

RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER 2015: NEW TRENDS, OLD DILEMMAS

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Sergey A. SHERSTYUKOV

ORCID 0000-0002-1392-2595, ssherstyukov@hse.ru

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 17, Malaya Ordynka Str., Moscow, 119017, Russian Federation.

Nicole V. BODISHTEANU,

ORCID 0000-0001-7113-029X, nbodishteanu@hse.ru

National Research University Higher School of Economics, 17, Malaya Ordynka Str., Moscow, 119017, Russian Federation.

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As the events of the past few years indicate, relations between Russia and Turkey are increasingly determined by security-related issues. Such a shift in priorities in bilateral relations should be perceived not only as a response to the emerging threats to the internal and external security of the two countries but also as a consequence of the changes in the strategic orientation of Russia and Turkey after the end of the Cold War. The most important events in the formation of a new model of relations between Russia and Turkey were such as the “Arab Spring”, the wars in Syria and Libya, US support for the Syrian Kurds from the “People’s Self-Defense Forces”, the revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Russian military operation in Syria, the 2015 crisis in Russian-Turkish relations, and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016. Regional crises near the borders of Russia and Turkey and the growing securitization of the policies of both states not only pushed Moscow and Ankara to interact in the security sphere but also created new challenges for their relations. In this article, the authors examine the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations, paying particular attention to the security dimension, as well as the opportunities and limitations for cooperation between the two countries, given that security is becoming an increasingly important element in bilateral relations. The main focus is on the analysis of competitive cooperation between Russia and Turkey in Eurasia, for the understanding of which it is necessary to refer not only to the current context but also to the historical experience of interaction between the two countries in this wide geographical space.

Keywords: Russia, Turkey, NATO, security, Eurasia, Middle East, regional conflicts.

About authors:

Sergey A. SHERSTYUKOV, PhD (History), Senior Researcher.

Nicole V. BODISHTEANU, PhD Candidate (International Relations), Research Assistant.

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Arab Spring, wars in Syria and Libya, US support for the Syrian Kurds from the People’s Defense Units, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the beginning of the Russian military operation in Syria, the 2015 crisis in Russian-Turkish relations, and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 are the most important events that largely determined the dynamics of bilateral relations and continue to influence them to some degree [1]. According to Shlykov, after the crisis of 2015 in Russian-Turkish relations and the ensuing period of the seven-month cold war, a new model of interaction between Moscow and Ankara is being formed, focusing on the problems of regional security. The paradox of the model, he believes, is that the two countries have differences in their approaches to many issues of the regional agenda, but this does not make their dia-

logue impossible [2]. At the same time, regional crises near the borders of Russia and Turkey not only pushed Moscow and Ankara to more active cooperation in the field of security but also created new challenges for their relations.

The authors of this paper explore the current dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations, as well as the opportunities and limitations for cooperation between the two countries, given that security is becoming an increasingly important element in relations between Russia and Turkey.

The process of rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, which began in the late 1990s and received an additional impetus in the early 2000s, was neither linear nor problem-free. There are contradictions and fault lines in the relations between the two countries,

which can not only stop their rapprochement but also reverse it. In the extensive literature on Russian-Turkish relations, they have been studied from the point of view of different conceptual approaches. Some experts describe them as interdependent, believing that an asymmetric interdependence is meant, in which Russia has a number of advantages over Turkey [3, p. 11]. These studies, however, rarely attempt to answer when this interdependence arose and what its dynamics are.

Other researchers believe that neither the liberal theory of trade nor the theory of institutional liberalism can fully explain the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations after the end of the Cold War. They draw attention, in particular, to the fact that, although during this period the economic cooperation between the two countries experienced both recessions and upswings, their rapprochement in general continued in the 1990s and 2000s [4, pp. 349-350], and the high level of economic interdependence did not become an obstacle to the crisis of bilateral relations in 2015–2016 [5, p. 95]. Therefore, they propose to consider Russian-Turkish relations in a realistic perspective. According to Akturk, the reason for the rapid rapprochement between Russia and Turkey in the 1990s was the reduction in the difference in the demographic, economic, and military potential of the two countries, since Turkey's fear of Russia disappeared [4, p. 348], which was a constant in both Ottoman and Turkish policy towards Russia. It is the change in the balance of military-strategic threats, he believes, that determined the course of Russian-Turkish relations both during and after the Cold War [6, p. 110].

