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REMARKS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY BY THE DIRECTOR OF SIPRI

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Academics and even some officials from the US are telling us today that the problem with Europe is that we have too much security. They paint a picture of our region as having settled its old problems, and turned inwards to complete the process of deepening and widening its own integration. They claim that we have forgotten the traditional language of power, and that we are no longer capable of seeing clearly enough the new threats to our security that we need to react to, nor of reacting to them strongly enough-especially outside Europe's own borders.

This story might sound a bit strange in the ears of someone who is trying to lead a civilized and peaceful life in Grozny, or indeed in parts of Kosovo or parts of Belfast. There are still some obvious black holes in the pattern of security in our region, and there are also still grey zones-though much less than there used to be-where the way ahead to peace and stability is far from clear and is over-shadowed by all-too-traditional kinds of tension and doubt.

Nevertheless, it is true to say that the huge changes in Europe's political and strategic architecture since 1989 have generated far less violence than any similar transformation in the past: that the worst episodes of violence, notably in the Balkans, already seem to have run their course: and that the conflicts which remain unsolved, mostly within the region of the CIS, have largely (I repeat largely) been contained in a way that avoids the worst dangers of escalation. When you reflect on it, it is also quite interesting that Europe's stability and development has not been affected in any major practical way by serious conflicts waged in our near neighborhood, such as the Gulf War of 1992 and the continuing acute Middle Eastern crisis. Looked at objectively, the circumstances of our life here today also seem to have changed very little-in practical terms-as a result of what happened in New York and Washington on 11 September last year.

Now, with all respect to American thinkers, I find it a bit strange to criticize Europe-and implicitly to criticize Russia, which has been so much a part of all this-for strengthening its own culture of peace. Considering what happened earlier in the 20th century, peace in Europe ought to be a great relief for the rest of the world as well as a benefit for Europe itself. But one of my own favorite sayings is that "Nothing fails like success". Progress and change bring their own problems: and in the rest of this talk I would like to focus on two sets of very immediate and important challenges of this kind:

- those connected with the enlargement of European institutions, which we must expect to take place on a large scale between now and the end of 2004;
- those connected with the new high priority of the fight against terrorism and the tensions it is creating in the partnership between the US, Europe and Russia.

I will end, if time permits, with some questions about the position and policies of Russia itself.

Up-sides and Down-sides of Enlargement

I should start here by admitting that I myself support the enlargement of both NATO and the EU, and see advantages in including Russia's Baltic neighbours in both. My reasoning is essentially to do with security. NATO and EU will provide a shelter for the new members, getting rid of possible 'grey zones' and the temptations they can bring. But they will also impose the discipline of strong common policies on all their members, making sure that no NATO or EU country—certainly not the smallest ones—can afford to act in a deviant, irresponsible or aggressive way. To be a NATO or EU member means to be forced to be a good neighbor, also towards neighbors outside these groups. It means focusing one's national defence efforts not on selfish but on collective goals, which now emphasize above all the need for military action in the service of the international community. In the light of 11 September, the internal security benefits of enlargement also seem quite important. In the EU in particular, new members will join in policies for law and justice and border management which ought to help defend an increasingly large area of our continent against such new-style, 'trans-national' threats as terrorist infiltration, organized crime, illegal immigration, disease and the smuggling of dangerous goods.

There is another point which is not much talked about but which I tried to emphasize when I spoke at the Summit of NATO applicant States at Riga in July. Enlargement will also be an arms control process because all NATO members seem bound to become involved one way or the other, despite the present complications, in the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) conventional disarmament regime. They will join NATO's policy of supporting other arms control processes such as the strategic nuclear agreements between the US and Russia. EU members will have to join the Union's Code of Conduct restricting the export of conventional weapons to dangerous destinations, and the Union's common positions in support of global arms control processes eg on landmines, laser weapons and small arms. At the same time it seems to me very likely that political choices will be made in the context of enlargement which will avoid the stationing of nuclear weapons or foreign forces on Central European territory in peacetime. If I were looking from Moscow I think I would be more happy than unhappy about the elements of predictability and restraint which these developments should bring in our neighborhood. But I do think that the Brussels institutions perhaps need to develop these elements of their enlargement policy more consciously, and advertise them more actively, and I have asked my colleagues at SIPRI to focus some serious research attention in the coming year on these very points.

