
CHINA: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

**RUSSIA IN THE PLANS
AND PROGRAMS OF PRC BORDER REGIONS**

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The article analyzes how the authorities of bordering Russia PRC's regions intend to exploit Russian economic potential in order to further develop their territories. Based on the study of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region's 14th five-year plans of socio-economic development, other official documents, as well as the results of last decade Russia-China cross-border interactions, the author comes to conclusion that for the last decades these territories' authorities did not change previously formed approaches to Russia. He identifies traditions, variations and innovations in the policies of each region and pays special attention to the cities of Suifenhe and Heihe, which are the most interested in cooperation with their northern neighbor. The author argues that relations with Russia are of fundamental importance for Heilongjiang province only, while the other two regions look at it only as an additional mechanism to solve energy and communication problems. Besides, their interest goes far beyond the border regions of Russia, the Far Eastern and even Siberian federal districts and is aimed at the entire territory of Russia. The analyzed documents contain a number of innovations like the expansion of scientific and technological cooperation, financial and digital interaction with Russia, but they are predominantly declarative in nature. The main focus is made on expanding imports of Russian energy resources and raw materials, creating a network of processing industries in Northern part of China, increasing exports of local industrial and agricultural products and services to Russia, making cross-border transport corridors more efficient, and creating various "special areas of interaction". Analysis shows that China's acquisition of the status of a global power and its entry into the "new era" of socialism building only slightly corrected the views of Beijing and border territories on Russian economic potential as a source of China development.

Keywords: China, Russia, the Far East, cross-border ties, development plans and programs.

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On January 8, 2021, The People's Daily (an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) published an article optimistically postulating that cooperation between Northeast China and the Russian Far East "gives impetus to the deepening of relations for comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation between China and Russia in a new era" [1]. This flexible formulation means, among other things, the ongoing search for more effective ways and means of developing the North-East of the country, where the Russian factor plays an important role in ensuring.

This strategic line, which in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s was implemented in the concept of development of three bordering Russia provincial-level territories of China – Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region [2, pp. 81-136], in the first two decades of the 21st century was repeatedly confirmed in documents of the central and local level. The Government of the

People's Republic of China (PRC) has made a series of decisions aimed at accelerating the development of the country's border areas, encouraging their cooperation with neighboring foreign territories, and provided them with a number of benefits and preferences for it. The territories neighboring Russia have made special decisions, programs, and plans to expand cooperation with their northern neighbor, fixed this course in five-year development plans, provincial and local interpretations of the Belt and Road Initiative, created special zones of external openness and international cooperation and behaved quite actively in promoting their interests within Russia.

Practical building of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the "new era", approved by the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party as the guiding ideology of the country's development for the long term [3, p. 178], required a revision of earlier actions, as well as the development of new approaches. Even a superficial analysis shows that many of the

planned benchmarks for the territories bordering Russia where the Chinese authorities intended to use Russia's potential have not been achieved. The strategy of reviving the "old industrial" base of the Chinese North-East, on which the bet was placed, gave very modest results [4, pp. 354-355]. The pace of its economic development chronically lagged behind the national average¹. "The program of cooperation between the regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia of the Russian Federation and the Northeast of the PRC for 2009–2018 has actually failed" [4, pp. 220-237; 8]. The volume of economic ties between the northeastern provinces of China and Russia has not grown recently but significantly decreased. These circumstances call into question the ideas about the effectiveness of Chinese mid-term planning, that have been established over the past few years in the information space of Russia.

On March 12, 2021, the National People's Congress approved the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People's Republic of China. Within the period from February to May of that year, similar plans were passed by the People's Congresses of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia, as well as the border cities of Suifenhe and Heihe. These documents allow assessing the intentions of these territories' leadership with regard to building ties with Russia not for five years only, but also for a longer period.