Beginning in the 1990s, attempts were made in both countries at various levels to find or develop some kind of common ideological platform for rapprochement. As a rule, these efforts focused on interpreting (and attempts to instrumentalize) Eurasian ideas. It was during this period that Turkish Eurasianism turned into the “fourth pole” of the Turkish intellectual landscape (the other three “poles” being Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, and Westernism) [7, p. 211]. Some researchers, drawing attention to certain parallels between “neo-Eurasianism” in Russia and “Kemalist Eurasianism” in Turkey, suggested that this would allow the two countries to develop a common view of Eurasia [8, p. 126]. Other experts, however, focused on the fact that Ankara's vision of its strategic interests is determined to a much greater extent by neo-Ottomanist ideas than by Kemalist Eurasianism [8, p. 145].

It should also be taken into account that in Turkey, unlike in Russia, Eurasianism does not rely on a serious intellectual tradition, moreover, after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, as some observers believe, there was a “neo-Ottomanist

interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism” [9, p. 431]. Malik Mufti writes that the leaders of the AKP have long held a distinct hegemonic vision in which Turkey plays a leading role in building a reintegrated regional political community – whose precise outlines remain unclear – with a shared normative (Islamic) and historical (Ottoman) identity. This vision, sometimes characterized as “neo-Ottomanism”, is, in his opinion, a modern manifestation of an older tradition of Islamic realism [10, p. 28].

The authors hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion of Russian-Turkish relations by once again addressing both the historical context of these relations and an analysis of the related changes that have taken place in recent years.

RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS: THE PAST MATTERS

The historical past is one of the initial parameters that should be taken into account by researchers studying Russian-Turkish relations.

Russia and Turkey are no longer empires, but the imperial past continues to influence their development and how the elites and societies of these countries perceive themselves and the outside world. Most often, researchers prefer to write about the “imperial” or “post-imperial syndrome” experienced by these countries [8, pp. 132-133; 11, p. 116], but more importantly, both Russia and Turkey retain certain structural features that do not allow them to be exhaustively described either as “former empires” or as ordinary “nation-states”. In both cases, the point is not about any attempts to restore the lost empires, however, both states claim a “special” role in the former imperial outskirts.

During the negotiations at the highest level, the leaders of the two states prefer not to make references to the past, nevertheless, both parties remember the numerous Russian-Turkish wars and that most of these wars ended in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. For several centuries, both empires periodically clashed over control over the border regions, which separated the spheres of their unconditional cultural influence [12, p. 36]. The Russian Empire was more successful in these conflicts. As Soner Chagaptai noted, “the history of rise of the Russian Empire is the history of decline of the Ottoman Empire” [13]. Turkey and Russia have been adversaries, not allies, for most of their modern history, and this still shapes their perception of each other [14, p. 216].

At the same time, there was much more interdependence and elements of cooperation in these relations than is commonly thought. According to a

number of researchers, the continental empires of the Romanovs, Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Ottomans, coexisting for several centuries, were interconnected, forming a special macrosystem, so the study of their history involves consideration of this macrosystem and the interdependencies established in its framework [15, p. 33]. The macrosystem of continental empires no longer exists, and neither do the continental empires themselves; however, some aspects of relations between Russia and Turkey, which still combine a complex dialectic of rivalry and interdependence, make one recall the legacy of the imperial past.

In Russian and Turkish societies, not only is the memory of the clashes between the Russian and Ottoman empires preserved, the societies themselves bear traces of the complex interrelations of the two empires, part of which was the periodically occurring process of population exchange. Currently, about 3–5 million people from the North Caucasus live in Turkey, a significant part of whom are descendants of Muhajirs who moved to the Ottoman Empire during and after the end of the Caucasian wars. Many of them are active in social and lobbying activities. They are represented in the army, parliament, media structures, and are an important electoral resource [16]. This is another factor that adds complexity and multidimensionality to Russian-Turkish relations.

Turkish researchers Yeşilot and Özdemir believe that, speaking about the development of relations between Russia and Turkey, one should not lose sight of the Turkic-Muslim population in Russia [17, p. 70]. It is very likely, however, that Turkey's increased attention to the Turkic and Muslim population of Russia will not rather bring the two countries closer but will increase Moscow's suspicions about Ankara's intentions.

RUSSIA AND TURKEY: CHANGE OF STRATEGIC ORIENTATION

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR made both Russia and Turkey face the need to find a new place in the world and develop a new foreign policy identity. It cannot be said that these searches are completed 30 years after the events mentioned. However, throughout this period, they were dramatically dependent on the relationship of Russia and Turkey with the West.