I would also admit that there are many challenges and potential downsides in a rapid large-scale enlargement. Here I will just mention enough of them to show that they pose headaches as much for those inside the process, as for those outside:

- the impact on the unity and efficiency in decision-making of the integrated institutions themselves
- the strains which are being placed and will continue to be placed on the new member States by the price they have to pay for integration
- the problem of coping with the ambitions of European countries who have been offered a chance of eventual membership but who will still be left out this time, and perhaps for a long time to come
- the handling of possibly harmful dividing lines between the new NATO and EU territory and its neighbors who may or may not be candidates themselves, but who are European countries wanting and deserving to have their interests respected (including the interest in being allowed to continue practical cooperation)
- the especially difficult case, in this context, of Kaliningrad
- (another issue especially sharp for the Northern region:) the impact on the policies of Western democratic States who are still only semi-integrated, including the Nordic States. Has a dynamic

been triggered which could lead to Finland and Sweden also applying to join NATO within the next five years? And what would that mean for Russia and for the stability and balance of the Baltic region generally?

These would be a hard enough set of challenges for Europe to solve even if it did not have plenty of other problems on its hands in the political, economic and security spheres. There are just two things that make me personally optimistic about our own collective ability to overcome them. Firstly, the political determination and skill being shown by the candidate countries and the apparent good understanding by Central European populations (voting in recent elections) of the national self-restraint necessary to become full members. Secondly and perhaps most important, the decision which Russia's leaders seem to have taken to swim with the general tide of cooperation and integration flowing across Europe rather than against it, and to seize the opportunity both to bring Russia closer to the EU and NATO in general and to secure specific national benefits in the process.

It is clear to me that Russia's participation in a Council of 20 with NATO members, and its increasingly close partnership with the EU, introduce an element of balance and completeness into the making of Europe's security and defence policy. I consider Russia's honorable place in the process important also for the image of inclusiveness and tolerance which Europe presents to the world abroad. And it underlines the very important possibility that Russia can be, as it were, a carrier of the cooperative and consensual European 'style' of security to other geographical regions of the world. The question of course is whether Russia itself sees its role that way and I hope to come back to this at the end.

The Global Challenges

The problems of extending the integration process in Europe and Eurasia do seem to fade almost into insignificance compared with the debate that is raging today over terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and "rogue States" and over the correct way of responding to these global or "trans-national" challenges. One of the strongest messages that comes across in the 2002 edition of SIPRI's Yearbook-and especially in Daniel Rotfeld's masterly Introduction-is that the world's institutions and instruments for responding to this challenge are alarmingly weak and vague compared with the scale of the dangers. And as long as we do not have a clear single view and set of rules for responding, the risk is ever-present that we shall add to the dangers ourselves by reacting in a divided or contradictory way or in a way that is just plain wrong.

This is a huge subject and I shall comment today on just three angles. The first, which I know is of acute interest to our Russian partners, is how we define terrorism and-as a logical consequence-how we define the limits of appropriate counter-terrorist action. Here I must say frankly that as a European, I have trouble with the notion of a 'war' against terrorism and feel it could lead us down a wrong path. It is clear that we do not have a single enemy, but rather a wide range of people and movements with specific geographical, political and/or ideological backgrounds who are using a single range-and a completely unacceptable range-of violent techniques. The techniques need to be clearly condemned and indeed, suppressed, but the roots of each problem need separate attention and the best ways of dealing with them cannot be limited to (or perhaps not even led by) military and interventionist approaches. Now, it is obvious that the actions of 11 September last year dramatically escalated the level of violence and the recklessness and cruelty of the means that were used against an open democratic society. That alone does not justify reacting with the methods of war because (as the saying goes) in love and war all things are considered acceptable and there is no theoretical limit to how much violence can be used in self-defence. It would, frankly, be a pretty dangerous world in which the US would feel free to use its self-defence capabilities without limit. But it would also be pretty

dangerous to say that Russia could do anything in Chechnya because the problem was defined as a terrorist one, or the UK free to do anything in Northern Ireland because terrorism was a strong dimension of the situation there.

