The article deals with the institutional performance of the U.S. executive power on the policy of sanctions. The topic is much less reflected in the literature in comparison with “canonical” issues like sanctions efficiency or particular case-studies of sanctions implementation. The goal is to fill in the gap in the literature on the following research questions. How do the U.S. sanctions policy executive institutions work? What is an extant of their involvement into the policy of sanctions? What is the balance of power between them? Why are particular institutes more active in comparison with others, and does it mean greater influence in terms of decision-making and implementation? The hypothesis implies that the U.S. executive institutions compose an imbalanced system with a skew in favor of the Department of the Treasury. However, this skew is smoothed by functional exclusiveness of other institutions and the impact of their decisions on sanctioned persons and states. “Sanctions Events Database” is used to test this assumption. Events are classified in terms of their institutional initiator (Department of the Treasury, Department of State, etc.), target states or problems, types of action, etc. The data is taken from open sources. It reflects a “micro-level” of institutional performance, depicting its everyday practice. The analysis demonstrates that a majority of events are connected to the Department of the Treasury, which is most active in comparison with other institutions. The Department of Commerce initiates much less events, however, the coverage of affected persons under its restrictions may be comparable to the one of the Treasury. The Department of Justice also initiates much less events, but the consequences for targets are harder due to criminal enforcement functions of the Department. The article relies on the 2020 data-set. This data is enough to understand basic trends of the U.S. executive institutions performance related to the policy of sanctions. Still, more data is needed to avoid possible fluctuations related to particular years.
sanctions policy, sanctions, United States, executive power, institutions, event-analysis
- Timofeev I. Sanctions Against Russia: A Look into 2021: Report 65/2021. Moscow, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) NPMP, 2021. 24 p. Available at: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/sanctions-against-russia-a-look-into-2021/ (accessed 23.05.2021).
- Hufbauer G., Shott J., Elliott K., Oegg B. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Third Edition. Washington DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. 233 p.
- Drury C. Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions. Models of Political Rationality. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 225 p.
- Zarate J. Treasury Wars. The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare. New York, Public Affairs, 2013. 488 p.
- Early B., Preble K. Enforcing Economic Sanctions: Analyzing How OFAC Punishes Violators of U. S. Sanctions. 2018. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306653 (accessed 10.06.2021).
- Glandin S. The Role of Internet in Search for the Evaders of the U. S. Sanctions in Relation to Russia. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 11, 2018, no. 6, pp. 96-112. (In Russ.)
- Bown Ch. Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat. Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper, 2020. 21 p.
- Bapat N.A., Heinrich T., Kobayashi Y., Morgan C. Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions, 2013, vol. 39, pp. 79-98.
- Timofeev I. Rethinking Sanctions Efficiency. Evidence from 205 Cases of the U. S. Government Enforcement Actions against Business. Russia in Global Affairs, 2019, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 86-108. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2019-17-3-86-108
- Jones L., Portela C. Evaluating the Success of International Sanctions: A New Research Agenda. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 2020, no. 125, pp. 39-60.
- Nephew R. The Art of Sanctions. A View from the Field. New York, Columbia University Press, 2017. 216 p.
- Jazairy I. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights. United Nations General Assempbly. 2015. 18 p. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=565ff2df4&skip=0&query=unilateral (accessed 06.06.2021).
- Drezner D. Targeted Sanctions Research in a World of Global Finance. International Interactions, 2015, vol. 41, pp. 755-764.
- Giumelli F. The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions. Targeted Sanctions. The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action. Beirsteker T., Eckert S., Tourihno M., eds. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 38-59.
- Timofeev I. Sanctions for Sanctions Violation: U.S. Department of Treasury Enforcement Actions Against the Financial Sector. Political Studies, 2020, no. 6, pp. 73-90. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2020.06.06
- 16. Casey Ch., et all. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2020. Available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45618 (10.06.2021).
Registered in System SCIENCE INDEX