62Received 04.09.2024. Revised 06.12.2024. Accepted 27.01.2025.
Acknowledgments. This article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Science Foundation, project no. 22-78-10014, https://rscf.ru/project/22-78-10014/
Abstract. The intention of Latin American countries to join the BRICS reflects a dynamical change in the international geopolitical landscape, where they are looking for new alliances and opportunities to diversify external relations and gain strategic advantages. BRICS as a coalition promotes global governance reforms by representing interests of states seeking to transform the existing world economic and political order. Membership in the bloc brings a high level of recognition from partners and allies, as well as from other actors such as international financial institutions. Furthermore, the BRICS can give an opportunity for countries on the periphery to become part of a group of power centers. Its cooperation mechanisms provide not only a platform for trade and economic development, but also a prospect for developing countries to play more significant role in decision-making and to become active participants in creating new international regulations. These factors determine the key imperatives for Latin American countries’ entry into the bloc. The study focuses on five states in the region that have applied for membership ahead of the XVIth BRICS’ summit 2024 in Russia. They are Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The tasks of diversifying commercial ties and finding resources for socio-economic development are of paramount importance for Latin American countries. Priority is given to cooperation formats that are most complementary in terms of bilateral trade growth and integration. Bolivia’s key interest lies in attracting potential investors for the industrial sector, particularly lithium extraction. La Paz can offer cooperation in areas such as energy, mineral, and food production. Membership in BRICS may assist Venezuela in achieving several objectives, including solving economic problems and overcoming political ambiguity in international relations. Caracas, sanctioned by the US, expects to get international support from BRICS and expand its commercial opportunities through alternative mechanisms in international trade. Honduras aims mainly to access New Development Bank funding and joint projects through BRICS. Havana is interested in attracting international attention to the primary Cuban demand for the lifting of the US trade embargo. As for Nicaragua, BRICS membership meets the foreign policy tenets of the government seeking to strengthen its counterweight to US influence in the region, among other benefits. It can be expected that the deepening of cooperation between the five countries and the BRICS, with a special focus on cooperation with Russia, China, and India, will continue. Moreover, the ideological orientations of current governments and their commitment to reducing the influence of the United States in regional and global level confirm that the inclusion of Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Honduras, to a lesser extent, may contribute to strengthening the anti-Western agenda within the bloc. The convergence of economic and political interests indicates a long-term trend toward Latin America’s participation in various formats of multilateral cooperation, integration into international financial mechanisms, and promotion of further interaction with the non-Western part of the globe. Considering the upcoming rotation of presidencies, which transferred 2025 to Brazil, the importance of the Latin American region for the BRICS is likely to increase.
Keywords: BRICS, Latin America, Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras, Cuba, Nicaragua, foreign policy, international relations, BRICS expansion
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