The purpose of this article is precisely to analyze the approaches formulated by the Chinese authorities to interaction with Russia in the context of solving old and new tasks development of border territories. The first part of the article briefly presents China's conceptual approaches to this issue that dominated their actions in the first two decades of the 21st century and the results of their practical implementation; the second one analyzes some elements of Chinese theoretical thought related the exploitation of Russia's potential in ensuring China further development in the "new era".

PAST EXPERIENCE AS THE BASIS FOR THEORETICAL REFLECTION

As the author of this paper has already written, although the leadership of the PRC formally professed, supported, and repeatedly declared the idea of attract-

ing the potential of Siberia and the Far East for the accelerated development of Chinese northern and northeastern territories [9, pp. 182-194], the latter were not in the focus of Beijing's global vision. The implementation of one of the "breakthrough ideas" proposed in the 1990s – the creation of a "single economic space in Northeast Asia" – was delegated to the three border provinces most interested in it. The same approach was manifested in the concept of the Belt and Road Initiative, which focused on the need to "use the proximity of Inner Mongolia to Mongolia and Russia", "strengthen cooperation between the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning and the Russian Far Eastern region in the field of sea and land transportation" and formulated the task of building the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor [10].

Thus, Beijing's position on the use of Russia's resources was largely formed on the basis of pragmatic calculations of the territories bordering the Russian Federation, which perceived it mainly in three projections: as a geographically close source of natural (including energy) resources; as a sales market (limited in scale, but important for certain sectors) of industrial and agricultural products and labor; as the owner of transport (railway, port, and sea) infrastructure, convenient to deliver these territories' goods to the European, Asian and American markets [11, pp. 16-18].

Heilongjiang province, which takes 70% (2,981 km) of the Russian-Chinese border, since the late 1980s has positioned itself as a national platform for cooperation with Russia and its eastern regions. The "General Plan for the Restoration of the Old Industrial base of Heilongjiang Province" (2004) fixed the goal to build a China-wide "window" for the opening of Russia and a transport corridor that should link China with Europe. The document designated three main areas of cooperation with Russia: science, development of natural resources, and trade [4, p. 222]. In March 2005, provincial authorities approved a program aimed to extend economic relations with Russia, supported by certain plans for cooperation in the energy sector, the creation of export, including agricultural, production aimed at Russia, scientific and technical cooperation [12]. In November 2009, the program was adjusted, but its basic settings have not changed [13]. The same year, "The Chinese Tumenjiang Zone Area Joint Development Program" was approved. It was created within the framework of the international project for the development of China, Russia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Mongolia territories adjacent to the Tumen River (Chinese: Tumenjiang, Korean: Duman-gang) which has been discussed for many years). Formally, the Program had the status of a national strategy, but it

¹ According to provincial statistics, the increase in the gross regional product in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region amounted to: in 2018 – 5.0, 4.5, and 5.2%, respectively; in 2019 – 4.5, 3.5, and 5.2%; in 2020 – 1.0, 2.4, and 0.2%, whereas the average economic growth figures in China were 6.8, 6.1, and 2.3% over the same years [5, 2019–2021; 6, 2019–2021; 7, 2019–2021].

was purely provincial, becoming a guide to action for the governmental and intellectual elites of Jilin province only [4, p. 227].

During 2012–2016, the Government of People's Republic of China sanctioned several new programs for the country's border territories' development, including stimulation of ties with foreign partners, such as Russia. In this vein, the documents devoted to strengthening the positions of Northeast China in Northeast Asia [17] and the further development of the Tumenjiang Project were sustained [18]. In 2014, Heilongjiang province initiated a program for the development of trade in services with Russia until 2023 [19]. In the spring of 2016, a Program of Northeast China development was approved [17]. The cooperation of North-East China and Russian Far East development plans and the construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor were among its priority tasks [4, pp. 219-223, 227; 9, pp. 187-193].

Local interpretations of the national Belt and Road Initiative, which actively promoted the border territories, were also focused on expanding cooperation with Russia. First of all, they were aimed at creating a cross-border transport infrastructure capable of providing them with access to the markets of Europe, Asia, and America. The Heilongjiang "Work Plan for Promoting the Construction of the Eastern Land-Sea Silk Road Economic Belt" [18] (approved in November 2014) and the "China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor" Heilongjiang Land-Sea Silk Road Economic Belt Construction Plan" [19] (April 2015) are designed specifically in this way.

