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FOREIGN TRADE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND SIBERIAN REGIONS

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Abstract. The paper examines sectoral and geographical structure of China's foreign trade cooperation with Russia in general and Siberian regions in particular. The history of foreign economic relations between Russia and China is revealed. The share and place of China in the structure of Russian commodity supplies have been determined. The geographical and commodity structure of China's exports and imports, as well as the share and place of Russia in the country's foreign trade turnover, have been identified. The role of Siberia in the structure of Russian-Chinese foreign trade cooperation and the dynamics of its share in recent years are shown. The share and value indicators of trade turnover and the main commodity groups of exports and imports of China and each Siberian region are calculated. More detailed attention is paid to the regions being leaders in the structure of Siberian-Chinese cooperation, in terms of both in export and import. The significance of foreign trade with China for the Siberian regions is determined. Issues of investment cooperation between Russia and China are touched upon, as well as the dynamics of the use of national currencies in foreign trade transactions between countries. The ways of commodity communication between China and Siberia are explained. The features and problem areas of their foreign trade cooperation are identified. Taking into account the intensified turn of Russia's vector of cooperation to the east in 2022, several promising ways of interaction between China and Russia in general and the Siberia in particular have been proposed. Namely: increasing the depth of processing of Siberian exported raw materials, increasing non-raw material exports from Siberia, further modernizing the railway infrastructure of eastern Russia, an alternative route for transporting Siberian bulk cargo to the East Asian market through Kazakhstan, creating an international transport corridor through Mongolia, constructing new elements of railway infrastructure, including the border crossing, Russia's third railway access to the Pacific Ocean, the development of interstate interaction at the level of small and medium-sized businesses.

Keywords: foreign trade, export, import, commodity turnover, commodity nomenclature, railways, seaports, China, Siberia, Russia.

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ВНЕШНЕТОРГОВОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО КИТАЯ И СИБИРСКИХ РЕГИОНОВ

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Аннотация. Статья посвящена выявлению отраслевой и географической структур внешнеторгового сотрудничества Китая с Россией в целом и сибирскими регионами в частности. Рассчитаны долевые и стоимостные показатели товарооборота и основные товарные группы экспорта и импорта Китая и каждого сибирского региона. Выявлены особенности и проблемные места внешнеторгового сотрудничества России и Китая. С учетом активизировавшегося в 2022 г. разворота вектора сотрудничества России на Восток, предложено несколько перспективных путей взаимодействия Китая с Россией в целом и регионами Сибири в частности.

Ключевые слова: внешняя торговля, экспорт, импорт, товарооборот, товарная номенклатура, железные дороги, морские порты, Китай, Сибирь, Россия.

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INTRODUCTION

Trade relations between Russia and China began to develop with the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 between the Russian Kingdom and the Qing Empire. Subsequently, relations between the two countries experienced both periods of warming (late 19th century, 1949–1956) and periods of cooling (1911–1945, 1959–1989). Since the early 1990s, Russian-Chinese trade cooperation has developed spontaneously. There was a flourishing of unofficial “shuttle” cross-border trade, whose volume in the late 1990s and early 2000s exceeded or was comparable to the volume of official Russian-Chinese trade [1]. Starting from the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, alongside the establishment of stricter customs and other administrative barriers for “shuttles” and “gray” Chinese firms, Russia began to make attempts to structure cross-border cooperation and align it with national interests [2].

Since 2010, China has become Russia’s largest trading partner. According to the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the General Customs Administration of the People’s Republic of China, in 2022, China’s share in Russia’s foreign trade turnover amounted to 22.37%, in Russian exports to 19.3%, and in imports to 29.4%. Russian exports to China are predominantly composed of mineral fuel, which accounted for 74.6% of the total (in 2022, Russia again ranked first in terms of crude oil supplies), while machinery and equipment made up 60.7% of imports from China. Despite the special nature of Russian-Chinese relations, only in 2022 did Russia enter the top ten foreign trade partners of China, with its share amounting to 3% [sources 1, 2].

