NATO versus PESCO: Economic Aspects

345
DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-6-40-50

V. Vorotnikov (vorotnikov.vladislav@gmail.com),
MGIMO-University, 76, Vernadskogo Prosp., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation;
Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), 11–3, Mokhovaya Str., Moscow, 125009, Russian Federation.
N. Gribin (n.gordin40@gmail.com),
MGIMO-University, 76, Vernadskogo Prosp., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation.
D. Petlyaeva (daryaalexandrovnafeel@yandex.ru),
MGIMO-University, 76, Vernadskogo Prosp., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation.
E. Pimenova (pimminito14@gmail.com),
MGIMO-University, 76, Vernadskogo Prosp., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation.
U. Yakutova (u.yakutova@my.mgimo.ru),
MGIMO-University, 76, Vernadskogo Prosp., Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation

Abstract. The article is devoted to economic consequences of the demands of the U. S. President Donald Trump to European NATO allies to increase defense spendings in the context of intensified European defense cooperation (in particular, the implementation of the PESCO initiative). Within NATO, a line of tension “West-East” or “old-new members” has been identified, due to both economic (the size and level of the economies’ development) and political (attitude to the USA as a guarantor of security) reasons. European states have committed to increase spendings both within NATO (defense investment pledge) and within PESCO. On the one hand, the development of the European defense identity and the growth of defense spendings will in any case serve to strengthen the overall NATO capabilities. On the other hand, in the medium and long term these measures are unlikely to lead to real strategic autonomy of Europe, although they are aimed at strengthening support for the military-industrial complex of the largest European states. The U.S. considers such policy as a challenge, given that American defense contractors have traditionally been involved in the distribution of defense orders in Europe (while the U.S. market is nearly closed for European companies). Under conditions of growing uncertainty and the crisis of globalization, support for defense industry enterprises can create additional impetus for internationalization of this economy sector, without which European products are unlikely to remain competitive in the global arms export market. The analysis shows that France as a country with one of the most technologically advanced military-industrial complexes will be the main “motor” and, most likely, the beneficiary of strengthening defense cooperation in Europe. Moreover, an additional factor of French ambitions may be a significant share of state participation in the defense sector of the economy and, in general, the strongest (in comparison with Germany and the UK) “national link” of the industry.

Keywords: NATO, European Union, European integration, PESCO, military industrial complex, military industry, strategic autonomy, arms export, security policy, trans-Atlantic relations


REFERENCRS 

1. Kauffmann S. Europe de la defense: la “Belle au bois dormant” se reveille. Le Monde, 15.11.2017. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/11/15/europe-en-attendant-berlin_5215081_3232.html#SeSES1huJ3fVzPPr.99 (accessed 14.03.2020).

2. Keohane D. Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense. Carnegie Europe, 02.08.2016. Available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64222 (accessed 14.03.2020).

3. Andreeva T.N. Voenno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Velikobritaniya-ES [Military-Technological Cooperation UK–EU]. Svobodnaya mysl, 2018, no. 5, pp. 87-100.

4. Istomin I., Bolgova I. Budushchee NATO: istochniki neopredelennosti i vozmozhnye stsenarii razvitiya. Doklad [Future of NATO: Sources of Uncertainty and Possible Development Scenarios]. “Valdai” Discussion club, October, 2018. 63 p.

5. Degtereva E.A. Konsolidatsionnye protsessy v oboronnoi promyshlennosti Evropeiskogo soyuza: Monografiya [Consolidation Processes in the Defense Industry of the European Union: Monograph]. Moscow, RUDN, 2016. 232 p.

6. Gromyko Al.A. Dilemmy Evropeiskogo oboronnogo soyuza [Dilemmas of the European Defence Union]. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law, 2019, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 6-28. DOI:10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-2-6-28

7. Danilov D.A. Evropeiskaya oborona – neudobnye voprosy [European Defence – Awkward Questions]. “Valdai” Discussion club, 23.09.2019. Available at: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/evropeyskaya-oborona-neudobnye-voprosy/ (accessed 14.03.2020).

