Abstract. Linking the 100th anniversary of the CPC, celebrated in 2021, with long-term goals, the Chinese leadership is talking about the country’s entry into the next stage of development – the stage of the “second century of the CPC.” The 14th plan for the socio-economic development of the country for 2021–2025, adopted in March 2021 and long-range objectives through 2035 are seen as the first steps in a new round of China’s evolution. According to the Chinese leadership, the goals of the first century have been largely achieved. Now China faces more ambitious tasks: 1) achieve socialist modernization by 2035, doubling its GDP per capita to the level of an average developed country; 2) to reach the German or Japanese level of industrial and innovative development by 2050; 3) to ensure the innovative and scientific and technological self-sufficiency of China in order to get away from the current technological dependence on the United States and the West in general, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, poses a threat to the national security of the PRC; 4) to create by 2027 (100th anniversary of the PLA) a strong modern army; 5) Ensure China’s global leadership by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. The peculiarities of the new 14th five-year plan include the absence of targets for GDP growth rates for 2021–2025. The benchmark will now be set every year. For example, for 2021, this indicator is set in the highly redundant formulation “6 percent or more”. Beijing records the nearing transition from quantitative planning to qualitative planning. The aggravation of relations between China and the United States under the Biden administration and Beijing’s retaliatory, in a new way, actions in almost all areas, from ideology to security and defense, in the near future will change the global balance of power and lead to the formation of a “new bipolarity” implying in the context of globalization, that in addition to the two new planetary “poles” in the world, regional and subregional centers of power will persist and develop, forming, as saying in China, modern “polycentricity”. Against such a background, the “new bipolarity” will be characterized not only by a direct clash of Chinese and American interests, but also by a struggle for dominance, influence, and alliance with the leaders of the “polycentric world.” Within the framework of the “new bipolarity”, the United States is strengthening relations with allies, opposing the “democratic economy” of the West to the “authoritarianism of China”. The concept of financing by the West of the world transport infrastructure of a “democratic sense” as opposed to the “authoritarian” Chinese “Belt and Road” is put forward. In the reciprocal steps of China to attract partners to the “Chinese pole”, the main place is given to Russia, relations with which are characterized as “exemplary” for the whole world. At the same time, there is an opinion among Chinese experts that “excessive rapprochement” with Russia is unprofitable for China, since for Russia, as well as for the United States, China is not only a partner, but also a “strategic competitor.” China has become the main Russian trade and economic partner, in many directions it has turned into an uncontested supplier. At the same time, the “Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership in a New Era” contains many tactical and long-term problems.