or destruction of the CWPFs. Out of 24 former CWPFs, six facilities have been already physically destroyed. All specialised equipment was destroyed at 10 former CWPFs. 75% of specialised equipment was dismantled at one former CWPF, which is subject to physical destruction. Seven former CWPFs have been converted. Nine former CWPFs are subject to conversion. Russia submitted to the Executive Council of the OPCW conversion requests and detailed plans for conversion of the former CWPF in Volgograd (the facility for the filling of sarin, soman, and viscose soman into munitions); the facility for the production of lewisite at Dzerzhinsk; the facility for the production of a VX type substance and filling it into munitions at Novocheboksarsk. The Secretariat of the OPCW has provided Russia with three further certificates of the completion of conversion of former CWPFs. These certificates pertain to the former mustard gas production facility, as well as to the former facility for the filling of mustard gas and lewisite mixture into munitions at Chapaevsk, and the former facility for the filling of hydrocyanic acid into munitions at Dzerzhinsk.

**Mechanism for the realisation of the Program**

The modified CWDP formalises and highlights considerable changes (initiated in 2000) in the organisation of the management of chemical disarmament activities. Ten federal agencies are assigned functions in this field. Strangely, the State Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Control is not designated as “a contributing agency”, although the Program envisages the carrying out of sanitary-hygienic and medical-prophylactic measures.

In the search for efficiency, the Munitions Agency has been made responsible for managing the Program and monitoring CW destruction activities. As the state customer of the Program and the national authority for implementing the 1993 CWC, the Munitions Agency bears most of the organisational burden in implementing the requirements of the CWC. It is
also called upon to ensure the effective use of the funds directed towards CW destruction tasks. Within the Munitions Agency the Federal directorate for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been created. It has a high status and enjoys wide powers. Its functions include, in particular: organisation and implementation of measures directed to ensuring the safe storage, transportation and elimination of CW; organisation of the accounting of CW agents, artillery, missile and air-delivered munitions filled with CW agents.\(^7\)

It has also been decided (by Presidential Decree no. 487) to establish a State Commission on Chemical Disarmament to ensure effective co-ordination between federal agencies, authorities of the subjects of the RF and governing bodies of the local communities in carrying out the state policy in the field of chemical disarmament. It is headed by Sergey Kirienko, the President’s plenipotentiary for the Volga Federal Region. (This Federal Region includes four of the Russian regions where CW is stored—Saratov, Kirov, Penza regions and Udmurt Republic). The membership of the Commission includes representatives of a number of federal agencies involved in chemical demilitarisation activities (defence, foreign affairs, economic development and trade, health, Munitions Agency, etc.). Other members of the Commission include representatives of all regions where chemical weapons are stored, as well as the Federal Assembly, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Green Cross (an NGO).

The Commission is authorised to co-ordinate work with local populations where chemical weapons are stored and to monitor the progress of the chemical demilitarisation program and use of funds allocated to its implementation, and to perform some other important functions.\(^8\)

The idea of creating such an authoritative body (comprising, \textit{inter alia}, representatives of the academic community and concerned NGOs) to improve government decision-making, was long advocated both in Russia (by academics and NGOs) and in countries providing assistance to Russia’s CW destruction effort. For example, one such proposal was elaborated as early as 1998 in the Special supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 1998.\(^9\) In order to provide effective oversight of the Russian chemical demilitarisation program it was proposed to establish a national commission on chemical disarmament, comprised of federal government officials, members of the State Duma, local administrators, business executives and academics. The intention was to increase the transparency of chemical demilitarisation activities and provide an effective counterweight to entrenched bureaucratic interests, to build public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of the CW destruction plan.
It should be noted that the modified Program contains a number of sound provisions in this respect. Thus, it states that activity in the field of chemical disarmament shall be carried out “in a public and open manner”. It stresses the importance of informing the Russian and international public by means of the mass media, public hearings, conferences, seminars, symposia, etc and using other facilities for public access. Such activities, undoubtedly, would make the CWDP more attractive to public opinion and allow non-governmental organisations to track the performance of the CWDP. Transparency would generate greater confidence in the activities of the Munitions Agency, lead to better understanding of its work and improve interaction with NGOs active in the disarmament field. If the Commission’s activities vindicate these expectations and the mechanism for the realisation of the CWDP becomes more transparent it would certainly enhance public confidence in the soundness of governmental planning and implementation of the CW destruction effort.

Regrettably, a trend in the opposite direction is evident. The Federal government decided to make secret a greater part of the defence appropriations in the budget for the year 2002, including the expenditure on the CWDP. This move is strange and even offensive: data, which the government will submit to the OPCW (and other international organisations such as the UN, OSCE), are concealed from the Russian public. Such an attitude on the part of government officials cannot but strengthen the concern of citizens about the issue of chemical demilitarisation (leaving aside other issues, related to transparency in military matters and civil control of defence policy).

Financial requirements

The CWDP is to be financed from the federal budget, gratuitous international aid and extra-budget sources. The extra-budgetary funds include profits anticipated both from the sale of recovered arsenic and the recycling of neutralisation solvents and reagents and operations of former CWPFs converted into facilities for peaceful production activities. The overall program is currently estimated to cost 92.7 billion roubles at 2001 prices (just over $3 billion). Of this amount 90.2 billion roubles are to be allocated to CW destruction, while 2.5 billion—to finance the conversion (or dismantling) of the former CWDFs. That may be an underestimate. It seems that the financial requirements of the Program cannot be evaluated credibly. Costs are inevitably subject to some adjustments, as they depend on many factors, including those of quite unpredictable character, such as foreign financial assistance, vagaries of the budgetary process (probability of its sequestration due to a dramatic fall in oil prices), repayments of
huge foreign debts (the peak of payments is scheduled in 2002 and 2003, $14 billions and $19 billions, accordingly). In addition, the cost of processing operations cannot be predicted with confidence until some operating experience is obtained at the Gorny and Shchuchye demonstration plants. The profits anticipated from sale of recovered arsenic cannot be assumed until some experience has been acquired. The CWDP budget seems to include no estimates for plant closure costs.

International co-operation

In contrast to the original CWDP, its modified 2001 version is more specific and definite on the role of gratuitous assistance provided by foreign countries. The new document clearly proceed from the necessity to significantly increase the amount of foreign assistance in this area and to ease the burden which the extremely expensive CWDP represents for the Russian state budget. The document contains concrete data on directions and volume of international assistance to Russian CW destruction and conversion of former CWDFs as well as on shares of individual donors in funding projects related to CW destruction and demilitarisation of CWPFs. It should be noted that the budgetary expenditure on the CWDP is made dependent on the flow of foreign funds into Russian chemical demilitarisation projects. This approach seems to be justified as the CWDP deals with the inherited CW stockpiles, created by the defunct state.

As of 1 May 2001 the gratuitous foreign financial and technical assistance and support for the Russian projects associated with CW destruction and demilitarisation of CWPFs amounted to about $300 million. Of this sum $260 million were allocated by the USA in the form of services provided by American companies and of supplies of American equipment. So far 12 countries have pledged to provide such assistance on a bilateral basis\(^\text{10}\), while the European Union and the Group of Seven do this within the multilateral framework.

The overall volume of planned (expected) assistance is evaluated as ranging from $750–780 million. Of this amount the USA promised to provide $630–660 million: assistance in the construction of a CWDF at Shchuchye and in the demilitarisation of former chemical weapons production facilities in the cities of Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. This will constitute 82–87% of the total amount of planned foreign assistance. The share of planned foreign financial assistance will be considerable in expenditure for the construction of CWDFs. The construction of the CWDFs is currently estimated to cost 31 781.8 million roubles (just over $1 billion). The expected foreign contributions to the construction of the CWDFs (in particular, for Shchuchye, Gorny and Kambarka) amount to
roughly $700 million. Therefore the success of the CWDP heavily depends on the availability of pledged funds to support the Russian construction effort.

It is a cause of concern that the gratuitous assistance provided by foreign countries is not yet consistent with the magnitude of the tasks which are to be resolved, notwithstanding the political promises made by a number of states parties to the CWC prior to Russia’s ratification of the convention. By the beginning of 2001 the overall amount of international assistance made available to Russia accounted for only 7% of the cost estimates of the CWDP.\textsuperscript{11} The number of the contributing countries remains small. Some assistance proposals are more in the nature of a symbolic political support (which is, of course, of value, too) but they amount only to a fraction of the funds needed for the implementation of the specific construction projects.

The Russian government should seek more active participation of foreign countries in financing CW destruction projects in the RF. Greater co-ordination between Russia and the donor states (current and potential) is needed to ensure sizeable support from the international community and more effective implementation of the assistance programs. Attention should be given to alternative assistance programs. Regrettably, these possibilities are not mentioned in the modified CWDP. For example, Russia should resolutely insist on the annulment of the debts of the former Soviet Union to the states parties to the CWC inherited by the RF with the provision that such debt relief funds are used to finance CW destruction and demilitarisation of chemical weapons production facilities.

