

---

---

## SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD

---

---

DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2025-69-1-66-75

EDN: NLMRAY

### STRENGTHENING THE BWC: EURASIAN OUTLOOK

Anastasia A. MALYGINA,  
ORCID 0000-0002-5543-5103, a.malygina@spbu.ru  
Saint Petersburg State University, 7-9, Universitetskaya Emb., Saint-Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation.

Sergei K. ZAVRIEV,  
ORCID 0000-0002-6741-8175, szavriev@ibch.ru  
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation.

Received 10.06.2024. Revised 05.07.2024. Accepted 23.10.2024.

**Abstract.** Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)<sup>11</sup> remains a topical issue. Rapid developments in life sciences and the increasing number of private actors in the global biotechnology market present several challenges related to monitoring and preventing biological threats at national and global levels. In the half-century since the BWC was opened for signature, the structure of the biosecurity problem has become more complex compared to what the architects of the Convention understood it to be. In the current geopolitical climate, mutual distrust has increased, which has led to the politicization of issues related to the national implementation of the BWC. The issue of national compliance with the BWC has significantly complicated the intersessional program and the work of the Ninth BWC Review Conference. Against this backdrop, attempts by non-state actors to bolster the BWC regime by developing mechanisms of enhanced transparency alongside the Convention have significantly intensified. In international practice, there is a noticeable trend for coalitions of like-minded countries to create informal structures that are supported by voluntary donations. These formats are seen as an alternative to slow-paced classical multilateral disarmament diplomacy, which innovators believe is unable to reach consensus in times of acute geopolitical confrontation. Russia is committed to enhancing regional cooperation in the field of biosafety and biosecurity within the framework of the BWC. As it is seen from Moscow, strengthening the BWC and promoting international cooperation on biosafety and biosecurity are crucial for establishing a regional security architecture in Eurasia. Russian Federation currently promotes the concepts of biological sovereignty and collective biosecurity among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This article provides a brief overview of the evolution of efforts to strengthen the BWC, from the launch of negotiations on its development to the establishment of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC in December 2022. The authors proceed to review practical steps taken by Russia in collaboration with other CSTO members aimed at creating a unified biosafety and biosecurity environment, and conclude by identifying some emerging challenges.

**Keywords:** biosafety, biological sovereignty, collective biosecurity, BTWC/BWC, CSTO, CIS, WMD nonproliferation, international cooperation and assistance, control and monitoring of bio-threats.

#### About authors:

Anastasia A. MALYGINA, Cand. Sci. (Political), Associate Professor, Director of Cross-Disciplinary Centre for Global Biosecurity Studies.

Sergei K. ZAVRIEV, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. Sci. (Biological), Professor, Leading Researcher.

### УКРЕПЛЕНИЕ КБТО: ЕВРАЗИЙСКАЯ ПЕРСПЕКТИВА

© 2025 г. А.А. Малыгина, С.К. Завриев

МАЛЫГИНА Анастасия Александровна, кандидат политических наук, доцент,  
ORCID 0000-0002-5543-5103, a.malygina@spbu.ru  
СПбГУ, РФ, 199034 Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., д. 7-9.

ЗАВРИЕВ Сергей Кириакевич, член-корреспондент РАН, профессор,  
ORCID 0000-0002-6741-8175, szavriev@ibch.ru  
ИМЭМО им. Е.М. Примакова РАН, РФ, 117997 Москва, ул. Профсоюзная, 23.

Статья поступила 10.06.2024. После доработки 05.07.2024. Принята к печати 23.10.2024.

**Аннотация.** В связи с развитием науки и технологий, а также увеличением количества участников на глобальном рынке биологических материалов и технологий перед государствами, подписав-

<sup>1</sup> Also Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

шими Конвенцию о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия (КБТО), встают серьезные вопросы, касающиеся мониторинга и предотвращения биологических угроз. Укрепление КБТО и развитие регионального сотрудничества в сфере биобезопасности являются для России приоритетными задачами. Статья предлагает ретроспективный взгляд на проблему укрепления режима КБТО. Вопрос выстраивания региональной архитектуры биологической безопасности на евразийском пространстве носит комплексный характер. В статье дан краткий обзор достигнутых результатов и намечены задачи на будущее.

**Ключевые слова:** биологическая защита, биологический суверенитет, коллективная биологическая безопасность, КБТО, ОДКБ, СНГ, нераспространение ОМУ, международное сотрудничество и помощь, контроль и мониторинг биоугроз.

