27Received 30.06.2025. Revised 30.08.2025. Accepted 13.11.2025.
Abstract. This article examines the profound crisis of the contemporary world order, which is characterized by high turbulence, mutual distrust, and the erosion of international law. Rejecting utopian “one-time establishment” and optimistic “natural evolution” scenarios, the analysis posits “natural-artificial evolution” as the only viable path toward a future “legal world order”. This envisioned order is defined minimally as a system in which major powers recognize their interdependence and, therefore, voluntarily adopt and collectively enforce rules aimed at preserving peace and protecting people, thereby limiting their freedom to act unilaterally. The central challenge lies in constructing the conditions for this transition without a catastrophic war, historically the primary catalyst for new security systems. The article uses analytical models to examine the obstacles and incentives for great powers. The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” framework illustrates the risks of vulnerability (“tied hands”) versus the modest gains of mutual rule adoption. The “Stag Hunt” model demonstrates the contrast between the long-term collective benefits of cooperation (“hunting the stag”) and the short-term allure of unilateral action (“hunting hares” guaranteed by sovereignty). Key obstacles include perceived costs to national sovereignty, threats of relative weakening, and blocked expansion prospects. To overcome these obstacles, the article proposes the following conceptual tools: “Incomplete contracts” allow for the gradual and reversible bundling and transfer of sovereign rights; other tools include the use of “soft” and “informal” law to build flexibility and trust, as well as the application of construal level theory to manage decision-making horizons. This theory favors abstract principles over rigid institutions in the early stages. Ultimately, the transition depends on forming and strengthening a broad “legal coalition” of states, international organizations, courts, civil society, and intellectual networks. This coalition must increase the perceived demand for order (e. g., by addressing shared threats such as terrorism) while simultaneously supplying order through initiatives that offer compensatory benefits, enhance prestige, and mitigate sovereignty costs. This will make the initial agreement between the strongest powers both rationally attractive and politically feasible.
Keywords: societies’ responses to challenges, security challenges, modern methods of social sciences, macrosociology, social orders, legal world order, conceptual modeling, social and historical dynamics, intellectual production
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