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On June 1 and 3, 2026, the All-Russian Scientific Conference "Economic, Socio-Political, Ethno-Confessional Problems of the Countries of Asia and Africa" was held at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

On June 3, Egor Besedin, Junior Research Fellow of the Laboratory “Sector for New Challenges in South and Southeast Asia” of the Center of the Indo-Pacific Region of IMEMO, presented a report "'How Can You Not Help Your Fellow': Phenomenon of Political Dynasties in Indonesia and the Philippines" within the framework of the Roundtable of the Conference "Socio-Political and Ethno-Confessional Problems of the Countries of Asia and Africa".

The presentation analyzed the phenomenon of political dynasties as one of the key issues in the post-democratic and post-reform development of Indonesia and the Philippines. The speaker demonstrated that the formal existence of democratic institutions, regular elections, party competition, and term limits does not prevent the reproduction of family control over power. On the contrary, in a number of cases, it is precisely democratic procedures that create the conditions for the adaptation of political clans, which use elections, parties, local budgets, and clientelistic networks as mechanisms for prolonging family dominance.

Particular attention was paid to the legal and institutional conditions for the existence of dynasties, which allowed to demonstrate the paradoxical consequences of institutional reforms: term limits, direct local elections and the liberalization of the party system did not eliminate family power, but rather facilitated the emergence of practices of "benchers" and reshuffles between relatives.

A separate section examined the socio-political mechanisms of dynastic dominance. The speaker analyzed the role of decentralization, local budgets, party weaknesses, and personalistic electoral machines. The consequences of dynastic politics for the quality of governance and socio-economic development received special attention. It was shown that political dynasties are capable of monopolizing access to local and national resources, controlling infrastructure flows, job allocation, media, and intermediary networks. However, dynastic power does not necessarily lead to improved public service quality: on the contrary, data was presented on reduced spending on health and education in several dynastically controlled districts, the commercialization of bureaucracy, the sale of positions, the correlation between political concentration and violence, and the persistence of poverty in regions where a significant proportion of positions are controlled by family groups.

In conclusion, it was noted that political dynasties in Indonesia and the Philippines are not an archaic relic, but a sustainable form of elite adaptation to democratic institutions.