At the opening of the presentation, Academician Alexey Arbatov, Head of the IMEMO Center for International Security, conveyed greetings from Academician Alexander Dynkin, President of the Institute, and Feodor Voitolovsky, Director of the Institute, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who could not attend the event. Alexey Arbatov congratulated the participants on the publication of the 25th anniversary Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook as a part of a joint IMEMO-SIPRI project. The project is aimed at translating, publishing and distributing a Russian-language version of the SIPRI Yearbook that has proved to be successful and become a unique initiative of its kind in Russia. Its significance is determined, among other things, by the fact that Russia being a nuclear power has a ‘strategic community’ (which includes research institutes, government departments and agencies, the military-industrial complex, etc.) which far outnumbers expert community fluent in English. On the other hand, it is very important that the translation in English of the IMEMO Special Supplement to the SIPRI Yearbook provides an opportunity to inform a wide audience across various countries about the views of Russian experts on key issues of arms control and international security.

Dan Smith, SIPRI Director, expressed his gratitude to IMEMO for organizing the presentation and doing exemplary job on the joint project. He noted the importance of exchanging views between representatives of expert communities of various countries which is particularly relevant in the current difficult political situation manifesting itself in a deadlock in arms control and non-proliferation. Dan Smith highlighted key SIPRI approaches to conducting research including clear identification of facts (relating to conflicts, arms trade, arms control), utmost objectivity when analyzing the facts, integration of human values and development goals, exchange of ideas and development of multilateral formats for dialogue between experts from different countries and between expert community and governments.

Academician Vladimir Baranovsky, Head of Research Division at the IMEMO Center for Situational Analysis, one of the founders of the IMEMO-SIPRI joint project gave a short overview of its history since the early 1990s. A prominent part in the development of the project belonged to then SIPRI Director Adam Daniel Rotfeld, as well as Sergey Chugrov, former Deputy Chief Editor of the IMEMO’s World Economy and International Relations journal who played an active role in assembling a special issue of the journal devoted to the SIPRI Yearbook. That issue also included articles on security-related issues prepared by IMEMO experts. Building on this initiative IMEMO started translation of SIPRI Yearbooks into Russian, and a few years later the Russian edition was complemented by the IMEMO Special Supplement on key arms control and international security topics.

Sergey Oznobishchev, Head of Sector at IMEMO Center for International Security and Project Coordinator, provided an overview of the work on the Russian edition and the key topics of the IMEMO Special Supplement.

At the first session of the conference the main discussion focused on the key issues of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. In his remarks Alexey Arbatov reminded the audience that the process of nuclear arms control had received a powerful impetus globally after the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to a dangerous point and demonstrated that nuclear deterrence could not by itself guarantee security. Shortly after the end of the crisis, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was signed and negotiations started on the 1967 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1972 Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation and other key agreements in the nuclear field. The key element of the nuclear arms control regime was the concept of strategic stability with its basic principles laid down in the 1990 US-USSR Joint Declaration. The main provisions of this concept concerned a mutually accepted balance between offensive and defensive arms, reduction of the number of nuclear warheads on launchers, and priority development of survivable weapon systems that could not be destroyed by a sudden disarming strike.
Over the recent years, the agreed principles of strategic stability have gradually eroded due primarily to three factors – a change in the world order (the emergence of a multipolar world instead of a unipolar one), the advancements in military equipment and technologies (including the emergence of fundamentally new weapon systems), and a new generation of policy makers, military, engineers, and experts who do not remember the Cold War crises. It is no coincidence that the governments of many countries, including nuclear states, attach far less importance to arms control agreements than to other political issues.

According to Alexey Arbatov, to improve the situation the United States and Russia should prioritize nuclear arms control as a key area of the bilateral relations. As a first step, Moscow and Washington should make an effort to preserve the INF Treaty, as well as to extend the 2010 New START Treaty beyond 2021. However, amidst aggravating US-Russian tensions, a productive dialogue on arms control is severely hampered.

Professor Vladimir Dvorkin, Chief Researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security, stressed the important role of nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and Russia, inter alia, as channels for regular exchange of parties’ data and views. He noted that the ongoing crisis was due primarily to the extreme lack of trust between Washington and Moscow. No progress has been made towards resolving mutual complaints regarding the INF Treaty compliance, and this is mainly due to political reasons and not to the lack of relevant technical capabilities. From a technical point of view, the United States and Russia can agree to conduct one-off inspections (in particular, in order to resolve Russian concerns about the US BMD launchers) or to conclude a separate agreement to resolve differences over unmanned vehicles. Such an agreement can build on the experience of existing limitations on ballistic and cruise missiles based on technical characteristics. As for the New START Treaty, Vladimir Dvorkin believed that its extension until 2026 would benefit both the United States and Russia, though Donald Trump’s administration avoided giving clear signals in this regard. The treaty is, in fact, the last ‘common thread’ in the area of arms control between Washington and Moscow with regard to both availability of mutual control and verification mechanisms and the absence of serious mutual concerns regarding its implementation. Preserving the treaty will allow to keep open the possibility of follow-on agreements on limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

