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FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN CHINA UNDER XI JINPING

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Abstract. Corruption has been a part of Chinese society throughout its existence. The fight against corruption is one of the most important work directions of the Chinese Communist Party and the law enforcement system. After the 18th National Congress of the CPC (November 2012) and the election of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, the anti-corruption efforts have reached a new and higher level. Xi Jinping initiated constitutional reform by establishing a single constitutional anti-corruption body, the National Supervisory Commission, with extensive law enforcement powers; it was formed from the Ministry of Control (a State Council's organ), the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (a State Council's organ) and the departments of the People's Procuratorates for combating corruption, bribery, and malfeasance. A reformatting of the entire anti-corruption system has taken place. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is no longer empowered to perform anti-corruption law enforcement functions, but rather should concentrate on controlling party discipline. At the same time, the overall control of the anticorruption fight still remains in the hands of the CPC. In addition to creating a new constitutional control authority, Xi Jinping intensified ideological education and launched a campaign for the total digitalization of the judiciary, law enforcement, finance, and banking, etc. In this way, the efficiency of control over the revenues and expenses of officials and businesses is increased. Under Xi Jinping, anti-corruption educational efforts have been enhanced by the number of documentaries and feature films about the government's success in combating corruption. The series "In the Name of the People" (2017) was especially popular among the citizens. In Russia, unlike modern China, there is no unified body in the field of combating corruption. The fight against corruption in Russia is the responsibility of the prosecutor's office and its own security services. From this point, low efficiency of the anti-corruption system is obvious. The experience of China in the investigated area is extremely relevant and significant both in practical and theoretical terms for domestic science and practice.

Keywords: China, Xi Jinping, corruption, politics, control power, CCP, legislation, death penalty, legal regulation.

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БОРЬБА С КОРРУПЦИЕЙ В КИТАЕ ПРИ СИ ЦЗИНЬПИНЕ

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Аннотация. Борьба с коррупцией – важнейшее направление деятельности Коммунистической партии Китая и правоохранительной системы КНР. После 18-го Всекитайского съезда КПК (ноябрь 2012 г.) и избрания Си Цзиньпина на пост генерального секретаря ЦК КПК соответствующая деятельность партии и государства вышла на более высокий уровень. Си Цзиньпин инициировал конституционную реформу, создав единый орган в сфере борьбы с коррупцией с обширными правоохранительными полномочиями – Государственный контрольный комитет. Произошло переформатирование всей системы борьбы с коррупцией. Центральная комиссия по проверке дисциплины теперь не вправе осуществлять антикоррупционные правоохранительные функции, а должна сконцентрироваться на контроле за соблюдением партийной дисциплины. При этом общий контроль за антикоррупционной борьбой остается за КПК. Поскольку в России нет единого конституционного органа в данной области, соответствующий китайский опыт чрезвычайно актуален, теоретически и практически важен для нас.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Си Цзиньпин, коррупция, политика, контрольная власть, КПК, законодательство, смертная казнь, правовое регулирование.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

China is a state with a unique experience of political, legal, and socio-economic development. Particular attention is drawn to the economic successes of Chinese reforms which have turned the country into a major civilizational, geopolitical, and economic competitor to the West and, as Vinogradov rightly points out, “returned China to the epicenter of world politics and geopolitics” [1, p. 6]. Economic transformations were directly related to changes in the administrative system, which were accompanied by a reduction of the state apparatus, simplification of administrative procedures, reduction of administrative barriers, and expansion of discretionary powers¹ [2]. In China, the latter has become a factor provoking corrupt behavior of officials due to vast freedom in making government decisions at the local level. The discretionary powers granted to officials by Chinese legislation became the main source of corruption in the distribution of material and non-material resources.

Corruption in China is considered the main obstacle to economic growth and stability of society [3, p. 171]. At the 20th National Congress of the CPC held in October 2022, the General Secretary of its Central Committee, Xi Jinping, said: “...putrefaction² is the biggest malignant tumor, destroying the vitality and fighting ability of the party...” [source 1, p. 69].