It is not yet clear how far the partners of the RF are willing to proceed to increase donor efforts in this field. The responsible officials in Western governments realise that their own security and the interests of international stability are served by helping Russia to eliminate the CW stockpile of the former Soviet Union. No one wants to see poison gas of Soviet origin ending up in the hands of rogue states or non-state actors or unleashed in domestic and regional conflicts. Increased international assistance to Russia in order to boost its efforts to fulfil its obligations under the CWC would strengthen the basis for countering this threat. It is to be hoped that the recognition of the new threats emanating from international terrorism will bring the leaders of Russia and other states parties to the CWC also to co-operate more closely on the issue of eliminating the Soviet CW arsenal.

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Experts claim that the modified CWDP is sufficiently adapted to the changing political and technical circumstances and inspires
confident. Implementation of the modified CWDP would allow Russia to fulfil its obligations under the CWC in a timely manner and enable the international community to get rid of the deadly heritage of the Cold war. However, its performance depends heavily on the availability of outside assistance, that is, on factors beyond Russia’s control. Therefore Russia’s partners bear their share of responsibility for making the future of the CWDP certain.

In his opening statement to the Executive council at its 26th session on 9 September 2001, Mr José Bustani, the Director-General of the OPCW, gave full praise to the new version of the Russian CWDP. “This long, long-awaited program, adopted by the Russian Government earlier this summer—he said—represents a significant milestone for both Russia and the OPCW. It places Russia’s efforts to implement its most vital obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention—the complete destruction of its large chemical weapons arsenal—on a very realistic footing.”12 The international community can draw comfort from the reiteration by Russia of its commitment to promote the cause of real chemical disarmament and resolutely get rid of the CW stockpile. Yet, it is far too soon to declare success. The very fact of the adoption of a realistic CWDP will not guarantee specific performance. The task ahead is going to be tough. All the participants in the Russian chemical disarmament process will have to learn lessons from the experience of the past decade and proceed to a long-term stable partnership manifesting firm political will in addressing in a well-coordinate way complicated problems left over from the 1990s. This would serve the interests both of Russia and of the wider international community and contribute to the solution of the vital tasks, they are facing,—strengthening the global chemical disarmament and non-proliferation regime and enhancing common security and world strategic stability.

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2 Category 1 CW consist of Schedule 1 chemicals, their parts and components. Schedule 1 chemicals are chemicals, which pose a high risk according to the CWC. Lewisite, sulphur and nitrogen mustard and all nerve gas agents are included in Schedule 1. Two toxins, ricin saxitoxin, are also included. The chemical components of binary weapons and nerve gas precursors are among the chemicals in section B.2.

3 The official title of the Convention runs as follows: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

4 In April 2001 the Secretariat of the OPCW verified the completion of destruction of more than 15 000 powder charges at the Leonidovka and Maradykovsky Category 3 CW destruction facilities. The destruction of burster charges and the remaining powder charges was to be completed during the fourth quarter of 2001. Russia is on track to complete the destruction of its entire declared Category 3 CW before 29 April 2002. New or amended plans for the verification of Category 3 CW are before the Executive Council.


8 See note 7.


10 Contributing countries comprise United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland.

11 See note 7.

12 See note 6.
10. THE RUSSIAN INITIATIVE ON BUILDING A JOINT NON-STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN EUROPE

Vladimir BELOUS

US President George Bush noted in his address to the National Defense University, on 1 May 2001, which a number of political experts looked upon as a program, that, in spite of the great changes in the international arena, “this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one”. On this the conclusion was made that “we need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation”1. The contents of this speech leaves no doubt that the USA sees as the main threat to its security the long-range missiles of “rogue states” and has adopted openly the course towards building, in the coming years, a national missile defence (NMD) system.

On 13 December 2001 President Bush announced his decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Russian leadership believes that unilateral actions in the field of security can have a destabilising effect. Moscow’s initiative for building a joint European ballistic missile defence (BMD) system represents an example of different approach.

European security: Russia’s position

Only four months had passed since President Bush’s address when a terrorist attack, unprecedented in cruelty, scale and possible consequences, shook not only America, but the whole of humanity. The USA turned out to be completely unprepared to meet such a threat. It is to be noted, in this connection, that as the technical level of the world community rises, more and more possibilities are created for carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks which can escalate into a kind of terrorist war.

Short-range missiles have proliferated, in the last decade, quite substantially. It is no secret that terrorists, in a number of countries, may get direct access to these missiles and threaten the countries of Europe with missile strikes. At the same time, the building of long-range missiles in those countries which could threaten the USA is, in the opinion of the experts, clearly not realistic. This is due, in the first place, to the fact that to do this, in principle, new extremely complex technologies are needed, requiring a high scientific-technical level which is simply not possible to provide in a short time.
The wide proliferation of short-range missiles can lead, in a number of cases, already today, to their operational use in conflicts between states. Such missiles can represent a danger for a number of European states.

In contrast to the egocentric position of the USA in respect of providing national security, Russia has put forward the concept of wide international co-operation in preventing dangers and threats, including the very same to which the USA points to argue the validity of its plans to build NMD. Wide co-operation of states presupposes a varied selection of concrete measures designed to provide international security and prevent the use of missiles and WMD.

During his visit to Italy, in June 2000, President Putin turned to the countries of Europe with the proposal to build, together with Europe and NATO, a BMD system for Europe\(^2\). In this way, such a BMD system is proposed as means of strengthening strategic stability on the continent and consolidating the security of the countries of Europe.

This initiative at once met with an ambiguous reaction in various countries of the continent. This was conditioned by a number of reasons, in particular, their varying degrees of vulnerability to a missile attack. On the whole, no great enthusiasm was shown on the part of many European countries. At first, the greatest interest in the Russian initiative was shown by France, Germany, and Greece, who are most worried about the state of regional security. Some foreign and also Russian politicians looked upon President Putin’s initiative as an attempt to put forward a political, but, in no way, a military alternative to American plans to build NMD and, in this way, bring about dissentions among the members of NATO. In actual fact, it was an extremely timely and farsighted proposal, directed at warding off a real threat to the security of the countries of Europe.

Russia’s policy in respect of the missile threat was characterised in President Putin’s statement of 13 November 2000. He pointed out that the problems resulting from the proliferation of missiles should be solved, in the first place, by political and diplomatic methods while strictly adhering to international agreements. This means that dialogue and co-operation should be established with all countries possessing missile technology and drawing them into the negotiation process. Further the MTCR systems should be comprehensively improved, a global control system of the proliferation of missiles and missile technology created and a non-strategic European BMD system built.

This proposal was concretely defined and handed to the Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, during his visit to Moscow, in March 2001.
The approaches to the construction of a European BMD system

The Russian proposals on joint construction of a European BMD system are based on a number of principles. Among these the following should be singled out, in the first place:

— the program for building a European BMD system should be based on close co-operation between countries, taking into account their security interests and quite independently of their membership of various international organisations or alliances;
— the concrete embodiment of the co-operation program could include both bilateral and multilateral action;
— co-operation in building a BMD system should be based on a firm juridical foundation in the form of a number of international legal accords;
— co-operation of the countries of Europe in building a European BMD system should not lead to an increase of tension in relations with other countries.

Russia’s approach is based on the fundamental propositions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF which clearly states that “the search for concrete forms of reaction of the international community to various acute situations, including humanitarian crises, should be conducted collectively and based on strict observance of the norms of international law and the UN Charter”.

The Russian proposals envisage, in particular:

— a joint assessment of the scale and nature of the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies and the possible threat arising from this;
— joint work on elaborating a concept of a European BMD system, the order of its development and deployment;
— the setting up of an all-European Warning Centre of missile launches;
— joint command and staff exercises and training, directed at elaborating joint action by various national formations in repulsing a missile attack;
— joint research and development of the ABM components and systems which ensure reliable defence of the countries of Europe against missiles.

In case the decision is taken to construct a European BMD system, these directions of joint action will clearly be considerably widened.
Joint study of the nature and scale of possible missile threats

As has already been pointed out, a key element in determining the subsequent stages and directions of the work on constructing a European BMD system is the objective assessment of the nature and scale of missile proliferation in the regions directly adjoining the European continent and the reality of their use against European countries. It is at this stage that the existence of a threat of non-strategic missile strikes against this or that country should be determined and of the emergence of such threats in the foreseeable future, including the possible seizure of missiles by terrorists.

To solve this basic task, it is necessary to organise, during the first stage, a wide exchange of views, with the participation of Russian and European experts as well as representatives of the secret services, in the course of which the true scale of the missile threat, emanating from potentially dangerous regions, should be comprehensively discussed and defined. It is very important, in this connection to pay attention to the factors which may motivate certain countries to acquire missiles, perfect them and build up arsenals. It is necessary to constantly follow the changes in the combat capabilities and tactical-technical characteristics of non-strategic missiles, their location, the dynamics in the quantitative and qualitative build up of the missile arsenals and the probability of new possessors appearing. On this basis it will be possible to quickly determine the zones from which the missiles of potential opponents may reach the territory of various European countries.

