760P. Kandel' (xpekan@yandex.ru),
Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, build. 3, Mokhovaya Str., Moscow, 125009, Russian Federation
Abstract. The European Union seems to have become worried by impetuous nationalist rhetoric heard from the Western Balkans. But it would be wrong to interpret it as a new whiff of gunpowder. In this case, it is about traditional ways of achieving short-term political goals, primarily for election campaigns. This is a different phenomenon worth consideration: in the aftermath of the EU crisis, policymakers from the Balkans began to speak against Brussels and even blackmail it. This made the European Union renew its attention to the region and take steps to restrain its wards. But its relationship with the states of the region has found a new mode: the applicants for the EU membership will be prone to exert more influence upon Brussels to accelerate the pace of their European integration. Russia has no sufficient resources and capabilities to compete with the EU for influence in South Eastern Europe on an equal footing. This is indicated by the incommensurability of the resources of the “rivals” that they are relying on in the region. Nevertheless, it is Russia who has a significant “historical capital” in the Balkans, namely the Russophile sympathies of a large part of the population of this region. Since these sympathies diverge from vital interests related to the EU, they could not be transformed into fundamental changes on the political arena or a shift in the foreign policy vector of the Balkan states. Nevertheless, the pro-Russian mood of a large part of the electorate is forcing the leaders loyal to other goals and values to reckon with it, complicating the implementation of evident anti-Russian political manifestations. Therefore, Moscow is capable to a certain extent to annoy opponents by taking advantage of some defects in the EU and the U.S Balkan policies. However, the risks of possible destabilization in the region would not benefit to Russia since its energy exports to the Balkans and its transit – the main means of Russian economic presence in the region – will be under threat. Hence, the prime focus of the Kremlin’s efforts looks like its attempts to minimize the damage from the NATO and the EU expansion for Russian relations with the Balkan states.
Keywords: Western Balkans, nationalism, elections, destabilization, EU, Russia
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