Accordingly, the view of Russia was presented in these territories' 13th five-year plans of social and economic development for 2016–2020. Among the basic tasks of Heilongjiang province's five-year plan were: the creation of a "system of comprehensive external openness with priority development of cooperation with Russia... in order to significantly increase the capacity of cross-border transport corridors"; the formation of a "China-oriented platform of services and channels for interaction with Russia"; "the development of cross-border production chains and clusters to deepen comprehensive cooperation with Russia and implement new breakthroughs in the development of relations with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Europe, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau" [20]. The Changjitu Zone (Changchun-Jilin-Tumenjiang triangle) was presented in Jilin province's five-year plan as a "reference area" of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor. The province aimed at the development of multimodal transportation through Russia, connection to the eastern part of its gas transportation system, and development of industrial and agricultural industries focused

on the Russian market [21]. Inner Mongolia intended to "increase the level of openness and cooperation with Russia and Mongolia", primarily through the creation of international "pilot sites", "open pilot zones" and "cross-border cooperation zones", logistics parks, production facilities for processing imported and exported goods, as well as the development of tourism, and, of course, construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor [22, pp. 116-118].

Several points in this planning are drawing attention. First, PRC border regions made no attempt to coordinate their plans of cooperation with Russia among themselves. On the contrary, they actually competed with each other in attracting attention, support, and transfers of the center being distributed within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative as well as in playing intermediary functions between manufacturers of export products from the southern and eastern provinces and Russian consumers, and fought for resources, markets, and access to the transport arteries of the Russian Federation. Second, rather simplified and little changed ideas about the most important forms of interaction with Russia have been preserved almost unchanged since the 1990s. Those were: 1) import, processing, and resale of Russian raw materials in China; 2) export of finished products to Russia, primarily from the interior regions of China; 3) construction of transport corridors through the Russian territory to Europe, Asia, and America. Third, the declarative nature of many provisions rarely extended beyond the mention of various special "zones of cross-border cooperation". Finally, there was a noticeable distance between theory and practice. As it turned out, all those correctly and convincingly substantiated statements and models initially barely worked in practice. Probably it was the reason why the stagnation of economic ties between these territories and Russia observed in the second decade, and in some cases the reduction of cross-border trade were perceived in China without much tragedy.

By the middle of the second decade of the new century, experts noted that cross-border cooperation, which could become the third important basis of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, looked pretty lame [23, pp. 9-19]. By the end of the decade, they assessed the state and prospects of cross-border relations between the two countries very critically. They pointed out that the commodity trade dominated border economic relations, and that trade had little to do with the real sector of the local economy as the producers and final recipients of goods were mainly the eastern and central provinces of the PRC and Chinese border business primarily played an intermediary role in these transactions [4, p. 206]. Industrial cooperation did not develop, the construction of transport corridors

Table. Russia in the foreign trade relations of the PRC's border territories

	Heilongjiang		Inner Mongolia		Jilin		Three regions of the Northeast	
	Volume, million dollars	Share in the region's trade, %	Volume, million dollars	Share in the region's trade, %	Volume, million dollars	Share in the region's trade, %	Volume, million dollars	Share in Russian-Chinese trade, %
Export								
2012	5155.8	35.7	278.6	7.0	822.1	3.3	6256.5	12.1
2019	999.9	28.6	386.7	7.1	240.0	5.2	1626.6	1.8
Increase/Decrease	-80.6	-7.1	+38.8	+0.1	-70.8	+1.9	-74.0	-10.3
Import								
2012	16153.4	69.1	244.5	3.4	143.9	0.8	16541.8	45.2
2019	11706.9	77.0	2307.7	22.0	584.5	4.2	9983.7	17.3
Increase/Decrease	-27.5	+7.9	+843.8	+18.6	+306.1	+3.4	-39.6	-27.9

Calculated by: [5 (2013, 2020); 6 (2013, 2021); 7 (2013, 2021)].

stalled, Russia's presence in most of the "pilot zones" was nominal, and scientific and technical cooperation remained only a dream.