Personally I feel we would be on safer ground if we defined terrorism as a crime. It is a crime under national law and a valuable way forward would be to try to harmonize the ways that different national laws deal with it, while improving also the means of national enforcement through the sharing of intelligence, of capacities and of competence. The EU has made great efforts in the last year to do just that and I see great potential for pursuing the same ideas on a wider European basis with the EU's candidates, partners and neighbors-very much including Russia. But it is also an international crime and a crime against humanity and in this context it is both appropriate and necessary that binding measures for universal application should be taken by the United Nations. It is not inappropriate, and in extreme cases may be necessary, to undertake the equivalent of an international "police" action for the forceful suppression of terrorists and the punishment of those who support and protect them. But just as a national policeman has to act within the law, and with the authority of courts and judges behind him, actions against international crimes must in my opinion be taken firmly within the international law.

There is a practical argument for doing them under a clear international mandate because this makes it easier to find partners for the action and more difficult for anyone else to take the bad guys' side. But there is also a very strong argument of principle, summed up in the old folk saying that two wrongs do not make a right. When we are trying to protect our societies we also need to protect their democratic rights and values, and we cannot do that if we weaken the rule of law either inside or outside our boundaries. Democracy and freedom are fragile things, and to use unlawful violence in their support would be like protecting a butterfly by crushing it in a suit of armour. Having said all this, I would be the first to agree that international law should not be a dead and rigid thing and that it will not be respected if its only effect is to protect the bad against the good. It can be updated to take account of the changing realities of global crime and global threat and it is being updated, for instance with the creation of the International Criminal Court. That approach takes time and it takes cooperation, and it depends on States resisting the temptation to block the necessary changes because of some short-term special interests or national doubts. But it is the best possible investment we could make for a future when there may be a quite different set of countries wielding power in the world, and we ourselves may need the protection of fair universal laws much more than we are aware of doing today.

My second point is about the tendency we can see in international security today to down-play the importance of traditional arms control or push it into a corner, while trying to handle an ever-widening range of security challenges by positive action, including the direct use of military forces. There are clear historical reasons why military intervention should be more common today: not least, that the risks of retaliation and escalation are much smaller after the end of the East-West strategic confrontation. The reconciliation between East and West and the acceptance of democratic free-market values by leading States in many other parts of the world has also opened the way for positive military cooperation and even for an integrated approach to security-building on a scale we could never have contemplated just ten years ago. Where we used to avoid war by sitting quiet behind our own borders and keeping our weapons and threatening gestures to a minimum, joining together across borders to carry out some new initiative together is today's typical way of working for peace. And in many ways, this is a very good thing. Positive cooperation in one field can lead to another; military forces and expertise can be used in many ways to serve not just humanitarian goals but political and economic progress; and when countries are working as military partners at least the sum of peace is increased because they are unlikely to attack each other. But as we all let ourselves get carried along by this new trend, I

think we should remember that all human action is ambiguous in its effects, and positive military action is never free from ambiguities and risks of its own. For a start it demands more arms and more military spending. It is always bound to exclude someone and it can easily be seen as threatening someone, however good the original intention. There is also a risk, particularly clear again since 11 September, that the logic of military cooperation will push us to work with partners who are not actually the right ones from a broader or more ethical point of view. And any mistakes in the choices made by Western actors on all these points will be far more serious if they are picked up and multiplied by ambitious military players in other parts of the world.