HISTORICAL REFERENCE

Chinese communists encountered corruption immediately after the Communist Party of China was created (1921) [4, p. 13]. The first member of the CPC to be executed for bribery and corruption was the head of the local government of a Soviet region under communist rule, Xie Busheng (谢步升) in 1932 [5, p. 20].

¹ Discretionary powers are the rights and obligations of a government body or official, giving them the opportunity, at their own discretion, to determine the type and content of a management decision or to choose from several options provided by a departmental act.

² “Putrefaction” (*fubai*, 腐败) is a common (non-legal) name for corruption in China, used in speeches by party and government leaders, in the media, and among ordinary citizens.

After the People’s Republic of China was formed in 1949, the new Chinese state continued to face abuses by government officials. Mao Zedong called for decisive actions against the phenomena; from late 1951 to October 1952, the CPC launched a campaign against the “three evils” (*san fan yundong*, 三反运动), aimed at combating “putrefaction”, embezzlement, and bureaucracy, later replaced by a campaign against the “five abuses” (*wu fan yundong*, 五反运动). The campaign revealed that about 80% of government employees were involved in corruption crimes to varying degrees. About 100 thousand people were identified as being involved in thefts amounting to more than 10 million yuan, and the total amount stolen was estimated at 6 billion yuan [6, pp. 32–33]. The largest case of that period was the case of Liu Qingshan (刘青山) and Zhang Zishan (张子善). They were Mao’s comrades in the revolutionary struggle and made a great contribution to the victory of the Chinese revolution over the Kuomintang and Japanese militarism. Liu Qingshan was charged with embezzlement of 300 million yuan which he used to buy two cars from Hong Kong and for other personal needs. This amount would allow the purchase of 1.1 million tons of rice, which would feed 3070 people for a year. Zhang Zishan spent about 2 million (old) yuan and changed five cars in two years. In February 1952, both criminals were shot.

A tough attitude toward corrupt officials yielded positive results: under Mao Zedong, the number of such offenses in the PRC was unprecedentedly low. During periods of mass political campaigns, corruption crimes were practically not committed.

With the end of the “cultural revolution” (1966–1976) and the beginning of large-scale transformations, “putrefaction” began to actively penetrate the party-state apparatus and business. However, as Vinogradov rightly noted, at the first stage of reforms, corruption even played a certain positive role, “compensating for the imperfections of the legal regime”, “was an organic part of increased economic activity and of creation of a free economic space parallel to the planned system” [7, p. 90]. The policy pursued since the end of 1978 provided broad law-making powers for

local authorities, and local officials had the right to grant benefits to entrepreneurs at their personal discretion.

Approaching a local administrator, the entrepreneur would make them interested in various material and/or intangible personal benefits, which, however, was accompanied by the creation of new enterprises and jobs, large investments, and the introduction of high-tech equipment and modern technical solutions. Everyone benefited from such a cooperation scheme: the state, the population, the entrepreneur, and the specific official who received “bonuses” from the business.

However, over time, when the personal interest of an official became a prerequisite for obtaining preferences, and without bribes business development and fair play became impossible, penetration of corruption into the party and the administrative apparatus began to undermine authorities, leading to rising prices for goods and services.

Every successive leader of China used slogans to counteract “putrefaction” as an element of their political program. All Chinese leaders in the post-Mao Zedong period called for a fight against corruption. Deng Xiaoping believed that economic reforms do not make sense if they are accompanied by a decline in the level of morality, which “will ultimately give rise to a world of unbridled embezzlement, theft and bribery” [source 2, p. 173]. Jiang Zemin stated that “the fight against putrefaction is a serious political battle, on which the existence or death of the party and the state depends” [8, p. 26]. Hu Jintao, in a report at the 17th Congress of the CPC (October 15, 2007), stated that “... the Party and putrefaction are absolutely incompatible, like fire and water” [9, p. 117]. Vinogradov states that the new “party leader began his rise to power by strengthening party work and increasing party discipline. The main method of achieving these goals was personnel purge” [10, p. 7].