In the geographical structure of China’s exports at the end of 2022, the United States occupied the first place (16.2%), followed by Hong Kong (8.27%) and Japan (4.81%). In the geographical structure of imports, Taiwan ranked first (8.77%), followed by the Republic of Korea (7.35%) and Japan (6.79%). The commodity structure of both exports and imports of China is dominated by machinery, equipment, finished products, and industrial goods. In 2022, these categories accounted for 86.8% of the country’s exports and 51.6% of its imports. In terms of the country

structure of China’s foreign trade turnover, the United States occupies the first place with a share of about 12%. Today, China is the world’s largest exporter of goods (USD3.36 trillion, 15.3% of world exports in 2021) and the second largest importer after the United States (USD2.68 trillion, 12% of world imports). The Chinese economy is the second largest in the world in terms of nominal GDP and the largest in terms of GDP (PPP) [source 2].

FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURE OF THE SIBERIAN REGIONS AND CHINA

The geographical position of Russia and China is characterized by the neighborhood factor: the length of their common border is more than 4.2 thousand km, second only to the Russian-Kazakhstan section. Over the last seven years, trade between Russia and China has grown from USD86.96 billion in 2017 to USD240.11 billion in 2023 (Fig. 1). The decline in absolute figures in 2020 was caused by pandemic restrictions.

The structure of trade turnover is characterized by a relative balance of exports and imports (until 2022), with a positive trade balance between Russia and China in 2018, 2019, 2022, and 2023, and a negative balance in the other years. In the Russian regional context, about half of the joint trade turnover with China, as well as Russian exports and Chinese imports, is centered in Moscow (other regions account for less than 7% each).

Siberia accounts for about one-sixth of Russian-Chinese foreign trade turnover. Its maximum value (18.39%) was observed in 2017, its minimum (14.67%) in 2018, and in 2021, this figure was 16.66% (see Fig. 1). The absolute values of foreign trade turnover increased from USD15.4 billion in 2020 to USD23.44 billion in 2021 [source 1]. The share of Siberian regions in all-Russian exports to China is more significant – 28.32% in 2021. However, these figures are underestimated due to the “registration” of the headquarters of some large companies in other macro-regions of Russia. The leading regions in the structure of Siberian-Chinese trade turnover were alternately the Irkutsk Region (2018 and 2020) and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area (2019 and 2021) (Fig. 2). In




Fig. 1. Dynamics of trade turnover between Russia (including Siberia) and China, 2017–2023, USD billion

* Data for Siberia for 2022 and 2023 were not shown due to lack of statistics. Calculated by the author according to: [sources 1, 2].




Fig. 2. Trade turnover between Siberian regions and China, 2021, USD billion

Calculated by the author according to: [sources 3, 4, 5].

terms of the physical volume of goods supplies, the Kemerovo Region is the leader. It should be noted that here and further, Siberia is considered not in a political-administrative sense, but in a general geographical interpretation – including the Tyumen Region (with the Autonomous Areas), the Trans-Baikal Territory, and the Republics of Buryatia and Yakutia.

Exports account for 80.5–82.2% of trade turnover between Siberia and China. The leader among Siberian regions in this indicator since

2019 is the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, which accounted for 24.9% (or USD4.81 billion in 2021). Its exports are almost entirely (98.6%) represented by crude oil. The second place is occupied by the Irkutsk Region, with 21.8% (or USD4.2 billion). The main export items from this region are crude oil (45.24%), unprocessed and processed timber (22.03%), and cellulose (20.42%). The Krasnoyarsk Territory has steadily held third place in the structure of exports of Siberian regions to China since 2016, accounting

for 10.6% (or USD2.03 billion). The territory's exports are primarily composed of unprocessed and processed timber (35.23%), lead ores (16.92%), unprocessed aluminum (16.41%), and precious metal ores (16.29%).

For the rest of the Siberian regions, the main export goods to China are as follows: coal from the Kemerovo and Novosibirsk Regions, and the Republics of Yakutia, Khakassia, and Buryatia; crude oil and natural gas from the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area; petroleum products from the Republic of Altai; copper, iron, and lead ores and concentrates from the Trans-Baikal Territory; zinc ores and concentrates from the Republic of Tuva; timber from the Tomsk Region; rapeseed and flax seeds from the Omsk Region and Altai Territory; and rapeseed oil from the Tyumen Region. In general, the commodity structure of exports of Siberian regions to China in 2020 was distributed as follows: mineral products – 66.29%, wood and wood products – 19.47%, metals and metal products – 4.91%, food – 4.18%, etc. [sources 3, 4, 5].

