What refugee policy is advisable under the new conditions in Germany and Europe? There is no consistent way out of the current refugee crisis, which in some cases has entailed high human and material costs for all the peoples involved. In 2015, Europe received over a million of refugees. However, a far greater number of people are attempting to reach Europe than the European states are willing to accept and integrate into their societies. Since the EU is a union of nation states, refugee policies are primarily national policies, which can only become the European policy when national governments and parliaments also reach agreement on this issue.

Refugee policy cannot be usurped by the European Commission or the European Parliament. The existing European asylum legislation and European law is without doubt inadequate in point of tackling the challenges posed by the refugee crisis [1, ss. 2-6; 2]. Currently, any change made to the European asylum and refugee legislation has only led to tightening of this legislation and adaptation of the German law to that of other EU states. It can be assumed that to a large degree, the reaction to David Cameron’s slogan “We need less Europe” has been positive throughout Europe.

First, the fact must be recognized that for most refugees, fleeing to Europe means fleeing to Germany, not only in terms of their intended destination, but also in reality. Germany as a key target country for refugees does not have options which other states have decided to pursue, or could do in the future. If Germany were to build a fence along its border with Austria, all other states along the Balkan route would be forced to do the same. Greece would have to prevent refugee boats from landing by force. This would be an
absurd “solution” to the refugee problem. Unlike the states along the Balkan route from Greece to Austria, Germany also cannot declare itself a transit country for refugees, and simply transport them onward from its border with Austria to its eight other borders. This would only work if refugees were to be just as badly treated as they were along the Balkan route, whereas affluent and democratic Germany is neither politically nor morally in a position to implement such a measure. And the mainland Europe which by driving people from one country to another, either out of helplessness or malice, until they finally end up in Calais in front of the Eurotunnel, cannot then decide one day to rent a flotilla of cruise ships to take hundreds of thousands of refugees to Britain, the U.S., Canada and Australia, where the boats are likely to be barred from entering the ports.

Germany also lacks the political influence needed to push through a distribution of all refugees arriving in Europe in accordance with the quotas agreed by the European interior ministers for the small figure of 120,000 refugees, either through friendly persuasion or even enforcement. The Hungarian prime-minister Viktor Orban is therefore correct in claiming that the refugee problem (at least primarily—E.J.) is a German problem, not only in practical terms, but also because German asylum law is extraordinarily generous due to its National Socialist past.

It is highly likely that the next year, a further one million of refugees will travel to Germany, and the prospect cannot be ruled out that in 2017, the year of the Bundestag election, there will be one million more if the current government policy is continued. Technically, Germany could receive all of the current 19.5 million refugees in the world over the next two years, and could at least feed and build barracks for them as it did after the Second World War. Germany would “only” have to be prepared to take on a debit of several billions of Euros (and in doing so, to further burden future generations), and to impose control over the housing management (of the 1.7 million empty flats and “excessive” living space occupied by current flat owners), etc. It is out of question that a willingness to adopt such measures will emerge. An upper limit for the acceptance of refugees is not a technical-economic issue, but an issue of the political will among the majority of society and the degree of tolerance among the opposing minority. This is all not so much about the financial costs, but far more about concerns regarding the longer-term capacity for social and political integration of refugees, the ethnic-cultural, liberal-democratic nature of German society. This political will is hardly likely to be expanded through humanitarian education measures, but will instead probably decrease over the coming months.

The Europeans and Germans must come to terms with the fact that some wars will last for a long time, and an increasing number of refugees will want to come to Germany. This would turn Germany ever more into a polyethnic, multireligious country with a large number of social and political problems. The first consequence will be that for years, funding for social services will be severely strained until many refugees find employment. For the large mass of illiterate refugees with a low level of education in terms of linguistic competence or professional skills, it will be difficult to find work, and if they do, this could entail taking jobs away from the local lower strata of society. Certainly, the creation of ethnosocial strata is unavoidable. Unemployment among those refugees granted the right to remain will be higher than among the local population, and will generate a sense of discrimination. Currently, the estimated cost of accepting refugees is calculated at 10 billion Euros [3]. Soon, this figure will rise considerably. The long-term resident poor and low paid workers in particular will ask why it is that more money is available for each refugee than for them. They will also wonder why it is that jobs can suddenly be found for thousands of new teachers and police officers while they are fighting in vain for fair pay of childcare workers and those caring for the elderly. How is it, they will ask, that solid accommodation can be quickly found for refugees while many German homeless people are still sleeping on the streets, and will probably again die of cold this winter?