However, the fight against “putrefaction” was carried out for a long time only within the framework of formal political campaigns, without real changes in the existing system of relations between government representatives and society. Although even before Xi Jinping, major party and

government officials were given harsh sentences, including the death penalty, in corruption cases, there were no significant changes in combating such crimes.

FIGHTING CORRUPTION UNDER XI JINPING

The 18th National Congress of the CPC (November 2012) laid the beginning of fundamental changes in the anti-corruption activities of the party and the state [11, p. 51]. The new General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping made the improvement of these activities one of the most important points of his practical program [12, p. 73]. By 2014, “the fight against putrefaction was the main direction of internal party life” [10, p. 9]. Xi Jinping began this work while still holding party and government posts in the regions³. Having arrived to lead the country, he launched a comprehensive reform of the anti-corruption system.

A number of Chinese scientists have singled out several stages of combating corruption in the PRC after 1978. They consider the first (1978–2012) to be “the development and spread of corruption”; the second (2012–2022) is defined as “putrefaction under heavy attack” (a significant increase in the number of convictions for the corresponding crimes), and the third (current) is “cleansing from putrefaction and ultimately containing it” (2023–2035) [13, p. 53]. Obviously, the second and third stages are directly related to the activities of Xi Jinping.

ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN SLOGANS

The fight against “putrefaction” in China is currently carried out under the motto “beat both tigers and flies” (*laohu cangying qi da*, 老虎苍蝇一起打), meaning the fight against both large and small violators. Xi Jinping spoke about the need to fight “tigers and flies” back in January 2013 at a meeting of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). He also pro-

³ This refers to the period of Xi Jinping’s work in Zhejiang province (2002–2007).

claimed “zero tolerance” (*ling ren-nai*, 零忍耐) toward any manifestations of corruption in the country [source 3, p. 394].

The choice of the motto is not accidental. In China, the tiger is considered “the king of the forest”, and the forest is a metaphor for state (public) property. The tiger is a symbol of power, the personification of an official holding a leadership position and managing state property. Some Chinese sources indicate that in ancient times, there was a custom to execute a corrupt official on the scaffold “with [an image of] a tiger’s head”⁴ symbolizing the threat that such criminals pose not only to the state but also to ordinary people. In turn, flies are annoying insects (in Chinese the word *fly* is associated with the verbs *to annoy*, *to bother*), which, although not a threat to life, are carriers of a dangerous infection. Since the “tigers” were once “flies”, the fight against small corrupt officials is the key to preventing large ones from entering the management system in the future.

Having called for a fight against “tigers and flies”, Xi Jinping began to insist on capturing and retrieving “foxes” – corrupt officials who would flee the PRC due to investigation. In traditional China, foxes were seen as werewolves who took on human form; they formed an intimate relationship with a person to obtain the vital energy necessary to replenish their strength [14], and as a result, the person would become exhausted and die. In the context of the fight against “putrefaction”, “foxes” are understood as seemingly law-abiding officials who rob the state and people and then escape the country – drain their prey and vanish like werewolves. Corrupt “foxes” are cunning and resourceful. Sometimes, “foxes” mean mistresses of corrupt officials because the latter assign illegally obtained assets to the former, including those transferred abroad. Chinese authors state that many of the corrupt officials hiding there “conspire with foreign hostile forces and sell state secrets, thus threatening the interests and security of the state” [15, p. 6].

To search for and extradite escaped officials, Xi Jinping in 2014 announced a nationwide “Net

⁴ The image of a dog’s head on the scaffold meant common crimes such as murder, robbery, or violence; a dragon’s head symbolized crimes against power.

of Heaven Action” campaign (*Tian Wang Xingdong*, 天网行动), which also applies to other criminals hiding abroad. As part of this campaign, the criminals and their illegal assets are regularly returned to China from more than 120 countries around the world. In 2017–2022, 7,089 criminals who fled abroad were returned to the PRC, including 1,992 members of the CPC and government officials, and 35,240 million yuan were returned to the treasury [source 4].

