The ruptures characteristic of Russian history, accompanied by the breakdown of the former political order, can be explained by two reasons. Monocentric power, which considers its policy to be the only right one, proves incapable of flexibility and adaptability in times of political crisis. At the same time, in Russia the relations between the authorities and groups opposing it have been built not according to the “authorities-opposition” logic, but according to the “authorities-anti-power” one. Cooperation between the two was not possible. They fought a war of annihilation. When the anti-power regime won, it also destroyed the political order associated with the previous regime. Society in Russia was never a driver of political change or an initiator of new political projects. In Pivovarov and Fursov’s terminology, this role was played by “unnecessary people” - groups that found no place in the system of relations between the authorities and society. In the 17th-18th centuries, the role of the “unnecessary” was played by the Cossacks, in 19th-beginning of 20th centuries - by intelligentsia. However, the Cossacks were incorporated by the monarchy into the Russian state system after the suppression of Pugachev uprising. The monarchy began to incorporate the intelligentsia after the 1905-1907 revolution. Under the Bolsheviks, both groups were destroyed over time. Under modern conditions they are not reproducible. The algorithm of Russian history for many centuries resembled the alternation of long periods of dominance of authoritarian power and shorter periods of turmoil and chaos. However, in the long run this algorithm will cease to work, as the possibilities of authoritarian modernization are exhausted.