Behind the INF Treaty: Military and Political Effects for Europe
ISSN 0201-7083
DOI 10.15211/soveurope42019140150
The U.S. withdrawal from INF Treaty will cause significant damage to global arms control system. Besides negative effects on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in the world, there will be significant risks of exacerbating the military confrontation in Europe due to potential deployment of medium - and short - range strike capabilities, which were previously prohibited by the INF treaty. The new factors create additional complications compared with the 1980s: the NATO enlargement to the east and the development of fundamentally new weapons, especially hypersonic boost - glide systems. A new “Eurostrategic crisis,” once having arisen, may become more severe. At the same time, despite the collapse of the key arms control regime, the parties retain the potential to reach stabilizing compromises in Europe which will allow to avoid a significant military and political confrontation. The importance of possible destabilization defines the motivation to reach these compromises. Successful conclusion and execution of informal or legally non - binding agreements on refusal or limiting the deployment of the most dangerous medium - and short - range strike capabilities in Europe would open the way to their codification into a new full - scale treaty and would serve to strengthen confidence in the Euro - Atlantic region.
Keywords: INF Treaty | intermediate-range missiles | boost-glide vehicles | Europe | eurostrategic balance | NATO–Russian relations | arms control | confidence-building measures |
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