As part of the “fox hunt”, a list of the 100 most wanted people – “Red Circular of a Hundred Faces” (*Bai Ming Hong Tong Renyuan*, 百名红通人员) is in force, which is submitted to Interpol and is regularly updated by the Chinese side. More than half of the large “foxes” who mainly prefer to hide in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon bloc (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were returned from abroad. The West accuses China of secretly opening police stations abroad and invading the jurisdiction of other states as part of the search for fugitive corrupt officials. Beijing rejects such accusations as unfounded [16].

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM

The fifth generation of Chinese leaders (led by Xi Jinping) began the search for new ways to counter “putrefaction” and finally appealed to the experience of old China, where the institution of censorship existed. The leader of the PRC seemingly saw opposition to his policies within the party, and in addition, the effectiveness of previous anti-corruption measures began to decline. In 2014, Xi Jinping initiated the creation of a new branch of government in the country – the control branch legally enshrined in changes to the Constitution in March 2018. As a result of the largest amendments in the history of the PRC to the Basic Law of the country [17, pp. 21-27], the National Supervisory Commission and local control committees were introduced into the system of supreme government bodies. Paragraph 7 of Chapter III “State structure” (Articles 123-127) is devoted to the constitutional and legal regulation of their powers and activities. The National Supervisory Commission is the main government

body fighting corruption, and it has enormous law enforcement powers. There was no such thing in China before.

Though such a committee had never existed in China before, this type of power is not new for the country since the isolation of control functions was an obligatory element of the public administration system in ancient times. Such organs originated during the Warring States period (the 5th-3rd centuries BC) [18, p. 106]. Controllers-“censors” secretly visited various areas to collect information about the work of a local official with a subsequent report to the emperor.

The founder of the Kuomintang party, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), attached great importance to this type of power. In his fundamental work “The Constitution of the Five Powers” (1924), state power, according to the Chinese tradition, was divided into legislative, judicial, executive, control, and examination. This system operated in the Republic of China (1912–1949), and now exists in the Republic of China on Taiwan. The Control Yuan created there examines cases of violations of the law or abuse of power by officials. Article 2 of the “Control Law” adopted in 1937 establishes the right of the said yuan and its committees to bring charges against officials who abuse their powers.

The control system also existed in the structure of communist power, but its components were divided between the party and the state. The Central Control Committee was created in the CPC in 1927, the prototype of the Central Control Committee that emerged in 1978, which took on the functions of a law enforcement agency. At the level of the government, counteracting abuses by officials was also entrusted to the Ministry of Control of the People’s Republic of China and the State Administration of the People’s Republic of China for the Prevention of Corruption (both are bodies of the State Council), as well as to the departments of the people’s prosecutors office for combating corruption, bribery, and malfeasance.

The law enforcement functions were unusual for the party – the discipline inspection commissions subjected suspects to arrests, searches, interrogations, etc. without initiating criminal cases and with no appropriate sanctions from the

prosecutor’s office and the court. The commissions collected evidence and then transferred it to the prosecutor’s office to initiate a criminal case and carry out subsequent procedural actions up to the transfer of the case to court. At the same time, the interrogator and investigator was not a law enforcement officer but a party worker; this situation did not suit Xi Jinping.

His experiment dating back to 2014 on creating new government bodies yielded positive results. In 2016, by the decision of the CPC Central Committee, control committees began to be introduced in Beijing, in the provinces of Shanxi and Zhejiang. The first such committee started working in January 2017 in Shanxi [19, p. 71], and by February 2018, a three-level system of state control (provinces-cities-counties) covered all of China, with the exception of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

In March 2018, amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control were adopted, and quasi-law enforcement powers in the field of combating corruption were taken away from the CCDI. The CPC retains the leading role in this struggle, but now the CCDI deals exclusively with issues of party discipline, and in case of violation of the law, it transfers the case materials to the National Supervisory Commission and local control committees. In other words, if an official is caught cheating on his wife, this is considered a violation of party discipline and of the moral imperatives of the CPC and falls within the competence of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. However, if cheating is accompanied by acceptance of expensive gifts, illegal acquisition of real estate, and similar violations, the CCDI no longer has the right to conduct its own investigation but is to pass on the information to the National Supervisory Commission.

