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**(Prospects for New Security Architecture,
Nuclear Reductions, CFE Treaty)**

Foreword

**By Academician Alexander A. Dynkin at the Conference
"The Future of NATO-Russia Relations"**

**Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin,
Sergey Oznobishchev and Alexander Pikaev**

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The authors, administrative and technical staff of this volume and of the IMEMO-NTI joint project, as well as the whole IMEMO research community hereby express their deepest regrets with regards to the untimely passing of their colleague and friend Alexander Pikaev and convey sincere condolences to his family.

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FOREWORD

**by Academician Alexander A. Dynkin, Director, Institute of
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the
Russian Academy of Sciences**

Esteemed participants in the Conference,

I would like to thank everyone who was able to join our today's discussion of the very important issues on our agenda. This is the second of this year's four meetings under the general topic "Russia and Deep Nuclear Disarmament" organized under the joint project of IMEMO and the US Nuclear Threat Initiative. It is necessary to stress the topicality of the project and note Senator Sam Nunn's and Mr. Ted Turner's personal commitment to it.

Today there will be discussed the security issues of Russia-NATO relations inasmuch as they influence the prospects for further nuclear disarmament. Unlike at our first meeting in March 2010, we can now speak about the further progress of this process, since between our two conferences, Russia and the US signed a new START Treaty in Prague (Czech Republic) on April 8.

This is obviously an almost historic event both in terms of unprecedentedly low levels set forth for the strategic weapons of the parties and in terms of the two powers' resuming the legal cooperation in this area that was suspended, due to known reasons, for more than a decade. Without the new START in Prague, the meeting of the leaders of 47 countries in Washington on nuclear security issues could not be successful.

The process of the Treaty ratification by the US and Russian Parliaments is still ahead. It is common knowledge that in the two countries there is a strong opposition to the Treaty and to the general strengthening of the security cooperation between the two states. It is therefore very important that the forthcoming heated debate, firstly, end with the Treaty entering into force and, secondly, contribute to the improvement – not to the aggravation – of political relations between the parties. Thirdly, it is also essential that there is a smoother rather than a tougher transition to the next stage of nuclear disarmament.

The recent history vividly demonstrates that the processes related to negotiations and agreements on nuclear disarmament between Russia and the US should be continuous and consistent. The experience of the

recent years has shown that deadlocks and standstills in the negotiations inevitably lead to the loss of mutual understanding and confidence between the great powers and breed mutual suspicions. In addition, they jeopardize strategic stability and undermine cooperation aimed at addressing new security threats of the 21st century.

A continuous dialogue on the regulation of the most destructive arsenals and destruction potentials (which even at this point are 150,000 times higher than the Hiroshima bomb) in the world history is one of the pillars of security for Russia, the US, their allies and international security at large.

The NATO-Russia relations will play a key role in the context of future steps towards nuclear disarmament. This is what renders the topic of this academic convention especially important.

Firstly, the future of further negotiations will depend on cooperation or lack of such cooperation on missile defense. This refers to the US and NATO plans to develop missile defense in Europe, the discussion of this issue by the US and Russia, as well as a dialogue on missile defense in the NATO-Russia Council.

Further nuclear disarmament efforts cannot continue to be bilateral. Third nuclear powers – of which the major two are situated in Europe – are also to be involved in the process in one form or another.

In addition, a point will be raised concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons that are also mostly located in Europe. In its turn, this issue is connected with conventional armed forces and arms limitation on the continent and the agreements related to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), which are currently "on hold".

Finally, all these scenarios may not be examined outside the general context of pan-European security with its current gaps and future prospects, including pertinent Russia's proposals.

The abovementioned issues have been discussed by many scientific and public forums and publications. However, neither the Russian standpoint in this area nor the attitude of Western experts and politicians to Russia's priorities and interests have been articulated clearly enough.

This is exactly why our today's meeting is of great importance and relevance. Both the profile of this project and high professionalism of the participants make us hope that our discussion will include an in-depth analysis of a whole range of problems and will result in novel conclusions and proposals of practical value. We may positively expect that this discussion will help us contribute to mutual understanding and practical cooperation of the parties on these complicated issues.

Let me wish you every success!

SUMMARY

Despite the frequently declared focus on partnership, the NATO-Russia relations have not yet reached a conflict-free and constructive level. Within the past two decades, the actual sharpness of the differences and discrepancies between the parties has not decreased; in fact, at times it has risen quite drastically. Despite the fact that none of successive Russia's presidents has ruled out the possibility of Russia's accession to NATO, the West invariably disregarded these messages.

Although there is quite a number of institutions and decisions to promote European security, the task of its enhancement certainly remains relevant. It is obvious that some elements of the existing European order are extremely fragile and inefficient.

Building a new European security architecture would help to address at least three tasks. The first one is to create a more favorable political environment in Europe and finally do away with the effects of the Cold War. Another one is to build close cooperation in the new areas of national and international security in Europe. The list of emerging security threats is long and growing. Addressing these threats requires complete mobilization of international cooperation resources. Finally, a number of contentious new issues need to be addressed (such as the peoples' right to self-determination, the current legal vacuum in Europe in relation to certain problems, etc.).

The signing of the new START Treaty by Russia and the US on April 8, 2010 in Prague marked the revival of the two powers' cooperation on legal instruments in nuclear arms reduction and opened the door to further nuclear disarmament measures in line with their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In the light of further nuclear arms reductions and limitations, it will be important that this process be extended to non-strategic (or pre-strategic) nuclear weapons. Most commonly these are considered to include operative-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons (which are usually referred to as TNWs).

Even defining the possible scope of future negotiations presents a number of difficulties. The major problem is the fact that TNWs employ

dual-use delivery vehicles. Neither Washington nor Moscow provide any specific official information on their non-strategic nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial estimates, the US currently has roughly 500 tactical nuclear weapons, including about 200 gravity bombs in Air Force storage facilities of five NATO countries in Europe. From Russia's perspective, the US forward-based tactical nuclear weapons in terms of their striking range are equal to strategic arms threat. France has 60 such weapons, however it qualifies them as strategic weapons.

Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons are hidden under an even thicker veil of secrecy, than those of the US. Most of the experts agree that Russia currently has around 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons.

With NATO expanding to the East, the past superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in general-purpose forces was replaced by a similar advantage of NATO over Russia and the CSTO countries. In this light it is evident that Russia perceives tactical nuclear weapons as an instrument of neutralizing NATO's superiority in general-purpose forces, especially in the context of the eastward expansion of the alliance.

Other nuclear powers keep the information on their strategic nuclear weapons in strict secrecy. According to expert estimates, the People's Republic of China has around 100 to 200 pieces of such weapons, Israel has roughly 60 to 100 pieces; Pakistan and India have about 60 and 50 pieces of strategic nuclear weapons respectively, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses 6 to 10 pieces. Given certain strategic and technical features of TNWs, the approaches of START treaties can hardly be used in respect of them; a fundamentally new solutions will be required in this sphere.

A possible integrated effort in the sphere of missile defense in US-Russia-NATO format may be a major step towards creating favorable conditions for maintaining strategic stability and further strategic weapons reductions. The crisis in the US-Russian relations caused by the prospect of missile defense deployed in Europe has receded following the decision by President Obama's Administration concerning a new missile defense architecture. However, there may be an even more drastic comeback of the crisis when the seaborne Standard SM-3 systems and their ground-based equivalents acquire strategic potential by 2020.