For both countries, over the past few centuries, Europe has acted as a constitutive *Other*. Anti-Westernism, in which the desire to challenge Western power was combined with admiration for Western successes, was an important element of the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement in the 1920s–1930s [18, p. 35].

After the collapse of the USSR, not only part of the Russian elite but also part of Russian society had hopes that Russia could become a member of the EU (and even NATO) in the foreseeable future [19, p. 79]. However, these hopes soon gave way to disappointment. Despite Turkey's presence in some Western multilateral institutions (primarily NATO), its attempts to become a member of the EU have not been successful. The described situation resulted not only in changes in the foreign policy of the two countries but also in the desire to work out viable alternatives to European integration. After an unsuccessful attempt at a military coup in Turkey in 2016 and the ambiguous reaction of Western countries and primarily the United States to this crisis, the voices of those who believe that it needs to reorient its foreign policy to other countries, including strengthening cooperation with Russia, have once again become stronger in Turkey [6, pp. 104–105].

However, in reality, the process of Turkey's strategic reorientation was launched after the end of the Cold War [20, p. 42]. With the collapse of the USSR, the most important threat to Turkey's security disappeared, but new threats emerged in a radically changed geopolitical context, giving rise to the need to develop new approaches to security, based, in particular, on the recognition that Turkey's security cannot be ensured only by relying on NATO [21, p. 38].

Between the spring of 2015 and the summer of 2016, Ankara's strategic reorientation entered a new phase – the events that took place during this period strengthened Turkey's determination to establish itself as an independent regional power [20, p. 45].

The Ukrainian crisis, which began in 2014 and led to a political clash between Russia and the USA and the EU, drew a line under Russia's repeated attempts to “integrate” into the Euro-Atlantic community, becoming part of the “expanded West” [22]. Moscow began to make increasingly persistent efforts to establish cooperation with other non-Western players in order to weaken the power and influence of the USA on the world stage and create a fairer, from its point of view, world order [23].

As Russia's and Turkey's relations with the West worsened, their perception of the threat (which is simultaneously perceived as internal and external) became more and more similar, creating an incentive for the rapprochement of the two countries [24, p. 11]. While Russia entered into a direct confrontation with the United States after 2014, Turkey's relations with the USA and the EU against the backdrop of the Syrian and Libyan crises and the growing activity and independence of Ankara in the region became more and more conflicting.

Despite the fact that Turkey supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and did not recognize the results of the referendum in Crimea, it refused to join Western sanctions against Russia and continued economic cooperation with it [25, p. 60]. Moreover, the statement about the TurkStream gas pipeline project, made during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in December 2014, could be considered as evidence of the transition of cooperation between the two countries to a higher level [25, p. 60]. Having taken a special position in relation to Russia, which corresponded to the logic of its strategic reorientation, Turkey tried to use the opportunities that opened up for it in the context of the growing confrontation between Russia and the West.

One of the points of divergence between the United States and the leading EU countries, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, was the new security concept adopted by Ankara, which was called the “Erdogan doctrine” in the Turkish media. In accordance with it, Turkey must pursue an active security policy using preemptive military force outside its borders and, if necessary, act unilaterally, even if this means ignoring alliance partners [14, p. 210].

According to many experts, the growing independence of Turkey within NATO is in the interests of Russia [26]. However, Turkey’s increasingly frequent use of the instruments of power politics not only complicated its relations with NATO partners but also created new lines of controversy in relations with Russia. The fight against broadly understood security threats (internal and external) is a priority not only for Ankara but also for Moscow. On the one hand, this pushes the parties towards rapprochement, on the other hand, the increasing securitization of their policies revives the traditional fears of the two countries regarding each other. In the light of these concerns, one should consider Ankara’s concern about security threats related to the potential of the *A2/AD* network, which was deployed by Russia simultaneously in three areas directly bordering Turkey, namely in the Caucasus, in Syria, and in Crimea [25, p. 67].

A number of Turkish experts express concern that the republic’s turbulent relations with the West may lead to a strengthening of Russia’s position in its relations with Turkey [27]. According to *Hürriyet* columnist Ergin Sedat, the main question is whether Turkey will be able to balance the rapprochement with Russia with its relations with the West in the coming period [27].