In the second decade of the 21st century, Inner Mongolia was the only border area of China that enlarged the volume of economic ties with Russia. Its trade with the Russian Federation increased fivefold, primarily due to a significant rise in imports (see the table). Jilin province, which in 2016 announced an intention to raise the trade with Russia to \$2 billion by 2020 [24], on the contrary, reduced it to \$825 million [6 (2020)]. The trade turnover of Heilongjiang with the Russian Federation, despite all the decisions, plans, programs, and efforts, decreased by 40%; in particular, the volume of Chinese exports had reduced 3.5 times. Of course, one may blame the decline of Russian demand for Chinese agricultural and light industry products, the fall in world prices for raw materials supplied from Russia, the devaluation of the ruble, and other objective reasons; however, the decrease in three border territories' proportion in China-Russia trade (since 2012 to 2019, their share in exports reduced from 12.1 to 1.8%, and in imports – from 45.2 to 17.3% (see the table) definitely indicates a crisis situation in their economic ties with Russia.

Economic cooperation between Chinese and Russian border businesses did not develop also. Despite the fact that the provincial authorities reported billion-dollar investments in the Russian economy (for example, the officials of Jilin province reported \$2 billion of accumulated investments in the Russian Federation at the end of 2015 and the intention to increase their volume up to \$3 billion in 2020 [24], and Heilongjiang authorities announced \$2.98 billion of provincial investments in Russia by the beginning of 2018 [25]), actual volume was significantly less. Proceeding from official statistics, in 2012–2018 Heilongjiang province

invested in Russia from 2.3 million to 72 million dollars per year, which was from 0.2 to 1.5% of all direct capital investments abroad and in the aggregate gives significantly less than the declared figures [5].

The only indicator that has grown significantly over the years is the number of Chinese tourists in Russia². It can be assumed that the vast majority of these tourists came from the border areas of China. At the same time, relying on data from provincial statistical yearbooks, the tourism industry of the Chinese border region missed about 40% of tourists from the Russian Federation: their number decreased from 2.4 million in 2012 to 1.47 million people in 2019, while in general, it increased by 7% in China [calculated by: 5 (2013, 2020); 6 (2013, 2020); 7 (2013, 2020); 26].

Even official data show serious economic difficulties that have arisen in two cities bordering Russia and economically tied to it: Suifenhe and Heihe. The average annual growth rate of Heihe's gross regional product (GRP) for the 13th five-year period was 6%, instead of the planned 7%; for capital investments, only 4.8% instead of 8%, and foreign trade brought not an increase of 5%, but a fall of 1.7% [27]. The annual GRP growth rate of Suifenhe amounted to only 2.86% [28].

Thus, the second decade of the 21st century demonstrated the low effectiveness of the cross-border cooperation model with Russia built in China at the turn of the century. This is a question for special analysis, whether the reasons were inflated expectations, excessive optimism of planners, or the mistakes of the performers. However, something else is of interest: what lessons have been learned from the last decade, and

² In particular, from 2012 to 2018 the number of tourists from China to the Far Eastern Federal District served by Russian travel agencies increased fivefold: from 46,000 to 246,000 people. Available at: <https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31598>

what is a perspective for the theme of Russia in the regional planning of the “new era” for the construction of socialism in China?

NEW PLANS FOR THE “NEW ERA”

There are two types of documents that allow answering this question. The first one is the reports of regional authorities summarizing the results of the last year and setting tasks for the next one. The second type of documents is the plans for these territories’ socio-economic development for the period up to 2025 and preliminary objectives for the next decade.