Meanwhile, technical capability of the US theatre missile defense to be deployed in Europe may prove insufficient to build effective interception potential. Joining efforts with Russia in this field may considerably increase the capabilities of such missile defense.

The route to deep nuclear disarmament is inapproachable without involving third nuclear states. In the modern world there are nine states possessing nuclear weapons. These include five who are official nuclear-

weapon states under the NPT. Those are Russia, the US, the United Kingdom, France and China. Besides, all the four non-NPT states also possess nuclear arsenals. Those are India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Although China and the four non-NPT states are located outside the Euro-Atlantic space, they influence the NATO-Russia relations through the multilateral nuclear balance. Russia and the US are asymmetrically positioned against third nuclear states. Russia's territory lies within the range of all the seven countries' delivery means, whereas the US is separated by the oceans and remains outside the range of the delivery means of the four non-NPT states. A shared concern for Russia and the US may be related with nuclear weapons build-up by China.

Involving these states in the process of strategic nuclear arms reduction and limitation will become an increasingly relevant objective. However, the incentives and mechanisms of such engagement still need to be developed.

As the amount of nuclear weapons – a universal equalizer of military capabilities – decreases, the importance of conventional weapons in terms of ensuring national security will grow. In the context of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, there is currently a perceived imbalance between the number of weapons of NATO and Russia which may increasingly influence the strategic stability and undermine the parties' political cooperation.

The lasting deadlock in this field, as well as continued reluctance of the Western partners to ratify the signed agreements on further reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe (the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) have aggravated the situation in this sphere. Against the backdrop of general deterioration of its relations with the West, it triggered Moscow's decision to declare a moratorium on the implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Thus, the "window of opportunity" to ratify the Treaty that existed for quite a long time, was not used. Moscow's performance in the withdrawal of military bases from Georgia and Moldova until 2007 was not regarded as satisfactory, while the Western community failed to exercise due political wisdom and reach a compromise to address certain negotiation issues, feasible as they were.

The recent attempts at the NATO level to "reset" the process of reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe have not been any success so far. For Russia, the situation is worsened by the negative attitude towards the Alliance (which many Russian politicians and experts perceive as a remnant of the Cold War era retaining its anti-Russian potential) as well as towards its policy of expansion and use of force. From

the NATO's perspective, Moscow's recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and deploying military bases in their territories is unacceptable.

The suspended CFE Treaty process and Russia's moratorium on the implementation of the Treaty obstruct arms control and confidence building. The importance of stability and confidence as to conventional weapons will increase as the parties move towards lower ceilings for nuclear weapons.

It seems reasonable to proceed from Russia's proposal which envisages provisional implementation of the Agreement on Adaptation. As for flank limits, besides their complete abolition, there may be another promising option of increasing these sub-ceilings while providing greater transparency on the part of Russia.

The newly-gained sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is also an obstacle for resuming the CFE Treaty process. However, with regard to the CFE Treaty one cannot fully rule out the possibility of technical solution implying "factoring out" the issue of Russian bases in the territories of the two young republics from the arrangement and adopting a separate document governing the status of the bases.

It appears that some legal arrangements, such as agreed statements and unilateral understandings may be used to resolve these issues. In this case, to facilitate the revitalization of the CFE Treaty, the Western states could, for instance, declare – in the form of a unilateral statement – that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states is unacceptable. Russia would declare its position on the status of these two republics.

Restoring the transparency regime throughout the entire area of application of the CFE Treaty could be the first step towards resuming the CFE Treaty process. Further headway in this field will be achieved against the backdrop of general progress in arms reduction and arms control, improvement of cooperation and building confidence in key areas, such as opening the negotiations on TNWs and facilitating progress in creating a joint missile defense system.

The success and effectiveness in resolving the issues examined in this paper primarily depends on the level of the US-Russian relations. Maintaining effective bilateral interaction between Moscow and Washington is still the key factor for furthering constructive NATO-Russia cooperation and successfully resolving the problems related to bilateral as well as multilateral security in the Euro-Atlantic space and beyond.

1. PROLOGUE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION

Russia and the West in post-Cold War times. The end of the Cold War ended confrontation between Russia and the West. However, this opportunity was not used to the full extent. The end of the first decade of 21st century saw yet another downslide in Russia's relations with the US and the West at large in many respects, and foremost in the sphere of security.

One of the important reasons for the said developments was Russia's new course towards changing the "rules of the game" in terms of its relations with the West as of the 1990s, as well as the reluctance of the West – mainly the US – to accept this proposition.

The 1990s' paradigm of relations, with Moscow moving in the wake of the US political line, its interests invariably disregarded and its opinion nearly always ignored, by the beginning of the current decade had become unacceptable for all Russia's political parties and state institutions. "Never again!" is the unifying motto of all with regard to their approach to the country's foreign policy.

Russian ambition to recover its great power position in the world was often seen by the US and other Western states as an abnormality, a manifestation of the "old-line antagonism towards the West and its values". It was considered a backslide into imperial designs and a Cold War mentality or – at best – as Moscow's misjudgment of global processes and its own interests. Only big failures of its own policy, economic crisis and a change of administration caused Washington to start reviewing such a perception in the last two years.

Recently, the self-assuredness and national pride of Russia's young political elite has risen perhaps even more than could be expected in the context of the nation's actual economic, social and defense achievements. Hence, in the sharp contrast to the 1990s, the increased diplomatic activity of Moscow on every continent, as well as its reluctance to blindly take the cue from the US in dealing with regional crises (such as in Kosovo, Palestine, Iran and the DPRK), as well as forging or restoring relations with countries tossing a political challenge to the US domination. Besides, Russia has been increasingly active within interstate organizations that are independent from the US, NATO and the European Union (such as CSTO, EurAsEC and SCO).

In addition to competition in arms trade, Russia no longer hesitated to openly counteract the United States in certain military areas (its reaction to the deployment of missile defense) and to vie in dismantling disarmament agreements (the CFE Treaty and the INF Treaty). In August 2008, for the first time in many years, Moscow resorted to the use of military force outside its borders - in the South Caucasus.

Another reason of the frictions stemmed from the consequences of the Western (primarily the US) policy during the last fifteen years. When the times of bipolarity and the Cold War were over, Washington was offered a unique historic opportunity to establish in the international politics the rule of law and the leading role of legitimate international institutions (first of all, the UN and the OSCE), the primacy of diplomacy as a means of conflict resolution, exclusive selectivity and justifiability of the use of force only in self-defense or with the purposes of ensuring peace and security (in line with Articles 51 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations). Early in the 1990s, the US got a singular opportunity to lead in building a new multilateral world order in alliance with other centers of power – an opportunity they so ingloriously missed.

After an unexpected collapse of Communism there emerged in Washington a new and exciting sensation of remaining the only superpower in the world. Filled with euphoria, the US increasingly tended to substitute the force of international law with the law of force. The legitimate decisions of the UN Security Council were replaced by directives of the National Security Council, and the OSCE prerogatives – by NATO activity. The 1999 military operation against Yugoslavia was the most vivid and dramatic manifestation of such policy. After the change of administration in 2001 and the enormous shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this policy was exalted to an absolute dogma. The US invaded Iraq (under a far-fetched pretext and without a sanction from the UN), aiming to eventually "re-format" all of the Greater Middle East – a source of oil, gas and Islamic extremism - to suit its military and political interests (replaying "the great reformation" of the Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980's and early 1990's).