A very important element, at this stage, is defining the possibility of joint use of political-diplomatic and military-technical methods of countering the missile threat as well as studying the military-political consequences of building a European non-strategic BMD system.

The elaboration of the concept of a European non-strategic BMD system

The existence of a real threat of missile strikes on the countries of Europe by third countries or terrorist organisations should incite the European states to elaborate the concept of a European BMD system. When doing this, an answer should be given to fundamental questions in respect of the basic tasks, composition, structure and specific features of a functioning missile defence system. It is necessary to determine against which strikes the future BMD system is to provide protection and on what basic principles its architecture should be built. This makes it possible to determine the necessary information- and combat assets of the defence system, the number of interception ranges, the composition of the system,
the principles of coordination of its elements and the possible algorithm of its functioning.

As basic data for the elaboration of a concept of BMD would serve a clear definition of the most probable regions and directions from which a missile strike is to be expected as well as the main parameters of the missiles. Taking into account the considerable size of the European continent and the inevitably high cost of a BMD system, the most acceptable variant, in accordance with the universal criteria—“effectiveness–cost–feasibility”—is a defence system based on mobile ground-, sea- and, later possibly, air-based anti-missiles complexes. These complexes, in case a real threat arises, can be quickly moved to directions from which a missile attack is to be feared to protect peace-keeping formations of the armed forces, the civilian population and the most important facilities. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that AA-missile complexes of a non-strategic European BMD system will be the most effective weapon, not only against missiles, but also aerodynamic targets - aircraft and cruise missiles - which may be used, both by the armed forces of certain states and by terrorist organisations.

It is clear that, bearing in mind, the particularities of the geographical position of different European countries, the hypothetical threat to them will not be of the same magnitude. The most exposed to such a threat will be the countries situated on the Southern and South-Eastern flanks of the European continent.

An extremely important task is to provide the anti-missile complexes with the capability of destroying the attacking missiles in the boost phase, where they are most vulnerable. A number of military experts maintain that no anti-missile system will be very effective if it cannot intercept missiles in this phase. There are a number of reasons for this. The radiation of the plume of the motors makes it possible to detect with great reliability the launched missile and aim the interceptor missiles at it; in one blow the attacking missile and the warheads and devices for countering missile defence with which it is equipped are destroyed; the large size of the missile body, which does not possess much mechanical solidity, makes it very vulnerable to destructive assets. In contrast, the small-sized warheads, which have to be destroyed, after their separation from the missile, possess quite considerable mechanical and thermal solidity which renders their destruction much more difficult.

It is necessary to set up an all-European Warning Centre of missile launches. This would make it possible to constantly follow the carrying out of missile tests, in various countries, evaluate the combat capabilities of missiles, the deployment areas of mobile and fixed launchers as well as determine the characteristics of the missiles and warheads on their flight path within radar, infrared and optic range. This
makes their timely identification possible in case they are used for combat purposes.

**Joint command and staff exercises**

Joint command and staff exercises and training are intended to organise and work out joint action of the command and control bodies in order to repulse a missile attack of a potential aggressor. In the first stages, particular attention should be paid to modelling various combat situations, which may arise in the course of repulsing a missile attack, the elaboration of a programmed, mathematical apparatus to coordinate the activities of different forces and assets when conducting combat operations. For this purpose extremely complex simulating models should be developed with the aid of a basic programmed packet, which contains a description of the possible threat, the specific features of the combat control system and the activities of the control centre of combat operations. The program for a fully automatic control system will prove particularly complex since, in the opinion of experts, it will amount to a few hundred thousand lines of programmed code. This will require a large number of highly qualified programmists to work out.

Russian–American command and staff exercises in non-strategic BMD were started in 1996. In the course of these exercises, the procedure was perfected which determines the order in which joint combat operations of the AA and BMD formations of the two countries for the protection of the civilian population and facilities of third countries are to be conducted in the course of peace-keeping operations. Such exercises with the conditional participation of tactical anti-missile systems were held in Moscow, Colorado and Texas.

The Russian side has expressed its readiness to broaden the program of these exercises by drawing in a wide circle of participants from European countries. It is supposed that, both in the course of command and staff exercises and in the process of combat operations, the European BMD formations will bear an international character, using, to begin with, military assets which are part of the armament of the armies of European countries, at the present time. These formations will have to meet a number of common requirements: a high degree of operational readiness, mobility and controllability. In the course of the exercises, the operational readiness of the anti-missile complexes, which are to be rapidly redeployed in any area of Europe on the territory of the member states participating in the BMD system in the direction which is deemed to present a missile threat, should be tested.

When conducting the exercises, particular attention should be paid to organising co-operation of heterogeneous forces in the European
BMD system, the creation of a operational command centre which ensures the optimal use of all the forces and assets at its disposal. When conducting combat operations, this command centre will bear a supra-national character and ensure the control of all the components of the European BMD system.

**Co-operation in research and development of BMD assets**

The creation of a European non-strategic BMD system will require R&D and the development of different elements of the defence system. The great scientific-technical potential of Russia, the USA and a number of European countries makes it possible to lay the foundations, already today, of a non-strategic BMD system, capable of repulsing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The constant development and perfection of missiles, however, places ever greater demands on anti-missile complexes and their components. To solve this problem, it is necessary to know the principal parameters of the missiles which have to be countered: the flight range, maximum speed, the curve of the trajectory, the presence on board of devices countering missile defence.

In the task of repulsing missiles a large role is assigned to the creation of an early-warning system, particularly in view of the relatively short (compared to ICBMs) flight time of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. In the beginning, the provision of information for the non-strategic BMD system will be based on already existing ground-based radar stations of the AA/BMD systems of Russia and a number of European countries as well as on special radio-technical complexes capable of detecting and tracking non-strategic missiles in flight. Later on, it would be expedient to unite the efforts of specialists from different countries to develop special information devices of greater reliability and efficiency. Simultaneously, work has to be done, at expert level, on the creation of a space-based information/intelligence system to control missile launches and track their flight path. This will make it possible to significantly increase the effectiveness of the entire defence system. Here, Russia, too, will play a leading role, as its intelligence satellites and missile-delivery vehicles may serve as the basis for the rapid creation of a detection and tracking system.

Using both national and supra-national intelligence assets, it may be expedient to consider the setting up of a specialised centre to process information on missile launches. The main task of this centre would be to function for the benefit of the European BMD system as well as to study suddenly arising, unclear situations, connected with missile launches. Use could be made, in this connection, of work, previously carried out in the course of the implementation of the Russian–American project to create in
Moscow a Centre for the exchange of information, obtained from the warning system of missile attacks.

Consistent implementation of the above conditions could make it possible to start defining the possible procedure and sequence for the formation of units and the building of facilities of a non-strategic BMD system, its scale and concrete time tables of its deployment. In the course of the final stage of the building of a BMD, it will be necessary to perfect and test its components on Russian test-ranges, which possess unique possibilities not equalled by any other European country.

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Terrorist attacks on the USA, in September 2001, will, undoubtedly, seriously influence the attitude of the European countries towards the need to ensure their security and build an effective, non-strategic BMD system.

At the same time, account should be taken of the fact that the different geographical positions of the countries of Europe determine their different interest in a European BMD system. There can be little doubt that one of the decisive conditions for building a European defence system will be the attitude of NATO.

At present, non-strategic anti-missile complexes have already been developed and some are already in service in certain countries, in the first place, Russia and the USA. Thus, for instance the AA-missile system S-300 PMU-1 was already developed in Soviet times and, later, its modernised version the S-300 PMU-2 “Favourite”, which do not have their equal in the world in respect of their combat and exploitation characteristics. Tests on the fourth generation AA-missile complex “Triumph” are almost completed. A new unified missile, the 9M96E, has been built which will form the main destructive asset for a whole family of S-300 PMU complexes. “Triumph” ensures the destruction of attacking, air-based targets, including intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. To counter aerodynamic targets, a whole range of army AA-missile complexes of the “Buk”, “Tor”, “Osa” and other types are in service.

In the USA, too, a number of complexes have been built to counter aerodynamic and ballistic targets. To these belong the ground-based, anti-missile complex for interception beyond the atmosphere THAAD, “Aegis”—a sea-based interceptor-missile complex, a Navy Area Defense (NAD) complex, the perfected close-interception complex “Patriot”, PAK-3, the AA-missile complex “Hawk” of the Marine Corps and the American–Israeli “Arrow-2” AA-missile complex. Serious work
has also been done on non-strategic BMD in a number of European countries.

On the whole, there are grounds for conclusion that, at the present time, objective possibilities exist to start work on building a European BMD system. At the present stage, its creation is determined by two fundamental factors: the existence of a real threat of missile strikes against the countries of Europe and the taking of a political decision by the European governments to respond to this threat.

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3 See text of the RF Foreign Policy Concept in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 July 2000.
4 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 June 2000.

