The end of the U.S. presence in the Afghan conflict by the 20thanniversary of events of September 11 2001 is a significant and symbolic event. In this article the author formulates an assessment by posing a question - how does the withdrawal of the US armed forces from AfPak region correlate with its strategy? The article examines the transformation of Washington’s policy goals towards the Afghan conflict throughout the last 20 years by comparing the approaches of four U.S. presidents, it also examines the conflict dynamics, internal and international factors of how the decision of withdrawal was presented and formulated. The author concludes, that if the U.S. policies in Afghanistan and the withdrawal are seen in the logic of previous strategical goals, the view on the campaign results as a defeat is accurate. Global war on terror and democracy promotion in the region was also focused on nation-building and the creation of a loyal and self-sufficient regime that could be used to project the U.S. interest in the region, which clearly didn’t happen. A different assessment arises in the new U.S. strategical framework to contain China and Russia. The author makes an assumption, that the announcement made by Beijing of the "Belt and Road" initiative and the Crimea crisis could have been one of the factors that postponed the initial NATO presence deadline. In this framework the US withdrawal from Afghanistan can be viewed as a step in the logic of Washington's new confrontation with Moscow and Beijing.

The article was prepared within the project “Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, compe-tition and cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological devel-opment (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).