827A. Auzan (auzan@inp.ru; dean@econ.msu.ru),
Lomonosov Moscow State University, build. 46, 1, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
Abstract. The transition from a developing, peripheral type of society to a developed economy presupposes certain conditions, including the spreading of liberal values in the peripheral society – individualism and personal activity, the spirit of competition, readiness to compete, the rejection of state paternalism, and the establishment of real democratic institutions. According to the author, these values and institutions are not yet being planted in Russia. Hence, the discrepancy between what is declared and what is actually done in practice. To change this situation, first, it is necessary that political and business elites are interested in modernization. The experience of successful modernization (for example, in some Asian countries) shows that a long planning horizon played a big role here. In other words, in the process of modernization the elite should have long-term interests and the confidence that the interests of business will be protected by the state. Secondly, it is important to support and disseminate informal values of development – in the education system, the army, and the media. If these conditions are take place, Russia has a chance for the future, albeit remote, beyond the short and even medium-term outlook. And then, with the adoption of a long-term development orientation, Russia will be out of the rut of dependent development.
Keywords: human capital, informal institutions, cultural capital, economic development
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