With regards to Russia during the 1990s, instead of interfering in Russia's internal affairs, the US and NATO should have encouraged its own way of reforming through ensuring a maximum favorable security environment and offering possibilities of its deep integration in the Western military and political as well as economic international institutions. During the said transition period, Russia's foreign policy was characterized not as much by its relations with the surrounding states than by choosing a model for its own economic and political development.

However, the West got it back to front: in addition to interfering with Russia's domestic affairs when the country was going through a profound internal crisis, the West was in a hurry to make the best use out of Russia's weakness in foreign policy and in the military sphere and nab as many advantages as possible, before the country started to advance its national interests. Furthermore, Russia was treated as the country that had lost the Cold War. This drew the indignation of the major part of Russia's new political class who assumed that the country had won the Cold War, defeating Communism, liberating Central and Eastern European satellite nations and obtaining Russia's own national identity, statehood and sovereignty.

The Western strategy was reflected in NATO's eastward expansion, in the unilateral actions of the Alliance in the conflicts in Yugoslavia with the resulting massive air-missile strikes on Serbia and large-scale exodus of Serbs from Kosovo. All this was done in defiance of Moscow's protests which were never taken seriously in any of the Western capitals.

A change of administration in 2000 resulted in an even tougher policy towards Russia. In this context, the mutual sympathy developed by the two Presidents at the Ljubljana Summit in 2001 could hardly smooth things over. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Vladimir Putin made a major step towards the US. In spite of the negative attitude among the majority of the political elite, the Kremlin offered full unconditional support to the forming of the antiterrorist coalition, providing arms to Northern Alliance (composed of units of ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of Afghanistan) and facilitating a successful anti-Taliban military operation in Afghanistan (with minimal NATO casualties in ground combat).

All Russia got in return was the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (simultaneous signing of the Moscow SORT Treaty in 2002 could not repair the damage), the 2003 war in Iraq (involving the cancellation of Russia's major oil concessions in the country), as well as a new step in NATO's expansion to the East, including the former USSR territory – the Baltic states. In addition, Russia's potential admission to the World Trade Organization was subject to hairsplitting bargaining of the Republican Administration, while the Congress irrationally clung to the moss-grown Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 (on economic sanctions for restricting emigration from the USSR).

Furthermore, the Western policy toward Russia distinctly smacked of rejection. Moscow was repeatedly given to understand that its full-scale integration to the Western military-political and economic organizations was out of the question even in the longer term.

It is hardly surprising that by 2004-2005 Russia eventually abandoned all hopes for a fairly swift and onward process of its integration with the West based on equal rights, mutual benefit and respect of each other's interests. Therefore, it started to look for more interested and less choosy partners in the South and in the East.

The last straw was the active involvement of the West in the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004-2005 with a view to support the most anti-Russian political groups (hence the suspicion appeared that the 2006 events in Kyrgyzstan were in line with a similar scenario). In addition, the plans on the accelerated admission of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO were revealed; then there emerged the project to build the US strategic missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic – in defiance of the spirit of the Joint Declaration on a New Relationship Between the US and Russia of May 24, 2002 and contrary to the negotiations in the NATO-Russia Council on the development of a common theater BMD (TMD).

Vladimir Putin's address at the Munich Conference in 2007 was a message to the West that Russia would no longer play by the old rules or beg for a more advanced cooperation, if the West was not truly interested. However, it took an armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 to make the Western world realize that Russia is talking seriously and is ready to support its statements with actions. The relations with Russia got to the brink of a military standoff in the Black Sea accompanied by political tensions unheard of since the Cold War.

Decline of NATO-Russia relations. Dramatic geopolitical changes in Europe resulted in a sweeping reorganization of the entire European security architecture. The Warsaw Pact broke up and its former members joined the North Atlantic Alliance. The mere fact of NATO's continuing as a military alliance against a common external foe (Article V) was now the major issues Russian politicians and experts held against the West. To make things worse, NATO's policy of expansion dating back to the 1990s had been a constant negative background undermining opportunities for meaningful cooperation.

In Russia, this policy was universally perceived as a breach of commitments previously undertaken at the highest level. Andrei Grachev, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the USSR Communist Party's Central Committee and a close associate of Mikhail Gorbachev later recalled that two months after meeting with Gorbachev in Malta (December 1989), the US Secretary of State James Baker said: "if the future Germany joins NATO, there would be no extension of NATO one inch to the East". When the Alliance actually proceeded with its

expansion that Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin warned the West of a possibility of ensuing "Cold Peace".

During the years that followed, the politicians and experts had more than one chance to recall this warning in light of recurring serious deterioration of NATO-Russia relations. Against the backdrop of NATO's sweeping expansion, Moscow once and again tried to obtain guarantees of ensuring its security interests as well as to gain a status equal to that of NATO in terms of pan-European policy-making.

Some step on this way was the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997. In particular, it included the following agreed language related to nuclear weapons: "The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so." In addition, it stated that NATO "has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities"¹.

However, this statement was linked to a specific time and situation. It did not imply legally binding verifiable commitment and could be changed if NATO decided to revise its "plan and reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members". This had actually happened with respect of alliance expansion to the East and this was how this statement was perceived by the majority of Russian political and expert community.

In 1997, the limitations on conventional forces were outlined in much the same terms. NATO leadership affirmed that "the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces"².

One of the most grievous episodes in the Russia-NATO relations was the Alliance's military action against Yugoslavia in 1999, which was commenced outside of international law and in straight defiance of the 1997 Founding Act. After the bombing of Yugoslavia, the attitude of the Russian political class towards NATO drastically changed to "totally negative". In contrast to common Western perceptions this had nothing to do with the legacy of the Cold War. Rather it was the fruit of Russia's

¹ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France on May 27, 1997, page 7. (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm).

² Ibid.

experience of post-Cold War relationship with NATO, which was a great disappointment after the wide-spread sympathies, hopes and expectations of the early 1990's.

The last attempt to substantially improve relations was taken in 2002 at the meeting of heads of governments of the Russian Federation and the NATO member-states. The meeting resulted in signing a declaration titled "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality". The declaration stated that within the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which came to replace the Joint Permanent Council after the latter fell short of the expectations, "NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest". However, despite the activities of 16 working groups of NRC it produced, with few exceptions (like joint computer TMD exercises), no more than lengthy talk shops on various issues. This explains the ease with which the bilateral cooperation was yet again suspended during the Caucasus crisis of August 2008 – exactly at the time when allegedly the NRC should have played the key role in crisis management and conflict resolution. Fortunately this role, for lack of anything better, was quite effectively performed on an *ad hoc* basis by the then leadership of the European Union, which helped to avoid escalation and end combat actions.

Another issue which entwined itself into the steadily negative context of bilateral relations was the US missile defense program which – according to many Russian military, politicians and academics – could weaken the country's nuclear deterrence capability. The new missile defense architecture proposed by Barack Obama's Administration has diffused the crisis. However, if there is no focused action on the joint development of a missile defense, another "missile defense crisis" in the relations between Russia and the US/NATO may be only a matter of time.