## INTRODUCTION

Half a century after the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force, its strengthening remains an important issue. Biological weapons pose a security threat to the entire Earth's ecosystem. If the Convention becomes universal (which is not yet the case, 187 of the 193 UN member states are parties to it as of November 2024) and all parties comply with it properly, this will ensure that biotechnology will not be used to create weapons of war. Among those that have not yet signed the treaty are countries with powerful technological potential. The Convention remains one of the central elements in the global architecture of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Its relevance is further underscored by ongoing negotiations at the United Nations in New York on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East [1]. Should such a zone be created [source 1], participating states would be required to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapon (non-NW) states, and to ratify both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the BTWC [2]. The UN Secretary-General has repeatedly pointed out the connection between disarmament and sustainable development goals [source 2]. One may recall that Article X of the BTWC obligates member states to promote international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the biological field and to support the development of national biosafety and biosecurity capacities among Convention members.

## A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT THE PROBLEM

As often happens, the multilateral negotiations on the BTWC resulted in a compromise. The final text of the Convention omitted several critical elements: it did not provide a formal definition of

biological weapons, lacked an explicit prohibition on their use, included no mechanisms for verification of compliance, and did not establish detailed procedures for investigating the alleged use of such weapons. While Article V of the BTWC does allow for consultations among state parties in the event of concerns regarding the Convention's interpretation or implementation, the mechanism for conducting such consultations was left undefined. Some of these deficiencies were apparent even to the Convention's architects at the time it was opened for signature in 1972 [source 3]. The need to strengthen the BTWC by developing procedural and administrative mechanisms was already being voiced in the lead-up to the First Review Conference (RevCon), which took place in Geneva in March 1980 [source 4].

The issue of strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) gained renewed urgency around the turn of the 1990s amid significant advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology, and bioinformatics. This period saw the most intensive efforts to reinforce the Convention, centered on the proposal to establish an intergovernmental Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. This organization would be endowed with a charter and a mandate to verify compliance with the BTWC. The proposed measures aimed to develop and sign a document that would enhance both the implementation of and confidence in the Convention, with verification mechanisms occupying a central place in the envisioned framework. However, negotiations reached an impasse in 2001, largely due to the position of the United States, which questioned the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed verification measures. As a result, the Fifth BTWC RevCon decided to suspend its work for a year, during which time the state parties continued consultations at various venues. Having resumed its work

in November 2002, the Fifth BTWC decided to strengthen the Convention through new mechanisms: Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties to the BTWC. The decisions made during these meetings are advisory in nature and serve to prepare the groundwork for subsequent Review Conferences. These interaction mechanisms, along with the thematic agenda established for each intersessional period since 2001, are collectively referred to as the “*intersessional program*”. Any mechanisms outside the core framework of the BTWC may only continue their work following the approval of a formal mandate and agenda by the Conference. For example, in 2006, at the Sixth BTWC RevCon, the intersessional program was expanded, and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) was established. For almost 20 years, the ISU has proven that a small, unbureaucratic, and relatively inexpensive structure can make a huge contribution to the intersessional program and promote progress towards such goals as universalization, confidence-building measures, overcoming institutional weaknesses, and raising awareness of the objectives and principles of the BTWC.

Following a decision by the Seventh RevCon (December 2011), the ISU established and has been administering a digital “assistance and cooperation database” [source 5]. The Seventh RevCon also established a sponsorship program, which is managed by the Implementation Support Unit within the framework of its mandate [source 5]. The BTWC sponsorship program is financed through voluntary contributions from member states and is aimed at promoting the Convention’s universalization. Specifically, the program facilitates the participation of diplomats and experts from diverse global regions – particularly those from countries with limited financial resources – in BTWC-related activities. Additionally, the ISU is responsible for the functioning of the electronic platform on which the reports within the framework of confidence-building measures are posted. The digitalization of the relevant annual submissions was initiated in 2011 following a decision by the Seventh RevCon. In 2022, the Ninth RevCon reaffirmed the mandate of this structure for the period of 2023–2027. The ISU is based in the Geneva sector of the UN Office for

Disarmament Affairs, which supervises and supports its activities [source 6].

For over 20 years, the process of developing a legally binding protocol to the BTWC had been stalled. By the Eighth RevCon in 2016, the depth and breadth of disagreement over how exactly to strengthen the Convention seemed an insurmountable task. While the need for change was undisputed, state parties could not reach a consensus on where to focus their efforts. The period between the Eighth and Ninth RevCons was prolonged by the *COVID-19* pandemic. By the time of the Ninth RevCon, it became clear that two issues were the least controversial in the context of strengthening: the establishment of a tool to review scientific and technological developments relevant to the BTWC, and the development of a mechanism to coordinate international cooperation in accordance with Article X of the Convention.

