65Received 18.08.2025. Revised 16.09.2025. Accepted 03.10.2025.
Acknowledgements. This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development no. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”.
Abstract. The article examines the transformation of Iran’s proxy strategy in the context of profound political changes in the Middle East and the weakening of Tehran’s traditional allies. Particular attention is given to the events of 2023–2025, including the twelve-day Iran–Israel war, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, and the significant losses sustained by Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian formations in Levant. Based on the analysis of these factors, it is shown that Iran has faced the necessity of rethinking its reliance on a limited and institutionalized circle of allies and shifting toward a more flexible network of interactions. The article discusses potential establishment of new logistical supply routes and redistribution of financial flows, with particular attention to Iran’s impact on the dynamics of regional conflicts. While this strategy remains central in Iran’s foreign policy arsenal, it increasingly combines traditional proxy structures and temporary and front organizations. At the same time, Tehran seeks to offset the military setbacks of the “Axis of Resistance” by expanding political and economic contacts with regional states, including Egypt and Gulf monarchies. The study also examines the perception of proxy strategy within Iranian political discourse. The term “proxy” is rejected by Tehran as a Western construct, while the activities of allied movements are presented as legitimate “resistance” against “Zionism and American imperialism”. In conclusion, it is argued that the transformation of the Iranian model reflects a broader process of change in international relations, within which proxy wars have become one of the key instruments of global politics, reshaping the balance of power and the nature of conflicts in the Middle East and beyond.
Keywords: Iran, Middle East, proxy war, Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas, Yemen, international security
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