A last straw in the decline of Russia-NATO practical cooperation (apart from airy declarations) was the preparation for the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO. It dealt a final blow to the bilateral relations between Moscow and Brussels during the period of two decades after the end of the Cold War and, according to many experts, eventually provoked the tragic climax – the Georgian conflict of August 2008.

The then Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Yuri Baluevsky voiced the sentiments shared by the major part of the Russian military and political elite. On April 12, 2008 he said that in case of the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO "Russia will take actions to ensure its interests along its borders" including "military measures" and

"measures of other kinds"³. No doubt, the armed clash was directly provoked by the adventurist attempt of Georgian leadership to resolve by force its separatist problems in South Ossetia and ensuing mass slaughter of local civilians and Russian peacekeepers. Still, the immediate background to both the action of Georgian army and Russian readiness to respond by massive use of force – was the preceding policy of NATO expansion plan for the post-Soviet space. In Moscow, there is still a strong conviction that Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili would have never taken the liberty to unleash military actions without tacit (or perceived) support from the US and NATO.

Currently, there have been signals from Brussels that for the time being the issue of admitting Ukraine (whose current domestic politics clearly discourages such a decision) and Georgia to NATO is dismissed from the agenda. However, many Russian politicians and experts, including pro-Western liberals, would like to obtain more dependable guarantees in this respect, which could visibly add stability to the Russia-NATO relations.

The tragic conflict of August 2008 not only suspended NATO-Russia relations; it actually set them far back towards the times of the Cold War. To this date, Moscow and Brussels have diametrically opposed views on some factual and all legal aspects of the conflict.

In the opinion of John Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the military operation in South Ossetia "overturned a basic assumption made by NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union — that no countries were under threat of invasion in Europe or Eurasia". He expressed the conviction that among other things, Russia was "determined to see Euro-Atlantic security institutions weakened"⁴ in pursuit of its anti-NATO policy. The danger of the Georgian conflict also was in the possibility of a direct military conflict between the armed forces of Russia and NATO either by accident or provocation by Georgian authorities or separatists (for example when the US warships demonstratively entered the Black Sea under pretext of delivering humanitarian aid to Georgian harbors).

³ Соловьев В. Штабы перерабатывают планы применения войск (ОДКБ поддержал Москву против вступления Киева и Тбилиси в Североатлантический союз) // Независимое военное обозрение. 18.02.2008.

(Solovyev Vadim "The Headquarters Review Plans of Using Troops" (CSTO Supported Moscow Against the Ascention of Kiev and Tbilisi to the North Atlantic Alliance), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February, 18, 2008)

⁴ NATO's Supreme Allied Commander: Russia Undermines the Influence of the US (Russian text is available at http://www.infox.ru/authority/foreign/2009/03/25/Glavkom_NATO__Rossiy.phtml).

The outcome of the conflict was the appearance of two new sovereign states – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – which are currently recognized by very few countries. As to the legitimacy of their self-determination, there was no agreement or understanding between Russia and NATO, despite the obvious analogy to the Kosovo precedent.

In Russia there is no doubt that the process of claiming sovereignty by the two ethnic minorities was greatly encouraged by the provision of sovereignty to Kosovo spurred and sponsored by the majority of Western governments in all their institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). At the bottom of this issue laid a "sincere misapprehension" of the authors of the Kosovo sovereignty, who presumed that it was a unique case and could not be used as a legal precedent. It turned out that truth was on the side of the government and overwhelming majority of Russia's politicians and experts who had warned against the negative political and legal implications of such a step, in particular for post-Soviet separatist problems.

These developments were predicted by Russian experts, who specified the region where the blood-spilling conflict would later unravel, noting that "those who want to see the precedent in Kosovo will see it anyway. And they will interpret its self-determination in the appropriate manner... Those who use this case for their own political ends will not be persuaded by analysts... One should have thought out the implications of such step, ramifications for the Balkans or for the South Caucasus"⁵.

Despite repeatedly declared partnership between NATO and Russia, the actual severity of contradictions has not decreased throughout the post-Cold War history of relations in proportion to the political rhetoric. In fact, over the years of the faked pretended partnership, the parties have developed rules of "political correctness" which implied that at a high political level and official meetings of Brussels and Moscow, they shall avoid open criticism of each other. On the contrary, during "in-house" meetings and discussions in Moscow the Alliance has been not only criticized but also defined as constituting a direct threat to Russia's national security.

This is directly evidenced by Russia's recent Military Doctrine (2010), which places "the willingness to provide the NATO's power potential... with global functions in violation of the norms of international

⁵ Маркедонов С., Романенко С. Косово: прецедент или исключение?// Индекс безопасности. 2008. №1 (84) (<http://www.pircenter.org/index.php?id=2297>).

(Sergei Markedonov, Sergei Romanenko Kosovo: A Precedent or an Exception?// Indeks Bezopasnosti. 2008. #1 (84) (<http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/sieng2-08/Kosovo.pdf>).

law, to move the military infrastructure of NATO member-states closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including through enlargement of the Organization" at the top (sic) of the list of priority of external military dangers facing Russia. This statement as part of Russia's basic defense document must be a matter of concern for those in charge of Russian policy in NATO Headquarters. This state of affairs can be regarded as an obvious failure of the twenty years effort to establish relations of mutual trust and partnership between the Alliance and Moscow.

In public addresses before top-ranking Western officials, each successive President of Russia has transparently hinted at the possibility of Russia's accession to NATO. In June 2001, at a joint press conference following the first US-Russian summit Vladimir Putin reminded to George Bush that a year before when asked at a meeting: "Is it possible that Russia would some time join the NATO?" he (Putin) said "Why not?". He also remembered that former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who was "someplace on a trip to Europe" said about this possibility, "Well, this is not discussed for the time being."⁶

Addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in November 2008 (presided by Madeleine Albright as a moderator), President Dmitry Medvedev noted that while at that point the situation did not speak in favor of Russia's accession to NATO, "there's a good phrase: Never say never".⁷

However, the overwhelming majority of the Western leaders comfortably ignored these rather distinct messages. No doubt, Russian leaders were not so naive as to count on Russia's joining NATO in the nearest future. But for them the willingness of the leadership of the alliance to openly and impartially discuss this issue and sincerely allow for such development has been the key litmus test of NATO genuine attitude towards Russia. Instead of repeating that "the doors of NATO were open to any country", it would suffice for Washington and Brussels just to officially state: there is no generic obstacle for Russia joining NATO, provided that it accepts universal membership standards, and Moscow is welcome to start serious consultations on this subject.

Unfortunately, up to now it has been a wasted historical opportunity to drastically change the nature of relations between NATO

⁶ Joint News Conference June 16, by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. 16 June 2001, Ljubljana, Slovenia (<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/18/bush.putin.transcript>). The Russian transcript is available at <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/06/28562.shtml>.

⁷ Meeting with representatives of the Council on Foreign Relations. Washington, 16 November 2008 (The Russian text is available at http://www.president.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/16/0526_type63376type63377type82634_209249.shtml).

and Russia. In the order of priorities the reasons for this mismanagement have been:

- The treatment of Russia by the West as a loser in the Cold War and weak heir of the Soviet empire (which in due course generated anti-Western, pro-Soviet and neo-imperial moods in Russia).