This not only encourages xenophobia among the local population, but also hatred against Germans among those frustrated refugees who are relieved and happy to have been received with such a welcome today, but who will realize tomorrow that they will remain socially excluded. Even more immigrant districts will be created, in which German is hardly spoken at all and from which the local German population, but also hatred against Germans could entail taking jobs away from the local lower strata of society. Certainly, the creation of ethnosocial strata is unavoidable. Unemployment among those refugees granted the right to remain will be higher than among the local population, and will generate a sense of discrimination. Currently, the estimated cost of accepting refugees is calculated at 10 billion Euros [3]. Soon, this figure will rise considerably. The long-term resident poor and low paid workers in particular will ask why it is that more money is available for each refugee than for them. They will also wonder why it is that jobs can suddenly be found for thousands of new teachers and police officers while they are fighting in vain for fair pay of childcare workers and those caring for the elderly. How is it, they will ask, that solid accommodation can be quickly found for refugees while many German homeless people are still sleeping on the streets, and will probably again die of cold this winter?

This not only encourages xenophobia among the local population, but also hatred against Germans among those frustrated refugees who are relieved and happy to have been received with such a welcome today, but who will realize tomorrow that they will remain socially excluded. Even more immigrant districts will be created, in which German is hardly spoken at all and from which the local German residents will move away. The laws of the market economy inevitably lead to ethnosocial segregation. The capacity to integrate immigrants depends heavily on the ratio between the local population and the immigrants in the place, and not solely on the national average.

There are a few reasons why Germany will in general develop a better capacity for integration than the traditional western democracies. After two hundred years, the U.S. has still not fully integrated all Afro-Americans, while France, Britain and the Netherlands are still a long way from assimilating the immigrants from their former colonies. What is there
in Germany to prevent racial unrest from emerging among the socially discriminated, or pogrom-style attacks being perpetrated against immigrants, as was the case in Rostock, for example? What is there to stop some urban districts from deteriorating to such a degree that not even the police feel safe to enter them? How can the German police force avoid becoming just as brutal as the police forces of other western democracies? What is there, in the longer term, to prevent individuals from arming themselves with private guns? Can the fact be overlooked that the Muslim refugees will dramatically increase the potential level of anti-Semitism in Germany? Or that among the millions of refugees who arrive here, a few dozen may either already be, or perhaps become Islamic extremists, who will aggravate the potential for terrorism among German citizens, be they refugees or converts to Islam from long-term resident Christian families? Will not the number of “honorary killings” of Muslim girls increase, who in the eyes of their families are far too willing to integrate? From a neutral standpoint, it can be assumed that the number of murder, rape, robbery and theft cases among refugees will be “normal”, despite their difficult social situation, in relation to the corresponding crime rates among the local population, taking into account the fact that most of refugees are young and male. Across Germany, the crime rate will therefore increase in tandem with the immigration level.