Siberian imports from China account for 17.8–19.5% of the structure of trade turnover. Since 2018, the Novosibirsk Region has been the leader among Siberian regions, accounting for 29.4% (or USD1.23 billion in 2021) of imports from China. This dominance is partly explained by Novosibirsk's role as a hub in Siberia, where some headquarters of companies purchasing Chinese goods for other Siberian regions are "registered" (similar to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok in other macro-regions of Russia). The region's imports primarily consist of various machinery, equipment, and hardware (32.44%), ferrous metals and their products (10.94%), plastics and plastic products (9.92%), and land vehicles (7.96%).

The Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area ranked second, with 25.7% (or USD1.08 billion) of imports, the overwhelming majority (92.94%) being machinery and equipment. The Irkutsk Region occupies the third place in the structure of imports of Siberian regions from China, with 11.5% (or USD482.1 million). Its imports are mainly composed of various machinery, equipment, and hardware (52.17%), ferrous

metals and their products (8.51%), and organic chemical products (7.57%).

In other Siberian regions, the primary imported goods from China are also various machinery, equipment, and hardware, except for the Republics of Khakassia and Tuva, which primarily import chemical industry products (silicon and sulfates, respectively). In general, the commodity structure of imports of the Siberian regions from China in 2020 was distributed as follows: machinery, equipment, and hardware – 50.03%, chemical industry products – 15.07%, metals and metal products – 11.35%, consumer goods – 6.53%, vehicles – 6.12%, food – 5.78%, etc. [sources 3, 4, 5].

The importance of foreign trade with China varies significantly across the Siberian regions. The share of China in its foreign trade structure ranges from 7.9% in the Kemerovo Region to 93.4% in the Trans-Baikal Territory. China is the largest foreign trade partner for the Trans-Baikal Territory, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Tyumen Regions. The Trans-Baikal Territory is the most dependent on China, with 95.7% of its exports and 88.1% of its imports being with China. The Tyumen Region is the least dependent on exports to China (0.5%), while the Republic of Khakassia and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area are the least dependent on imports from China (8.9% each) [sources 3, 4, 5]. The volume of trade turnover between Siberian regions and China correlates with their export specialization and geographic proximity. Leading regions are those involved in mineral mining, are geographically close, or serve as import hubs. Regions at the end of the rating are those that are geographically remote and lack railway connections.

Regionally, there is also differentiation within China regarding the level and direction of foreign trade cooperation with Russia. For 2017–2019, almost half of Chinese exports to Russia came from three coastal regions: Zhejiang (18.6%), Guangdong (17.4%), and Jiangsu (10.1%).

The Russian market is most significant for the export supplies from Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces (almost 25% of all exports), Jiangsu (13.4%), and Shandong (12.8%). Meanwhile, the share of China's border regions in total

exports to the Russian market does not exceed 7% (Heilongjiang – 2.9%, Xinjiang Uygur – 2.8%, Inner Mongolia – 0.9%, and Jilin – 0.2%). More than 70% of the total value of imports from Russia is concentrated in three Chinese regions: Heilongjiang (27.4%), Beijing (26.3%), and Shandong (17.3%). Imports from Russia make up a significant portion of the total imports arriving in these regions (57.6% for Heilongjiang, 55.1% for Beijing, and 36.3% for Shandong in 2017–2019) [3]. This spatial differentiation highlights that southeastern Chinese regions are more focused on exports to Russia, northeastern ones on imports from Russia, while Shandong province, located between them, engages significantly in both exports and imports.

Investment cooperation between Russia and China has a comprehensive structure characterized by heterogeneous sources of capital investments, leading to a variety of approaches to assessing its scale [4]. According to statistics from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the share of Chinese direct and accumulated investments in Russia is relatively insignificant.

At the beginning of 2022, this figure amounted to USD 3.3 billion [source 6]. However, Chinese data indicates that at the beginning of 2020, the figure was more than USD 12.8 billion [source 7]. The Russian-Asian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs estimates that the total volume of accumulated Chinese investments in Russia over the past 20–25 years is approximately USD 55 billion, making China the third-largest investor in Russia after Germany and the United States [source 8]. Conversely, Russia ranks tenth among the largest recipients of Chinese investments for the period from 2005 to the first half of 2023 [5].

