The article examines the trend connected with the growing risk of institutionalization of the “Central Asia—China” (“CA—China”) dialogue format for the interests of Russia and political solidarity within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In June 2025, Astana will host the 2nd China—Central Asia summit, which will outline further institutionalization. Since 2023, the process of institutionalization of the “CA—China” format has gradually created an institutional framework for a future international intergovernmental organization with functions that duplicate the existing functions of the SCO. In official documents Russia declares the importance of developing the SCO and assigns it a special role in implementing the “pivot to the East” policy, forming the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” and deploying the internati onal North — South transport corridor project. In this regard, further institutionaliza tion of the “CA—China” format may create restrictions for the implementation of the se Russian plans and even for protecting its interests in Central Asia. This circumstance is against the background of active attempts by the West and the United States to force a number of Central Asian countries to reduce the volume of trade and economic coo peration with Russia in the context of sanctions pressure. Plans to institutionalize the “CA—China” format may also lead to increased opposition from other major global actors, such as the United States, India, the European Union and Japan, which have been actively involved in Central Asian processes in recent years, including developing a dialogue in the “5+1” format with the countries of the region.