- The desire of NATO to take advantage of Russia's weakness during the 1990's (which provoked revisionist trends in Moscow after 2000).

- The reluctance of NATO establishment to fundamentally restructure its nature as a military alliance against common foe (which channeled its activities to geopolitical expansion and out-of-area offensive use of force with disregard to the UN Charter – and provoked Russian hostile reaction).

- Moscow's course after 2000 on insuring its sovereignty and centralized rule by building an authoritarian political regime on the basis of carbon-export economy (which required a notion of immanent external threat as one of the instruments of consolidation).

- Russia's failures in implementing efficient military reforms under the rule of defense bureaucracy and incompetent state officials (which created a sense of growing inferiority and vulnerability to expanding and modernizing NATO).

The last two years have been marked by attempts of Russian leadership and advanced part of political elite to change national economy from raw material export model to innovative high-tech system. Accordingly, there has emerged a more constructive attitude to cooperation with the West in economic, technological, political and security areas, recently labeled "Partnership for Modernization". The prospects for the new post-post-Cold War relations depend on the ability of both sides to learn the negative lessons of the past twenty years and to persistently strive for genuine resolution of (not papering over) the problems and controversies of NATO-Russia relations in Europe and elsewhere.

2. EUROPEAN SECURITY: SEARCHING FOR A NEW ARCHITECTURE

Despite the abundance of institutions and declarations dedicated to European security, the task of its refurbishment and overhaul certainly remains a relevant one. It is obvious that some elements of the existing European order are extremely fragile and inefficient.

New Russian proposals. In June 2008 President Medvedev appealed for a new European security architecture. At the core of his initiative was the proposal to work out and sign a European Security Treaty (EST). In November 2009 Russia submitted a draft of this document for discussion. So far, the draft has not provoked broad enthusiasm on the part of European political and expert community, yet it will probably draw greater attention over time.

One of its most disputable provisions is the proposed mechanism allowing a state-party to the Treaty to block those steps of multilateral institutions it considers threatening its security. This provision of the draft is perceived as reflecting candidly the intention to provide Russia with a veto power regarding NATO's actions (in particular, its expansion), and is deemed unacceptable by the West.

Other elements of Russia's proposal, such as the idea of establishing a new crisis or conflict prevention consultation pattern, might in principle appear more acceptable. Other provisions of the draft (indivisibility of security, renunciation to prepare an attack against other countries using the state's own territory or the territories of other states, assistance in ensuring security of any OSCE member state provided by any other member state) either are too amorphous and general, and thus non-binding, or can be used against Russia's own interests and activities, for example, in the post-Soviet area.

Probably the added value of suggested draft is not obvious. However, the very fact of engaging in negotiations would not only recognize Russia's good intentions, but also – and more importantly – would respond to the idea of involving Moscow in a more substantive way in European security affairs, instead of isolating and estranging it, as was happening during the last twenty years .

Nonetheless, it would be short-sighted to confine the new European security architecture to signing a new (even a comprehensive)

treaty. The tasks in this sphere are so immense, that it would be unreal to address them with a sole instrument. In fact, reforming the European security architecture implies much more than the elaboration and signing of a treaty.

Imperatives for re-engagement of Russia. The end of the Cold War dismissed only part of European security agenda – the one related to the traditional East-West confrontation. Other items of this agenda persisted or emerged, consecutively or simultaneously, in various contexts, such as the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, Moscow's military and political retreat from the centre of the continent, the dramatic disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the destabilisation in the Balkans in general.

Resulting from controversial, sometimes dramatic developments, certain elements of the existing situation in Europe are regarded by Russian and some other European nations as suspicious or unjust, externally imposed and discriminating, generating security risks and promoting new dividing lines.

Indeed, there are new members in NATO and the EU, new relations between these two structures and non-members, a new political landscape in the former Yugoslav territory, new transnational patterns of energy resources supply, new (and ongoing) re-alignment within the post-Soviet geopolitical space. Besides, there exist new secessionist entities of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose international future remains uncertain due to their selective recognition by other states. Many other conflicts are still unresolved and might erupt in violence (Transdnestria, Karabakh, Cyprus, separatism in a number of states). There are new threats and dangers of the XXI century (illegal migration, Islamic extremism etc.). In fact, a totally new international and domestic environment has emerged in Europe, as compared to that of the outset of the post-Cold War era.

Some of these new realities have questionable political or legal genesis and could easily bring about international controversy, as there are appeals to restore the *status quo ante*. The very possibility of such appeals could constitute a security challenge. As a preventive response thereto, political legitimization of the new situation is needed, that is, its *de facto* recognition by all international actors involved.

The principle of legitimization is the core of European security. It could have various sources, including an important multilateral forum which would serve international stability. The legitimization of new realities within a broader package of agreements was tested as far back as in the 1970s. At that time, the Helsinki process "blessed" the European borders that emerged after the Second World War, as well as the new political setting across the continent (East-West-neutral states) in

conjunction with the solution of economic and humanitarian problems. That experience could very well be used in the current situation.

Three major tasks. More specifically, engaging in building a "new European security architecture" could be useful for addressing at least three tasks.

The first one is to create a political atmosphere in Europe in general which would be more conducive to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in traditional security-related areas in which, for various reasons, there has been no satisfactory progress.

The second one is to promote cooperation in new areas that are increasingly important as national and international security factors in Europe.

Finally, the third one is to address a number of contentious issues (i.e. nations' right to self-determination as opposed to territorial integrity, state sovereignty and humanitarian interventions, the right to choose alliances and the right to have secure neighborhood). They may be a subject of conflicting interpretations and approaches. These, as recent developments have shown, may very easily and quickly escalate from theoretical collisions to political tensions and subsequently to violent confrontations. Europe needs mechanisms that would effectively reduce the possibility of such scenarios.

Strengthening traditional security. Dealing with new security environment would be impossible if traditional military problems ("hard security") are just ignored. Such problems are of particular importance to Russia, which has become vulnerable and inferior to NATO twenty years after the end of the Cold War. Removing Moscow's "hard security" concerns is necessary for engaging Russia in constructive cooperation on the new security agenda.

It is possible to promote a more stable traditional security regardless of any "grand design" for an overall political architecture. This was proved by the US decision in 2009 to renounce the deployments of the ballistic missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yet this case has also shown once again how fragile the current situation is and how quickly old concerns and behavioral instincts in security sphere can reappear. To remove such concerns, an approach is needed, which would aim at establishing a most deep cooperation in developing a joint missile defense providing protection for the whole Europe, with the tripartite partnership of the US, Russia and NATO (and/or the EU).

Among the items on "traditional" agenda, special attention should be paid to arms control in Europe, in which there has been a stalemate of over a decade. Moreover, this sphere that once gave impetus to strengthening stability on the continent is currently in a state of

disintegration. Upgrading the European security architecture is impossible without serious steps towards changing the current situation.