Two factors are important to consider here: first, the offshore factor, as both Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs often use such jurisdictions for their investments. Second, the Russian and Chinese sides use different methods for assessing investments. The Central Bank of Russia tends to underestimate the volume of direct and accumulated Chinese investments. Specifically, when calculating the final indicator, the regulator does not include capital investments made by small businesses through offshore jurisdictions,

as part of informal business activities and cross-border cooperation [4].

Sector-wise, the most significant volumes of Chinese investments in the Russian economy from 2005 to the first half of 2023 were concentrated in the oil and gas, coal, and mining industries. During this period, the fuel and energy sector accounted for 67.4% of all Chinese investments in Russia [source 9].

The use of national currencies in foreign trade transactions between China and Russia intensified in 2019 coinciding with worsening trade relations between the United States and China. Consequently, the share of the American currency in bilateral transactions began to decline sharply, which was offset by an equally sharp increase in the share of settlements in euros. By the beginning of 2022, the combined share of the US dollar and the euro in trade settlements between China and Russia still exceeded 84% (with the ruble accounting for 8.5% and the yuan for 7.1%) [6]. In 2023, the share of national currencies in trade settlements between Russia and China significantly increased. According to the chairman of the Union of Chinese Entrepreneurs in the Russian Federation, this share exceeded 70% [source 10], while the head of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia reported it reached 90% (with the ruble at 20% and the yuan at 70%) [source 11]. This represents a 4.5- to 6-fold increase in the use of national currencies in mutual settlements within just a year and a half.

Trade between China and Siberia is primarily conducted by rail, sea, pipeline, road, and air transport through the southeastern regions of Russia, including the Trans-Baikal, Primorye, and Khabarovsk Territories, as well as the Amur Region and the Jewish Autonomous Region. To a lesser extent, trade is also carried out by rail and air transport through European Russia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. In southeastern Russia, there are a total of four railway, eight road, and eight river border crossings with China, in addition to eight continental sea cargo ports. Siberia and China are further connected by the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline and the “Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean” oil pipeline.

Of the new projects, the cross-border bridges across the Amur River, opened in 2022, are

noteworthy: the road bridge Blagoveshchensk-Heihe and the railway bridge Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang. Siberian-Chinese trade turnover mainly involves railway border crossings and sea cargo ports. An interesting feature of trade traffic is the transportation of export and import goods, which mostly use different routes: the main flow of goods heading to China crosses the border through the Zabaikalsk-Manchuria railway border crossing, while goods heading to Siberia more often arrive through the sea cargo ports of the Primorye Territory.

FEATURES AND PROBLEM AREAS

A notable feature of the trade turnover structure between Siberia and China, in contrast to other macro-regions of Russia and the country as a whole, is the significant prevalence of exports over imports: 81–82% versus 47–48% for the Russian Federation as a whole, 59% for Pacific Russia, and 40% for European Russia (including the Urals region). This discrepancy is likely because the headquarters of some large companies that purchase Chinese goods are “registered” outside of Siberia, resulting in the underestimation of indicators for the Siberian regions and overestimation for regions like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Primorye Territory.

Another feature is that Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation is mainly driven by large state-owned companies. This is because the foundation of bilateral interaction between Russia and China traditionally revolves around “trunk megaprojects” in sectors such as energy, military-industrial, and large-scale infrastructure construction.

The main participants in bilateral cooperation are large, mainly state-owned companies, along with relevant ministries and departments. Given the economic and political characteristics of Russia and China, cooperation at the highest political level and interaction between large companies through specific transactions will likely continue to form the basis of bilateral partnerships for a long time [7]. The underdevelopment of interstate cooperation at the level of small and medium-sized businesses can be considered a future challenge.

A significant issue in foreign trade cooperation between the regions of Siberia and China is the established imbalance in the commodity structure of trade. Exports from Siberia are dominated by low added value goods, such as mineral resources and energy, while imports from China primarily consist of high added value goods, such as mechanical and electrical products.

This disproportion, marked by the dominance of resources and minerals in Russian exports and machinery and engineering products in Chinese imports, has persisted since the 1990s. Currently, a resource-conducting framework has almost formed in eastern Russia, with Russian national corporations focusing on mining and transporting resources to Northeast Asian countries, ensuring the loading of existing infrastructure capacities with export goods [2]. A negative factor in this situation is the potential threat of falling into technological and financial dependence on China in some sectors of the Russian economy, as well as solidifying Russia’s status as a resource supplier for the Chinese economy [8].

