22Received 15.10.2025. Revised 17.11.2025. Accepted 20.04.2026.
Abstract. This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the role played by international organizations – particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – in shaping a global economic order marked by institutional inequality and policy standardization. The first part examines the conceptual framework that treats international institutions as “closed clubs”, where access and influence are governed not by formal rules but by unequal distributions of power and resources. The second part focuses on the governance structure of the IMF, showing that, despite reforms after 2008, decision-making power remains concentrated in the hands of Western states, while the formal voting shares of Global South countries remain disproportionate to their growing economic weight. The third part explores the historical evolution of IMF policy, especially the promotion of a neoliberal model that often functions as a tool of macroeconomic control and limits the policy autonomy of developing countries. The fourth part presents empirical findings based on regression and content analysis, revealing that low- and lower-middle-income countries are more likely to encounter difficulties in meeting IMF conditions, particularly in fiscal and external sectors. Focusing on 2010–2015, the study shows that more IMF conditions are associated with higher implementation difficulties, especially for lower-middle-income countries in fiscal and external sectors, and for low-income countries in the financial sector. High-income countries face fewer constraints. Content analysis further reveals that similar conditions are applied across diverse countries, indicating a persistent reliance on standardized conditionality despite formal reforms. The article concludes by questioning the legitimacy of this model and calls for a more flexible and context-sensitive approach to global economic governance.
Keywords: International Monetary Fund, inequality, standardization, closed club, neoliberalism, economic dominance, conditionality, developing countries
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