First of all, Western countries' renunciation to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty and its suspension by Russia have created a legal vacuum in Europe by eliminating the key element of the system for prevention of military and political confrontation. It would not be easy to break the deadlock, yet this still appears possible. The key elements should include re-establishing the regime of transparency and control measures provided for by the CFE Treaty, extending the regime (even without setting agreed quotas for military equipment) to countries outside the area of application of the CFE Treaty (including the Baltic states), starting negotiations on a new treaty which would include a wider range of participants and provide for deeper armed forces reductions and greater transparency.

Eventually traditional arms control should be replaced by projects of integration of ballistic missile defense, air defense, and joint rapid deployment contingent for peacekeeping operations, peace-enforcement, counter-proliferation and suppressing terrorism. However it would be unrealistic to try to short-circuit to such endeavors by-passing existing traditional security concerns and mutual suspicions.

Among such traditional areas one deserves special attention. In Europe, there already exists a unique set of comprehensive military restraint, confidence- and security-building measures, which have been agreed upon or unilaterally adopted and implemented for over thirty years. Those include annual exchange of military information, risk reduction measures, military-to-military contacts, prior notification and observation of military exercises and other military activities, constraining provisions, on-site inspections etc. It would be extremely useful to consolidate and upgrade this segment of the European security architecture by further building confidence of states with respect to military security.

Conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution are yet another broad area where joint efforts of the European countries are needed both in Europe and in other regions. Such joint efforts may become a source of controversy among the countries, but their effect in terms of strengthening common security is considerably more important than possible risks.

Dealing with new security challenges. The list of "new" security threats is long and grows over time. Those are usually considered to include illicit drugs trafficking, terrorism, environmental challenges, climate change, bio-security, emergency situations, humanitarian crises; cross-border crime, cyber-terrorism/subversive operations, corruption, illegal migration, sea piracy and others threats are added.

Often, national and international experience in countering these challenges is quite limited as compared to the traditional military threats to

security. Yet, it is widely recognized that full mobilization of the resources of international cooperation is required to counter them, in some cases by employing the existing multilateral institutions, in other cases by creating special institutions.

The format of cooperation on the new threats may certainly be affected by disagreements on the issues of traditional policy, military security, economic and energy interdependence, etc. Yet the very urgency of dealing with unconventional security threats requires joint efforts that would not fall hostage to the state of traditional problems, but would proceed in parallel to the removal of "hard security" concerns and capitalize on enhanced mutual trust and confidence. For example, the involvement of the Russian EMERCOM's fleet of amphibious firefighting aircrafts in joint efforts against wildfires in Europe allowed for broader cooperation than those initially envisioned by extending it to a permanent capacity to provide urgent humanitarian relief on a pan-European scale.

Addressing contentious issues. Many security-related controversies – and whether in Europe or beyond – are not a consequence of a lack of good will on the part of the parties involved, but are rather the result of objective complexity of issues. It would be over-ambitious and unrealistic to aim at resolving such issues in one stroke. Hence, it is important to hone the language of various political and legal formulae, but it is also vital to pay special conceptual attention to the issues that generate (or could in the future generate) most tension.

The collision between the right of nations to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states is a good example. The Helsinki security system of the 1970's has dealt with it by setting the rule of changing territorial borders only in peaceful way. But in practice these two equally respectable principles have remained irreconcilable and gave way to ethnic terrorism and ethnic cleansing, savage suppression of human rights and wars of external military interventions, which Europe witnessed more than once during the last two decades.

Another controversy is related to the means and limits of external influence on the internal development of states, as well as their right to resist such influence. The problem was highlighted in the context of the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, although similar examples can easily be found both within and outside the post-Soviet geopolitical space.

Differences in the interpretation of mutual responsibility of states regarding the use of natural resources and their transit across borders, threats of international political instability on ethnic and confessional grounds, conflicts provoked by separatism and irredentism and connected with demographic and migration processes are some other potential causes of serious destabilizing trends in Europe. All these issues require serious

analytical and conceptual work, rather than mere political talks. A parallel could be drawn with the work on the "Helsinki Decalogue" within the framework of the All-European Conference (1973-75). Yet today the abovementioned problems deserve much more thorough, structured and diversified analysis.

The dilemma of sovereignty and legitimate external intervention was the subject of heated debate in Europe in 1999 against the backdrop of the NATO military operation against Yugoslavia, which had no UN approval. The 2008 conflict in the Caucasus revived the debate. In this context, the re-organization of the Euro-Atlantic security space would require that at least three issues be addressed. First of all, it is necessary to define criteria for and rules of external intervention with the use of military force. Besides, militarily efficient methods of such actions should be developed in practice (interoperability, burden sharing, chain of command etc.). Finally, their application outside the region should be considered as joint trilateral operations (US-Russia-Europe).

Institutional landscape. Most institutions operating in the Euro-Atlantic area could contribute to consolidating security in various spheres and forms. Some of them could certainly do it more efficiently. It is widely acknowledged that the OSCE could serve as the main platform for discussing President Medvedev's initiative. According to this logic, the reform could lead to a more powerful OSCE, with its role and functions reviewed and adapted to the new realities, as its main outcome. Besides, there are ideas to revitalize the OSCE by expanding its powers in preventing and settling conflicts, including carrying out peacekeeping operations.

However, in recent twenty years it has become an established practice for the OSCE to focus on humanitarian issues, development of the democracy, human rights and the rights of national minorities. It will hardly be possible to drastically change this practice and bring the OSCE back to the issues of Euro-Atlantic security (as some kind of UN branch). With respect to this, the European Union could seriously claim a major role; its functions in organizing the Euro-Atlantic security space are very likely to be expanded. The EU role is crucial for forging security cooperation with Russia in Europe for dealing with new threats and for promoting trilateral interaction between the US/NATO and Russia outside the continent⁸.

⁸ For comprehensive elaboration of this concept see: Надежда Арбатова. Реконструируя европейскую безопасность. // Дипкурьер, приложение к Независимой Газете, 24 марта 2009.

(Nadezhda Arbatova. Restructuring European Security// Dipcourier, supplement to the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 24, 2009).

Russia's serious concern over the central role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic institutional structure has often pushed it to opt for promoting the role of other institutions. However, there may be an alternative logic, that is, the logic of promoting "special relationship" between NATO and Russia, eventually aimed at their strategic alliance (or even at Russia's joining NATO in the long run).

Restructuring the security space in the Euro-Atlantic area should not be viewed as a plan for brand-new construction to replace the existing multilateral organizations. The discussions on how to make these bodies more efficient are quite logic, yet it would be wrong to eliminate them and build a comprehensive substitute. Europe can boast the highest density of multilateral mechanisms in the world; the continent seems to be overburdened with them, yet the calls to merge them into something larger or to create new ones have little chance of being supported.

The prevailing approach in favor of maintaining *status quo* would hardly make any dramatic institutional reform in the Euro-Atlantic security space possible. However, some innovations may be helpful and promising. Thus, the general course towards increasing the efficiency of conflict prevention and conflict settlement may necessitate reforms of the existing mechanisms or establishing new ones within the OSCE, EU, NATO-EU-Russia framework or some other format.

Politics of shaping European security architecture. Institutions do matter in consolidating the European security, but the role of certain states' policy is more important and more ambiguous as well. Russia's return to the world political arena after many years of "low profile" may be helpful in re-balancing the international system that became excessively US-centric. However, Russia's ambitions and assertiveness, as well as its propensities to similar unilateral behavior, in their turn, are sometimes a matter of concern.

