57Received 20.12.2023. Revised 31.01.2024. Accepted 01.02.2024.
Abstract. War, loss of control over part of the territory, and economic sanctions have had a devastating effect on Syria’s economy. However, the country has managed to survive. This has been possible in part due to the measures of the Syrian government, private business, and the population to resist and adapt to economic sanctions. The adaptation strategy had not been planned, and the measures the state, private business, and the population have taken were not coordinated, unlike, for example, in Iran’s case, where strategies are developed and then announced based on future economic risks. Because of this, this strategy of counteraction and adaptation to economic sanctions may be termed as adaptive. The most serious economic sanctions on the Syrian economy have been imposed by the US, the EU, and the League of Arab States. They have restricted Syrian access to goods, technology, financial instruments and products, investments, and even in some cases humanitarian aid from the countries that initiated the sanctions. It is a very difficult task to identify the real Syrian losses caused by the economic sanctions, but it can be accurately asserted, based on the analysis in this article, that they do not allow the country to move forward to the recovery phase. State measures of adaptation to economic sanctions were supposed to become a buffer that would allow the national economy not only to survive, but also to move from stagnation to economic growth. However, it has to be stated that the situational strategy of adaptation to economic sanctions allowed the national economy to remain in a viable state, however, it does not allow it to move from recession to growth.
Keywords: Syria, economic sanctions, countering sanctions pressure, situational adaptation, adaptation policy
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