Not every immigrant will become a fully integrated Cem Özdemir or Yasmin Fahimi. It is likely that efforts to integrate large numbers of migrants and refugees will fail, even if one assumes that Germany will learn fundamental lessons from the mistakes of the integration policies of other western democracies. A rational response to the question of whether Germany will be able to feed and accommodate those refugees who will not return to their country of origin, first in emergency accommodation facilities and then in apartments, can only be that yes, it will. However, the question of whether Germany will successfully integrate the remaining refugees socially and politically prompts a very different answer: yes, a very large share will be excellently or adequately integrated, but a considerable portion will not. An insufficient level of openness towards integration among a large section of the local population coupled with insufficient willingness to integrate among large numbers of refugees (and also migrants) will act in parallel to prevent the real integration of many immigrants. Thus, the response to the above question is: we will largely succeed, but to a far too great extent, we will not. Since it is easier to integrate a small number of refugees than a large influx, it can be concluded that the more refugees arrive, let alone within a short period of time, the more likely it is that the integration will fail. In other words: a limitation and deceleration of the acceptance of refugees should be considered urgently. The open invitation to all refugees who wish to come to Germany (and Europe) is utterly irresponsible both socially and politically.

All these considerations are not intended as arguments against the Willkommenskultur (“Welcome Culture”). Quite the opposite. Only such a welcome culture could, alongside the undoubted positive effects arising from the changes in ethnoreligious population structure, prevent or reduce some extremely negative consequences and help overcome the new challenges faced by the German domestic policy. A clear, unequivocal differentiation must be made between the “Welcome Culture” (in relation to refugees who have arrived in Germany) and the continued policy of inviting additional millions of refugees to make the journey here. A halfway adequate integration of migrants and refugees is only possible by limiting and decelerating the acceptance of further immigrants.

Furthermore, a clear differentiation should be made between immigration or migration policy and refugee policy. One could even talk of a shameless misuse of refugees as a substitute for children in Germany by those who wish to see the comprehensive immigration as an answer to the insufficient number of workers and future pensions funding in compensation for the low birth rate in the German society, and thus want to integrate and “Germanize” refugees as quickly as possible. Many refugees are not interested in such a prospect, but rather wish to live and work in Germany only temporarily. Their main interest is in socializing their children in their native language and in their own culture. Their motivation to learn German to a sufficient standard which enables them to find work themselves and have a better life in exile is only secondary.

Refugees from autocratic countries without a democratic tradition will not become democrats on crossing the border into Europe, but will have to be won over to liberal-democratic attitudes in a decades-long process of socialization. During the recent parliamentary elections in Turkey, a greater share of the Turks who have been living in Germany for many years voted in favour of Erdoğan’s Party for Justice and Development, the AKP (which is tending to autocracy), than their compatriots at home. In Egypt, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who are being persecuted and threatened with the death penalty,
and who themselves had harassed the Copts, will not automatically become enlightened, secular humanists on arriving in Europe. Undemocratic, right-wing radical views are not a phenomenon unique to a considerable proportion of the long-standing German population, but are also prevalent among migrants and refugees. The fight against right-wing radical xenophobia among Germans must not make us blind to the hostile, right-wing radical attitudes among some refugees and migrants who do not agree with the Germans’ social and political way of life. Terrorists are just the tip of the iceberg of millions of peaceful immigrants who have not been successfully integrated in the political and social sense, and who have found no political channel to express their dissatisfaction.

Following the above analysis, refugees from outside Europe who have already travelled across hundreds of kilometres to reach the EU must remain there, at least until the wars in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc. come to an end. A very different question is whether and how Germany and the European states, which have no interest in seeing Germany become an overburdened refugee country, are able and willing to allow further millions of refugees to come to Europe. In principle, this is not a matter for the European Union alone, but also for NATO, since the refugee crisis is impending domestic security and stability in Europe, and because Turkey is a NATO member. Germany, the foremost destination for the refugee movement, which can neither close its borders nor transfer refugees onwards without threatening the existence of the European Union, has no other choice but to urge and work towards the EU borders closure against an uncontrolled, unlimited influx. In other words: unlike other European Union member states, Germany does not have the option of implementing a purely national refugee policy. Securing the outer EU borders might be feasible against such country as Libya, which has no functioning state organs, but is unthinkable against Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey could at just a small expense confiscate all people smuggler boats along the coast in the interest of national security, and prevent them from leaving Turkish waters – in cooperation with the Greek navy and using several boats from other EU countries.