8. Houwelingen J. van, Rose C. Western Europe: Prospects for Cooperation in Defence. The RUSI Journal, 1985, vol. 130, no. 3, pp. 10-13. DOI:10.1080/03071848508522678

9. Mott W.H. Transatlantic Defence‐Industrial Collaboration. The RUSI Journal, 1991, vol. 136, no. 1, pp. 58-65. DOI:10.1080/03071849108445496

10. Hartley K. The Future of European Defence Policy: An Economic Perspective. Defence and Peace Economics, 2003, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 107-115. DOI:10.1080/10242690302921

11. Meijer H.L.E. Post-Cold War Trends in the European Defence Industry: Implications for Transatlantic Industrial Relations. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2010, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 63-77. DOI:10.1080/14782801003638745

12. Fiott D. Modernising NATO’s Defence Infrastructure with EU Funds. Survival, 2016, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 77-94. DOI:10.1080/00396338.2016.1161905

13. Fiott D. The EU, NATO and the European Defence Market: Do Institutional Responses to Defence Globalisation Matter? European Security, 2017, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 398-414. DOI:10.1080/09662839.2017.1352582

14. Calcara A. Cooperation and Conflict in the European Defence-Industrial Field: The Role of Relative Gains. Defence Studies, 2018, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 474-497. DOI:10.1080/14702436.2018.1487766

15. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (20132019). Communique PR/CP (2019)123. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 29 November 2019. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171356.htm (accessed 14.03.2020).

16. Hoffmann C. Der Zwei-Prozent-Fetisch. Spiegel Politik, 04.04.2019. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/nato-der-zwei-prozent-fetisch-kommentar-a-1261274.html (accessed 14.03.2020).

17. Korkmaz S. The Effect of Military Spending on Economic Growth and Unemployment in Mediterranean Countries. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2015, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 273-280.

18. Fiott D. What Does It Mean to Be a European Defence Company Today? IFRI, 25.11.2019. 6 p. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/what-does-it-mean-be-european-defense-company-today (accessed 14.03.2020).

19. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Available at: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (accessed 14.03.2020).

20. Malashenko O.A. Voenno-politicheskie otnosheniya Frantsii i NATO: istoriya i sovremennost’ [Political and Military Relations between France and NATO: Past and Present]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 25. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika, 2011, no. 4, pp. 42-56.

21. Chikhachev A. Voennaya politika Frantsii pri Emmanuele Makrone: osnovnye tendentsii [French Defense Policy under President Emmanuel Macron: Major Trends]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2019, vol. 63, no. 8, pp. 82-90. DOI:10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-8-82-90

22. Defence Industrial Links Between the EU and the US. Report #20. Armament Industry European Research Group, September 2017. 51 p. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Ares-20-Report-EU-DTIB-Sept-2017.pdf (accessed 14.03.2020).

23. Ivanov I.D. Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks Evropeiskogo soyuza [Military-Industrial Complex of the European Union]. Contemporary Europe, 2006, no. 1 (January–March), pp. 31-48.

24. Fiott D. The Poison Pill. EU Defence on US Terms? Brief 7. European Union Institute for Security Studies. June, 2019. 8 p. Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/poison-pill-eu-defence-us-terms (accessed 14.03.2020).

25. Maulny J.-P., Di Bernardini L. Moving PeSCo forward: What are the next steps. Policy Paper #39? IRIS, May, 2019. 30 p. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ARES-39.pdf (accessed 14.03.2020).


Registered in System SCIENCE INDEX

For citation:
Vorotnikov V., Gribin N., Petlyaeva D., Pimenova E., Yakutova U. NATO versus PESCO: Economic Aspects. World Eonomy and International Relations, 2020, vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 40-50. https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-6-40-50



Comments (0)

No comments

Add comment







Indexed

 

 

 

 

Dear authors! Please note that in the VAK List of peer-reviewed scientific journals, in which the main scientific results of dissertations for the degree of candidate and doctor of sciences should be published for the “MEMO Journal” the following specialties are recorded:
economic sciences:
5.2.5. World Economy.
5.2.1. Economic Theory
5.2.3. Regional and Branch Economics
political sciences:
5.5.4. International Relations
5.5.1. History and Theory of Politics
5.5.2. Political Institutions, Processes, Technologies

 

Current Issue
2023, vol. 67, No. 9
Topical Themes of the Issue:
  • Contradictions and Conflicts in the Multilateral Trading System 
  • Global Climate Agenda: Big Gamble 
  • South Asia in Regional and World Politics 
  • Social Policy and Public Administration Ecosystems
Submit an Article
INVITATION FOR PUBLICATION
The Editorial Board invites authors to write analytical articles on the following topics:
  • changes in the processes of globalization in modern conditions
  • formation of the new world order
  • shifts in civilization at the stage of transition to a digital society

The editors are also interested in publishing synthesis articles / scientific reviews revealing the main trends in the development of certain regions of the world - Latin America, Africa, South Asia, etc.