Vadim VLADIMIROV

The presentation of this book took place, on 22 may 2001, at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS) under the chairmanship of the Director of the Institute, Academician Nodari Simonia and the Director of the Stockholm International Institute for Peace Research, Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld. More than 180 guests attended, among them: scientific researchers of institutes of the RAS and other research centres, both civil and military, senior officials of a number of government departments, the defence-industry, activists of non-governmental organisations and foundations, anti-militarist, human-rights, and ecological movements, diplomats from a number of Embassies and representatives of the mass media. The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Sweden in the Russian Federation, Sven Hirdman, was also present.

Dr. A.D. Rotfeld, addressed guests on the theme “In search for new approaches to global security”.

Academician N. Simonia, presenting the Russian edition of the SIPRI 2000 Yearbook, noted that this book is the result of many years of fruitful co-operation between the SIPRI, the IMEMO and all those colleagues from other scientific bodies in Moscow, who took part in this project. N. Simonia stressed that the Russian edition of the Yearbook has become a source, which is frequently used by scientists, legislators, politicians, journalists, teachers and students, who are studying the problems of disarmament and security. This publication is of particular importance to the CIS countries because most of the specialists in those countries turn by preference to this publication.

In the view of the Deputy Director of the IMEMO, Vladimir Baranovsky, Russian themes are more fully represented in the Russian edition of the SIPRI 2000 Yearbook than in previous editions of this yearbook. Whatever questions are considered in this edition—global security, conflicts, European development, questions connected with military spending, the arms trade, nuclear and other weapons, confidence- and security-building measures—everywhere, in one way or another, the Russian aspects of the subject are present. That is why, the Yearbook is of double interest to the Russian readers.

For several years already the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook includes a Special supplement which is prepared by the
IMEMO Centre for international security, headed by Alexei Arbatov, with the participation of representatives of other Russian scientific research centres. This makes it possible to focus the attention of the readers on problems which are of special importance to Russia and, at the same time, more fully present the Russian view on the subjects with which the SIPRI is concerned. Those readers, however, who do not know Russian could not acquaint themselves with this material. In 2000 an additional project was completed: the first publication of *Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security* in the English language, was prepared in which supplements to the editions of the SIPRI Yearbooks for 1997–2000 by Russian authors were collected. Those who are used to reading the SIPRI Yearbook in English will have the possibility of acquainting themselves with the corresponding material originating in Russia.

As a result the intellectual exchange between experts, concerned with the problems of international security, acquires a two-way character. The edition of the SIPRI Yearbook in the Russian language provides our professional community and a wide circle of interested readers in Russia access to the results of the analyses of independent foreign researchers. Not less important, however, for the English-speaking readers is to have the possibility of acquainting themselves with the opinions of Russian experts on international security, both in a wider sense and in specific aspects.

The implementation of a project of this size and complexity, as V. Baranovsky stressed, required the efforts of a large team of scientific and publishing experts. Their work deserves high praise. Gratitude was expressed to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and its Director, Dr. Theodor Winkler, for the contribution to the joint IMEMO and SIPRI project.

Noting the qualities of the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, guests at the presentation offered comments and suggestions to improve it. In particular, the Deputy Director of the Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, Vassily Krivokhizha, calling the SIPRI Yearbook a chronicle of contemporary history of international relations and a bedside book for politicians and experts, recommended to take account, in a greater measure, of the dominating tendencies in the field of disarmament and security. The edition would, in his opinion, gain if, when examining a number of key-problems, not just one, but at least two points of view were reflected.

The Director of the Centre for disarmament of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mikhail Shelepin, called the new publication an encyclopaedia of arms control. He especially noted the importance of the publication of documents on disarmament questions as well as of material contributing to openness in the sphere of military
spending, the arms trade and arms control. At the same time, M. Shelepin expressed surprise that, in the last two editions of the Yearbook, the section on nuclear-free zones has been omitted. This problem remains very actual, in his view, especially in the light of the need to create new nuclear-free zones, in particular, in Central Asia. He, further, expressed regret at the absence, in the Special supplement of the IMEMO to the Russian edition, of material on the problem of conventional weapons.

Yuri Batenko, from the Scientific-Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence, joined in the praise of the new publication. At the same time, he made a number of comments and expressed the desire that more attention should be paid to methodological questions in the chapters dealing with economic problems. He also suggested that the Yearbook should include a section on military activity in space, since this theme is becoming more and more actual with the growing militarization of space. It would also be appropriate, in his view, to give a more detailed explanation in the Yearbook of the peaceful initiatives put forward by governments and non-governmental organisations in the course of the year.

Alexander Kovalenko, professor at the Military-Financial University, developed the thought that the Yearbook should devote more attention to the evaluation of the effectiveness of armaments as well as problems connected with the formation of armed forces.

The guests at the presentation expressed their deep gratitude to the Director of the SIPRI, A.D. Rotfeld, who, in the last ten years, has made an outstanding contribution to strengthening the cooperation between the SIPRI and the IMEMO.

The publication of the Russian version of the SIPRI Yearbook 2000 also met with favorable comments in the mass media. In particular Pyotr Titov noted in his review in the “Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye” (no. 21, 2001) “The issues of the SIPRI Yearbook have already become traditional. All the editions, including the latest, are important sources of information in the Russian language both for specialists and the wide public. They help to find one’s way in the complex military processes which are going on in the world.”
ANNEXE. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL (OCTOBER 2000–2001)

Alla KOZLOVA and Tamara FARNASOVA

I. Legislative acts of the Russian Federation

Passed by the SD on 11 October 2000, approved by the FC on 25 October 2000 and signed by the President of the RF on 1 January 2000.
The law defines the legal basis of the social protection of citizens working with chemical weapons, on contract, of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the RF and officials of agencies of the Ministry of the Interior, employed on work with chemical weapons as well as of citizens having contracted professional diseases as a result of being thus employed.

Passed by the SD on 27 October 2000, approved by the FC on 24 November 2000 and signed by the President of the RF on 6 December 2000.

Passed by the SD on 22 December 2000, approved by the FC on 31 January 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 12 February 2001.

Passed by the SD on 22 December 2000, approved by the CF on 31 January 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 13 February 2001. This Law ratifies the above-mentioned international Convention signed in the name of the RF in the city of New York, on 12 January 1998.

Passed by the SD on 21 February 2001, approved by the FC on 14 March 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 24 March 2001. This Law ratifies the above-mentioned Treaty, signed in Moscow on 16 April 1999.
Federal Law no.30-FL “On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan on further strengthening comprehensive co-operation in military and military-technical spheres”

Passed by the SD on 21 February 2001, approved by the FC on 14 March 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 24 March 2001. This Law ratifies the above mentioned Treaty, signed on 11 March 1999.


Passed by the SD on 21 March 2001, approved by the FC on 4 April 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 16 April 2001. This Law ratifies the above-mentioned Convention, signed in New York on 26 September 1995.

Federal Law no.57-FL “On the Ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies”

Passed by the SD on 18 April 2001, approved by the FC on 16 May 2001 and signed by the President of the RF on 26 May 2001. This Law ratifies the Treaty on open skies, signed in the city of Helsinki on 24 March 1992.


Passed by the SD on 4 July 2001, approved by the FC on 20 July 2001 and signed by the President on 7 August 2001.

II. Draft legislation

The Draft Federal Law “On the introduction of changes in article 24 of the Federal Law “On military duty and military service”

Passed by the SD on 5 April 2001, voted down by the FC 15 April 2001. A conciliation commission of the SD and FC has been set up to prepare a joint text of the draft law.

The Federal Law “On military duty and military service” did not envisage deferment of the call-up of citizens, who for one reason or another, on reaching the age of 18 years, continue to attend secondary school, although such deferment exists for pupils attending secondary, professional, educational institutions. The new law will give schoolboys the possibility of enjoying deferment until they reach the age of 20 years.

The Draft Federal Law “On the introduction of changes and additions to article 12 of the Federal Law “On the status of military personnel”

Passed by the SD on 19 April 2001, approved by the FC on 16 May 2001, but turned down by the President of the RF on 31 May 2001.

The Draft Law proposes to introduce a new procedure for computing the pay of military personnel in order to bring it up to a level which will not be lower than the salaries of state employees as well as excluding, in the future, the
possibility of any substantial disparity between the material provision of military personnel and that of state employees.

The President of the RF, turning down the Draft Law, submitted to the SD his variant of increasing the pay of military personnel by the adoption of another Draft Law “On the introduction of changes in certain enactment of the Russian Federation on questions of pay of military personnel and the granting to them of individual benefits”.

The Draft Constitutional Law “On martial law”
Passed by the SD on first reading, on 19 April 2001. Two alternative Draft Federal Constitutional Laws “On martial law” were submitted to the SD: one introduced by the President of the RF and one by the deputies of the SD, E. Vorobyov, V. Pokhmelkin and S. Yushenkov. The version submitted by the President was juridically better drafted and this is why the authors of the second version withdrew their Draft Law

The Draft Federal Law “On introducing changes in the Federal Law “On the destruction of chemical weapons” (in the part relating to the specification of localities for the destruction of chemical weapons)”
Passed by the SD, on first reading, on 25 April 2001 and on second reading, on 13 July 2001. In the Draft Law the following wording of article 2 Part IV of the Federal Law “On the destruction of chemical weapons” is proposed: “The destruction of chemical weapons is carried out in facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons which, as a rule, are located on the territories of subjects of the Russian Federation and where storage facilities for chemical weapons are situated”, i.e. it is a question, here, of introducing the three words “as a rule”. This will make it possible to take other decisions on locations where chemical weapons may be destroyed.