Turkey will only be prepared to abandon its current policy of facilitating the through-transit and smuggling of refugees if the European Union and NATO states are willing to pay a large sum to resolve the refugee problem in Turkey itself². Here, the following options are available: 1. The Turkish military (or, alternatively, NATO), in agreement with the UN Security Council, establishes protection zones for refugees in the north of Syria and Iraq, where people are provided for by the UNHCR until the internationalized civil wars are brought to an end. The same protection zones could be established in Afghanistan and other countries where war is being waged. 2. Turkey declares itself willing to organize refugee settlements within border areas of its own, which are financed by the EU/NATO states and by wealthy Arab states as far as feasible. 3. If no agreement with Turkey is possible, the European Union could rent an island in Europe and establish settlements there under the EU administration where refugees would remain until the return to their countries of origin when peace has been restored. These options will be discussed in greater detail in the excursus below.

The admirable “Welcome Culture” in Germany, Sweden and other countries with regard to the way refugees have been treated, which is surprisingly broadly anchored among the general population, can only be maintained if, at the same time, there is a drastic limitation set for the number of refugees accepted.

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

What could the author therefore advise the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel or her minister Peter Altmaier to do? First of all, to make a clear political statement, such as: “The authorities and above all civil society in Germany have in recent months actively supported a very large number of refugees arriving in Europe in their difficulty, and have taken them welcome. This was a correct response, and we are rejoicing at the emergence of the German and European “Welcome Culture” in the spirit of the humane and democratic values which we consistently promote. However, in the years to come, we cannot take on unlimited further millions of refugees, and integrate them economically, socially and politically. We will therefore do everything we can in order to restrict the number of refugees accepted in Germany to 500,000 in 2016 (this is the author’s random figure.—E.J.), and to 300,000 in 2017. And we hope that most refugees will soon be able to return home. For this reason, we will intensify our diplomatic efforts in order to achieve a rapid compromise peace between the civil war parties in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and the states which are militarily involved in these wars. In recent years, German diplomacy has made some achievements, in particular an important contribution

² The link to other issues, such as visa freedom or the resumption of the EU accession negotiations, is an extremely dubious blackmailing tactic being pursued by Turkey which can afford to do so because the EU is unwilling to protect the Greek islands from the people smugglers’ boats.
to the signing of the Minsk Agreement on ending the war in Ukraine and to the agreement regarding the prevention of Iran’s nuclear armament. We will apply the same dedication in our work towards finding a peaceful solution in the war regions. At the same time, we will support the targeted battle against the terrorist “Islamic State”, which endangers both the state and domestic order of many countries. In doing so we will employ means which we regard as being suitable and which have been agreed internationally.

In order to make it easier for refugees to return home, we will undertake to ensure that they receive professional training in their native language in order to be able to rebuild their country with our help after the destruction caused by the war. We will also teach refugees German during their stay in our country and give them access to professional training, so that they can provide for themselves through their own work while they are living here.

We are neither willing nor able to send back refugees arriving in Central Europe over the coming months and years as long as the conditions from which they are fleeing continue. We will integrate some of them into our society in the long term. For this reason, we must prevent too many refugees from coming to Europe. In our view, there are four ways of doing so: 1. To try and persuade some EU member states which to date have only accepted a small number of refugees, or none at all, to relieve others, who have already allowed many to enter their country, of the burden. Germany is willing and able to apply economic pressure to its European partner countries to act in a similar manner to Germany itself, or according to the model presented by Sweden, Malta and other EU states in their generous acceptance of refugees. 2. To establish and finance safe zones where refugees can flee to, if possible under a UN mandate, in the civil war countries themselves. 3. To provide for a large German and European financial contribution to support refugee camps in the neighbouring countries of the civil war region, i.e. in particular Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. We will request and urge the U.S., the wealthy Arab countries and other UN member states to support us in this effort. 4. To establish and finance large refugee settlements on the borders of the European Union using funds from the EU and its member states.