In December 2022, the Ninth RevCon established a Working Group on Strengthening the BTWC (WG), to meet twice a year. The WG’s operating procedure is based on the experience of holding annual Meetings of States Parties to the Convention, but does not duplicate or replace these meetings. Oversight of the activities of the WG and overall management of the intersessional work is entrusted to the three-day annual Meeting of States Parties. The WG’s mandate includes identifying possible approaches and developing proposals and recommendations for strengthening the BTWC, including the development of a draft of legally binding measures. The WG did not start from scratch. In general, state parties to the Convention continue to promote ideas that were voiced in previous cycles of intersessional work.

Russia’s recent initiatives suggest that it will continue to advocate, within the BTWC framework, for proposals it first advanced between 2016 and 2021. These include the establishment of mobile bio-medical units; the creation of a scientific advisory committee tasked with monitoring scientific and technological developments relevant to the BTWC; and the enhancement of the Convention’s confidence-building measures through the introduction of an additional reporting form. This proposed form would encourage state parties to provide information on biological defence

research and development taking place outside the national territory. Russia has also reiterated its call to strengthen Article VI of the Convention by establishing a dedicated mechanism for investigating alleged violations of BTWC obligations. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized that its proposal to create such an investigative mechanism under Article VI is not intended to undermine the independent status of the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM). It is worth recalling that the UNSGM, established by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1987 and administered by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, remains in a developmental phase. The Mechanism requires modernization in terms of methodology, as well as improvements in administrative, technical, and personnel support [source 7].

#### BIOSECURITY AND BTWC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

In the half-century since the BTWC was opened for signature, the landscape of biosecurity has evolved in ways that its original architects could not have fully anticipated. Today, biosecurity challenges extend well beyond the traditional military context, encompassing critical sectors such as agriculture, public health, and biodiversity protection [3]. The proliferation of dual-use technologies – scientific advances with both civilian and potential military applications – has further complicated efforts to sustain the BTWC regime. At the same time, deepening geopolitical rivalries, mistrust, and mutual suspicions have increasingly politicized the discourse surrounding BTWC compliance. A notable example of this politicization occurred in November 2023, during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the APEC summit in San Francisco, where a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden was scheduled. Although a clandestine Chinese laboratory in Ridley, California, had been discovered as early as December 2022, it was not until November 2023 that the case gained substantial socio-political traction in both the United States [4, 5, 6] and internationally [7, 8, 9, 10]. On November 15 – the very day of the Xi-Biden meeting – the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee on China released

a report containing sensational allegations linking the clandestine facility to the Chinese government [source 8].

In December 2022, local law enforcement authorities in California discovered a clandestine laboratory and storage facility on the outskirts of the town of Ridley. The premises were officially leased by a Chinese company purportedly engaged in the sale of pregnancy test systems [source 9]. However, upon inspection, thousands of vials containing biological materials and hazardous chemicals were uncovered. Subsequent media reports alleged the presence of 20 pathogens associated with dangerous infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis, and HIV, as well as approximately one thousand genetically modified mice [source 8]. For nine months following the discovery, local officials reportedly struggled to prompt federal action. Appeals to agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initially went unanswered [source 9]. It was only after local residents raised the issue with their congressional representative that the case began to gain national attention. The incident revealed a critical gap in the United States' regulatory architecture: no single federal agency holds comprehensive responsibility for investigating and overseeing such biosecurity threats. Further scrutiny revealed that the laboratory's operator – an individual with a criminal record in the United States and an active warrant in Canada – had managed to establish a new business and acquire dangerous biological agents from American suppliers [source 8]. The rise in private biological laboratories across the United States, particularly since the onset of the *COVID-19* pandemic [11, 12, 13], has highlighted serious deficiencies in federal oversight, gaps in national biosafety legislation, and a lack of coordination among relevant government agencies.

In international practice, there is a noticeable tendency for individual groups of countries to create informal structures financed by voluntary donations [sources 10, 11, 12, 13]. Such formats are promoted as an alternative to slow multilateral diplomacy, which is allegedly incapable of reaching a consensus within a reasonable time frame in the context of geopolitical contradictions. On the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference

and the World Economic Forum in 2023 and 2024, *NTI | Bio* promoted the idea of quickly introducing approaches similar to the IAEA safeguards system into global biosafety management practices. These approaches were called the “system of safeguards for modern biological sciences and biotechnology”. At the beginning of 2024, the creation of an information and analytical platform and network structure “International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science” was announced [source 14], financed by voluntary donations. This structure, formed under the patronage of *NTI | Bio*, has the legal status of a non-governmental non-profit organization. This “International Initiative” will have a subsidiary body that will, among other things, review scientific and technical achievements that are significant for the BTWC.