The need to adopt this law is connected with Russia’s obligation to completely destroy, in the course of ten years, its stocks of chemical weapons, with a possible five-year prolongation of the term for destruction. This requires the construction of a number of new facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons within the time limits set, together with their social infrastructure and safe conditions for storage. In view of the lack of sufficient budget appropriations for this purpose, it appears not very likely that this will be achieved, in the coming years. That is why, it is considered expedient to destroy chemical weapons, not only at their storage sites, but in other territories where ready facilities already exist.

The Draft Federal Law “On the legal position and financial-economic activities of military organisations”
Passed by the SD, on second reading, on 26 December 2001. The Draft Law was drafted by the Defence Committee of the SD.

The aim of the Draft Law is to create a legislative basis which defines the legal status of military organisations as juridical persons and regulates relations in the course of financial-economic activities by military organisations, taking into account their specific nature.
The Draft Federal Law “On introducing changes and additions in

The Draft Law is at the stage of elaboration. In the present wording of
the Law “On state secrets” all information on expenditure under the section
“National Defence”, including the total expenditure under this section, is subject
to classification. This state of affairs, when up to 30% of all expenditure is
classified, puts obstacles in the way of the yearly drafting of the Federal budget.
When it is debated on third reading and the expenditure is distributed over the
sub-sections, target items and forms of expenditure, it is often impossible to
determine the expediency of adopting this or that amendment, both on the
sections “National Defence” and “Law-enforcement activities and provision of
the security of the state” and on other sections of the Federal budget. Apart from
this, the practical work of the Commission of the State Duma on the examination
of classified items of the Federal budget shows that its decisions are taken in
camera, without voting, and the work of the Commission is not examined at
plenary sessions of the SD.

The Draft Law proposes that all sub-sections, target items and forms of
expenditure, connected with the pay of military personnel, the salaries of civilian
personnel, subsistence allowances of personnel, combat readiness and material-
technical provision of the troops, departmental expenditure on education and
health care, which are defined by the Federal Law “On the budget classification
of the Russian Federation”, be open to public scrutiny.

The Government of the Russian Federation, in its official comment on
the Draft Federal Law “On the introduction of changes and additions in the Law
of the Russian Federation “On state secrets”, took a negative view of the Draft
Law. It bases its conclusion on the fact that the open presentation of information
on the Federal budget may lead to the divulgence of information on the strength
and condition of the troops, their combat provision and other measures.

The Draft Federal Law “On alternative civilian service”

Alternative civilian service is envisaged by the Constitution of the RF
(art. 59 p. 3), adopted in 1993. Up to now, however, no corresponding law has
been enacted and this leads to violation of citizens’ rights, as laid down in the
Constitution. The Draft Law “On alternative civilian service” was passed, on first
reading, in 1994 and fully corresponds to the spirit of the democratic reforms in
Russia. Subsequently, however, this Draft Law was withdrawn from examination.
As a result, there are, at present, two Draft Laws extant in the SD. One was
drafted and submitted by a group, in the work of which the deputy of the
“Yabloko” fraction in the second convocation of the State Duma, V. Borshchev,
took an active part. The Second Draft Law was drafted by deputies of the
“Yedinstvo” (Unity) fraction and the “Narodny deputat” (People’s deputy)
fraction. On a number of points these two drafts completely contradict each other.
This will require lengthy consultation.

The Draft Federal Law “On the status of participants in combat
operations”

In spite of the existence of a number of Federal laws, defining the status
of combatants and veterans of the Great Patriotic War, other wars and military
actions, waged by the USSR and the RF (such as “On veterans”, “On the status of military personnel”, “On defence”, “On an emergency situation”, “On military duty and military service”, “On the pension provision of persons having served in the Armed Forces and their families”, “On additional guarantees and compensations for military personnel having served on the territories of the Transcaucasian states, the Baltic states and the Republic of Tajikistan, as well as those accomplishing missions in the defence of the constitutional rights of citizens in conditions of an emergency situation and armed conflicts” a.o.) Many combatants in such military operations as, for instance, the current, antiterrorist operations in the Republic of Chechnya, receive additional benefits and payments in accordance with decrees of the President of the RF and ordinances of the Government of the RF. The fact that the antiterrorist operation in the Republic of Chechnya lacks, at present, a sufficiently clear juridical definition may lead, in the future, to arbitrariness in respect of the combatants in this operation.

The submitted Draft Law (the working group which drafted it was headed by the Deputy A. Arbatov) is directed at regulating the status of combatants in military operations, including such operations as are, at present, being conducted in the Republic of Chechnya, by a general, federal law in accordance with which the state assumes certain material and moral obligations in respect of combatants in military operations.

The existence of such a law, apart from everything else, ensures that the Executive authorities, when embarking on this or that military operation, bear full responsibility for expenditure connected with providing combatants in military operations and their families with corresponding material benefits for the risks and loss of health.

The Government of the RF commented adversely on this draft law, basing itself on the fact that many provisions in this law are already reflected in enactment and other regulations, at present, in force in the RF and that to adopt it in its proposed wording would lead to duplication. Apart from this, the adoption of this law would, in the view of the Government, considerably extend the circle of persons eligible for benefits and this would require additional funding.


The draft law envisages extending the list of departmental expenditure of the Ministry of Defence of the RF, not only with reference to the Ministry, as a whole, but also with reference to the service arms and independent military corps: the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Land Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Parachute troops and the Space Forces. This makes it possible to extend considerably the list of departmental expenditure. This will require a more professional approach to the process of confirming the Federal budget and of control over its implementation, both on the part of the Federal Assembly of the RF and the public. The authors of the draft law have not changed the structure and headings of the sections, subsections, target items and forms of expenditure, as compared with the Federal Law “On budget classification of the Russian Federation”, at present in force.
III. Normative acts of the Executive Authorities. Presidential decrees and orders

Ordinance no.779 of the Government of the RF of 12 October 2000 “On confirmation of the regulation on the accounting for and use of funds, received by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for rendering services, on a contractual basis, in training military personnel in the interest of foreign states, from military-technical co-operation and as a result of activities, permitted by the laws of the Russian Federation”

This ordinance confirms the above-mentioned regulation.


This ordinance approves the above-mentioned Agreement and submits it to the SD for ratification.


This ordinance accepts the proposal of the Ministry of Defence of the RF, concerted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, to sign the above-mentioned documents. The Ministry of the Defence, with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been instructed to conduct negotiations with the Kyrgyz side and, on reaching agreement, to sign, in the name of the RF, the above-mentioned protocols.

Ordinance no.836 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 30 October 2000 “On signing the Agreement on co-operation between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States in combating the illegal trade in narcotic and psychotropic substances and their precursors”

The Government of the RF decided to approve the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement, submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF in consultation with the Federal Executive authorities concerned.
Decree no.1834 of the President of the Russian Federation of 4 November 2000 “On the creation of the unitary, federal, state enterprise “Rosoboronexport”

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the military-technical co-operation between the Russian Federation and foreign states, the present Decree orders: 1) to set up the unitary, federal, state enterprise “Rosoboronexport” by merging the unitary enterprises “the state company Rosvoornzheniye” and “Promeexport”; 2) the unitary federal, state enterprise “Rosoboronexport”, founded with the right to engage in economic activities, to be appointed as intermediary for the export (import) of production for military purposes; 3) the Ministry of Defence to be charged with the functions, formerly discharged by the Ministry for Industry, Science and Technology, of regulating military-technical co-operation with foreign states; 4) the Government to be charged with ensuring, within a period of 3 months, the transfer to the enterprise “Rosoboronexport” of the state property, formerly assigned to the reorganised enterprises and to bring its enactment in conformity with this Decree.

Ordinance no.1603 of the President of the Russian Federation of 17 November 2000

The present ordinance approves the proposal of the Russian Munitions Agency, concerted with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance of the RF, on conducting negotiations on signing amendments to the Agreement of 30 July 1992 between the Presidential Committee on Convention problems connected with chemical and biological weapons and the Ministry of Defence of the USA in respect of the safe, reliable and ecologically harmless destruction of chemical weapons.

Ordinance no.1627 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 17 November 2000 “On the division of responsibilities between the Federal Executive authorities, participating in the implementation of international treaties in the sphere of chemical disarmament”

The present ordinance approves the proposal of the Russian Munitions Agency, concerted with the Federal Executive authorities concerned, on the coordination of the activities of the Federal Executive authorities participating in the implementation of international treaties in the sphere of chemical disarmament. The division of responsibilities between them is confirmed (list attached). It is ordered that the funding of measures, connected with the implementation of this ordinance, is to be provided for by the appropriations in the Federal budget for the maintenance of the Federal Executive authorities and by the appropriations for the Federal program “The destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons in the RF”.