Russia sees a completely different picture: real problems result from the policy aimed to prevent Russia from becoming more independent, defending its own interests and occupying the place it deserves on the international arena. Such policy, both open and concealed cannot but affect Russia's stance on many issues of the European security agenda. The post-Soviet geopolitical space is the focal point of these efforts, opening ways for both the Western countries' alienation or rapprochement with Russia.

By and large, among the challenges facing Europe in organizing its security space, alleviating concerns of Russia and about Russia is the most

serious one. The minimum program would include reducing Russian-European mutual claims and misunderstanding in the security area. More ambitious tasks include involving Europe in solving the problems of post-Soviet space and Russia, and vice versa – thus building an integrated Europe on the basis of cooperation of all its nations in economic, political and security areas.

3. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The new START Treaty between the US and Russia marked the revival of legal cooperation of the two powers on nuclear arms reduction and cleared the path for further steps towards nuclear disarmament in line with the parties' obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In terms of further reductions and limitations of nuclear weapons, an important question will be the extension of this process to non-strategic (or pre-strategic nuclear weapons).

Even during the negotiations on the April 2010 Treaty the US Senate had insisted that tactical nuclear weapons be included in the reductions, but eventually they were not. The new US Nuclear Posture stresses the concern over Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons and indicates the importance of including these weapons in the agenda for the future negotiations⁹. Therefore, there is every indication that the US and NATO will intensify their efforts in this area. In particular, there are several specific arguments:

- It is assumed that Russia still has a considerable advantage over the US and NATO in this nuclear weapons class; with lower levels of strategic nuclear forces this advantage will be yet more tangible;

- Russia's assumed advantage in this respect is becoming a concern for the NATO allies of the US;

- In time of war TNWs are to be deployed together with general-purpose forces and may be immediately involved in a conflict with high risk of nuclear escalation;

- Allegedly, TNW have less robust systems for prevention of unauthorized use ("locks" for "negative control") than strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, the hazard of an unauthorized nuclear strike is higher;

- It is generally accepted that forward-based TNWs (especially older versions) are more vulnerable to theft, are lighter and have less efficient blocking devices which makes them attractive for terrorists.

Russia's position on this issue has been extremely reserved and vague: it is in fact limited to the demand that the US remove its TNW

⁹ See Nuclear Posture Review Report. NPR. April 2010. Department of Defense. USA. Wash., DC., 2010. P. X–XI.

based in Europe to its national territory, this being the condition for opening any dialogue on the subject. It should also be noted that the discussion of this issue within Russian expert community and in the press has had a relatively low profile, with just a few publications on the subject.

Meanwhile, the interest in the issue will predictably increase in the context of nuclear disarmament as well as in the discussions on European security and on Russia's relations with NATO and other states.

The subject of discussion. Even defining the subject of future negotiations presents certain difficulties. Not touching yet the military and strategic aspects of the issue, it would be logical from the legal point of view to include nuclear weapons that are not covered by the existing treaties, namely the START Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, in the non-strategic systems category.

According to this logic, the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons should include ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of less than 500 km, combat aircraft with ranges of less than 8,000 km not capable of carrying long-range (i.e. with ranges of over 600 km) air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with ranges of less than 600 km.

In addition, in line with parallel commitments of the US and the USSR/Russia on the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons dating back to the early 1990s, these include artillery shells and nuclear mines (demolition munitions) assigned to the ground forces; land-based and air-launched anti-aircraft missiles; air-to-surface missiles and bombs (including depth charges) assigned to non-strategic strike Air Force and Navy aircraft; various surface-to-air, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles and torpedoes of surface ships and attack submarines, as well as depth charges and artillery shells of surface ships.

However, even such broad interpretation poses a number of questions. For example how to define long-range (over 600 km) nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) that may be deployed on ships and attack submarines? In terms of technical characteristics, this system is close or even identical to the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) banned and eliminated under the INF Treaty and to the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) included in the START Treaties, as well as to the conventional GLCM and ALCM widely deployed by the US Air Force and Navy. In relation to such nuclear SLCMs, START I Treaty provided for a separate ceiling of 880 for each of the parties, whereas the new START Treaty makes no mention of this category.

Further, some nuclear gravity bombs (such as the US B-61 and B-83) may be the armament of US heavy bombers as well as of tactical strike aviation.

Finally, alongside with the US and Russia, other nuclear states (France, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) also have short- and medium-range aircraft and missiles in their inventory. In some of the mentioned states, these systems comprise the entire nuclear capability or its major part. However, the above states do not regard these weapons as pre-strategic. In particular (talking of NATO) the French Strike Force includes 60 Mirage 2000N aircraft and 24 Super-Etendard carrier-based fighter-bombers that are capable of delivering a total of 60 Air-Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) air-to-surface missiles to the target. By their range these systems may be attributed to tactical nuclear weapons, though France regards them as a part of its strategic forces.

Still more important is the fact that TNW employ dual-use platforms, launchers and delivery vehicles (medium bombers, fighter-bombers, ships and attack submarines, short-range offensive missiles and surface-to-air missiles, naval weapons, heavy artillery). Therefore, unlike strategic nuclear forces, it is impossible to implement or control the limitation, reduction or elimination of TNW through the elimination of launchers, delivery vehicles or platforms (such as nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines - SSBNs), since they all fall in the category of general-purpose forces inventory. They are designed mainly for conventional military operations and are partially covered by other agreements (such as the CFE Treaty, which limits non-strategic combat aircraft and artillery in Europe). Thus, any substantial reduction of TNW by their launchers and delivery vehicles would lead to drastic cuts in combat equipment and arms of air forces, the navies, ground forces and air/missile defense of the nuclear powers, including those assigned missions in local conflicts.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons of the US and Russia. Neither of the two powers provides official information on its non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The US. According to different expert estimates, by the end of the 1990s the US had over 11,500 such weapons (over 7,000 units in Europe and 1,000 units in Asia; 2,500 units in the Navy and 200 to 300 units as part of Air Defense system in the US territory). Another 4,000 nuclear weapons allegedly were maintained as strategic and tactical reserve. In line with the unilateral presidential initiative of 1991, the US withdrew from foreign bases to its territory and eliminated all tactical nuclear weapons of

ground forces, removed all TNW from surface ships and attack submarines, excluding long-range SLCMs, and destroyed 50% of them¹⁰.

According to unofficial estimates, the US currently has around 500 TNW units. These include 100 Tomahawk SLCMs (TLAM/N) for attack nuclear-powered submarines at Kings Bay and Bangor naval bases in the US territory. Further 190 SLCM warheads (W80-0) are reserved in storage. In addition, there are 400 gravity bombs (B-61-3 and B-61-4), with 200 bombs at six US Air Forces special storages in five NATO member-states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Germany). These bombs are to be delivered by F-16 fighter-bombers of the US Air Force, as well as by Belgian and British airplanes of the same type and by German-Italian Tornado strike aircraft¹¹.

According to the new US Nuclear Posture, all Tomahawk nuclear SLCMs will be retired. However the B-61 gravity bombs will undergo life extension program to enhance safety, security and prevention of unauthorized use. The new tactical F-35 fighter aircraft will be certified to deliver these bombs. They are addressed in the context of nuclear guarantees to the allies and their future deployment in Europe will be subject to consultation among the allies¹².