Most government reports are naturally devoted to the issues of domestic being. Nevertheless, they can be used to assess both the foreign economic priorities of the territory and the depth of its authorities’ interest in Russia. Russian issues were presented quite widely in the Heilongjiang government reports for 2017, 2018, and 2019 [29, p. 11]. However, in the 2020 report, Russia is mentioned 11 times only. At the same time, the acting governor of the province, Hu Changsheng, was optimistic. According to him, Heilongjiang has “further strengthened its status as a major province to promote cooperation with Russia”, forms a “comprehensive model of openness focused on Russia and Northeast Asia”, intends to improve cross-border trade in services, actively expand investment cooperation and work “on key projects”, strengthen cooperation in the field of industry, technology, and education [30]. However, at the same time, Russia is not mentioned at all in the working report of the Inner Mongolia government for 2020 [31]; the similar document of Jilin province only calls for “effective use of Russian oil and gas resources” [32]. Not much was written about Russia in the reports of the Jilin and Inner Mongolia governments over the previous five years. They mostly contain general phrases about the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, the importance of China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor and cross-border transport infrastructure.

Five-year plans for social and economic development for 2021–2025 as well as the goals for 2035 declared by these regions’ authorities give much more food to think of the place and role assigned to Russia in their strategic vision.

The quintessence of Jilin province’s policy towards Russia is called “cooperation in the development of Russian resources and cross-border trade”. Speaking about relations with two other closest neighbors: Japan and South Korea, the plan assumes the development of “economic, trade and technical cooperation” with them [33, p. 95]. “The province intends to “effectively develop” Russian oil and gas resources by the construction of a gas pipeline from the Primorye Territory

to the Hunchun city, the creation of appropriate infrastructure and a petrochemical base with a capacity of 10 million tons [33, pp. 27, 104-105]. Among other innovations, it is worth mentioning the expansion of provincial exports to Russia using electronic trading. Overall, the plan has only general phrases about the development of cross-border trade, speeding up the process of creating transport corridors using the ports of the Primorye Territory, the Ice Silk Road, and cross-border cooperation zones. The task of creating a special maritime economic development zone in Hunchun, the closest point of the province to the coast of the Sea of Japan, is also noteworthy. Having no direct access to the sea, the provincial authorities nevertheless intend to “create objects of maritime cultural tourism and to build a port and a logistics center for shipping within the framework of smart sea cities concept... to promote the construction of marine products processing plants, the production of equipment for marine activities and fishing, marine biomedicine, etc.” [33, pp. 95-98].

Inner Mongolia continues to build external relations in the format of “accelerated construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor». Its specific interests in Russia are limited to gas supplies to Hulunbuir city by the branch of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, improving the organization of cross-border trade, and the development of humanitarian exchange, including by attracting “outstanding talents” to the region [34]. The government of the Khulunbuir District located directly on the border with Russia does not bother looking for original solutions and gets off with stereotyped phrases about the need to “deepen cooperation with neighboring regions of Russia and Mongolia, strengthen interpersonal and cultural exchanges, improve the mechanism of regular intergovernmental meetings and develop cooperation with neighboring regions of Russia and Mongolia in the fields of economy and trade, tourism, culture, education, sports, ecology, and the Red Cross to constantly achieve new results” [35]. Another province of the Northeast which is relatively close to Russia but does not have a common border with it is Liaoning. This province limits its plans to “active participation in the construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor”, “associated cooperation (对接合作) with the Russian Far East” and “fisheries development” [36, pp. 125-126].

Russia is much more widely represented in the plans of Heilongjiang province, which the central government sees as a springboard for further cooperation with Russia. The goal of “raising the openness level of Harbin for cooperation with Russia” is even fixed in the national 14th five-year plan [37].

Heilongjiang province itself, as before, considers the neighborhood with Russia a favorable factor and

intends to use it more productively. Within 2020, the Provincial Ministry of Commerce organized a series of online seminars for officials, businessmen, lawyers, and all interested parties on various aspects of cooperation with Russia. The focus was on the problems of investment and the peculiarities of Russian legislation. Provincial authorities obviously have set themselves the task of forming a group of highly qualified experts capable to meet the needs of businesses throughout China in consultations on Russian economic development, various aspects of Russian law, including the intellectual property field [38, 39]. Developing this line, the Suifenhe authorities have outlined the goal of creating “the largest cross-border training base in the country” for Chinese specialists working with Russia [28].