This ordinance confirms the attached plan for measures in respect of the implementation of the Program of the member states of the CIS in the flight
against international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism, for the period up to year 2003.


This ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement, submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF and concerted with the Russian Space Agency and other Federal Executive authorities concerned and the Italian side.

**Ordinance no.983 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 21 December 2000 “On the provision of a military formation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to be dispatched to Sierra-Leone for participation in UN peacekeeping operations”**

This ordinance charges the Ministry of Defence of the RF to resolve, in concert with the UN Secretariat, the corresponding organisational questions connected with the dispatch and participation of a Russian military formation as well as with the reimbursement, by the UN, of the expenditure of the Russian Federation incurred for these purposes. The ordinance defines the procedure of material and financial provision for the personnel of the Russian military formation.

**Decree no.8 of the President of the Russian Federation of 6 January 2001 “On confirmation of the Charter of unitary, federal, state enterprise “Rosoboronexport”**

The present decree confirms the Charter of the military federal, state enterprise “Rosoboronexport”.


In order to carry out the work in the sphere of chemical disarmament, the present Ordinance confirms the attached Regulation on the above-mentioned Federal Directorate. The regulation lays down that the funding of this body will be provided for from the appropriations in the Federal budget for financing the activities of the Russian Munitions Agency.

**Ordinance no.245 of Government of the Russian Federation of 20 February 2001**

In accordance with the present ordinance, the Ministry for Atomic Energy and other Federal Executive authorities are instructed to work out and submit, in accordance with established procedure, in the first half of 2001, to the Government of the RF a draft program “The international thermonuclear reactor ITER” for 2002-2005. The Ministry for Atomic Energy has been designated as the customer of this program.

The ordinance confirms the text of the above-mentioned Note. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is instructed to send the Note to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is acting in the name and on the instruction of the European Union, to promote the implementation of a project to build a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in Gorny (Saratov region).


The present Decree defines the extend and nature of the measures to implement the above-mentioned resolution of the UN Security Council. In accordance with the decree, all state institutions, industrial, trade, financial, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks, organisations or other juridical and physical persons, within the jurisdiction of the RF, are forbidden, in particular, to: 1) deliver, directly or indirectly, sell and transfer to the territory of Afghanistan, controlled by the “Taliban” movement, from the territory of the RF, by ship or aircraft under the Russian flag, goods for military use, dual-purpose goods and technology as well as spare parts, aggregates and accessories of the above-mentioned goods, as laid down by the Committee of the UN Security Council, established in accordance with Resolution 1267 of the UN Security Council of 15 October 1999 (hereinafter named the Committee); 2) directly or indirectly sell and provide the territory of Afghanistan, under control of the “Taliban” movement, technical consulting services and assistance to armed personnel, under control of the “Taliban” movement, or the organisation of their training in military activities, as laid down by the Committee.


The ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement. The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF is charged with conducting negotiations with the Romanian side and, on reaching agreement, signing the above-mentioned Agreement.


The ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulation.

Ordinance no.204 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 19 March 2001 “On a competent state agency for ensuring nuclear and
radiation safety in the transport of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and articles manufactured with them”

The present ordinance confirms the submitted Regulation on the above-mentioned, competent agency. It points out that the functions of this agency in organising co-operation in this sphere between the Federal Executive authorities, the Executive authorities of the subjects of the RF, the local self-government authorities concerned, the Russian Academy of Sciences and other organisations are invested in the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF.


The Ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned Protocol, submitted by the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF, concerted with other Federal Executive authorities concerned, the German and French sides and worked out, together with the Belgium side. The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF is charged with conducting negotiations with the Belgian side and, on reaching agreement, sign the Protocol in the name of the Government of the RF.

Ordinance no.207 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 19 March 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulation on licensing activities in the sphere of armaments and military equipment”

The ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulation.

Ordinance no. 215 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 21 March 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulation on licensing activities connected with the utilisation of munitions”

The ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulation.

Decree no.412 of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 April 2001 “On the introduction of additions to the List of dual-purpose of goods and technologies, the export of which is controlled, confirmed by Decree no.1268 of the President of the Russian Federation of 26 August 1996 “On the control of exports from the Russian Federation of dual-purpose goods and technologies”

In accordance with the present decree, the above-mentioned List is supplemented by section 4 “Goods and technologies to be controlled for considerations of national security, in accordance with the Supplement to this Decree”.

The ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement, submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF and the Russian Space Agency and concerted with the Federal Executive authorities concerned and the Australian Government. The Russian Space Agency is charged with signing it in the name of the Government of the RF.

Ordinance no.296 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 16 April 2001 “On the implementation of control of the foreign trade activities related to equipment, materials and technologies which can be used in the manufacture of missile weapons”

In accordance with the Federal Law “On export control”, the present ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulation.


The ordinance confirms the submitted text of the above-mentioned Note in accordance with the Agreement of 22 October 1993 between the Presidential Committee on Convention problems, connected with chemical and biological weapons, and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on co-operation in the safe destruction of chemical weapons while complying with the measures for the protection against pollution of the environment.

Ordinance no.356 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 10 May 2001 “On funding the measures connected with international inspection to verify compliance with the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stocking and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction”

The present ordinance lays down, in particular, that: 1) the funding of expenditure on the reception of inspectors, observers and members of the crew of foreign aircraft, arriving on the territory of the RF for the purpose of verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as of persons accompanying them and their interpreters is effected in accordance with the norms confirmed by ordinance no.187 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 15 March 2001; 2) The funding of the expenditure, mentioned in point 1 of the present ordinance, as well as reimbursement of the expenditure of the OPCW in foreign currency, on inspections, carried out on the territory of the RF, is effected from appropriations in the Federal budget, allocated to the Russian Munitions Agency for the utilisation and destruction of weapons, including implementation of international treaties.

Russian Federation and the European Atomic Energy Community on co-operation in the sphere of nuclear safety”

The ordinance approves the attached draft of the above-mentioned Agreement. The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Inspection for nuclear and radiation safety, are charged with conducting negotiations with the Commission of the European Communities and, on reaching agreement, signing the above-mentioned Agreement in the name of the Government of the RF.

Decree no.581 of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 May 2001 “On prolongation of the term of participation of Russian Federation in the international presence in Kosovo, the Union Republic of Yugoslavia”

In accordance with the present Decree, the term of participation of troop formations of the Russian Armed Forces of a total strength of 3400 men with their established armament, military equipment and other material assets, in the international presence in Kosovo is prolonged till 10 June 2001. The Russian troop contingent is charged with carrying out tasks in the zones of its responsibility in accordance with Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council of 10 June 1999.


The ordinance approves and submits for ratification to the SD the above-mentioned Agreement, signed in Moscow on 29 August 2000 and in Washington on 1 September 2000.


The present directive approves the draft of the above-mentioned Protocol, submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of the RF and concerted with the other Federal Executive authorities concerned.


The ordinance approves and presents to the Government of the Russian Federation for submission for ratification to the SD of the above-mentioned Agreement, signed in Moscow on 20 June 2000.

The present ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned agreement. The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the RF, is charged in participation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, with conducting negotiation with the Commission of European Communities and on reaching agreement, signing it in the name of the Government of the RF.


In connection with the expiry date of the above-mentioned resolution of the UN Security Council, the present Decree instructs all government institutions, industrial, trade, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks, organisations, other juridical and physical persons, within the jurisdiction of the RF: 1) to proceed, in their activities, from the fact that the term of the embargo on delivery of weapons to Eritrea and Ethiopia expired on 16 May 2001.

Ordinance no.441 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 June 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulation on the funding of expenditure, connected with the assistance given by the Russian Federation to other states in the implementation of international, humanitarian, mine-clearing programs, projects and operations, on keeping accounts of this expenditure and accounting for it and on reimbursing the Federal budget the moneys, received by Russia in compensation for the above-mentioned expenditure”

The Ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulation.

Ordinance no.447 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 June 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulation on implementing control of foreign trade activities in respect of dual-purpose goods and technologies, which can be used in the manufacture of weapons and military equipment”

The ordinance of the Government of the RF confirms the above-mentioned Regulation, elaborated in order to protect the national interests of Russia and to ensure the implementation by Russia of its international obligations, assumed in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Ordinance no.462 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 June 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulation on the implementation of control of foreign trade activities in respect of dual-purpose equipment, material and corresponding technologies used for nuclear purposes”

In accordance with the Federal law “On export control”, the present ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulations.

In order to perfect the mechanism for the control of foreign trade activities in respect of goods, information, work, services and the results of intellectual activities, which may be used in the manufacture of WMD, their means of delivery, other types of weapons and military equipment (further named goods and technologies) and in accordance with the Federal Law “On export control”, the present ordinance lays down that independent identification expertise is carried out by the corresponding organisations, having received, in accordance with the established procedure, special permission to carry out such activity in respect of the above-mentioned goods and technologies for the purpose of export control. It is stressed in the Ordinance that the decision to classify goods and technologies as destined for military purposes and the issuing of corresponding conclusions is taken by the Ministry of Defence of the RF, in accordance with the procedure established by that Ministry. The Ordinance confirms the rules for receiving special permission for carrying out independent, identification expertise of goods and technologies by Russian organisations.