The new American administration is likely to put pressure on Ankara and at the same time try to make relations with it more functional. The implementation of the periodically discussed scenario [28], involving Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO and its further movement towards Russia and China, would become

a strategic challenge for the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance. Despite the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the US, NATO, and the EU in the past few years, this scenario hardly deserves serious attention, but Turkey will remain a difficult ally, and relations between Ankara and Washington will no longer return to the model that existed during the years of the Cold War.

In the situation of the ongoing militarization of the Black Sea and the degradation of relations between the West and Russia, the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance is striving for closer coordination of the actions of the Black Sea states that are members of NATO. At the same time, Ankara’s concern about the strengthening of Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea after 2014 increases its interest in NATO. Ankara’s concern was connected not only with the crisis in Russian-Turkish relations that manifested itself in 2015 but above all with the recognition that Russia’s actions led to a change in the strategic balance in the region, as Erdogan openly said at NATO Summit in Warsaw, held in July 2016. Shortly before this summit, the Turkish leader demanded to take countermeasures against the actions that turned the Black Sea into Russia’s “inland sea” [25, p. 64].

Moscow considers its steps related to the strengthening of the military infrastructure in the Greater Black Sea region as the restoration of positions it once lost and as a symmetrical response to NATO’s actions. Ankara, in turn, regards them as a direct threat to its own security, resurrecting fears that seemed to be left in the past after the end of the Cold War.

The desire to achieve and maintain strategic autonomy brings Moscow and Ankara closer together, as does a pragmatic approach to bilateral relations. However, one should also remember that Turkey’s desire for strategic autonomy extends not only to Turkey’s relations with the United States and the leading countries of Europe but also to relations with Russia. This is manifested, in particular, in Ankara’s efforts to reduce the dependence of the Turkish economy on Russian energy resources by diversifying supply routes and turning Turkey into a major energy hub.

The deal between Moscow and Ankara, connected with the purchase by Ankara of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, the fate of which is still unclear, is considered both as an attempt by Turkey to strengthen relations with Russia, and as another confirmation of its desire for strategic autonomy, and as another manifestation of its conflict relations with the West. Experts Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Jeremy Shapiro believe that Turkey’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system reflected Erdogan’s fears about another coup involving his own air force rather than an attempt to get closer to Russia [29]. However, it is hardly pos-

sible to oppose these reasons to each other, since in this case, as in a number of others, the logic of security did not contradict, but pushed Turkey towards rapprochement with Russia, but the same logic underlies more and more its leadership's recent desire to make relations with the United States and NATO more functional.

RUSSIA AND TURKEY IN EURASIA: COMPETITIVE COOPERATION

Russia and Turkey are the two most important states in Eurasia, with long traditions of Eurasian politics, significant resources, as well as historical, cultural and economic ties with the states of this region [30, p. 17], aimed at active participation in the construction of a greater Eurasia. Both in Russia and Turkey, ideas about their unique geographical position are widespread, in both countries security has been to date of paramount importance, which is a consequence of both their geography and history [21, p. 38]. However, the similarity of the two countries is not limited to this; the strategic cultures of both states reflect the idea (dating back to their experience of the collapse of multinational empires) that external enemies use internal differences [24, p. 11].

Russia and Turkey face similar challenges, one of them is the need to build an acceptable model of relations with other centers of power in Eurasia, and above all with the largest of them, China. The rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara, which has taken place in recent decades, and the growing attention of both countries to the Eurasian space and the concept of "Eurasia", on the one hand, have created opportunities for their interaction. On the other hand, there are also differences in approaches, and a mismatch of interests and goals, which also extend to the security sphere.

With the emergence after 1991 of independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, there was space for both cooperation and competition between Russia and Turkey. The activation of Turkey, which tried to implement large projects in these regions, came as an unpleasant surprise for Moscow, and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992 brought the two countries to the brink of a direct military clash [6, p. 99]. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, there was an increase in cooperation between the two countries, including because of the understanding that only cooperation can help resolve conflicts in the "common neighborhood" space [31, p. 383].

The rapid reduction of the Soviet-Russian threat, embodied in the disappearance of the land border between post-Soviet Russia and Turkey, opened up many opportunities for bilateral cooperation [6, p. 99].