Discipline inspection commissions and control committees, both at the highest level and locally, now work in the same buildings and share the Internet platform (<http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/>) where the necessary information is collected regarding the person who has violated discipline and/or the law. Yet the commissions now have no

right to interfere in the law enforcement sphere. Thus, the entire anti-corruption system was restructured, and the CPC maintained supremacy: the party exercises political leadership over control committees [20, p. 76]. In addition, according to the Constitution, the National Supervisory Commission is responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.

Sonin compares the new system, which has two governing bodies – the party and the state, with the mythical two-headed Cerberus. The Russian scientist believes that the creation of control committees will somewhat reduce the responsibility of the law enforcement and administrative systems and also strengthen the positions of the CCDI [18, p. 116]. One can only partially agree with this statement; it appears that the creation of the National Supervisory Commission weakens the prosecutor's office, since its functions in relation to the fight against corruption are transferred to the control authority. The prosecutor's office, as a body supervising the rule of law, continues to function with greatly reduced powers. The positions of the CCDI, which has lost the right to directly intervene in the law enforcement sphere, are weakening. The personnel of the National Supervisory Commission, which has extensive law enforcement functions, included employees of the disbanded Ministry of Control, the State Administration for the Prevention of Corruption, and the corresponding anti-corruption department of the prosecutor's office. Obviously, the staff of the National Supervisory Commission also includes employees of law enforcement agencies responsible for operational investigative work, but open sources provide no information on this.

According to Art. 15 of the Law on Control, the objects of inspections by the National Supervisory Commission are a wide range of persons; Chinese scientists define this as “full coverage” (*quan fugai*, 全覆盖) [21, p. 49]. The corresponding list covers members of the CPC and of any of the eight democratic parties, non-party civil servants, senior officials of government-commercial, medical, educational, sports, scientific, and similar organizations, law enforcement officers systems, including police, state security, courts, prosecutors (but not limited to these institutions);

persons holding leadership positions in the People's Liberation Army and the armed police, deputies of the National People's Congress and local people's assemblies, employees of the control authorities themselves, etc.

The powers of the latter are very extensive, providing the right to initiate criminal cases, conduct interrogations, searches, block accounts, seize property, conduct examinations, etc. (12 types of competencies in total). A key power is the possibility of “detention/retention” (*liuzhi*, 留置), that is, restricting the freedom of an individual and their right to dispose of property and assets (without the sanction of the court and prosecutor's office). It is applied in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Art. 22 for up to 6 months (Part 2 of Art. 43 of the Control Law). The Law makes no mention of the presumption of innocence or obtaining the assistance of a lawyer. The right to qualified defense appears only at the stage of judicial proceedings.

It is practically impossible to effectively appeal the procedural measures applied by control bodies. Such a decision can be appealed initially only to the body that made it (Article 49 of the Control Law), and in case of repeated disagreement, only to a higher control authority. During this period, execution of the decision is not suspended. The person being inspected is not only deprived of qualified legal assistance but also cannot file a complaint against the decisions of the control authorities to the court or prosecutor's office.

What is taking place in the PRC is not just the emergence of a new constitutional branch of government but the institutionalization of the entire system of anti-corruption fight with the transfer of law enforcement functions from the CCDI to the State Control Commission. Xi Jinping now has another powerful tool for promoting his anti-corruption policy. The National Supervisory Commission is turning into a force competing with the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATIVE AND PARTY ACTS

To effectively counteract “putrefaction” under Xi Jinping, various regulato-

ry legal acts, as well as party documents, were adopted [4, pp. 14-15]. A “three no’s” campaign was announced [22, pp. 389-391]⁵ which promotes certain moral and psychological prohibitions and the adoption of strict measures to ensure they become the norm.