It is worth recalling that *NTI | Bio* is a division of the highly influential American non-governmental organization *NTI*. This name previously stood for Nuclear Threat Initiative, since the organization previously specialized in nuclear security issues. After the organization took a course on expanding the range of programs, the name was shortened to an abbreviation. In 2017, *NTI*, having received substantial funding for the implementation of projects specifically on biological issues [source 15], established the structural division “Global Biological Policy and Programs” or *NTI | Bio* for short, aimed at constructing an expert narrative on global biosecurity issues, organizing events and publishing various ratings. It is reasonable to anticipate the emergence of new rankings and informal coalitions that advocate for specific principles of public health governance, as well as distinct approaches to the regulation of research and development and export controls in the biological sphere. Voicing a vision of such dynamics from Russia, the Chief of the Radiation, chemical and biological protection Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General Kirillov, stated at one of the briefings that the United States was trying to replace the BTWC and other international legal norms with “its own rules, which were developed in American interests, supported by the collective West and imposed on third countries” [source 16].

As stated in statements and presentations by the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Minis-

try of Foreign Affairs, as well as in the final report of the Parliamentary Commission presented in April 2023 [source 17], the US Department of Defense and related organizations, including private firms, carried out a military biological program in Ukraine up until February 2022, directed, among other things, against Russia. At the initiative of Moscow, a Consultative Meeting on Article V of the BTWC was held in early September 2022 [source 18]. In late October and early November 2022, Russia also initiated meetings of the UN Security Council to address concerns raised by Russia and submitted a proposal to conduct an international investigation under the auspices of the UN Security Council in accordance with Article VI of the BTWC. The Russian Federation has previously repeatedly expressed concern about the military biological activities of Western countries in the post-Soviet space. In a number of states in the Eurasian space, Russia’s statements were and continue to be perceived painfully. At the same time, the pendulum of reactions swings between a categorical denial of any claims in the context of upholding the sovereign right of the country to carry out scientific and technical cooperation in the spirit of Article X of the BTWC to categorical statements by concerned civil activists in these states demanding that immediate measures should be taken against medical and biological work supervised and sponsored by the Americans. While the Russian side continued to present more and more new facts, US and Ukrainian officials rejected accusations of violating the Convention, insisting that the cooperation was aimed at strengthening the potential to combat epidemics.

The issue of compliance with the BTWC significantly complicated the course of the intersessional program and the work of the Ninth RevCon. The discrepancy between the volume of Russian arguments and the scant explanations of the opposing side has increased suspicions about the large-scale and often opaque medical and biological activity of the United States on the territory of other states. In April 2024, American journalists published the results of an investigation indicating the scale and nature of the activities carried out in 2012–2022 by citizens of various countries in the interests and at the expense of American grants. The authors of that article

point to a number of problems associated with procedural shortcomings and the general lack of transparency in the American biosecurity system. According to federal officials familiar with the situation, there are some organizations in the United States working with dangerous pathogens that have not registered their laboratories, which, among other things, involves supervision and inspection by specialists from the CDC [14].

#### BIOLOGICAL SECURITY: GLOBAL, REGIONAL, NATIONAL

Russia and the states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have made progress in creating a unified biological security system [15]. In the fall of 2021, by decision of the Committee of Secretaries of the CSTO Security Councils, the Coordination Council of Authorized Bodies of the CSTO Member States on Biological Security (CC) was established. It was initiated by Russia, and the head of the Federal Service for the Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare Popova was elected chairperson [source 19]. The Council meetings were held in December 2022 in St. Petersburg, in July 2023 in Minsk, and in December 2023 again in St. Petersburg. The decisions of this body are aimed at “strengthening the biological sovereignty” of the CSTO member states and coordinating their positions on strengthening the BTWC regime [source 20]. At the third meeting of the Council, Russia presented a report on international exercises of rapid response teams to fight emergency sanitary and epidemiological situations using mobile laboratories. The fourth meeting was held in December 2024 in Kazakhstan [source 21]. In November 2022, the heads of state of the Organization signed the Decision of the CSTO Collective Security Council “On the joint formation of radiation, chemical and biological protection and medical support of the CSTO”. The combined unit of radiation, chemical and biological protection (RCBP) and medical support troops is a new component of the Organization’s collective security system, designed to respond to biological threats [source 22]. The model of such a unit was tested during a joint exercise with the CSTO Collective Rapid Response Forces, “Interaction-2022”, which took place at one of the Kazakhstani training grounds in October 2022

[source 23]. In September 2023, a special, separate exercise, “Barrier-2023,” was organized in the Republic of Belarus, in which this new component of the Organization’s collective forces was involved. Both in Kazakhstan in 2022 and a year later in Belarus, during the exercises, interaction with local sanitary and epidemiological surveillance authorities and other specialized national structures was successfully established [source 23].