Ordinance no.509 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 July 2001 “On approval and submission to the President of the Russian Federation of the proposal to sign the Protocol to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on safe and secure transportation, storage and disposal of weapons and the prevention of weapon proliferation”

The present ordinance approves the above-mentioned proposal and the draft Protocol to the above-mentioned Agreement, which has been jointly elaborated with the American side.


In view of the creation of a unified military trade system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Ministry for Property, together with the Ministry for Economic Development and the Ministry of Defence of the RF, are instructed to take legal action, according the established procedure, in connection with the liquidation of unitary, state enterprises, engaged in military trade and based on the right to carry out economic activities, and to submit a list of such enterprises.

Decree no.828 of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 July 2001 “On a special commission for questions connected with the import on the territory of the Russian Federation of irradiated, heat-releasing aggregates of foreign make”

The present decree approves the setting-up of the above-mentioned commission: the chambers of the Federal Assembly and the Government of the RF are requested to submit proposals for its composition.
In order to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, the international airport Sheremetyevo (Moscow) is by this Directive designated as the point of arrival/departure on and from the territory of the RF of international inspection teams of the OPCW: the Russian Munitions Agency is instructed to inform, in accordance with the established procedures, the OPCW and, together with the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, adopt the measures connected with the landing of non-scheduled ORCW aircraft, used for carrying out inspections on the territory of the RF.

The Government of the RF decrees: 1) the corresponding Federal Executive authorities, to implement, within the limits of their competence, the above-mentioned document of the OSCE; 2) the unitary, federal, state enterprise «Rosoboronexport» and other agencies for military-technical co-operation of the RF with foreign states, when delivering small arms and light weapons outside the RF, to be guided by the normative legislation on foreign trade of Russia with foreign states as well as by the regulations in the framework document of the OSCE “On small arms and light weapons”. 3) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of the RF to work on the question of giving Russia international, financial and material assistance in the safe storage and utilisation of small arms and light weapons; 4) to confirm the attached Regulation on the procedure to be followed for providing Russia with the information, envisaged in the OSCE framework document “small arms and light weapons”.

Decree no.417 of the President of the Russian Federation of 8 August 2001 “On signing the Protocol to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the safe and secure transportation, storage and disposal of weapons and the prevention of weapon proliferation”
The present directive accepts the proposal, submitted to the Government, on signing the above-mentioned Protocol. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on reaching agreement with the American side, is to sign it in the name of the RF.

Decree no.1005 of the President of the Russian Federation of 8 August 2001 “On confirming the list of equipment, materials and technologies which can be used in the manufacture of missile weapons and are subject to export control”
The decree confirms the attached List, submitted by the Government.

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the transfer of goods, within the framework of co-operation in the development of outer-space and the building and exploitation of space-missile and missile equipment”

The present ordinance approves and submits for ratification the above-mentioned Agreement signed in Dnepropetrovsk on 11 February 2001.


The ordinance approves the above-mentioned Protocol. The Ministry for Atomic Energy is charged with signing it in the name of the Government of the RF and allowed to introduce in the attached draft changes and additions, not affecting matters of principle.


The present ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Program.

Decree no.1081 of the President of the Russian Federation of 28 August 2001 “On measures to implement resolution 1343 of the UN Security Council of 7 March 2001”

In accordance with the present Decree all state, industrial, trade, finance, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks organisations and other juridical and physical persons, being within the jurisdiction of the RF are in their activities to proceed from the fact that, as from 7 March 2001 and until 7 March 2002, it is forbidden to sell or deliver to Liberia military production, civilian an service weapons and spare parts for them as well as to use for this purpose sea-going vessels and aircraft; to supply to Liberia any technical assistance or training services connected with the transfer, production servicing and operation of the above-mentioned assets. These measures do not affect military property destined for humanitarian purposes. The import of unprocessed diamonds from Liberia is forbidden.

Decree no.1082 of the President of the Russian Federation of 28 August 2001 “On confirmation of the List of chemicals, equipment and technology which can be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons and which are subject to export control”

The present Decree confirms the above-mentioned List.

Ordinance no.647 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 30 August 2001 “On confirmation of the procedure for drawing up a List of military production which it is permitted to transfer to foreign customers, and the procedure for drawing up a List of States to which it is permitted to transfer military production permitted to be transferred to foreign customers”
The present ordinance confirms the above-mentioned documents which are attached.

Ordinance no.686 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 24 September 2001 “On confirmation of the Regulations on implementing control of foreign trade transactions in respect of chemicals, equipment and technologies, which can be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons”

The ordinance confirms the above-mentioned Regulations. Its full text and the Supplement to it is attached.


In accordance with the present ordinance the Russian Munitions Agency is charged with the functions of representative agency of the Russian side in respect of the above-mentioned Agreement which were formerly discharged by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.


In accordance with the Federal Law “On ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” the Government of the RF has designated the Ministry for Atomic Energy as the national agency in respect of the above-mentioned Treaty. The present ordinance charges the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF with informing the organisation for the CTBT of this decision. The Ministry of Defence of the RF is charged with exercising control over compliance with the CTBT with the use of Russian facilities of the International monitoring system, envisaged by the CTBT, and of national technical control assets as well by exchange of information with the International Data Centre in Vienna (the Austrian Republic) through the National Data Centre of the RF.

Decree no.2140 of the President of the Russian Federation of 23 October 2001 “On prolongation of the period of use of military formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the international security presence in Kosovo, the Union Republic of Yugoslavia”

The present Decree prolongs until 10 June 2002 the use of military formations of the RF with their established armament, military equipment and other material assets in the international security presence in Kosovo at a strength of up to 3400 men until November 2001 and from that date at a strength of up to 2000 men until 10 June 2002.

Decree no.1243 of the President of the Russian Federation of 23 October 2001 “On measures to implement Resolution 1367 of the UN Security Council of 10 September 2001”
In accordance with SCR 1367 of 10 September 2001 all state, industrial, trade, transport, and other enterprises, firms, banks, organizations and other juridical and physical persons within the jurisdiction of the RF are in their activities to proceed from the fact that, as from 10 September, the measures to implement the prohibition on delivery of military production to the Union Republic of Yugoslavia (in accordance with SCR 1160 of 31 March 1998) are rescinded.


By the present ordinance the proposal of the Russian Munitions Agency on signing the above-mentioned Agreement is adopted and the draft of this Agreement, previously agreed with the British side, approved. The Russian Munitions Agency is charged with holding negotiations with the British side and, on reaching agreement, signing the Agreement in the name of the Government of the RF.

Decree no.1321 of the President of the Russian Federation of 16 November 2001 “On prolonging the period of use of the contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the peace-keeping operations of the multi-national stabilization forces within the framework of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement on peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”

The present Decree prolongs until 31 July 2002 the period of the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at a strength of 500 men with their military equipment, armament and property in the peace-keeping operation of the multi-national stabilisation forces within the framework of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement on peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian military contingent is to provide, in the zone of its responsibility, for the implementation of the main tasks of the General framework Agreement on peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 December 1995, in accordance with SCR 1247 of 18 June 1999, SCR 1305 of 21 June 2000 and SCR 1357 of 21 June 2001.

Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Chinese People’s Republic on the Russian-Chinese border on its Western part

The agreement consists of eight articles, detailing and defining the line of the Russian-Chinese border on its Western part. The full text of the Agreement is attached (see Collection of Laws of the RF 2001).
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ABSTRACTS

Vladimir BARANOVSKY and Nodari SIMONIA, “Terrorist attacks in the United States: implications for international politics”

The terrorist attacks in the USA, carried out on 11 September 2001, will have serious consequences for US policies, for the system of international relations as a whole and for Russia.

Powerful political-psychological prerequisites appeared for significant changes in American foreign policy which may acquire a more active and assertive character. Isolationist motives, always present in American foreign-policy thinking, will move into the background.

The fight against terrorism will gradually be regarded as a task of higher priority than others with which the state is faced. Forceful reaction on the part of the USA may become a model for the behaviour of other states in conditions which they consider a challenge to their own interests (in the first place, but not only, from international terrorism). The international system may become more unbalanced and subject to the sudden emergence of crises. The task of managing the international, political system, which already today, is of great actuality, will become one of the first importance.

Russia is vitally interested in a successful outcome of the fight against international terrorism. It is important for Russia to demonstrate its readiness for co-operative action with the USA and the West, as a whole, without placing itself in a subordinate position or allowing erosion of its co-operation with the Islamic world.

