118Received 22.04.2024. Revised 30.04.2024. Accepted 29.05.2024.
Abstract. The formation of a geopolitical triangle between the U.S., PRC and Russia is becoming the main driving factor shaping the strategic landscape. This raises several key questions for researchers. It is necessary to clarify the peculiarities of the “tripolar” world order from the military-strategic point of view and identify innovations it brings to the existing methodological corpus of studying and maintaining strategic stability. The dynamics of contradictions in this system is complex, characterized by multiple variants of transformation into a more or less stable system, which will form the basis of the emerging multilateral world order. The three main players can enter into different relationship models and change them as the situation evolves. The military-strategic dimension of trilateral interaction has already significantly changed views on the operating factors and the essence of strategic stability compared to the way it was understood at the end of the Cold War. The situation is seen as far less stable than in the bipolar model of confrontation which was realized during the Cold War. It is necessary to rebuild the system of risk reduction measures, including declarative ones. However, it seems clear that such a process could only develop sustainably in parallel with a broadbased process of international political détente. This will require all parties to the process to manage the acute phase of the crisis around Ukraine, creating grounds for revising the foundation of strategic relations in Europe following the principles of equal and indivisible security. At the same time, a comprehensive regional security system in the Indo-Pacific will be needed that can effectively address the most pressing issues of U.S. – China contest there. Despite the fact that relations in the triangle are currently in an acute phase of confrontation, conclusions should already be drawn about the practical forms of realizing the notions of strategic stability through arms control measures.
Keywords: arms control, international security, deterrence, strategic stability, tripolar world order, escalation
REFERENCES
1. Waltz K. The Stability of a Bipolar World. Daedalus, 1964, vol. 93, no. 3, pp. 881-909. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026863 (accessed 28.03.2024).
2. Caplow T. A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad. American Sociological Review, 1956, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 489-493. DOI: 10.2307/2088718
3. Tatu M. The Great Power Triangle: Washington–Moscow–Peking. Paris, Atlantic Institute, 1970. 27 p.
4. Brown R. Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle. Foreign Policy, 1976, no. 23, pp. 3-24. DOI: 10.2307/1147867
5. Garrett B. China Policy and the Strategic Triangle. Oye K., Rothchild D., Lieber R., eds. Eagle Entangled: U. S. Foreign Policy in A Complex World. London, Longman, 1979, pp. 228-264.
6. Graham T. China–Russia–USA: Relations and Strategic Triangles. Polis. Political Studies, 2020, no. 6, pp. 62-72. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2020.06.05
7. Dittmer L. The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis. World Politics, 1981, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 485-515. DOI: 10.2307/2010133
8. Zuenko I.Yu. Russia-China Partnership in the Context of US-China Rivalry: Search of Starting Point and Assessment of Prospects. World Economy and International Relations, 2023, vol. 67, no. 11, pp. 24-34. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-11-24-34
9. Goldstein J., Freeman J. US-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations? The American Political Science Review, 1991, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 17-35. DOI: 10.2307/1962876
10. Wishnick E. Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001. 320 p.
11. Dittmer L. Ghost of the Strategic Triangle: The Sino-Russian Partnership. Zhao S., ed. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 207-223.
12. Bobo L. Russia, China and the United States. From Strategic Triangularism to the Post-modern Triangle. Paris, IFRI, 2010. 36 p.
13. Wohlforth W. et al. Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History. European Journal of International Relations, 2007, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 155-185. DOI: 10.1177/1354066107076951
14. Arbatov A.G., Dvorkin V.Z. The Great Strategic Triangle. Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013. 36 p. (In Russ.)
15. Khudaikulova A.V. Geopolitical Triangles in the Context of International Security. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, 2020, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 53-73. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2020-13-4-3
16. Kristensen H., Korda M. China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion: From Minimum Deterrence to Medium Deterrence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 01.09.2021. Available at: https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-minimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/ (accessed 28.03.2024).
17. Korda M., Kristensen H. A Closer Look at China’s Missile Silo Construction. Federation of American Scientists, 02.11.2021. Available at: https://fas.org/publication/a-closer-look-at-chinas-missile-silo-construction/ (accessed 28.03.2024).
18. Kashin V.B. The Development of Chinese Nuclear Forces: Start of a Deep Transformation. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, 2016, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 76-93. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2016- 9-4-76-93
19. Wohlstetter A. The Delicate Balance of Terror. Foreign Affairs, 1959, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 211-234. DOI: 10.2307/20029345
20. Schelling T. Surprise Attack and Disarmament. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1959, vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 413-418. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1959.11454030
21. Roberts B. Tripolar Stability: The Future of Nuclear Relations Among the United States, Russia, and China. Alexandria, VA, Institute for Defense Analysis, 2002. 80 p.
22. Arbatov A.G. Strategic Stability and Chinese Gambit. World Economy and International Relations, 2022, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 5-22. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-3-5-22
23. Maurer J.D., Maurer J.H. The Challenge of Tripolar Arms Competition: Lessons from the Washington Treaty. War on the Rocks, 10.11.2023. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-challenge-of-tripolar-arms-competition-lessons-from-the-washington-treaty/ (accessed 28.03.2024).
24. Bogdanov K.V. The Escalation Risks of Multi-Domain Battles. World Economy and International Relations, 2023, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 29-39. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-4-29-39
25. Stefanovich D.V. Forever current. Russia in Global Affairs, 2021, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 61-74. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.31278/1810-6439-2021-19-6-61-74
26. Miller F. U.S. Nuclear Policy in a Two Peer Nuclear Adversary World. Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035. Washington, DC, CSIS, 2023, pp. 38-48. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep53287.6 (accessed 28.03.2024).
27. Savelyev A.G. Is It Appropriate to “For Three”? Russia in Global Affairs, 2020, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 202-215. (In Russ.) Available at: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/umestno-li-na-troih/?ysclid=lwdpuexgj4477249442 (accessed 28.03.2024).
28. Bull H. The Control of the Arms Race. Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age. New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 215 p.
SOURCES
1. 2022 Space and Missile Defense Symposium. U. S. Strategic Command, 11.08.2022. Available at: https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/3126694/2022-space-and-missile-defense-symposium/ (accessed 28.03.2024).
2. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, The White House, 2017. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf (accessed 28.03.2024).
3. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, The White House, 2017. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf (accessed 28.03.2024).
4. 2022 National Defense Strategy. Washington, Department of Defense, 2022. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed 28.03.2024).
5. 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. 2022 National Defense Strategy. Washington, Department of Defense, 2022. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed 28.03.2024).
6. America’s Strategic Posture. The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Washington, Institute for Defense Analysis, 2023. Available at: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf (accessed 28.03.2024).
7. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023. Washington, Department of Defense, 2023. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF (accessed 28.03.2024).
8. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022. Washington, Department of Defense, 2022. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF (accessed 28.03.2024).
No comments