18Received 01.09.2025. Revised 23.12.2025. Accepted 30.12.2025.
Abstract. This article explores the geopolitical, economic and logistical dimensions of the planned North-South International Transport Corridor, evaluating Iran’s potential involvement and the effect of its cooperation with Russia, India and Azerbaijan. Iran’s geostrategic position is critical, and Iran is seeking to pursue an independent foreign policy by focusing diplomatic efforts on improving relations with eastern states such as China, India, and Russia. This approach is based on a multipolar logic, in which transport and energy connectivity serve as instruments of not only economic growth but also foreign policy. Notably, interaction is increasing within organizations such as the SCO and BRICS thanks to the planned Corridor. Iran’s accession to these organizations demonstrates its efforts to diversify its foreign policy and indicates a high level of trust in Tehran from the Global South. India is experiencing rapid growth and interested in stable energy supplies, particularly given the instability of global markets, thus transit projects via Iran are ever more appealing. And despite its close ties with the West, India has thus far held strong against intense pressure from Washington, continuing to strengthen its cooperation with Moscow on energy and logistics. Projects related to the North–South International Transport Corridor are expected to become not just transport arteries, but also the geo-economic anchor of a new system of international relations emphasizing regional autonomy and a push to be free of dependence on the West. This creates an opportunity for establishing an integrated “Greater Eurasia” space centered on energy, logistics and infrastructure as the foundation for economic and political stability. Azerbaijan’s role has particular importance for evaluating the project’s prospects as Baku has been actively developing its own logistics and transport infrastructure in recent years.
Keywords: Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, India, North–South International Transport Corridor, geopolitics, energy
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