I am not arguing here that we should stop the trend to military action and cooperation-probably impossible anyway-but that we should try a little harder to balance it with measures of good old-fashioned control and restraint. Arms control is still a good way to save expense, cut risks and promote transparency and stability, and it can also go hand in hand with positive international cooperation (as US/Russian CTR shows). Export controls on dangerous goods are especially valuable and extremely up-to-date now that we realize how vital it is to stop such weapons getting into the hands of sub-State and non-State actors such as criminals and terrorists: supply-side restraint is one of the very few obvious methods that ought to work against them just as well as it works against States. The importance of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also clearer than ever, if only we could make it work. So what I am saying is that I believe all the major actors with the power to set examples in this field ought to try harder to balance their active interventions with the parallel or longer-term strengthening of measures of control. Improvement of military capabilities should be accompanied by doctrines of appropriateness and sufficiency and the improvement of arms destruction techniques. The EU should widen and deepen its export control and global arms control policies hand in hand with building up its crisis management forces. The US showed creativity and determination in developing the recently agreed US/Russian strategic nuclear package: we could wish that it would be equally creative and less defensive in other crucial dimensions of arms control. The parallel message for Russia itself hardly needs spelling out. Now, we at SIPRI know better than anyone that arms control will never be saved by fossilizing it, and will not be sold to its opponents just by repeating old mantras. Its methods must move with the times, face up to new challenges, and we have to be honest about some of the weaknesses that undermine our existing arms control regimes due to past failures of realism or consistency or political will. But let us set aside at least a little energy to work sincerely on correcting these weaknesses, rather than letting ourselves drift into a world where more is automatically better and even the sky (literally speaking) is no longer the limit for a lawless and limitless arms race.

My third point is briefly stated. Difficult though it is to say this in face of the terrible suffering and damage caused by terrorists, terrorism is not the only and perhaps not even the worst challenge for the security of the human race today. We are most keenly aware of it because it does most immediate damage in rich, open, trusting societies like that of the United States. But there are other problems that don't hurt us so much, which do hurt and even kill tens of thousands daily in less fortunate parts of the world. The new SIPRI Yearbook lists 22 conflicts which have each killed more than a thousand victims, mostly civilians, in the space of a year; it cannot list the numbers who fell victim to hunger, crime, natural disaster or avoidable disease. I agree with those world leaders who said after 11 September that we must fight poverty, sickness, hunger and intolerance because they create the conditions in which terrorism thrives. I also think they are worth fighting for their own sake. This is not just a matter of idealism for us here in Europe, but reflects the fact that we do depend on the rest of the world and on the ability of poorer regions to survive and work with us: as suppliers of the goods we use, or as markets for our own goods, or in the future, perhaps as the source of the extra manpower we shall need. It is also common sense, not idealism, for us to take steps to stop the deterioration of the world environment or the spread of new human and animal diseases. The floods in central Europe this

summer have reminded us that while we are running around trying to defend ourselves against the latest threats from men, we can suffer much greater losses (with much less hope of defence) from the sheer destructiveness of nature.

Why say all this here in Moscow? The short answer is that IMEMO's cooperation with SIPRI, and the excellent work done here to translate and distribute the SIPRI Yearbook, shows that there are people in Russia who genuinely care about peace-and who care about the security of others as well as themselves. Russia is still a powerful State by European and world standards, and it is perhaps moving towards being more powerful again in the future, perhaps in a different way from the past. Despite all the continuing security problems Russia faces from inside and outside, it is living today at an objectively higher level of cooperation with the US, with Europe, and with European and world institutions than ever before since 1917. Russia cannot help but be affected by all the challenges and contradictions I have just been talking about within Western security policy, because Russia is very much in this sense a part of the wider West. We need to know which side of the various arguments Russia is going to place itself on: what value it will give to the European-style integration process, to the role of law in internal security and international affairs, to the opportunities for cooperative military action, the need for balancing measures of arms control, and the fight against the non-military threats to human survival. Present arguments over these questions between the US and Europe-and indeed within Europe-do not make Russia's short-term decisions any easier. "Divide and rule" might have been attractive in the old days but now when Russia shares so many positive responsibilities, it would seem to me like a way of running away from the problem. Ganging up with the Europeans to criticize the US, without having any better practical solution to offer, does not seem a very helpful answer: but neither does making ad hoc power deals with Washington over the heads of the Europeans, with whom the Russian people must live side by side and mix increasingly closely in the longer term. I do not know the answer to these contradictions and I have no clear or simple advice to offer my Russian friends. What I do hope is that we can talk together and work together to overcome them, in the spirit of truth and objectivity and goodwill for which SIPRI and the SIPRI Yearbook stands.