At the same time, the territorial proximity of the two countries and their contact in the regions, which both countries consider as their own spheres of interests, influence the dynamics of the development of bilateral relations. Not only in the Middle East but also in the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and Central Asia, Russia and Turkey perceive each other most often as rivals, rather than partners. This circumstance, and, in addition, their dissimilar positions in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea again make one recall the imperial past of the two countries and, in particular, the "complicated border zones" that existed along Eurasian borders, where three or more imperial powers vied with each other for influence or direct control [12, p. 56]. Although direct comparisons and analogies must be treated with caution, it is sometimes useful to look at contemporary issues from a broader historical perspective.

Most of the conflicts between Russia and Turkey in recent years have taken place in Syria and over Syria. At the same time, Syria acts as a kind of training ground where new forms of interaction and controlled rivalry between the two countries are developed. Under certain circumstances, they may be required outside of Syria.

The conflict in Karabakh and Turkey's new role in this conflict have become another challenge for Russian-Turkish relations. Turkey, strengthening its positions in the South Caucasus region, put Moscow in front of the need to negotiate with it, so as not to bring down the entire structure of bilateral relations, as Ankara itself had to do after the start of Russia's military operation in Syria in 2015. Contradictory statements by the Russian and Turkish parties regarding the possible entry of Turkish peacekeepers into Karabakh [32, 33] testify not only to the complexity of the negotiation process and the search for mutually acceptable solutions but also to how significant is the role the balance of power plays in relations between the two countries in the region.

As Russian political scientist Trenin noted, "cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh creates the best climate for cooperation in all areas. Lack of cooperation there would spoil relations in all directions" [34]. On the one hand, the expansion of Russian-Turkish cooperation to Nagorno-Karabakh (following Syria and Libya) further expands the interdependence of the two states, potentially making their relations more stable, and, according to some experts, indicates the transition of these relations to a new level of cooperation [2]. On the other hand, one should not forget that in all three zones of conflict, Russia and Turkey act as rivals supporting opposing forces, therefore, not only the space of cooperation but also the space of rivalry has expanded. As 2020 showed, in the context of the

expansion of the “regional security” agenda, the dialogue between Ankara and Moscow is becoming increasingly difficult [2]. It is important not only that Russia and Turkey began to interact and compete in a wider space but also that this space, which includes not only the Caucasus but also the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, is becoming increasingly interconnected and permeable.

Some observers believe that Russia and Turkey proceed from the need to preserve the relative status quo in the Great Black Sea region [5, pp. 110-111]. However, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the Ukrainian political crisis of 2014 and Russia’s reaction to it, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey’s role in it, show that both countries can commit or support the use of force by their allied forces (leading to violating the status quo in the region) if they regard the situation as a threat to their national security and/or as an opportunity for a strategic gain.

Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years has been increasingly shaped under the influence of not only Islamist ideas and ideas of Islamic solidarity but also nationalism, which is associated both with the growth of nationalist sentiments in society and with changes in the political life of the country and, in particular, with the ever-closer rapprochement of the AKP with the ultranationalists.

Islamist and nationalist visions are in a complex relationship with each other, but both are oriented towards seeing Russia more as a competitor (or even a strategic adversary), rather than as a partner, much less an ally. For example, former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in his most famous work *Strategic Depth*, called for a more “dynamic” and “daring” (attacking) position in the north, based on the recognition of one fundamental reality: “historical Ottoman/Turkish-Russian/Soviet/Russian rivalry”. Allowing for the possibility of periodic cooperation with Russia for the common good or against a common threat, he nonetheless proceeded from the fact that relations between the two countries are of a competitive and conflict nature and wrote about the need to “balance Russia’s influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus” [10, p. 33].

In any case, a pragmatic approach to relations with Russia (even speaking about “Islamic realist pragmatism”) suggests that there are certain limits to the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey and, probably, these limits have already been reached.

Turkey’s foreign and security policy continues to be influenced by perceptions of its vulnerability [14, p. 207]. For a long time, these ideas were fueled by the threat from Russia/USSR. Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR

opened a new page in Russian-Turkish relations, the framework of which was trade and economic cooperation, the events of recent years have shown that the logic of bilateral relations is increasingly determined by problems of security. The change of strategic guidelines by Russia and Turkey, largely due to the growing alienation of the two countries from the West, as well as the need for interaction to reduce security threats, created the preconditions for their rapprochement. However, the factor complicating and limiting this rapprochement is that both parties continue to see threats to security not only outside but also in each other. Regardless of whether speaking about the Kemalist or Islamist elite, as Turkish researcher Akıncı puts, the formation of Turkey’s foreign policy is largely limited by the Sevres syndrome and Russophobia [35, p. 11].

