Abstract. This article analyses the Karabakh problem, the politics of the conflicting parties, Russia and other countries after the First Karabakh War (1992–1994). The focus is on the results of the Second Karabakh War (September 27 – November 10, 2020) and reasons for the maintenance of a high level of tension in the region. The author concludes that the situation is developing in the direction of a new military confrontation, and not on the path of a peaceful settlement. The desire of the conflicting parties to use the Russian factor exclusively in their own interests contradicts the position of the leadership of the Russian Federation, which strives to preserve its neutral position of the mediator who contributes to the resolution of the conflict through negotiations and the development of mutually acceptable solutions. In 2021–2022 numerous formal peacemaking initiatives of the USA and its allies did not lead to a reduction in tension, but allowed to block the process of a peaceful settlement under the mediation and auspices of Russia, to create prerequisites for the liquidation of the Russian military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia. Thus, the policy of the collective West increased the probability of new shocks and military conflicts in the South Caucasus.