The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly, created in 2006 on the basis of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, adopted the “Recommendations on Legislative Support for Biological Security of the CSTO Member States” on December 19, 2023. The document uses such concepts as “global biological security”, “regional healthcare systems”, and “regional biological security”. The latter “consists of national systems for ensuring the public sanitary and epidemiological well-being” [source 24]. The recommendations were developed seeking to harmonize the relevant national regulations of the Organization’s members and forming a “unified legislative mechanism aimed at protecting the population of the CSTO member states, protecting the health of animals and plants, and protecting the environment from the impact of hazardous biological factors” [source 24].

It cannot be said that the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly serves as a platform for promoting exclusively Russia’s initiatives. In September 2022, at the 77<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Tokayev put forward an initiative to create an International Biological Safety Agency (IBSA) on the BTWC platform. This initiative was noted in the Statement of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly on the inadmissibility of developing biological (bacteriological) and toxin weapons dated December 5, 2022. On the sidelines of the BTWC Ninth RevCon in December 2022, Kazakhstan presented a version of the IBSA initiative, taking into account the consultations held. The Kazakhstan’s party emphasizes that this initiative cannot and should not replace negotiations on the BTWC verification protocol, but was put forward with the aim of stimulating the search for viable solutions through the implementation of the principle of modularity<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The principle of modularity presupposes the gradual, consensus-based completion of processes, procedures,

[source 25]. In December 2023, the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Organization's member states continue consultations on finalizing this initiative [source 24].

### CONCLUSION

At the end of 2023, the Russian President held a meeting with permanent members of the Russian Security Council on the issues of ensuring "collective biological security in the CIS space" [source 26], organized on the eve of President Putin's meetings with the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which took place on December 25–26, 2023. It is worth noting that in 2024, the CIS chairmanship was passed onto Russia. At the meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the Commonwealth in Minsk on January 23, 2024, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Pankin proposed that CIS countries "think together about expanding the regional biological security system, including the formation of an appropriate legal framework" [source 27].

Biological security remains a complex and inherently transboundary issue. Since the World Health Organization was established in 1948 and the BTWC entered into force in 1975, the spectrum of biological threats has expanded and become more multifaceted. Until now, the Convention regime does not have a unified methodology for assessing scientific and technological progress and organizational formats within the BTWC regime that would comprehensively address the task of strengthening the Convention.

in terms of risks and opportunities for global biological security, while the international mechanisms and procedures for investigating facts of the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons are poorly developed.

Today, there is a shortage of specialists in the CIS who would be engaged in long-term and continuous work on transboundary biosecurity issues. The need to intensify international political dialogue has become urgent, but it is not always clear which ideas the BTWC member states could bring to the dialogue on institutional strengthening of the Convention. Those who routinely deal with various aspects of national biosecurity are overloaded with operational tasks, and it is not always possible to distract them from their work for the sake of participation in consultations on issues of a more general, political nature. It is gratifying that such platforms for interdepartmental and interstate dialogue as the Coordination Council of Authorized Bodies of the CSTO Member States on Biological Security, regular intergovernmental meetings on these issues, and the CIS Joint Consultative Commission on Disarmament Issues continue to function. It is important that the mood for cross-sectoral dialogue on current issues of biological security at the CSTO and CIS platforms be supported by the readiness to take mutual interests into account. Building the architecture of the Eurasian biological security should not resemble a one-way street. For the full development of such a regional system, mutual enrichment of ideas, approaches, and lessons learned is important.

### REFERENCES

1. Шестакова С.С. Вторая сессия конференции по созданию ЗСОМУ на Ближнем Востоке: итоги и перспективы. *Индекс Безопасности. Научные записки*, 2022, № 12, сс. 5-14.  
Shetakova S.S. The Second Session of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. *Security Index. Research Notes*, 2022, no. 12, pp. 5-14. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://pircenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/22-04-28-INF-SI-RUS-%E2%84%9612-38-2022.pdf> (accessed 15.05.2024).
2. Родина И. Перспективы создания ЗСОМУ на Ближнем Востоке: история и современность. *Российский Совет по Международным Дела́м. Блог Научного студенческого общества МГИМО*, 07.06.2019.  
Rodina I. Prospects for Establishing Middle-East Zone Free of WMD: History and Current State of Affairs. *Russian International Affairs Council. Blog of the Students' Research Society*, 07.06.2019. (In Russ.) Available at: [https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/NSO\\_MGIMO/osvobozhdenie-blizhnego-vostoka-ot-omu-istoriya-i-perspektivy-na-sovre/](https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/NSO_MGIMO/osvobozhdenie-blizhnego-vostoka-ot-omu-istoriya-i-perspektivy-na-sovre/) (accessed 05.04.2024).
3. Завриев С.К., Игнатов А.Н. Потенциальные угрозы в сфере сельскохозяйственной и продовольственной безопасности. *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, 2020, т. 64, № 7, сс. 100-107.