We are aware that the refugee crisis presents a Herculean task. This is true not only for Germany, but is also a challenge for the European Union. We also know that we will not succeed in limiting the flight to Germany and Europe within just a few days. However, we ask the citizens of our country not to let up in their willingness to help refugees arriving here, and to trust in the fact that we are doing our best to stem the flow of refugees to Germany.” After such a declaration has been made, fundamental changes to Germany’s refugee policy should be introduced.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPEAN REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS (“REFUGES”) It is becoming increasingly urgent that international protection zones and settlements, which are called “refuges” here, should be established for a growing number of refugees from all over the world. There are numerous reasons for this. The first is that for a long time humanity and international politics will not be ready for or capable of removing all causes of flight sustainably. Due to contradictory national interests, the United Nations Security Council is only to a very limited degree able to guarantee world peace and international security. Wars will therefore continue in the indefinite future (currently, around 25 wars are being waged), as well as countless repressive regimes which use torture and create the conditions forcing people to flee. The second reason is that three large regions of the Earth where people enjoy a high level of security, social peace and prosperity have increasingly become the destination for global refugee movements. These regions are Western and Central Europe, North America and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). The states in these three regions are, however, not willing to accept all refugees, integrate them socially and make those who wish that citizens in the longer term. On the basis of state sovereignty, each state ultimately decides itself how many refugees it should accept by legal means, and to what extent it tolerates illegal immigration. The third reason is that liberal-democratic, affluent states are, however, not willing to leave refugees solely to their fate, and therefore wish to contribute to their survival, safety, to ensure as far as possible that they live in decent human conditions on the borders of their ruling country or beyond. To date, such intentions have, however, only been implemented to an entirely inadequate degree through the refugee agency of the United Nations (UNHCR), which is given far too little financial support. The more the suffering of refugees is withheld from the eyes of the western general public, the lower is the level of humanitarian commitment on the part of that public. It was not until millions of people fled across the Mediterranean and across the borders of Europe that an entirely new historical challenge was presented to the EU, and to a certain degree also to North America and Oceania.

The contradiction between the limited willingness among liberal-democratic states to accept millions of refugees and concern of securing their safety
can only be resolved by establishing refugee settlements on the borders of the liberal-democratic world or beyond its boundaries. Europe bears a particularly high level of responsibility for refugees who arrive on its territory or in its waters, or who are saved by European countries in the open sea. Common membership of NATO and the European Neighbourhood Policy also demand that countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan be relieved of the burden of accepting refugees. For this reason, the EU and its neighbouring European states, in close cooperation with the UNHCR, should establish numerous refuges of a quasi-ex-territorial nature under the European Union jurisdiction, either outside its territory or close to its border. These would then cater for, let us say, 40,000 to 200,000 refugees.

There is already agreement over the fact that all refugees who reach the EU territory should be first registered in a European database and identified at initial reception centres on the borders of the Union, where they also undergo health and security checks. Each individual refugee is given a provisional refugee identification card. Then, as many refugees as possible will be distributed across the individual European countries according to an as yet to be developed distribution system designed to take into account both subjective preferences among refugees for certain countries due to relatives and friends living there and objective factors such as their linguistic and professional skills, whereby these countries determine how many refugees they are willing to accept on the basis of mutual agreement between themselves.

The refuges should accept those refugees who cannot be distributed to the states. They should be established and administered either by the UNHCR or by an EU body which is to be newly created – the EUREF (European Refuges) headed by a High Representative of the European Union. The territory required could be purchased or rented by the EU if it is not donated for the purpose. Here, the most advantageous location would be the islands on the edge of Europe, in order to avoid creating the illusion that the refugees had de facto immigrated to Europe. However, almost unpopulated stretches of terrain in some European countries would also be possible sites for refugee settlements. The refuges could be funded either from the EU budget, from contributions made by its member states, or by means of an EU refugee tax, the level of which would need to be agreed (for instance, in the form of a Tobin tax, a solidarity supplement to income, wage and capital earnings tax of e.g. one percent). If not all member states are prepared to contribute to funding the refuges, EUREF should initially be set up by a sub-group of EU states according to the Euro or Schengen group model, while remaining open to entry by other members.

