Abstract. The article examines the materials from the Report of the Iraq Inquiry, also known as the Chilcot report, that scrutinizes the UK government’s actions in the lead-up to and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq through the 2000s. The article focuses on the British officials’ approaches to the use of “soft power” and to managing public opinion at home and abroad as the UK prepared for employing and employed “hard power” in Iraq. It also explores the specifics of the shaping of the media space at the time that are compared to present approaches to such activities. On the basis of excerpts from the minutes of official meetings and government correspondence cited in the Chilcot report, other documents, and more recent and current UK government publications, the article identifies key characteristics of British strategies for working with partners, media, and wider public in the period covered by the Chilcot report and at the present stage. It is concluded that approaches and strategies developed during the Iraqi campaign remain relevant. The article assesses the impact of public relations strategies employed by the UK during the Iraq campaign on current political situation in Britain and its “soft power” potential.