289Received 14.03.2023. Revised 03.04.2023. Accepted 28.04.2023.
Abstract. The Biden administration openly declares Washington’s intention to “play offense, act more aggressively” against China, which, in its opinion, is an “unfriendly” country and pursues a policy of “military-civilian fusion” aimed at undermining American production and national security. In accordance with the doctrine of “precision decoupling”, the desire to “actively strangle large segments of the Chinese technology industry” becomes a priority instrument of pressure on China and is put above the commercial interests of American companies and concerns about the possible diplomatic or economic consequences of these steps. Subsidies, tax incentives, as well as regulations obliging American enterprises to use local raw materials, components and parts become the main instruments of competition designed to “put an end” to US dependence on imports of semiconductor products. The possibility of extending restrictions on the sale of almost any equipment containing at least a small proportion of American technologies is being studied. The actions of the Biden administration are based on the presumption of the existence of an insurmountable gap in the scientific and technical power of the United States and China. However, an objective analysis of the existing global economic relations in the semiconductor industry indicates a high degree of dependence of this industry in the United States on the state of cooperation with firms in China, Taiwan and South Korea. A radical restructuring of supply and logistics chains can lead to an increase in production costs and, ultimately, to disruptions in the US manufacturing sector. Despite the sanctions, China aims to increase its share in the semiconductor technology market and intends to concentrate resources on original and innovative scientific and technical research to pursue a course towards self-sufficiency.
Keywords: USA, China, technological leadership, economic nationalism, industrial policy, supply chains, import substitution, protectionism, trade policy
REFERENCES
1. Gaida J., Wong-Leung J., Robin S., Cave D. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker. The Global Race for Future Power. Washington, ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre, February 2023. Available at: https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-03/ASPIs%20Critical%20Technology%20Tracker_0.pdf?VersionId=ndm5v4DRMfpLvu.x69Bi_VUdMVLp07jw (accessed 12.03.2023).
2. Varas A., Varadarajan R., Palma R., Goodrich J., Yinug F. Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. Washington, BCG/SIA, 01.04.2021. Available at: https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain (accessed 12.03.2023).
3. Matheny J. The U.S. Has a Microchip Problem. Safeguarding Taiwan Is the Solution. The Atlantic, 03.10.2022. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/10/taiwan-microchip-supply-chain-china/671615/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
4. Hufbauer G., Hogan M. CHIPS Act Will Spur US Production but Not Foreclose China. Washington, PIIE, October 2022. Available at: https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/2022-10/pb22-13.pdf (accessed 12.03.2023).
5. Ezell S., Koester S. Three Cheers for the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. Now, Let’s Get Back to Work. Washington, ITIF, 29.07.2022. Available at: https://itif.org/publications/2022/07/29/three-cheers-for-the-chips-and-science-act-of-2022-now-lets-get-back-to-work/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
6. Alper A., Nellis S., Yang H. Exclusive: Samsung’s New Texas Chip Plant Cost Rises above $25 Billion. Reuters, 16.03.2023. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/technology/samsungs-new-texas-chip-plant-cost-rises-above-25-billion-sources-2023-03-15/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
7. Swanson A., Clark D. Chip Makers Turn Cutthroat in Fight for Share of Federal Money. The New York Times, 23.02.2023. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/business/economy/chip-makers-fight-federal-money.html?action=click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage§ion=Technology (accessed 12.03.2023).
8. Zinkula J. The World’s Biggest Chipmaker Is Making a Multi-Billion Dollar Investment in the US Even Though It’ll Cost Way More to Make Chips There. Here’s Why It Decided to Do It Anyway. Business Insider, 17.12.2022. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.nl/the-worlds-biggest-chipmaker-is-making-a-multi-billion-dollar-investment-in-the-us-even-though-itll-cost-way-more-to-make-chips-there-heres-why-it-decided-to-do-it-anyway/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
9. Clark D., Swanson A. U.S. Pours Money into Chips, but Even Soaring Spending Has Limits. The New York Times, 01.01.2023. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/01/technology/us-chip-making-china-invest.html (accessed 12.03.2023).
10. Tang K. In Its Rivalry with the US, China Can Leverage 3 Advantages. InoSMI, 30.01.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: https://inosmi.ru/20230130/kitay-260146198.html (accessed 12.03.2023).
11. Gans J. DOJ, Commerce Department Strike Force to Fight Technology Threats from Adversaries. The Hill, 16.02.2023. Available at: https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3861681-doj-commerce-department-strike-force-to-fight-technology-threats-from-adversaries/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
12. Arcesati R., Hmaidi A. Industry, Allies and Partners Face Tough Choices as US-China Tech War Escalates. Mercator Institute for China Studies, Berlin, 20.10.2022. Available at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/industry-allies-and-partners-face-tough-choices-us-china-tech-war-escalates (accessed 12.03.2023).
13. Daniels O., Hunt W. Sustaining and Growing the U.S. Semiconductor. Advantage: A Primer. Washington, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, June 2022. Available at: https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Sustaining-Growing-US-Semiconductor-Advantage-A-Primer.pdf (accessed 12.03.2023).
14. Hufbauer G., Hogan M. Washington Won’t Chip away at China’s Military with Semiconductor Sanctions. EastAsiaForum, 11.12.2022. Available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/11/washington-wont-chip-away-at-chinas-military-with-semiconductor-sanctions/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
15. Bresnick S., Sher N. New Export Controls on Chinese Semiconductors May Prove Self-Defeating. ChinaFile, 16.09.2022. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/new-export-controls-chinese-semiconductors-may-prove-self-defeating (accessed 12.03.2023).
16. Schmidt E. Innovation Power. Foreign Affairs, March–April 2023. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/eric-schmidt-innovation-power-technology-geopolitics?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=special_send&utm_campaign=post_release_tech&utm_content=20230309&utm_term=promo-email-prospects (accessed 12.03.2023).
SOURCES
1. 2022 Report to Congress of the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, U. S. Government Publishing Office, November 2022. Available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/2022_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf (accessed 12.03.2023).
2. Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit. Washington, The White House, 16.09.2022. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
3. 2022 State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry. Washington, SIA, November 2022. Available at: https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SIA_State-of-Industry-Report_Nov-2022.pdf (accessed 12.03.2023).
4. Fact Sheet: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China. Washington, The White House, 09.08.2022. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
5. Remarks by President Biden at Signing of H.R. 4346, “The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022”. Washington, The White House, 09.08.2022. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/08/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-h-r-4346-the-chips-and-science-act-of-2022/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
6. U.S. Export Controls and China. Washington, CRS, 24.03.2022. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11627.pdf (accessed 12.03.2023).
7. Yellen Called Dependence on Taiwan in Semiconductors a Risk to US National Security. TASS, 22.09.2022. (In Russ.) Available at: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15841031 (accessed 12.03.2023).
8. Fact Sheet: United States and India Elevate Strategic Partnership with the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET). Washington, The White House, 31.01.2023. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/31/fact-sheet-united-states-and-india-elevate-strategic-partnership-with-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology-icet/ (accessed 12.03.2023).
9. Top Meeting Urges Expedited Establishment of New Pattern of Development. Global Times, 01.02.2023. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202302/1284649.shtml (accessed 12.03.2023).
10. GT Voice: West’s Obsession with Replacing China’s Supply Chains Counterproductive. Global Times, 05.03.2023. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1286680.shtml (accessed 12.03.2023).
11. Semiconductor Decoupling Push Disturbs Global Supply Chain: Experts. Global Times, 01.03.2023. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1286461.shtml (accessed 12.03.2023).
No comments