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© Portansky A.P., 16.09.2024

In early September 2024, Beijing hosted the 9th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), with Chinese President Xi Jinping extending a formal welcome to participants. Among the distinguished guests was António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Forum saw the participation of representatives from 53 African nations, including 51 heads of state—exceeding the number expected to address the United Nations General Assembly later that month. By comparison, only 17 African heads of state attended the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, a significant decline from the previous summit in 2019.

The high level of African participation at FOCAC underscores China’s enduring appeal to African leaders. In recent decades, economic cooperation between China and Africa has expanded substantially. China has emerged as the continent’s primary trading partner, with annual bilateral trade increasing from $12 billion two decades ago to $282 billion in 2023—far surpassing Africa’s trade volumes with the United States and Russia [1]. Chinese enterprises have made substantial investments in African industries, while development banks have financed numerous infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, discussions at the Beijing Forum also highlighted challenges, particularly concerning Africa’s debt obligations. Contrary to the expectations of many African leaders, China refrained from offering debt relief. Instead, it pledged $50.7 billion in credit lines and investment partnerships over the next three years. While this remains a significant commitment, it is notably more conservative than China’s financial engagements prior to 2016. This cautious approach likely reflects China’s growing concerns over domestic financial constraints and broader global economic uncertainties. It also signals a strategic shift toward a more restrained credit policy, emphasizing trade relations over large-scale infrastructure financing, which has contributed to rising debt levels among African nations.

A more sustainable and mutually beneficial framework for cooperation may be emerging. China has increasingly prioritized the expansion of African exports, particularly in agriculture and natural resources. This aligns with Africa’s economic development objectives while ensuring China’s access to vital commodities, including energy resources.

Nevertheless, China’s lending practices in Africa have generated considerable debate in the West, particularly regarding debt sustainability and national sovereignty. Western critics have long accused Beijing of employing so-called “debt trap diplomacy.” However, a 2022 report by the respected Chatham House found no evidence to support claims that China deliberately leverages debt as a tool for political coercion. Notably, China holds just 1.5% of Africa’s external debt, a figure lower than that of multilateral institutions or private lenders. Still, infrastructure development remains central to China’s African engagement strategy, affording Beijing significant strategic influence [2].

The Beijing Forum’s agenda encompassed governance, industrialization, agricultural modernization, global security, and deepened cooperation. Notably, 30 new infrastructure projects were announced, spanning key sectors such as transportation and energy. These initiatives form part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), designed to further integrate African economies into Chinese markets and supply chains. As long as these investments drive local economic growth, they will likely continue to be welcomed by African leaders, reinforcing China’s long-term presence and influence on the continent.

The Forum also addressed the issue of competition between China and the West for influence in Africa. In this context, Beijing has specifically decided to significantly expand its scholarship programs, offering African representatives the opportunity to study governance and political party management. China aims to position itself as a reliable partner in Africa’s development, without the conditions often attached to Western aid.

Barring significant domestic challenges, China is expected to maintain its dominant position in Africa in the foreseeable future, having already established a strong foundation for its influence. In contrast, Russia is unlikely to challenge China’s leadership on the continent. The era when Moscow played a leading role in Africa has largely passed. Instead, Russia has opted for a more selective engagement strategy, focusing its cooperation on a core group of key African partners. Notably, five countries—Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and South Africa—account for over 70% of Russia’s total trade with Africa. When Sudan and Nigeria are included, this figure rises to approximately 85% [3]. Given this concentration of economic ties, it is likely that Moscow will continue to prioritize these partnerships in the coming years.