1017I. Istomin (iaistomin@gmail.com),
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation (MGIMO University), Vernadskogo Prosp., 76, Moscow 119454, Russian Federation;
A. Baikov (a.baykov@inno.mgimo.ru),
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation (MGIMO University), Vernadskogo Prosp., 76, Moscow 119454, Russian Federation;
“International Trends”, Vernadskogo Prosp., 76, Moscow 119454, Russian Federation
Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project ¹ 17-78-20170.
Abstract. Interstate military alliances have long been in the lens of theoretical and empirical research of international relations scholars. The classical view of alliances treated them as a tool for balancing amongst roughly equal players in a multi-polar anarchical environment. Meanwhile, the practice of international relations at least from the second half of the 20th century testifies to the rise of asymmetrical alliances as a new major type of military-political institutions. In such formations, a hegemon, characterized by an overwhelming preponderance in terms of its aggregate material (primarily military) capability cooperates with one or several largely inferior players from the standpoint of their comprehensive power. Traditional balancing theories are not in a position to satisfactorily account for the motivation and dynamics of the parties’ behavior in alliances of this type. In the present study, based on an analysis of voting data in the UN GA and on the record of supporting U.S. actions against both Iraq in 2003 and ISIS in 2014–2017, the authors offer their theoretical explanation of the logic of participants’ conduct in asymmetric alliances. They hypothesize and evidence that in exchange for military security guarantees, small and middle countries provide legitimization of unpopular foreign policy actions of the hegemon. The exchange of different types of goods represent the second type of asymmetry in the studied institutions. There is also a third dimension to it: whereas commitments of major powers are formally recognized in alliance establishing agreements, political obligations of its weaker partners remain mostly informal. However, this lack of legal expression of the allegiance to the hegemon could, the authors argue, turn out in the latter’s own interests, as it increases the legitimating effect of support from the allies. In addition, a side effect of building a global client network of junior partners is the cementation of hierarchic structures under the patronage of the United States. The latter is an attempt by Washington to limit and ultimately transcend both the anarchic nature of the international environment and the ensuing low predictability of the global security environment.
Keywords: The United States, military-political alliances, the „axis and spokes“ system, the war in Iraq, the fight against ISIS, international hierarchies
REFERENCES
1. Waltz K.N. Theory of international politics. Long Grove, Illinois, Waveland Press, 1979. 251 p.
2. Morrow J.D. Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security. International Organization, 1993, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 207-233.
3. Parent J. M., Rosato S. Balancing in Neorealism. International Security, 2015, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 51-86. DOI:10.1162/ ISEC_a_00216
4. Leeds B.A., Long A. G., Mitchell S. M.L. Reevaluating alliance reliability: Specific threats, specific promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000, vol. 44, vol. 5, pp. 686-699. DOI:10.1177/0022002700044005006
5. Christensen T. J., Snyder J. Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization, 1990, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 137-168. DOI:10.1017/S0020818300035232
6. Womack B. Asymmetry and International Relationships. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016. 244 p.
7. Beckley M. The myth of entangling alliances: Reassessing the security risks of US defense pacts. International Security, 2015, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 7-48. DOI:10.1162/ISEC_a_00197
8. Walt S. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca. London, Cornell University Press, 1987. 321 p.
9. Carr E. Twenty years’ crisis 1919–1939: an introduction to the study of international relations. London, Macmillan, 1940. 247 p.
10. Morghentau H. Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power Peace. New York, Higher Education, 1948. 489 p.
11. Axelrod R. Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1980, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 3-25. DOI:10.1177/002200278002400101
12. Gibler D.M. The costs of reneging: Reputation and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2008, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 426-454.
13. Crescenzi M.J.C., Kathman, J.D., Kleinberg, K.B., Wood R.M. Reliability, reputation, and alliance formation. International Studies Quarterly, 2012, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 259-274. DOI:10.1111/j.1468–2478.2011.00711
14. Smith A. Alliance formation and war. International Studies Quarterly, 1995, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 405-425. DOI:10.2307/2600800
15. Bas M., Schub R. Mutual Optimism as a Cause of Conflict: Secret Alliances and Conflict Onset. International Studies Quarterly, 2016, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 552-564. DOI:10.1093/isq/sqw002
16. Mearsheimer J.J. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2017. 296 p.
17. Layne Ch. The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, November 2007. 304 p.
18. Posen B. R. Restraint: A new foundation for US grand strategy. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2015. 256 p.
19. Kim T. Why alliances entangle but seldom entrap states. Security Studies, 2011, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 350-377. DOI:10.1080/09636412.2011.599201
20. Narang N., Mehta R.N. The unforeseen consequences of extended deterrence: Moral hazard in a nuclear client state. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017. Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002717729025 (accessed 03.06.2018).
21. Morrow J. D. Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances. American Journal of Political Science, 1991, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 904-933. DOI:10.2307/2111499
22. Troitskii M.A. Kontseptsiya “programmiruyushchego liderstva” v evroatlanticheskoi strategii SShA [Concept of Programming Leadership in the Euro-Atlantic Strategy of the USA]. Pro et Contra, 2002, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 86-103.
23. Bennett D.S. Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816–1984. American Journal of Political Science, 1997, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 846-878. DOI:10.2307/2111677
24. Istomin I.A., Vodop’yanov K.G. Transformatsiya amerikano-yaponskogo soyuza [Transformation for the American-Japanese Alliance]. International Trends, 2016, no. 1(14), pp. 121-142. DOI:10.17994/IT.2016.14.1.44.10
25. Lake D.A. Hierarchy in international relations. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009. 232 p.
26. Cha V.D. Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2016. 352 p.
27. David S. R. Explaining third world alignment. World Politics, 1991, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 233-256. DOI: 10.2307/2010472
28. Mastanduno M. System maker and privilege taker. World Politics, 2009, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 121-154.
29. Paul T.V., Larson D.W., Wohlforth W.C., eds. Status in World Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 324 p.
30. Renshon J. Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017. 328 p.
31. Ward S. Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2017. 274 p.
32. March J.G., Olsen J.P. The logic of appropriateness. The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Goodin R. E., Tilly Ch., eds. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 478-497.
33. Krasner S. D. Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 280 p.
34. Olson M., Zeckhauser R. An economic theory of alliances. The review of economics and statistics, 1966, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 266-279. DOI:10.2307/1927082
35. Leeds B. A. Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. International Organization, 2003, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 801-827. DOI:10.1017/S0020818303574057
36. Brooks S., Wohlforth W. America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. Oxford, Oxford University Press, September 2016. 288 p.
37. Istomin I.A. “Dilemma al’yansov” v razvitii voenno-politicheskikh soyuzov SShA [“Alliance Dilemma in the Development of Military and Political Alliances of the USA]. Situatsionnye analiz. Vyp. 5: mezhdunarodnye instituty v sovremennoi mirovoi politike [Situational Analysis. Issue 5: International Institutions in the Current World Politics]. Shakleina T. A., ed. Moscow, MGIMO-University, 2017. pp. 215-265.
38. Newnham R. “Coalition of the bribed and bullied?” US economic linkage and the Iraq War coalition. International Studies Perspectives, 2008, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 183-200.
Registered in System SCIENCE INDEX
No comments