These intentions were reflected in the provincial 14th five-year plan of economic development, including the assessments of long-run prospects. The main tasks of the province for nearest future include: the formation of a “new model of external openness with an emphasis on Russia and Northeast Asia”; “a further breakthrough in consolidating the position of Heilongjiang province as a leader in China’s interaction with Russia” [40, p. 18]; turning it into the “vanguard” of Chinese-Russian trade and economic cooperation [40, p. 83] and a “key industrial base” [40, pp. 84-85]. Several large cities and territories of the province have specific functions assigned to them in relations with Russia. Harbin is positioned as the “central city of cooperation between China and the Russian Federation”; Mudanjiang as “an important window to Russia and Northeast Asia” and “a model city of cooperation with Russia”, a center of interaction in the field of agriculture and pharmaceuticals [40, p. 69]; Qiqihar as a processing center for wood imported from Russia [40, p. 43]. In fact, the entire 10th chapter of the plan is devoted to ways and methods of implementing these tasks, revealing the actions to implement the Belt and Road Initiative and the policy of external openness.

Special powers are assigned to bordering Russia cities – Suifenhe and Heihe. The five-year plans of these cities are largely based on the idea of using their “unique geographical location” considered the almost the only favorable factor for development. Heihe aims to become “a strategic center and an important platform for Sino-Russian cross-border cooperation”, “the largest, populated, promising, and environmentally friendly city on the Russian-Chinese border” [27]. The competitor of Heihe is Suifenhe. Its authorities intend to make the city “an important window for the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, openness and cooperation in Northeast Asia”, “an innovative and experimental platform for close trade and economic cooperation between China and Russia” [28]. In order to achieve these goals, both plans

prescribe a whole range of measures in various areas of economic and social policy, including the amount of funding and specific facilities.

The analysis of the directions, spheres, and forms of activity that the authorities of the border territories intend to carry out to develop relations with Russia, as well as the features of industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure facilities scheduled to build, is beyond the scope of this study. This paper will only outline some fundamental points concerning the intentions of the Chinese regional administration.

First. The strategic course of the Chinese authorities for the use of Russian economic potential to satisfy the needs of the North-East of the country has remained unchanged. However, this task is of fundamental importance for Heilongjiang province only, while Inner Mongolia is equally looking for resources in Russia and Mongolia, and Jilin province considers the interaction with the Russian Federation as nothing more than a bit of a help an aid in solving energy and communication issues. The main goal of Heilongjiang province remains to maximize the attraction of Russian resources, strengthening positions in the Russian markets in the interests of its own development, as well as the preservation of intermediary functions in the other Chinese territories’ relations with Russia. The long border, numerous border crossings, trained personnel who speak Russian and are familiar with Russian realities, and many years of experience working with the northern neighbor are serious arguments in this case.

Second. Ideologically, the idea of using Russia’s potential is firmly linked with the solution of the most important national tasks: the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (construction of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor and the Ice Silk Road), ensuring the “five most important aspects of security” highlighted by the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party as one of the medium- and long-term policy priorities in the following sectors: scientific and technical, defense, food, energy and raw materials, the construction of a “green” and innovative economy, etc. In practice, the border territories are guided by their urgent needs for raw materials and intellectual resources, sales markets, and communications. At the same time, they do not limit the scope of their interest to neighboring territories and regions of Russia, the Far Eastern and even Siberian federal districts. Suifenhe generally builds its strategy based on the motto “buy all over Russia, sell all over China” [28], and Heihe relies on the principle of “connecting China and Russia, serving the whole country” [27].