Another possibility is a combination of private and public funds. There are a large number of millionaires and billionaires, but above all also millions of normal EU citizens, who are willing to make a one-off or regular financial contribution in support of the refugees. A civic initiative could begin here and now to establish model refugee settlements through a private association and a private foundation, and in doing so prepare public opinion in Europe for comprehending the decisions that need to be made by the states and EU institutions, which will not be reached overnight.

A refuge should fulfil three objectives: 1. Guarantee protection and safety, decent humanitarian living conditions, food, health services and education facilities. 2. Prepare refugees for returning to their homes after the reasons for fleeing have been remedied. 3. Organize the transfer of long-term refugees to countries which are willing to take them.

Regarding the first objective: the external and internal protection provided by a refuge should be guaranteed by a European police unit which is able to draw on experience from EUPOL and which recruits suitable auxiliary police officers from among refugees themselves. A European justice service, which would include judges, state attorneys and solicitors, should implement legal order in the refuge in accordance with European law, with help and cooperation of legal professionals among refugees. For this purpose, a brief set of fundamental rules should be drawn up which applies to the refuge, is understandable to everyone, and should be communicated to refugees in a brief introductory course. Afterwards, every refugee who wishes to remain in the refuge rather than being sent back to the country of origin should agree to abide by the regulations set out in the fundamental rules. They will then be given the status of a fixed-term refugee citizen, and will be given a refugee identification certificate with which they will be able to apply for a visa or gain visa-free access to the EU states in accordance with their legal stipulations.

The issue of the spatial distribution of refugees in a large settlement the size of a town or a city is a difficult challenge. Mixing up the location of accommodation for refugees on a random basis or following the principle of a consciously designed inter-ethnic neighbourhood could easily lead to conflicts, and provide sustenance for individual fears of isolation in an alien environment, since in most cases, there is no common language of communication or experience in dealing with other cultures. Furthermore, it cannot
be expected that refugees should be willing to live in
direct proximity to supporters of the civil war party
from which they have fled, and which has been the
cause of traumatic experiences of war and persecution.
For this reason, it may be advisable to divide the
settlement according to political communities. These
should preferably be state communities, and in cases
where refugees come from mutually hostile civil war
parties and their sympathizer groups, a separation
on the basis of voluntary association could be the
best option, which would probably match primarily
political-linguistic-ethnic-religious criteria. At the
same time, however, voluntary and mandatory
intercultural events should also be organized for the
purpose of promoting peaceful coexistence in a large
settlement among refugees who have very different
origins and reasons for fleeing. If this succeeds, the
refugee settlements could become schools for global
tolerance and understanding among people from
different countries and cultures.

The refuges should not become hermetically
sealed settlements. Children and young people could
for example be invited to spend their holidays in
the European states. A school exchange could help
increase understanding for refugees through personal
experience in refuges. Mandatory civic education
events for all refugees could teach them fundamental
values of the European political culture which they
have to thank for being allowed to settle the refugees
in a manner that respects their human dignity.

European legal and societal standards, such as those
referring to relations between the sexes, should not
simply be octroyed onto refugees from other continents,
but be explained to them in cultural education centres.
Possible compromises should also be sought with
refugees’ own cultural norms, particularly when the
issue under debate is not fundamental human rights,
but merely cultural habits which can be changed or
tolerated. To the largest possible degree, the refugees
should promote an individual responsibility, motivation
and self-organization. Following their recognition
as citizens of the refuge, refugees can participate in
the construction, extension and maintenance of solid
apartment buildings as soon as building materials, tools
and machinery are provided for the purpose. As far as
possible, they should be given small plots of land to grow
fruit and vegetables. In the longer term, craft enterprises,
IT companies and other businesses which only require
a small amount of space could be established in the
refuges. In the nursery schools and schools, as well
as in further education institutions, trained personnel
could be involved, mainly recruited from among
refugees, particularly since in these institutions, the
respective native language should be used. Language
courses in English – the global communication
language – as the official refuge language could make
communication between heterogeneous refugee groups
possible. The construction of mosques and other places
of worship would be a clear sign of a tolerant religious
culture in the refuges. The rapid mobilization of
workers in the refuges under EU management would
make these institutions considerably cheaper to run
than the extremely expensive German administration
which condemns the refugees to months of inactivity
engendering frustration and aggression.

