175Received 17.03.2024. Revised 18.04.2024. Accepted 24.04.2024.
Abstract. In the kaleidoscopic events of the current international politics, the destiny of the Russian-American Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the New START Treaty and in Russia – as the START-3 Treaty) has moved to the shadow of the world public opinion. In February 2021, the parties extended the New START Treaty by five years – until February 2026, and launched consultations in Geneva on strategic stability including the scope of the follow-on treaty. However, the U.S. interrupted this dialogue in February 2022 in reaction to the special military operation of Russia in Ukraine. Since then the Western states have been increasing their participation in the conflict by massive deliveries of arms and military equipment to Ukraine, as well as by applying unprecedented economic and political sanctions against Russia. On its part, Russia has declared suspension of participation in the New START Treaty on February 21, 2023 in response to the policy of the West, openly aimed at inflicting “the strategic defeat” on Russia, and for some other reasons. Under these conditions, the uncertain future of the New START Treaty and of the endurance of negotiations of the two nuclear superpowers is prone with the expanding crisis of the strategic stability and global security. Disintegration of this bearing construction would most probably trigger the collapse of other crucial agreements in this sphere: the ban on nuclear testing and prevention of nuclear proliferation, prohibition of deployment of nuclear arms in space and on the seabed. Without strategic arms control it would be impossible to expand the process of nuclear disarmament to the third nuclear-armed states and other kinds of weapons and disruptive military technologies.
Keywords: New START Treaty, strategic stability, arms control, negotiations on arms reduction, non-proliferation of nuclear arms, prohibition of nuclear tests, third nuclear-armed states, strategic delivery vehicles, nuclear warheads, disruptive military technologies
REFERENCES
1. Gordon Ì.R. U.S. Stops Sharing Data on Nuclear Forces with Russia. The Wall Street Journal, 28.03.2023. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wont-share-data-on-nuclear-forces-with-russia-46700a50 (accessed 08.04.2023).
2. Turner M.S. The Not So Diabolical Crossbow: A Re-Examination of Innocent II’s Supposed Ban of the Crossbow at the Second Lateran Council. New York, Robert Appleton Company, 2007. 43 p.
3. Bogoturov A.D., ed. A Systematic History of International Relations: in 4 volumes, 1918–2000. Vol. 2. Documents of the 1910s‑1940s. Moscow, Moskovskii rabochii, 2000. 243 p. (In Russ.)
4. Arbatov A. Nuclear Arms Control: the End of History? World Economy and International Relations, 2015, no. 5, pp. 5-18. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-5-5-18
5. Chernyshev A.K. From the generation of winners. Academician A.D. Sakharov in the USSR Atomic Project. Sarov, FGUP RFYATS-VNIIZHF, 2021. 287 p. (In Russ.)
6. Davis J., Friel P., Pfaltzgraff R. SALT II and U.S. – Soviet Strategic Forces. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, INC. Cambridge, Mass., Washington D. C., 1979. 51 p.
7. Cochran T., Arkin W., Hoeing M. Nuclear Weapons Data book. U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Vol. I. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. Cambridge, Mass., Harper &Row, Publ., Inc., 1984. 340 p.
8. SIPRI Yearbook 1986: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. 611 p.
9. Nazarkin Y. About diplomatic everyday life and other stories. Memoirs of a diplomat. Moscow, MGIMO-University. 2011. 320 p. (In Russ.)
10. Arbatov A. Doomsday Dialectics: the Arms Race with Arms Limitations. Polis. Political Studies, 2019, no. 3, pp. 27-48. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2019/03/03
11. Calmes J. Obama Asks Russia to Join in Reducing Nuclear Arms. New York Times, 19.07.2013. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/europe/obama-asks-russia-to-join-in-reducing-nuclear-arms.html (accessed 14.04.2024).
12. Pifer S. Reviving nuclear arms control under Biden. Brookings, 01.12.2020. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reviving-nuclear-arms-control-under-biden/ (accessed 16.04.2024).
13. Gottemoeller R. Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control. The Washington Quarterly, 19.07.2020, vol. 43, iss. 3, pp. 139-159. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1813382
14. Korda M., Kristensen H., Reynolds E. Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13.03.2023. Available at: https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/nuclear-notebook-chinese-nuclear-weapons-2023/ (accessed 05.04.2023).
15. Arbatov A. Strategic Stability and Chinese Gambit. World Economy and International Relations, 2022, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 5-22. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-3-5-22
16. Litovkin D. The Last Equalizer. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 09.06.2022. (In Russ.) Available at https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-06-09/1_1192_equalizer.html (accessed 16.04.2024).
17. Tadtaev G. Putin instructed to look into the construction of a nuclear installation in space. RBK, 14.03.2024. (In Russ.) Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/14/03/2024/65f30f909a794712ec0378ee (accessed 16.04.2024).
18. Poroskov N. Russia will be protected by “Poseidon”. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 20.04.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2023-04-20/1_1233_poseidon.html (accessed 17.04.2023).