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In relations between Russia and Turkey, already after 2016 (when the process of normalization of bilateral relations began as a result of the meeting between Putin and Erdogan), situations arose more than once that could be assessed as crisis or pre-crisis. Each time, the parties managed to overcome these situations and restore the fragile balance of bilateral relations, but this happened only as a result of meetings and negotiations between the two leaders. As Shlykov noted, relations between Russia and Turkey are leader-centric, that is, they are based on personal relations between the two presidents, whose views on the world are very similar [2]. The two leaders agreed on the implementation of key projects that are a showcase of Russian-Turkish cooperation (Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, the Turkish Stream), as well as on the purchase by Turkey of Russian S-400 complexes. Agreements in bilateral and trilateral formats made it possible to create a mechanism for balance and cooperation in Syria. At the same time, the reverse side of the personalization of bilateral relations is their weak institutionalization [24, p. 15].

Moscow’s attempts to drive a wedge between the US and Turkey should not replace the need to find a strategic approach to dealing with Ankara. Experts Graham and Trenin, in their paper devoted to Russian-American relations, write about the need for responsible regulation of the rivalry between the two countries in order to prevent a sudden escalation that could provoke a military conflict [36]. Without comparing Russian-American relations with Russian-Turkish ones, which differ in many parameters, the authors note that for the latter, managing rivalry is an urgent task both for today and for the foreseeable future. In fact, elements of controlled rivalry are already present in Russian-Turkish relations, nevertheless, the stability and predictability of relations between the two most important Eurasian powers should not critically

depend on the good relations of their leaders and their ability to negotiate at moments of periodic tensions.

A number of Turkish researchers also recognize that the priority of cooperation between the two countries does not mean ignoring the existing problems and factors of competition between them. In this regard, they propose to increase the number of platforms on which Russia and Turkey could discuss the problems of bilateral relations without the participation of third countries [17, p. 70]. This proposal seems reasonable, but contacts and joint work between Russia and Turkey within the framework of multilateral structures and platforms (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Astana format") can also give additional dynamics to their relations and reduce the degree of rivalry.

Proponents of the theory of asymmetric interdependence, as confirmation of their point of view, point to the fact that the freezing of bilateral relations and Russian sanctions against Turkey, which followed the incident with the Russian plane, turned out to be more

painful for the Turkish economy than for Russian, and therefore, they believe, Russia has a leverage of economic pressure on Turkey. However, Russia also depends on Turkey in a number of very sensitive issues (the regime of the Black Sea straits, the Turkish Stream, Russian communications with Syria, maintaining the status quo and the future political settlement in Syria). In addition, Turkey is still one of the largest buyers of Russian gas [6, p. 98]. The economic interdependence between the countries could not prevent the crisis of 2015, however the importance of cooperation for the economies of the two countries became one of the reasons that pushed Ankara and Moscow to overcome this crisis and normalize relations. Despite the fact that in recent years an important (and probably decisive) place in Russian-Turkish relations has been occupied by the security agenda, it just does not reduce, but even increases the importance of other areas of interaction, on which both the stability of bilateral relations and their functionality will largely depend.

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ШЕРСТЮКОВ Сергей Андреевич, кандидат исторических наук,

ORCID 0000-0002-1392-2595, ssherstyukov@hse.ru

Научный исследовательский университет “Высшая школа экономики”, РФ, 119017 Москва, ул. Малая Ордынка, д. 17.

БОДИШТЯНУ Николь Витальевна, аспирантка департамента международных отношений,

ORCID 0000-0001-7113-029X, nbodishteanu@hse.ru

Научный исследовательский университет “Высшая школа экономики”, РФ, 119017 Москва, ул. Малая Ордынка, д. 17.

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После начала “арабской весны” и особенно после 2014 г. безопасность занимает все более важное место в российско-турецких отношениях, а необходимость сотрудничества для снижения угроз безопасности стала движущей силой сближения Москвы и Анкары после кризиса 2015 г. Такое смещение приоритетов в двусторонних отношениях следует рассматривать не только как реакцию на возникшие угрозы внутренней и внешней безопасности двух стран (в том числе в пространстве их “общего соседства”), но и как следствие произошедших изменений в стратегической ориентации России и Турции после окончания холодной войны.

Ключевые слова: Россия, Турция, НАТО, безопасность, Евразия, Ближний Восток, региональные конфликты.

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