The self-administration organs should be elected in the
respective political communities. A federation of these
would represent common interests in the refuge. In this
way, the refugees can become places where communal,
inter-ethnic, inter-cultural democracy and peaceful
settlement of conflicts are experienced, particularly
for people who have never had an opportunity to take
responsibility for their own public interests.

Regarding the second objective: the refugees should
not be sent back home abruptly after the war has ended
or there is a regime change in their countries of origin.
To a far greater degree, the resettlement activities
should be staggered in terms of their timing and
quantity. However, the refugees who are not invited
to immigrate to an EU country should then return and
become involved in rebuilding of their country, even if
their personal living situation initially becomes worse
than it was in the EU or a refugee settlement as a result.

Regarding the third objective: refugees should not
stay in the refuge for their entire lives, even if the
reasons for their flight continue to exist for decades
on end. For this reason, refugee citizens of many
years should be given a certain degree of preferential
treatment when it comes to accepting immigrants
into the states that permit limited immigration. States
which decide to take on more refugees after all could
undertake to ensure that applicants for an immigration
permit learn the local language while still living in
the refugee settlement, in order to be able to take
up work on a par with their qualifications as soon as
they move to their new home. In this way, they would
fill the social security benefits coffers, rather than
depletting them. For this purpose, language courses,
probably for all European languages, would have to
be provided in the refuges, which could be organized
and funded either by state cultural institutions or by
private refugee associations. Those states willing
to accept refugees could also provide access to the
desired specialist training in the refuges, or invite
refugees to take part in training programmes in the
country itself. Refugees would in this way get the
opportunity to immigrate through their own efforts,
and not simply due to their injured person status.
THE SIMULTANEOUS NATURE OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT REFUGEES

It is unlikely that a clear, commonly agreed European policy on refugees will be developed for some time. Instead, modest efforts towards this aim are more likely. As a result, a large number of different national refugee policies will compete with each other and with Brussels, will continue to trade insults and accusations of blame. Viktor Orban and many others will denigrate Germany with its moral imperialism as being the cause of the refugee chaos in Europe. Conversely, German, Swedish and other politicians will accuse those countries which take in only a small number of refugees, or none at all, as lacking in European solidarity. The people who bear the brunt of difficulties arising from this situation will be refugees themselves, shunted from one country to another. However, Europe may further tighten its borders against refugees in the months to come without really ensuring that the living conditions in the countries neighbouring the civil war region become more compatible with human dignity.

Tens of thousands of Islamist extremists from 80 countries have managed, at least for a time, to create a barbaric Islamic State and to spread fear of terrorist attacks across the world. Why should not tens of millions of people with humane, cosmopolitan attitudes, even if they find themselves in the minority in society, not at last manage to create humane refugee settlements along the lines of the model described above, even if – and precisely because – social majorities are in some cases forcing their governments to seal off their country and the EU against the influx of refugees?

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В результате “политики гостеприимства”, провозглашенной канцлером Германии Ангелой Меркель в августе 2015 г. по отношению к беженцам из Сирии и других неблагополучных стран, по всей Европе активизировались радикальные националисты, что вылилось в акты насилия против беженцев и предназначенных для них жилищ. Все это, наряду с проблемами размещения, питания и одежды для беженцев, побудило действующие политические силы к поиску способов ограничения притока беженцев в Европу. Настоящая статья предлагает несколько рекомендаций по решению проблемы.

Ключевые слова: беженцы, Сирия, Исламское государство, Европа, ЕС, Турция, эмиграционная политика, лагеря для беженцев, квоты на размещение, этнорелигиозная структура.

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