In his remarks Petr Topychkanov, Senior Researcher with SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, noted that with respect to the nuclear arms race, current active development of nuclear missile programmes in Asia – most notably in China, India, and Pakistan – was even more dangerous than the uncertainty around the US-Russian INF Treaty and New START Treaty. While by the end of the Cold War the United States and Russia had had a set of joint agreements, frameworks, and regimes on arms control that provided for a certain transparency and predictability, in the current environment China, India and Pakistan are not ready for any limitation of their nuclear weapons. They oppose such limitations, despite participating in various dialogues on nuclear issues, and this opposition makes the nuclear arms race in the region dangerous and unpredictable. What makes it particularly dangerous is territorial disputes which these three countries continue to be involved in while having asymmetric potentials and asymmetrically developing their missile and nuclear forces. The complicated relationship between the United States and Russia in the nuclear domain, as well as their changing approaches on the use of nuclear weapons, including suggestions to develop low-yield nuclear warheads voiced in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, do not help to promote nuclear arms control among the three Asian states.

The second session addressed issues of European security, conventional arms control in Europe, and the impact of technological advancements on arms control. Andrey Zagorsky, Head of Department at the IMEMO Center for International Security, suggested that at the heart of the current European security crisis was the crisis in relations between Russia and Western countries (Russia/EU, Russia/NATO) and identified four ‘key tracks’ to find solutions. The first track should seek to update the Helsinki principles, primarily on the balance between the right to be a party to an alliance and the concept of equal security actively promoted by Russia in the OSCE
area, which involves consideration of legitimate security concerns of other states. The focus of the second track can be to halt the start of a conventional arms race in Europe, particularly in the overly ‘sensitive’ Baltic and Black Sea regions. Here the parties can build on the obligations on mutual restraint enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The third track may concentrate on promoting among certain European countries the benefits of maintaining status of neutrality (non-participation in military alliances) including the post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, etc. The fourth track should determine ways to further the dialogue between Russia and the EU, including by accepting countries’ simultaneous participation in association agreements with the EU and in developing cooperation (trade, economic, and political) with Russia.

**Sergey Oznobishchev**, Head of Sector at IMEMO Center for International Security, noted that Russia and Western countries did not have a forum for positive dialogue and restoring relations in important areas of conventional arms control in Europe. All they are left with is mutual accusations that have become a part of PR campaigns. At the same time, a detailed analysis of the facts and events related to relations between NATO and Russia and to conventional arms control, in spite of everything, does not definitely prove the argument about a sharp increase in bilateral tensions.

So, despite an increase in scope of military exercises, there has been no recent sharp increase in their number. Russia and NATO countries exercise certain restraint in deploying their forces and military equipment, the NATO-Russia Council meetings have resumed, and the ceilings adapted by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (despite the suspension of Russia’s participation in the treaty) for the most part have not been exceeded. A number of key contentious issues, including the prevention of military incidents, are discussed during direct contacts between high-ranking military, in particular between Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Curtis Scaparrotti, Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations. Though there are a number of worrying factors (close encounters of Russian and NATO troops, aggravation of mutual fears in connection with military exercises, possible deployment of a heavy US division on the European continent), Sergey Oznobishchev believed that overall the current Russia’s relations with the EU/NATO countries could be viewed with ‘guarded optimism.’

**Dr. Sibylle Bauer**, Director of SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme, addressed a number of important aspects of the impact that technological advancements – artificial intelligence, autonomous and unmanned systems, hypersonic, information, and biotechnology, etc. – had on arms control. She noted that many of those technologies, in fact, were not new: rather they represented a combination and ‘synergy’ of old and new technological approaches. At the current stage of the technological development the weapons and equipment (including dual-use ones) are cheaper, more miniature and easier to use. In addition, there are new trends in development, production, procurement, and deployment, while the number of actors involved is expanding. In this regard, the significance of control over the sales/purchases of these new systems and, above all, of export control regimes is increasing. This is important, among other things, so that new dual-use systems (some of which may currently or in the future be carriers of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction) do not fall into the hands of ‘unscrupulous users,’ including terrorists.

Dr. Sibylle Bauer reviewed technological advancements in the context of the vulnerability of new systems and their interfacing with the ‘old’ weapon systems, their positive and negative influence on the social and technological environment, the debates in the UN on lethal weapons systems, their application and the relevant international humanitarian law norms, and a number of other issues.

The conference concluded with a general discussion with the participation of the following conference attendees: **Natalia Bubnova**, Leading Researcher of the IMEMO Center for International Security; **Viktor Esin**, Leading Researcher of the Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Colonel General (ret.); **Viktor Mizin**, Leading Researcher of the IMEMO Center for International Security; **Alexander Perendzhiev**, Associate Professor of the Plekhanov Russian
University of Economics; Vladimir Rybachenkov, Independent Expert, former Advisor at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Vladimir Vinokurov, Vice President of the League of Military Diplomats; Alexander Zhebin, Director of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Valery Zhuravel, Head of the Center for the Arctic Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Albert Zulkharneev, Director of the PIR Center; and a number of other experts and officials. The event was attended by representatives of several research institutes of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, legislative bodies, and embassies, as well as by scholars, international affairs experts, and journalists.