Moreover, the underdevelopment of transport infrastructure in eastern Russia, particularly the insufficient throughput capacity of the Eastern range of Russian railways, is a critical problem. Recently, the transport system of eastern Russia was already operating at its capacity limit. Now, after redirecting a large amount of cargo that previously went to the west towards the east, the railway infrastructure can no longer cope with the demand.

The construction of additional tracks on various branches of the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur Mainlines increased the throughput capacity of the Eastern range to 158 million tons per year by 2023. However, this is still insufficient. The port capacity of eastern Russia is now twice the capacity of the railway approach tracks, and this gap is growing. Currently, the shortage of railway access capacity is estimated at 95 million tons per year, and by 2025–2027, considering current development plans for the Eastern range, this shortage could reach 187 million tons per year [source 12].

PROSPECTS

Modern political and economic events have pushed Russia to pivot rapidly towards Eastern

cooperation, exacerbating some pre-existing problematic and limiting factors. In the current situation, foreign trade relations between China and the Siberian regions (and the east of Russia as a whole) can be developed in the following main directions.

Increasing the depth of processing of exported mineral wealth from Siberia will both increase and enhance the added value of shipped goods and expand sales markets by improving the profitability of transportation and reducing the physical freight volume. This is particularly important for alleviating the burden on the Eastern range of Russian railways, whose capacity is currently insufficient. Prospects in this direction should be found primarily in the oil, gas, and forestry sectors, which are now the main components of Siberian exports to China. These exports are characterized, particularly in the forestry sector, by low added value. In the oil sector, it is rational to build oil-refining plants near the border with China. In the gas sector, establishing gas chemical plants is recommended, a process that has already begun. In the forestry industry, it is necessary to introduce restrictions on the export of round timber and to organize timber processing and forest chemical industries.

Increasing non-resource exports from Siberia will reduce the mineral orientation of the Russian economy, decrease its dependence on fluctuations in global energy prices, and contribute to the transition to an innovative development model. Prospects in this direction with China can be found in the areas of aviation products, jet engine manufacturing, nuclear energy, metallurgical products, medical equipment, agriproducts and food, as well as in innovation and technology clusters, where jointly produced goods will be created with the introduction of modern scientific and technical advances.

Further modernization of the railway infrastructure in the east of Russia is essential to increase the capacity of the eastern part of the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur Mainlines (BAM). Addressing the main bottleneck of the Baikal-Amur Mainline requires the construction of a second (parallel) Severomuysk tunnel, which will increase the freight capacity of this section

from the current 16 million tons of cargo per year to 100 million tons.

The following steps are also required: constructing the second BAM track east of Lena-Vostochnaya station, electrifying the railway east of Taksim station, building the second (parallel) Kodar tunnel, and modernizing railway approaches to Pacific ports. On the Trans-Siberian Mainline, constructing a second track on the Korkinsky Bridge in Krasnoyarsk is necessary. As a result, it is desirable to maximize the transfer of freight traffic from the Trans-Siberian Railway to BAM and the eastern part of the South Siberian Railway (Novokuznetsk-Taishet section) and subsequently specialize the Trans-Siberian Mainline in passenger and container freight.

Due to the increased congestion of the eastern part of the Trans-Siberian Railway, resulting from the sanctions policy against Russia that began in 2022 and the impossibility of exporting the full volume of Siberian bulk freight, Russia requires a sharp increase in the throughput capacity of the Eastern railway range. However, achieving this in the shortest timeframe is challenging, and therefore it is worth exploring alternative transportation routes.

The most significant cargo for the railways of Asian Russia is Kuznetsk coals. Most of these coals were previously supplied to the West, with the second most important direction being East Asia – specifically the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan. Now, East Asia will naturally become the primary destination.

