In the complex of political relations between society and power, one of the most vulnerable aspects is the transit or succession of power. An even more serious challenge to political stability is the change of the head of state for countries with unstable political institutions due to short history of independence, as a result of the lack of traditions and mechanisms for changing power, and the lack of stable institutions for the protection of private property. In such circumstances, the ruling class of these countries is looking for such scenarios of power transit that would ensure political and economic stability and continuity, as well as guarantee security and property rights for the outgoing heads of state and their entourage. The optimal scenario in this case is a successor scenario with the coming of power of the candidate chosen by the outgoing head, who would guarantee the fulfillment of these conditions. But in the newly independent States, which include the former republics of the USSR, with an extreme level of sacralization and absolutization of power, its transfer even to a trusted person carries risks for the ruling circles. As a result, the dynastic scenario of the transfer of Supreme power in the state as a rule to the son of the head is chosen as the solution, which allows solving all the key tasks for transit. This scenario was implemented in 2003 in Azerbaijan. The purpose of the research is to identify the reasons for choosing such a mechanism of power transfer based on a systematic and comparative analysis of existing precedents for implementing the dynastic scenario of power transit in the post-Soviet space. Practical work with the analysis of the causes and mechanisms of power transfer within the family will reveal the impact of this mechanism on the development of political institutions in the selected countries.