Aleksei ARBATOV, “Ballistic missile defence and the prospects for strategic stability”

The present co-operation between the Russia and the USA remains a system of mutual, nuclear deterrence. This will not change in the next 10–15 years, even if these powers reduce their strategic nuclear forces to 1500–2000 nuclear warheads. The formula of strategic stability does not exclude the presence of a certain defensive component. From the point of view, of the stability of deterrence, not the number of permitted areas for the deployment of BMD or the quantity of interceptor-missiles, is important, but the general capacity of the BMD system to repulse a larger or smaller part of the means of a retaliatory strike by the other side. In this respect, in the balance RF–USA, there is an overwhelming predominance of offensive over defensive weapons. In certain conditions, it is quite possible to maintain this predominance, while, at the same time, building a defence potential against missiles from third countries.

The proliferation of missile-nuclear weapons can be regarded as a good enough reason for modification of the ABM Treaty, though its complete abrogation, especially unilaterally, will become a destabilising factor as long as relations of mutual, nuclear deterrence continue to exist between Russia and the USA. A review of the Russian concept of national security and a significant intensification of efforts on the part of the RF are needed both to render the non-proliferation regime stricter and in developing a non-strategic BMD both for Europe and Asia.
Vladimir BARANOVSKY, “Common European security and defence policy: horizons of the Russian perception”

In the problem of the attitude towards the European security and defence policy certain key-dilemmas for Russian foreign policy, connected with the difficulty of self-identification of the country, find their perfect reflection. In the joint statement on the results of the Russian–European Union summit meeting, which was held in Paris on 30 October 2002, Russia for the first time, at the highest political level, expressed its positive attitude to a new dimension in the development of the European Union, which has been rapidly forming in the course of the last two years or so – the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Energetic steps should be taken to involve Russia in one way or another in this policy. Action should be taken rapidly, moreover, while this structure is still taking shape and its modus operandi is being worked out – for when the rules of the game have been finally established and adopted, it will be much more difficult to change them. It is important, moreover, to bear in mind that, in the present conditions, co-operation with the EU, outside the established relations with NATO, is not possible and even less so in opposition to it. Even so, co-operation may be quite expedient for both sides. Russia could, in any case, offer its European partners something quite real and attractive, for instance, the possibility of using its military transport aviation for the benefit of those tasks which will be carried out in accordance with ESDP. Thus, the joint accomplishment by Russia and the European Union of the “Petersberg tasks” in no way belongs to the category of “thoughts about the unthinkable”.

Ekaterina STEPANOVA, “Russia and the combat against terrorism in local regional conflicts”

The task of combating terrorism, both internal and international, had become the most important component of Russia’s policies in respect of the settlement of local-regional conflicts long before the last outburst of international terrorism in the shape of the terrorist attacks in the USA. The September attacks are evidence of the start of a qualitatively new stage in world politics, as a whole, and in the combat against terrorism, in particular. Today it is a question not only of the proliferation of international terrorism but of its “globalization”. The fact that the territory of a superpower, which up to then was considered invulnerable against threats on this scale, has become, for the first time, the arena of terrorism does not mean, however, that the fight against terrorism can be “torn” out of a specific, local-regional conflict.

The heightened attention on the part of Russia to the problems of countering terrorism in local-regional conflicts, in the course of recent years, is explained by the fact that these sore spots are the sources of the proliferation of terrorism which it is most difficult to combat when it is part of a larger confrontation which has the support of a certain part of the population in the zone of conflict.

Effective counteraction against terrorism requires the elaboration of a long-term strategy, adequately supported financially, technically and juridically and the solution of those social-economic and political problems to which it is a violent reaction. That is why, the task of combating terrorism in local-regional
conflicts cannot bear a self-sufficient character since it is directed rather at countering certain tactics of confrontation in a conflict than at solving its deeper causes. In conditions of growing tension on the Southern borders of the CIS, it is its considerable experience in combating terrorism and its understanding of the complexity of its deeper causes which should help the government of the RF to maintain a moderate and balanced approach to the situation in the region and beyond its borders.

Alexander PIKAYEV, “The September 11 Attacks and Russian-American relations”

The events of 11 September changed the place which the RF occupies in the priorities of American security policy. The need for Moscow’s support in the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan have made a significant rise in Russia’s role in the foreign and military-political plans of the USA possible. The present state, of Russian-American relations is not of an irreversible nature. In spite of the first signs of a long-term shift in American policy towards Russia, the present high level of agreement is, in the main, determined by the war in Afghanistan, where Moscow and Washington have broad, parallel interests.

Alexander SAVELYEV, “Has the idea of unilateral reduction of strategic offensive arms a future?”

If the transition by Russia and the USA to unilateral reduction of their nuclear arsenals becomes a reality, the level of openness, when the corresponding reductions of the strategic offensive weapons are effected, should be the main characteristic determining the prospects for the relationship between the two sides. This may represent the most important indicator of the degree of trust between them. After all, not the fact of reducing superfluous nuclear arsenals determines the nature of the strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, but its ultimate purpose and the atmosphere in which these reductions are effected. If it is a question of getting rid of the inheritance of the Cold War, openness, predictability and transparency may become the instruments which help the two sides to achieve this aim. It is necessary to develop or, at any rate, not to lose the very mechanisms worked out to provide the two sides with the assurance that the obligations assumed in arms control agreements are complied with. Even if these obligations take on the form of unilateral action, the control and verification mechanisms should continue to operate, if not in full measure, at least to a sufficiently large extent. The international situation is taking shape in such a way that Russia and the USA are provided with extremely favourable opportunities and prospects for a significant breakthrough towards the establishment between them of relations of true partnership – at first in the military political sphere and later in others.

Galina OZNOBISHCHEVA, “Parliament’s role in the field of arms control and disarmament. Proceedings of the IMEMO Roundtable”

Contains a detailed report on the proceedings of the IMEMO Roundtable on the role of the Russian parliament in the areas of arms control and disarmament, held at IMEMO on 22 May 2001.
Pyotr ROMASHKIN, “Appropriations on defence in the Federal budget for 2002”

Expenditure on defence and law-enforcement is growing more slowly than the whole expenditure part of the federal budget and the expenditure on social policies, in particular. The biggest shortcoming in the draft law, submitted by the government, is the classification of all target items, not only in the section “National Defence”, but even in the section “Utilisation and destruction of armaments, including the implementation of international treaties”. It would be expedient to broaden the list of target items and forms of expenditure in the section “National Defence” and render them accessible to public scrutiny to a maximum degree.

Alexandre KALIADINE, “Prospects for the elimination of the world’s largest CW arsenal”

Both the original plan of 21 March 1996 and its modified version of 5 July 2001 provide for the full implementation of the CWC. The new document reiterated Russia’s commitment to the objective of complete chemical disarmament and the government’s readiness to comply with the requirements of the convention. At the same time the revised program offers in many respects new solutions and approaches to overcoming technical difficulties in implementing the CW destruction plan. They cover destruction timetables, the technological maturity of the CW destruction processes, cost estimates for the overall program, some specific programmatic measures, the role of international assistance and the mechanism for the realisation of the Program.

Vladimir BELOUS, “The Russian initiative on building a joint non-strategic ballistic missile defence system in Europe”

Russia has proposed to build, jointly with Europe and NATO, a non-strategic BMD system for Europe. Bearing in mind the realities of the existing situation in respect of security questions in Europe, the Russian proposals define the main directions and approximate sequence of a stage by stage solution of the task of building a European BMD. They envisage, in particular, a joint evaluation of the scale and nature of the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies and the possible threats connected with this; joint work on a concept of a European BMD system and the sequence of its development and deployment; the setting up of an all-European Warning Centre of missile launches; the holding of joint, command-staff exercises and training, directed at refining the interaction of different national formations in repulsing a missile attack; the carrying out of joint research and development of ABM assets and systems which can provide a reliable defence of the countries of Europe against missiles. There exist, at the present time, objective possibilities to start, building a Euro-BMD. At the present stage, this depends on the governments of the European states taking the political decision to begin the deployment of a non-strategic, BMD system.

Provides an overview of assessments of this publication by the Russian disarmament and security research community.
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The first issue of *Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security* included the IMEMO contributions to the Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbooks for 1997-2000.

The second issue contains the results of research conducted at the IMEMO and published as a Special supplement to the Russian edition of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. It is devoted to those aspects of international security, arms control and disarmament that are of particular relevance to Russia. However, these analyses may be of interest to foreign readers as well.

The focus of this publication remains the same: to provide Russian perspectives on issues affecting international co-operation in conflict resolution, disarmament and security, to present facts, data and analyses on defence and foreign policy developments and to contribute to the unbiased assessment by the international community of Russia’s security situation and needs. Translating the IMEMO studies into English will hopefully assist foreign readers who follow with insight security thinking in Moscow.

It is envisaged to continue this series in future. This will allow regular readers of the SIPRI Yearbook in English to have access to corresponding materials representing the views of Russian experts on international security, both in a wider sense and with respect to its specific aspects.

“The IMEMO contributions to the Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbooks provide analyses of a broad range of problems related to security, armaments and disarmament, evaluations of the on-going trends in these spheres, assessments of Russia’s security interests. They contain information on military and political issues which are of particular significance for Russia”.

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