19. Tukembaev Ch. Retribution of the new wave. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 29.01.2019. (In Russ.) Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20190712002229/https://vpk-news.ru/articles/47945 (accessed 18.04.2024).
20. Sivkov K. The elusive “Poseidon”. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 05.03.2019 (In Russ.) Available at: https://trueinform.ru/modules.php?name=Laid&sid=38971&ysclid=lvcmu3ivav278428741 (accessed 18.04.2024).
21. Sivkov K. Disarmed and Dangerous. Voennoe obozrenie, 26.03.2017 (In Russ.) Available at: https://topwar.ru/111529-razoruzhen-i-ochen-opasen.html (accessed 18.04.2024).
22. Arbatov A. Miltilateral Strategic Dialogue: Dilemmas and Obstacles. World Economy and International Relations, 2023, vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 5-21. (In Russ.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-7-5-21
23. Bolton J.R. Putin did the world a favor by suspending Russia’s participation in New START. The Washington Post, 06.03.2023. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/03/06/russia-china-united-states-tripolar-nuclear-powers/ (accessed 16.04.2024).
24. Khazbiev A. The System of Control Over START is a Corpse Which Cannot Be Revived. Expert, no. 4 (1148), 14.01.2020. (In Russ.) Available at: https://expert.ru/2020/01/14/sistema-kontrolya-nad-snv--eto-trup-kotoryij-nevozmozhno-ozhivit/ (accessed 12.04.2024).
25. Karaganov S.A. Age of wars? Article two. What to do. Russia in Global Affairs, 21.02.2024. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.31278/1810-6439-2024-22-2-37-52 Available at: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vek-vojn-chto-delat/ (accessed 17.04.2024).
26. Panda A., Volpe T. Limited Leverage: Nuclear Latency in South Korea’s Alliance Bargaining. The Washington Quarterly, 15.04.2024, pp. 147-166. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2024.2326727
27. Kuhn U. Germany debates nuclear weapons again. But now it is different. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15.03.2024. Available at: https://thebulletin.org/2024/03/germany-debates-nuclear-weapons-again-but-now-its-different/ (accessed 17.04.2024).
28. Kearn d. Strategic myopia: the proposed first use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan. War on the Rocks, 14.03.2024. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/strategic-myopia-the-proposed-first-use-of-tactical-nuclear-weapons-to-defend-taiwan/ (accessed 17.04.2024).
SOURCES
1. Presidential Address to Federal Assembly. Official website of the President of Russia, 21.02.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565 (accessed 08.04.2024).
2. Russian Noncompliance with and Invalid Suspension of the New START Treaty. U. S. Department of State, 15.03.2023. Available at: https://www.state.gov/russian-noncompliance-with-and-invalid-suspension-of-the-new-start-treaty (accessed 08.04.2024).
3. Foreign Ministry statement on the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 21.02.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1855184/ (accessed 08.04.2024).
4. Report to Congress on implementation of the New START Treaty. Washington D. C. The US State Department, 31.01.2024. 19 p. Available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023-New-START-Treaty-Implementation-Report.pdf (accessed 08.04.2024).
5. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with TASS news agency, Moscow, December 28, 2023. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 28.12.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1923539/ (accessed 01.04.2024).
6. Council for Civil Society and Human Rights meeting. Official website of the President of Russia, 07.12.2022. (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/new (accessed 05.04.2023).
7. Interview to Dmitry Kiselev. Official website of the President of Russia, 13.03.2024. (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73648 (accessed 05.04.2024).
8. Soviet-American summit meeting. Geneva, 19–21 November 1985: Documents and materials. Moscow, Politizdat, 1985. 77 p. (In Russ.)
9. Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability. State visit of USSR President M. S. Gorbachev to the United States of America, May 30 – June 4, 1990. Documents and Materials. Moscow, Politizdat, 1990. pp. 197-199. (In Russ.)
10. START II. Facts and arguments (White Paper). Moscow, International relations.1993. 250 p. (In Russ.)
11. Speech by the delegation of the Russian Federation at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (cluster 1, nuclear disarmament), Vienna, August 3, 2023. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 08.03.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1900234/ (accessed 17.04.2024).
12. The Obama Administration has planned to change the doctrine of the use of nuclear force. Interfax, 16.07.2016. (In Russ.) Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/world/518835 (accessed 14.04.2024).
13. Ryabkov: Russia Offers the United States to Include Non-Nuclear Weapons in Strategic Agenda. TASS, 27.01.2021. (In Russ.) Available at: https://tass.ru/politika/10557045 (accessed 14.04.2024).
14. Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples’ Republics of China, 2021. Annual Report to Congress. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF (accessed 27.12.2021).
15. America’s Strategic Posture. The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Washington D. C., 20.10.2023. 160 p.
16. Executive Order approving Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. Official website of the President of Russia, 31.03.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811 (accessed 05.04.2023).
No comments