1. “[So that] they do not dare to putrefy” (*bu gan fu*, 不敢腐). This is achieved by tightening penalties for corruption crimes, abuse of official positions, and giving and receiving bribes. In such cases, criminal law gives the death penalty (Article 382 of the Criminal Code of the PRC). A most high-profile case that resulted in such a sentence was the case of Lai Xiaoming⁶. In April 2016, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Prosecutor’s Office adopted a joint act, according to which a person guilty of accepting a bribe or of corruption involving benefits worth more than 3 million yuan can be sentenced to death (Part 1, Article 3). Under certain circumstances, the death penalty may also be imposed on the perpetrator of corrupt acts that led to the receipt of benefits in the amount of 1.5 million to 3 million yuan (Part 2 of Article 3).

2. “[So that] ‘putrefaction’ [becomes] impossible” (*bu neng fu*, 不能腐). Strict preventive control is established over the income and expenses of officials and their family members. The official is obliged to regularly report on the marital status – their own and family members, including children marrying foreigners, family members moving abroad, changing jobs, private trips abroad, involvement in legal liability, salary and other income, personal property and property of close relatives, accounts abroad and the movement of funds on them, investment activities, participation of close relatives in commercial organizations, etc.

3. “[So that no one] desires ‘putrefaction’” (不想腐). Measures are being taken to increase

⁵ The slogan was widely used in the “Chinese world” even before Xi Jinping. Thus, it was proclaimed during anti-corruption campaigns in Singapore (since the late 1950s), in Hong Kong (Hong Kong) in the 1970s, and in Taiwan in the 2000s.

⁶ Lai Xiaoming was the chairman of the board of directors of a large state-owned asset management company. It was proven that he received bribes in the amount of about 1.8 billion yuan (277 million USD). The sentence was carried out on January 29, 2021 by lethal injection.

the consciousness of officials; they are to voluntarily refuse to violate the law and disciplinary norms [23, pp. 28-29].

Notably, the first two points, implying legislative prohibitions and liability for acts of corruption, are already fully regulated. The measures to be taken demonstrate to potential violators that the losses from “putrefaction” will be greater than the benefits received, yet to date, Chinese experts note that there is a “bottleneck” effect: the abundance of legal acts and party documents reduces their effectiveness [24, p. 117].

Therefore, measures are being taken to improve the moral character of party members and leaders in the field of government and business. Nurturing moral principles that deny the very possibility of violating the law and morality is the main task of the modern campaign to combat “putrefaction”.

DIGITALIZATION AS A TOOL TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

The total digitalization of Chinese society is a priority area of combating corruption [25]. A unified platform for broadcasting court hearings on the Internet was launched (<http://tingshen.court.gov.cn/>) allowing the public to access court proceedings in civil, administrative, and criminal cases online. Sentences (decisions, rulings) of courts are placed under public control; citizens can freely familiarize themselves with details of the trial at any time and from anywhere in the country. There is a unified platform of judicial decisions on the Internet with open access for citizens (<https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/>).

To receive reports of violations of discipline and corruption, specialized Internet platforms provide the opportunity to report even in an anonymous mode. Reports of violations can be left on the websites of the CCDI/National Supervisory Commission, the Supreme People’s Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme People’s Court, public security agencies, state security, customs, etc. The state encourages citizens who report corruption violations. For false reports, legal liability is provided, including criminal liability. In this way, the state demonstrates that it entrusts the public

with the functions of control over the state apparatus. Thus, power is not wasted on expanding the control apparatus, transferring some of its functions to the population. At the same time, there is a danger of turning the system of denunciations into a channel of income for a certain category of people, a way to achieve material and career benefits.