The length of the most frequently used railway route to deliver Kuznetsk coals to China (with Novokuznetsk as the starting point and Tianjin, an industrial suburb of Beijing, as the final point) through the Zabaikalsk-Manchuria border crossing is about 5,370 km. An alternative transportation option is available through Kazakhstan via the Dostyk-Alashankou border crossing. This route, along the main railway lines, is about 4,770 km, approximately 600 km shorter. Moreover, the railways of eastern Kazakhstan and northern China are much less congested than the eastern part of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Using this route, along with the main one, will facilitate faster delivery of freight from the western

and central parts of South Siberia to East Asia and reduce congestion on the Trans-Siberian Railway. Potential difficulties in fully operating this route (such as unsettled logistics, differences in railway freight rates, and customs clearance) seem entirely solvable [9].

The economic and geographical position of Russia, located inland between the two largest world markets – European and Chinese – provides unique opportunities for creating international transport, primarily railway corridors that can connect Northeastern China with Western Europe in the shortest possible way. Based on the Trans-Mongolian Railway, it is possible to create an international transport corridor China-Mongolia-Russia as one of the routes within the “Belt and Road” initiative, connecting China and Europe.

Given that Russia is a co-owner of the Ulaanbaatar Railway (which owns and operates the Trans-Mongolian Railway), its participation in this project seems more than appropriate. The western part of the Trans-Siberian Railway, now freed from part of the freight due to the sanctions policy, will allow Chinese and European companies to engage in larger freight volumes in the exchange of goods [10]. Geographical researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences agree, believing that creating high-speed rail traffic in the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor is the most effective way to increase the connectivity of transport infrastructures in the east of Northern Eurasia [11].

In addition to modernization, constructing new elements of railway infrastructure in eastern Russia is required. Promising projects include the construction of the Dzhalinga-Mohe railway border crossing (with a bridge across the Amur River) and the restoration of the abandoned and partially dismantled Skovorodino-Reinovo railway line, which is 69 km long. Operating this railway line and bridge will cut the freight transportation route from southern Yakutia (primarily South Yakut coal) along the Amur-Yakutsk Mainline to the border with China by approximately 2,000 km, bypassing traffic on the BAM and Trans-Siberian Railway and thus reducing their congestion. The prospects of this border crossing (along with the possibilities of building others) are noted by other Russian researchers [12].

For successful foreign trade cooperation between the Siberian regions and the coastal provinces of China, as well as with other countries beyond the border, further development of Russia’s Pacific port capacities is necessary. A strategic project in this area should be Russia’s third access to the Pacific Ocean, based on the railway lines Ulak-Elga and Elga-Port Elga (Pacific Railway), and a sea cargo port in the area of Cape Manorsky.

Currently, this railway line under construction is planned as a private, non-public use, intended for exporting coal from the Elga deposit abroad through the coal terminal under construction. However, this facility should acquire strategic importance for the country. By modernizing the railway into a double-track electrified public line and transforming the port into a universal one, Russia could secure a third railway access to the Pacific Ocean, which is also remote from external borders. Additionally, utilizing these facilities can relieve congestion on the easternmost sections of the Trans-Siberian Railway, BAM, and existing Pacific ports, while also shortening the delivery route for inland cargo to the World Ocean, where transportation costs are noticeably lower than by rail.

In developing interstate interaction at the level of small and medium-sized businesses, stimulating cross-border cooperation with China in the southeastern regions of Russia requires further improvement of the regulatory framework and conditions to increase attractiveness for investors. This is particularly important for already established special economic zones near the Russian-Chinese border, such as the international transport corridors “Primorye-1” and “Primorye-2,” territories of advanced social-economic development, cross-border zones of economic cooperation, and the Vladivostok free port.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Foreign trade cooperation between China and the Siberian regions in recent years has been characterized by an increase in absolute values and in the share of Siberia within Russia. Trade turnover is marked by a noticeable predominance of exports from Siberia over imports from China,

with Siberian exports being significant on an all-Russian scale. The intensity of foreign trade relations between Siberian regions and China correlates with their export specialization and geographic proximity to China.

In recent years, China has solidified its position as Russia's main foreign trade partner, accounting for more than 1/5 of its foreign trade turnover. In the current political and economic conditions, this is a positive development. However, focusing on

a single foreign trade partner carries certain risks, especially when that partner is a neighbor with an economy almost ten times larger than Russia's in terms of nominal GDP, and is becoming an almost uncontested supplier of a wide range of technically sophisticated products. Therefore, it is important to diversify the geographical structure of Russia's foreign trade. This can be achieved through cooperation with other Asian neighbors and by strengthening Russia's own port facilities.

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