- Zavriev S.K., Ignatov A.N. Potential Threats in Agriculture and Food Security Area. *World Economy and International Relations*, 2020, vol. 64, no. 7, pp. 100-107. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-7-100-107>
4. Rumpf-Whitten S. Owner of California Biolab Has Close Ties to Chinese Government, Military: House Report. *Fox News*, 16.11.2023. Available at: <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/owner-california-biolab-close-ties-chinese-government-military-house-report> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  5. Nava V. Pathogens Labeled ‘HIV’ and ‘Ebola’ Found Inside Secret, Illegal Chinese-Owned Biolab in California. *New York Post*, 16.11.2023. Available at: <https://nypost.com/2023/11/16/news/pathogens-labeled-hiv-and-ebola-found-inside-illegal-chinese-owned-biolab-in-california/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  6. Ingber S. “Shock after Shock”: A Visit to China’s Secret Biolab in California. *Scripps News*, 07.12.2023. Available at: <https://www.scrippsnews.com/us-news/shock-after-shock-a-visit-to-china-s-secret-biolab-in-california> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  7. Morrison C. Congressional Report Reveals New Details about Chinese-Run California Lab Full of Genetically Engineered Mice and Viruses and Slams the CDC for Refusing to Investigate. *Daily Mail*, 16.11.2023. Available at: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-12758597/congress-chinese-california-lab-genetically-engineered-mice-viruses-CDC.html> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  8. Gupta A.K. Illegal Chinese-Owned Biolab in California Busted with Pathogens Labeled “HIV” and “Ebola”. *Hindustan Times*, 17.11.2023. Available at: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-news/illegal-chinese-owned-biolab-in-california-busted-with-pathogens-labeled-hiv-and-ebola-101700212547202.html> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  9. Bickerton J. CDC Responds to Claims about Chinese Biolab in California. *Newsweek*, 17.11.2023. Available at: <https://www.newsweek.com/cdc-responds-claims-about-chinese-biolab-california-1844760> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  10. Проскурякова Т. Перед встречей Байдена и Си Цзиньпина в США нашли тайную китайскую лабораторию. *HTB*, 11.11.2023.  
Proskuryakova T. An Illegal Chinese-Owned Biolab Was Found before the Meeting of Biden and Xi Jinping. *NTV*, 11.11.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2799054/?ysclid=lpibgucubx940977634> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  11. Armus T. Breweries, Farms, Spas? To Fill Empty Offices, Downtowns Get Creative. *Washington Post*, 28.08.2023. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/08/28/empty-office-buildings-commercial-vacancy-zoning/> (accessed 15.03.2024).
  12. Green D., Pannu J., Berke A. The Danger of “Invisible” Biolabs Across the U.S. *Time*, 31.08.2023. Available at: <https://time.com/6309643/invisible-biolabs/> (accessed 15.03.2024).
  13. Kamin D. “A Wild 15 Months”: Pandemic Spurs Conversion of Offices to Labs. *New York Times*, 27.07.2021. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/business/office-space-conversion-labs.html> (accessed 15.03.2024).
  14. Willman D., Warrick J. Research with Exotic Viruses Risks a Deadly Outbreak, Scientists Warn. *Washington Post*, 10.04.2024. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2023/virus-research-risk-outbreak/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
  15. Малыгина А.А., Завриев С.К. Перспективы сотрудничества на евразийском пространстве в контексте Конвенции о запрещении биологического оружия. *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, 2022, т. 66, № 10, сс. 34-44.  
Malygina A.A., Zavriev S.K. Cooperation Prospects in Eurasian Region in the Context of the Biological Weapons Convention. *World Economy and International Relations*, 2022, vol. 66, no. 10, pp. 34-44. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-10-34-44>

## SOURCES

1. Постпред РФ в Вене назвал нулевыми перспективы участия Израиля в конференции ЗКОМУ. *TASS*, 13.11.2023.  
The Russian Permanent Representative in Vienna Said the Prospects of Israel’s Participation in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Negligible. *TASS*, 13.11.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://tass.ru/politika/19273273> (accessed 05.04.2024).
2. *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament*. Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 2018. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/en/> (accessed 05.04.2024).