Third. Despite the declared intentions to move away from the primitive model of economic interaction “raw materials in exchange for finished prod-

ucts”, to make Heilongjiang province “a key platform for scientific, technical and innovative cooperation” with Russia [40, p. 85], “to achieve a breakthrough in such areas as technology, education, high-tech production and trade in services”, “to strengthen investment cooperation with Russia in the field of high-tech production”, neither the provincial-level five-year plans nor similar documents of Heihe and Suifenhe cities provide any particular steps in these areas. At the same time, they describe in detail the actions to expand the import of Russian energy resources and raw materials, create a network of processing plants on the Chinese territory, increase exports to Russia of its own industrial and agricultural products and services, and increase the efficiency of cross-border transport corridors. The tasks of “using Russian land to solve the important problem of food shortage in our country”, import and processing of environmentally friendly agricultural and seafood from Russia are carefully set in these documents also.

Fourth. Nevertheless, some elements of new approaches are making their way. The Suifenhe authorities, for example, declare financial support to companies investing in Russia. Documents indicate the need to create the favorable legal, financial, and customs regimes for economic cooperation. Plans are being made to support electronic commerce and banking interaction development. The tasks to form the Chinese-Russian production chains in such areas as woodworking, petrochemistry, grain and soybeans processing, pharmaceuticals, etc., to train highly qualified personnel with knowledge of the Russian language and Russian business and social practices are set.

Fifth. A serious bet is still being placed on the creation of various “special areas of interaction”: “platforms for technology exchange”, scientific and technical parks and “pilot zones”, exhibition and demonstration centers, etc., where it is supposed to introduce progressive forms of cooperation. At the

same time, the Suifenhe authorities do not lose hope of breathing life into the ever-memorable Pogranichny-Suifenhe cross-border trade and economic zone, the history of which goes back to the 1990s, and Heihe continues to promote the idea of “co-development” with neighboring Blagoveshchensk [27, 28].

Sixth. In addition to purely economic cooperation, all plans with varying degrees of depth and breadth are aimed at developing exchanges in education, culture, medicine, sports, and tourism, creating more favorable conditions for attracting highly qualified specialists from Russia, ensuring environmental, biomedical and sanitary safety, etc.

Summarizing the above, one can state that China’s acquisition of the status of a global power and its entry into the “new era” of developing socialism, as well as the assimilation of past, not too successful attempts to use Russia’s resources as a driver of socio-economic development of the Northeast, only slightly corrected the course of Beijing and the territories bordering with the Russian Federation in this direction. The policy of developing relations with Russia is mandatory for Jilin, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang, but only Harbin treats it with full seriousness, putting multilateral and multifaceted cooperation with Russia at the forefront of external openness policy. Suifenhe and Heihe are making plans for their development based not only on the resource potential and market in the neighboring Siberian and Far Eastern regions but in the whole of Russia. The focus remains on the import and processing of Russian raw materials, the export of local products, and the development of transport infrastructure. Even though innovations focused on scientific and technological, cooperative, financial, and digital interaction are mainly declarative in nature, and some of the intentions expressed in the Chinese plans go beyond real possibilities, all of them are aimed at cooperation, not confrontation, which means they have the positive potential for both sides.

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РОССИЯ В ПЛАНАХ И ПРОГРАММАХ ПРИГРАНИЧНЫХ ТЕРРИТОРИЙ КИТАЯ

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В статье анализируются современные взгляды руководства приграничных с Россией территорий КНР на использование российского потенциала в интересах будущего этих регионов. На основе изучения планов социально-экономического развития провинций Хэйлунцзян, Цзилинь и Автономного района Внутренняя Монголия (АРВМ) на 14-ю пятилетку, других официальных документов, а также результатов приграничного взаимодействия последнего десятилетия делаются выводы о преемственности подходов властей указанных территорий к России в “новую эпоху” развития Китая, выявляются традиции, вариации и новации в предполагаемом использовании российского фактора каждым из трех регионов, а также городами Суйфэньхэ и Хэйхэ, которые наиболее заинтересованы в сотрудничестве с северным соседом.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Россия, Дальний Восток, приграничные связи, планы и программы развития.

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