China under Xi Jinping is now a world leader in the use of digital currency. The gradual introduction of the digital yuan will allow citizens to take control of their income and expenses. Unlike the cash yuan, the movement of the digital yuan can be effectively tracked, and the corruption component of financial transactions can be identified. With the gradual displacement of cash and the current ban on cryptocurrency, the widespread circulation of the electronic yuan will contribute to success in the fight against abuse.

Obviously, new technologies, including artificial intelligence and big data, will increase the level of state control in the field of counteracting “putrefaction”, in particular, facilitating the identification of an official’s affiliation with business.

USING CINEMA TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

In order to morally educate the population, induce strict compliance with anti-corruption legislation, train citizens to combat such violations, and provide information about the successes achieved in this area, under Xi Jinping, a broad campaign was launched to create documentary and feature films and TV series. Their release was publicly announced, they were shown on central television channels, and some films topped the charts in terms of viewership. Such extensive cinematic material does not exist in Russia.

Notably, one of the most popular series in China about the fight against “putrefaction”, *In the Name of the People* (*Renmin de ming yi*, 人民的名义) released in 2017, shows the internal politics of China, connections between businesses, party bodies, law enforcement and judicial systems, examples of criminal schemes, and the amount of kickbacks for illegal actions. Some of the documentaries on the successes of the state in fight-

ing “putrefaction” appeared after the creation of the National Supervisory Commission. The most popular ones are *Always on the Go* (*Yongyuan Zai Lushan*, 永远在路上) (2016), *Sharp Sword of Inspection* (*Xunshi Li Jian*, 巡视利剑) (2017), *State Control* (*Guojia Jiancha*, 国家监察) (2020), *Anti-Corruption Fight Is on Your Side* (*Zhengfeng fan-fu jiu zai shenbian*, 正风反腐就在身边) (2021), *Zero Tolerance* (*Ling Ronzhen*, 零容忍) (2022), *Always Trumpet the Attack* (*Yongyuan Chuichong Fenghao*, 永远吹冲锋号) (2023). They show real cases, the activities of law enforcement officers to catch bribe-takers and embezzlers, and interviews with convicts. Such an extensive amount of documentaries dedicated to the fight against “putrefaction” became possible only under Xi Jinping.

CONCLUSION

Xi Jinping created a constitutional control branch of government based on the traditional Chinese approach to governance as a reaction to the inability of Chinese legislation and numerous party acts to fully combat corruption. The control power united the law enforcement powers of previously disparate bodies. At the same time, the CCDI continues to work as a body to monitor the behavior of party members. Thus, in the anti-corruption sphere, a “one-window” system emerged, a quasi-single body “with two heads”: the Central Committee of the Communist Party stands guard over party discipline, and the National Supervisory Commission stands for the defense of the law. The role of the prosecutor’s office is reduced to preparing and supporting charges in court.

Evaluating the effectiveness of a new system takes time, yet redistribution of law enforcement powers is already obvious: the prosecutor’s office is significantly weakened, its anti-corruption functions were taken away, and the Central Committee for Police has lost the opportunity to intervene in the law enforcement sphere. As a result, a powerful law enforcement agency with enormous powers appeared in the constitutional field, which can also be used in the fight against the opposition.

Institutionalization of the anti-corruption sphere in itself will not put an end to abuses, but it can significantly reduce their level. This should also be facilitated by an increase in the moral

qualities and legal awareness of government officials, businesses, and ordinary people. The current leadership of the country works in this direction. Lomanov states that the ability to regulate the situation in the ideological sphere under Xi Jinping increased noticeably [26, p. 21].

The platforms for propaganda are television and the Internet; with the support of the state, a significant number of films and TV series are produced about the fight against “putrefaction”, the inevitability of punishment, and the encourage-

ment of those who are on the path of correction or report facts of violations. Eradication of corruption solely through educational measures is not yet achievable, therefore the state has a repressive written law that provides severe legal liability for such crimes, including the death penalty.

Regretfully, China’s progressive experience in institutionalizing the anti-corruption system is not in demand by the Russian authorities, and the competencies of sinologists in this area are not in demand.

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