3. *Final document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC. BWC/CONF.I/4.* Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Available at: [https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/29407/documents?f%5B0%5D=document\\_type\\_meeting%3AFinal%20reports](https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/29407/documents?f%5B0%5D=document_type_meeting%3AFinal%20reports) (accessed 05.05.2024).
4. *Background information document submitted by the Implementation Support Unit. BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/2.* Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g18/184/70/pdf/g1818470.pdf> (accessed 05.05.2024).
5. *Final Document of the Seventh Review Conference. BWC/CONF.VII/7.* Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Available at: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Biological\\_Weapons\\_Convention\\_-\\_Seventh\\_Review\\_Conference\\_\(2011\)/BWC\\_CONF.VII\\_7\\_Corr.1.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Biological_Weapons_Convention_-_Seventh_Review_Conference_(2011)/BWC_CONF.VII_7_Corr.1.pdf) (accessed 05.05.2024).
6. *Final Document of the Ninth Review Conference. BWC/CONF.IX/9.* Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g22/617/94/pdf/g2261794.pdf> (accessed 05.05.2024).
7. *Выступление заместителя руководителя российской делегации К.В. Воронцова в ходе тематической дискуссии по теме “Другие виды ОМУ” в Первом комитете 78-й сессии ГА ООН.* Официальный сайт Постоянного представительства Российской Федерации при ООН, 18.10.2023.  
*Statement by Konstantin Vorontsov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, at the Thematic Debate on “Other WMDs” in the First Committee of the 78th Session of the UNGA.* Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 18.10.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://russiaun.ru/ru/news/5181023> (accessed 05.05.2024).
8. *Select Committee Unveils Report on Illegal PRC-Tied Biolab in Reedley, CA with McCarthy and Costa.* The Select Committee on the CCP, 16.11.2023. Available at: <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/select-committee-unveils-report-illegal-prc-tied-biolab-reedley-ca-mccarthy> (accessed 15.05.2024).
9. *An Accidental Discovery in Rural California Raised Biosecurity Fears. The Economist, 23.11.2023.* Available at: <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2023/11/23/an-accidental-discovery-in-rural-california-raised-biosecurity-fears> (accessed 15.05.2024).
10. *Webinar: IPSN Catalytic Grant Fund.* The United Nations Foundation, 05.03.2024. Available at: <https://unfoundation.org/event/webinar-ipsn-catalytic-grant-fund/> (accessed 15.04.2024).
11. *Who We Are.* The United Nations Foundation, 2024. Available at: <https://unfoundation.org/who-we-are/> (accessed 15.04.2024).
12. *The Rockefeller Foundation and World Health Organization Announce Partnership to Expand Global Pandemic Preparedness in Era of Climate Change.* The Rockefeller Foundation, 23.05.2023. Available at: <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/the-rockefeller-foundation-and-world-health-organization-announce-partnership-to-expand-global-pandemic-preparedness-in-era-of-climate-change/> (accessed 15.04.2024).
13. *IANPHI Strategy 2021–2025.* The International Association of National Public Health Institutes, 2021. Available at: [https://www.ianphi.org/\\_includes/documents/sections/tools-resources/ianphi-strategy-2021-2025.pdf](https://www.ianphi.org/_includes/documents/sections/tools-resources/ianphi-strategy-2021-2025.pdf) (accessed 15.04.2024).
14. *International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS).* NTI, 2024. Available at: <https://www.nti.org/about/programs-projects/project/international-biosafety-and-biosecurity-initiative-for-science-ibbis/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
15. *Nuclear Threat Initiative – Biosecurity Program Support.* Open Philanthropy. <https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/nuclear-threat-initiative-biosecurity-program-support/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
16. *МО РФ: деятельность США в области биоконтроля сопровождается подменой положений КБТО. ТАСС, 09.10.2023.*  
Ministry of Defense of Russia: The Activities of the United States in the Field of Biocontrol Are Accompanied by a Substitution of the Provisions of the BWC. *TASS*, 09.10.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/18948493> (accessed 15.05.2024).
17. *Итоговый доклад парламентской комиссии по расследованию обстоятельств, связанных с созданием американскими специалистами биологических лабораторий на территории Украины.* Москва, 2023.  
*The Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission to Investigate the Circumstances Related to the Establishment of Biological Laboratories by American Specialists on the Territory of Ukraine.* Moscow, 2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://www.pnp.ru/upload/user/2023/04/12/biolab-ukraine.pdf> (accessed 15.05.2024).
18. *Выступление главы делегации Российской Федерации на консультативном совещании государств – участников Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия (КБТО) по статье V КБТО.* Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 08.09.2022.

- Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Consultative Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) under BTWC Article V.* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 08.09.2022. (In Russ.) Available at: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/international\\_safety/disarmament/drugie\\_vidy\\_omu/biologicheskoe\\_i\\_toksinnoe\\_oruzhie/1829041/](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/drugie_vidy_omu/biologicheskoe_i_toksinnoe_oruzhie/1829041/) (accessed 15.05.2024).
19. *В Санкт-Петербурге состоялось 1е заседание Координационного совета государств – членов ОДКБ по вопросам биологической безопасности.* Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, 15.12.2022.  
*The First Meeting of the Coordinating Council of the CSTO Member States on Biosecurity Was Held in St. Petersburg.* Collective Security Treaty Organization, 15.12.2022. (In Russ.) Available at: [https://odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/v-sankt-peterburge-sostoyalos-1-e-zasedanie-koordinatsionnogo-soveta-gosudarstv-chlenov-odkb-po-vopr/#loaded](https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/v-sankt-peterburge-sostoyalos-1-e-zasedanie-koordinatsionnogo-soveta-gosudarstv-chlenov-odkb-po-vopr/#loaded) (accessed 15.05.2024).
20. *В Минске состоялось заседание Координационного совета уполномоченных органов государств – членов ОДКБ по вопросам биологической безопасности.* Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, 14.07.2023.  
*A Meeting of the Coordinating Council of the National Authorities of the CSTO Member States on Biosecurity Was Held in Minsk.* Collective Security Treaty Organization, 14.07.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: [https://odkb-csto.org/news/news\\_odkb/v-minske-sostoyalos-zasedanie-koordinatsionnogo-soveta-upolnomochennykh-organov-gosudarstv-chlenov-o/#loaded](https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/v-minske-sostoyalos-zasedanie-koordinatsionnogo-soveta-upolnomochennykh-organov-gosudarstv-chlenov-o/#loaded) (accessed 15.05.2024).
21. *О заседании Координационного совета уполномоченных органов государств – членов ОДКБ по вопросам биологической безопасности.* Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 11.12.2023.  
*On the Meeting of the Coordinating Council of the National Authorities of the CSTO Member States on Biosecurity.* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 11.12.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1920158/](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1920158/) (accessed 15.05.2024).
22. *На учениях ОДКБ сводное формирование РХБ защиты и медицинского обеспечения локализовало очаг инфекционного заражения.* Объединенный штаб Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, 06.10.2022.  
*During the CSTO Exercise, the Combined Forces of CBRN Protection and Medical Support Teams Worked together to Prevent the Spread of an Infectious Disease.* Joint Headquarters of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 06.10.2022. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://www.jscsto.org/news/9723/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
23. *Об основных итогах совместного оперативно-стратегического учения “Боевое братство2023” и деятельности по совершенствованию военной составляющей Организации.* Объединенный штаб Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, 16.11.2023.  
*On the Main Results of the Joint Exercise “Combat Brotherhood2023” and Activities to Improve the Military Component of the Organization.* Joint Headquarters of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 16.11.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://www.jscsto.org/news/11628/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
24. *Рекомендации по законодательному обеспечению биологической безопасности государств – членов ОДКБ.* Парламентская Ассамблея Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, 19.12.2023.  
*Recommendations on Improving the Legislative Framework for Biosecurity of the CSTO Member States.* The Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 19.12.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://paodkb.org/documents/rekomendatsii-po-zakonodatelnomu-obespecheniyu-biologicheskoy-bezopasnosti-gosudarstv> (accessed 15.05.2024).
25. *Conference on Kazakhstan’s Initiative of an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS). 12 April 2022. Summary of Discussions Submitted by Kazakhstan. BWC/CONF.IX/WP.4.* Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g22/577/22/pdf/g2257722.pdf> (accessed 15.05.2024).
26. *Президент России В.В. Путин провел в режиме видеоконференции оперативное совещание с постоянными членами Совета Безопасности.* Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации, 22.12.2023.  
*Russian President V. Putin Has Held Briefing Session with Permanent Members of the Security Council in a Video Conference Mode.* Security Council of the Russian Federation, 22.12.2023. (In Russ.) Available at: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/3622/> (accessed 15.05.2024).
27. *Россия предложила обсудить в СНГ усиление региональной биобезопасности.* ТАСС, 23.01.2024.  
*Russia Proposed to Discuss Strengthening Regional Biosecurity in the CIS.* TASS, 23.01.2024. (In Russ.) Available at: <https://tass.ru/politika/19792215> (accessed 15.05.2024).