Facing Race with No Rules? (Nuclear Deterrence without Arms Control)

752
DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-5-24-35

A. Arbatov (alarbatov@gmail.com),
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation

Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project no. 18-18-00463.


Abstract. By the end of the second decade of the 21st century, due to domestic and international developments, Russia and the West entered a state of tensions and a new cycle of the arms race – unprecedented since the worst times of the Cold War. Both sides got into this phase of relationship under the new world order, with advanced military technologies and under the rule of a new generation of political leaders. The turning point of these dangerous trends came with the decision of the United States to withdraw from the INF Treaty and high probability of the expiration of the New START without its extension or substitution by a follow-on treaty after 2021. Hence, the U.S. and Russia are on the verge of a new large-scale and uncontrolled nuclear arms race, which will be aggravated by the rivalry in offensive and defensive conventional strategic and medium range systems, as well as space weapons and means of cyber warfare. In combination with the development and deployment of short-flight-time ballistic and hypersonic systems as well as introduction of low-yield strategic and tactical nuclear arms for “limited” and “tailored” nuclear attacks this would drastically lower nuclear use threshold and increase incentives for preventive or preemptive nuclear strikes. In addition, the arms race will be multilateral, involving, beside the U.S. and Russia, China and many other nations. This would undercut the norms and regimes of nuclear non-proliferation, security and safety of nuclear materials, technologies and sites, which sooner or later would provide international terrorism with the access to nuclear weapons – with all the ensuing consequences. This article is dedicated to the above dangers and still remaining possibilities of averting them. In particular, if the two sides agreed on the new intrusive verification procedures, the INF Treaty still could be saved. Likewise, extension of the New START might stabilize strategic relations for another five years after its expiration in 2021. During those years or, still better, during two years remaining till 2021, a follow-on treaty could be negotiated to reduce strategic arms ceilings and envelop advanced destabilizing nuclear and conventional weapons.

Keywords: nuclear arms, strategic weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium- and short-range missiles, nuclear arms control treaties, anti-ballistic missile defense, hypersonic weapons, nuclear use threshold, concepts of limited nuclear war


REFERENCES

1. Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference. December 20, 2018, Moscow (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455 (accessed 30.01.2019).

2. Basic Principles of Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.grinchevskiy.ru/1945–1990/osnovy-vzaimootnosheniy-mejdu-sssr-i-swa.php (accessed 24.01.2019).

3. Joint U.S. – Soviet Statement. Pravda, 22.11.1985 (In Russ.)

4. Primakov E.M., ed. Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost’. 1988–1989. Ezhegodnik IMEMO [Disarmament and Security. 1988–1989. IMEMO Yearbook]. Moscow, Agentstvo pechati “Novosti”, 1989. 736 p.

5. Newhouse J. War and Peace in the Nuclear Age. New York, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1989. 486 p.

6. Perry W. My Journey at the Nuclear Brink. California, Stanford Security Studies, 2015. 276 p.

7. McNamara R. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York, Harper and Row, 1968. 176 p.

8. Karaganov C. O novom yadernom mire. Kak ukrepit’ sderzhivanie i sokhranit’ mir [A New Nuclear World. Strengthening Deterrence and Preserving Peace]. Russia in Global Affairs, 2017, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 8-19.

9. Kortunov A. Konets dvustoronnei epokhi. Kak vykhod SShA iz Dogovora o RSMD menyaet mirovoi poryadok [The End of the Bipolar World. How U. S. Withdrawal from INF Treaty Changes the World Order] Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77551 (accessed 24.10.2018).

10. Sivkov K. Razoruzhen i ochen’ opasen [Disarmed and Dangerous]. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 20.03.2017. Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/35718 (accessed 02.04.2017).

11. Khramchikhin A. Chem opasen konets odnopolyarnogo mira. [The Dangers of the Collapse of a Bipolar World]. Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 11.01.2019. Available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2019-01-11/1_1029_welt.html (accessed 02.04.2017).

12. Shirokorad A. Vypustit li Tramp yadernogo dzhinna iz butylki [Will Trump Release Nuclear Genie Out of the Bottle]. Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 26.10.2018. Available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2018-10-26/3_1019_tramp.html (accessed 02.04.2017).

13. Sivkov K. “Khvason” – primer dlya “Sarmata” [Hwasong: Example for Sarmat]. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 23.10.2018. Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/45824 (accessed 30.01.2019).

14. Tukembaev Ch. Tsunami s pritselom na Vashington [Tsunami Aiming at Washington, DC]. Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, 25.12.2018. Available at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/47228 (accessed 30.01.2019).

15. Colby E. If You Want Peace Prepare for Nuclear War. Foreign Affairs, 2018, vol. 6, no. 97, pp. 25-32. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war (accessed 02.02.2019).

16. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (In Russ.) Available at: http://undocs.org/ru/A/CONF.229/2017/8 (accessed 28.11.2018).

17. Arbatov A. Kontrol’ nad yadernym oruzhiem: konets istorii? [The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2015, no. 5, pp. 5-18.

18. Arbatov A. Smena prioritetov dlya vykhoda iz strategicheskogo tupika [Changing Priorities for the Sake of Escaping the Strategic Dead End]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2014, no. 6, pp. 3-17.

19. The Ministry of Defense Held a Briefing for the Foreign Military Attaches Showing the 9M729 Missile from the Iskander-M Complex (In Russ.) Available at: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12213705@egNews (accessed 30.01.2019).

20. Statement and Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. February 10, 2007, Munich (In Russ.) Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (accessed 04.02.2019).

21. Litovkin D. Adekvatnyi “Iskander” [Adequate Iskander]. Izvestiya, 21.02.2007. Available at: https://iz.ru/news/321928 (accessed 04.02.2019).

22. Safranchuk I. Putanitsa voenno-diplomaticheskikh azimutov [The Tangle of Military-Diplomatic Azimuths]. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26.02.2007. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-02-26/3_kartblansh.html (accessed 04.02.2019).

23. Shirokorad A. Ognennyi mech rossiiskogo flota [Burning Sword of the Russian Navy]. Moscow, Yauza-Eksmo, 2004. 416 p.

24. MacFarquhar N. Russia Shows off New Cruise Missile and Says It Abides by Landmark Treat. The New York Times, 23.01.2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/europe/russia-inf-cruise-missile.html (accessed 04.02.2019).

25. \The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly. March 1, 2018, Moscow (In Russ.)]\ Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/56957 (accessed 10.03.2018).

26. Nuclear Posture Review. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC, February 2018. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL- (accessed 01.03.2018).

27. \Meeting with Sergey Lavrov and Sergey Shoigu. Vladimir Putin Held a Working Session with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu. February 2, 2019, Moscow (In Russ.) Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763 (accessed 05.02.2019).

28. President’s Address to the Federal Assembly. December 12, 2013, Moscow (In Russ.) Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825 (accessed 17.12.2013).

29. Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. March 21, 1997, Helsinki (In Russ.) Available at: https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/hel-js.htm (accessed 30.01.2019).

30. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. Annual Defense Department Report, FY1975. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, March 4, 1974. Available at: http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150705-323 (accessed 02.02.2018).

31. Ogarkov N. Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva [Always in Readiness for Defense of the Motherland]. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982. 71 p.

32. Crucial Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Krasnaya zvezda, 11.10.2003 (In Russ.) Available at: http://old.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html (accessed 02.02.2018).

33. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (In Russ.) Available at: http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf (accessed 01.02.2018).

34. Einhorn R., Pifer S., eds. Meeting U. S. Deterrence Requirements. Washington, Brookings Institution, 2017. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170920_deterrence_report.pdf (accessed 01.02.2019).

35. Blair B., Wolfsthal J. Trump can launch nuclear weapons whenever he wants, with or without Mattis. The Washington Post, December 23, 2018. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/12/23/trump-can-launch-nuclearweapons-whenever-he-wants-with-or-without-mattis/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0d90b4c31eea (accessed 01.02.2019).


Registered in System SCIENCE INDEX

For citation:
Arbatov A. Facing Race with No Rules? (Nuclear Deterrence without Arms Control) . World Eonomy and International Relations, 2019, vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 24-35. https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-5-24-35



Comments (0)

No comments

Add comment







Indexed

 

 

 

 

Dear authors! Please note that in the VAK List of peer-reviewed scientific journals, in which the main scientific results of dissertations for the degree of candidate and doctor of sciences should be published for the “MEMO Journal” the following specialties are recorded:
economic sciences:
5.2.5. World Economy.
5.2.1. Economic Theory
5.2.3. Regional and Branch Economics
political sciences:
5.5.4. International Relations
5.5.1. History and Theory of Politics
5.5.2. Political Institutions, Processes, Technologies

 

Current Issue
2024, vol. 68, No. 7
Topical Themes of the Issue:
  • The Supporting Structure of Global Security
  • Institutional Features of the Fourth Energy Transition
  • The Evolution of Modern German Christian Democracy
  • The Monarchies of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia
Submit an Article
INVITATION FOR PUBLICATION
The Editorial Board invites authors to write analytical articles on the following topics:
  • changes in the processes of globalization in modern conditions
  • formation of the new world order
  • shifts in civilization at the stage of transition to a digital society

The editors are also interested in publishing synthesis articles / scientific reviews revealing the main trends in the development of certain regions of the world - Latin America, Africa, South Asia, etc.