There is no reasonably reliable information on nuclear warheads stored in central sites on the US territory. These warheads are known to be stored in several storage facilities on the air and naval bases, in separate central locations and in depots at nuclear explosive devices manufacturing Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. They are subdivided into various reserve categories; part of the warheads may be quickly made operational, other warheads are to be used for spare parts. Still other portion consists of warheads awaiting dismantling and removal of nuclear material for long-term storage for peaceful or military purposes (for the assembly of new warheads).

According to the recent official data, the US strategic nuclear forces, TNW force and the active stockpiled reserve consist of 5,113 nuclear warheads. According to independent experts' estimates, another

¹⁰ See Пикаев А. Нестратегические ядерные вооружения/Ядерное распространение. Новые технологии, вооружения и договоры. Под ред. А. Арбатова, В. Дворкина. Московский Центр Карнеги. РОССПЭН. М., 2009. С. 129–159. (Alexander Pikayev Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons/Nuclear Proliferation. New Technology, Weapons and Treaties. Under the editorship of Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin. Carnegie Moscow Center. ROSSPEN. Moscow, 2009. P. 129-159).

¹¹ See SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 367–369.

¹² See Nuclear Posture Review Report. P. XII-XIV.

4200 weapons are de-activated and intended for disposal¹³. This number may increase due to the strategic nuclear forces reduction under the new START Treaty which permits a major part of the reductions to be implemented by removing some of warheads from multiple-warhead missiles and sending them to storage as well as extracting part of SLBMs from submarine launchers and placing the warheads in storage facilities.

The Russian Federation. Unlike its strategic nuclear forces, Russia's non-strategic nuclear assets are hidden behind a veil of even greater secrecy than those of the US. According to some estimates, Russia had up to 22,000 units of non-strategic nuclear weapons late in the 1980s.¹⁴ In line with unilateral presidential initiatives of the USSR and Russia of 1991–1992, announced in response to the US decision and in the context of the break-up of the Warsaw Pact (and later of the USSR), a number of large-scale measures were outlined. In particular all TNW of the ground forces were to be moved to storages of nuclear weapons manufacturing plants and to central storage locations for subsequent total elimination. In addition, 30% of TNW of the Navy, 50% of warheads of surface-to-air Air Defense missiles, and 50% of the aircraft weapons were to be eliminated. It was also proposed that the two countries move all TNW of their Air Forces to central storage locations, however this motion did not win Washington's support (since it would have removed the TNW of the Air Force from foreign bases perceived as an attribute of nuclear guarantees to the allies).

According to available official data, by the year 2000 all TNW of the Navy and the Air Forces were moved to central storages, with 30% of them eliminated. Also, 50% of the Air Force TNW and 50% of the warheads of surface-to-air missiles were eliminated. In addition, a large part (although for financial reasons not all) of nuclear weapons of the artillery, tactical missiles and mines of the ground forces were eliminated as well¹⁵.

Currently, by the unofficial estimates of the majority of experts and foreign sources, Russia has an active stockpile of about 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons¹⁶. These include about 500 tactical nuclear air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs for 120 TU-22M medium range bombers and 400 SU-24 tactical bombers. In addition, there are about 300 air-to-surface

¹³ See *Eliminating Nuclear Threat. A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*. Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (co-Chairs). Canberra, 2009. P. 20.

¹⁴ See Пикаев А. Указ. соч. С. 129–159 (Alexander Pikaev, Index of collected works, p.129-159).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See SIPRI Yearbook 2008. P. 373–375.

missiles, gravity bombs and depth charges of the naval aviation comprised of 180 TU-22M, SU-24, BE-12 and IL-38 aircraft. Over 500 tactical nuclear weapons are anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes of surface ships and submarines, including up to 400 nuclear long-range SLCMs of attack submarines. Allegedly, around 100 nuclear warheads are assigned to missile interceptors of the Moscow A-135 anti-ballistic missile system; another 630 pieces are assigned to C-300/400 surface-to-air and other air defense missile systems¹⁷. It is generally accepted that in time of peace all these nuclear weapons are stored at designated depots at air, naval and air defense bases.

As noted above, in the 1990s all TNW of ground forces and air defense, as well as most of the TNW of the Air Force and the Navy, were redeployed to the centralized storages of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) where they are kept in reserve or are awaiting disassembly and disposal. According to the declarations of the representatives of the military and political authorities, all non-strategic nuclear weapons are stored at centralized facilities¹⁸.

However, it is unclear whether that refers to storage facilities of air and naval bases placed under the management of the 12th GUMO, or to the previously built special centralized large storage facilities of the 12th GUMO. The latter also store warheads and other weapons of strategic nuclear forces. Although their total amount is kept in secret, foreign experts estimate it at around 8,000.¹⁹ Equally questionable is the calculation method used by some independent experts, in particular, the fact that they include 630 warheads of air defense missiles in the total number of TNW, while Moscow insists that these warheads have been removed to central locations.

Russian tactical nuclear weapon systems are modernized through the deployment of Iskander tactical ground-mobile missiles that may apparently be equipped with either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. In addition, the new SU-34 tactical strike bomber will probably be a dual-use aircraft.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See Литовкин В. Безопасность бывает только равной// Независимое военное обозрение.19.12.2008.С.3 (Viktor Litovkin "Security May Only Be Equal"/ Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie December 19, 2008. P. 3); Иванов С. Ядерное разоружение: возможен ли "глобальный ноль"?// Военно-промышленный курьер. 17–23.02.2010. № 6. С. 3. (Sergei Ivanov "Nuclear Disarmament: Is Global Zero Possible? // Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier #6. February,17-23, 2010 P. 3)

¹⁹ See Eliminating Nuclear Threat. P. 20.

Other nuclear powers keep the information on their non-strategic nuclear assets in total secrecy. According to expert estimates, the People's Republic of China has around 100 to 200 such weapons, Israel has 60 to 200 pieces, Pakistan and India have around 60 and 50 pieces, respectively, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has 6 to 10 weapons²⁰. These include medium and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as air bombs of strike aircraft. For some of the above countries, such weapons comprise their entire nuclear capability or its major part and are therefore regarded as strategic nuclear deterrent being within range of their principal opponents or of opponents' foreign military bases.

Strategic priorities of the parties. With the Cold War over, Germany united, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the USSR collapsed and the Soviet troops withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe, the threat of an attack by general purpose forces was lifted for the NATO member-states. It had been perceived as the principal threat for forty years since 1945, and it was this threat that the US nuclear deterrence and nuclear guarantees had addressed, including the deployment of TNW in Europe and the concept of first-use of these weapons in case of an attack of conventional armed forces and weapons.

Nevertheless, today the US alone has nuclear weapons in foreign territories (in five NATO member-states) in the amount of around 200 tactical air bombs. In the recent years, the US TNW have been withdrawn from Greece and the United Kingdom. After the tactical nuclear weapons were dismantled from the US ships and submarines, Japan – where the US Seventh Fleet was anchored – was also dismissed from the list. There has been serious discussion among NATO member-countries on the issue of withdrawal of US TNW from the Europe.

Apparently, these weapons are regarded by the US as a sort of a "political rein" for the NATO allies, despite the fact that the new Nuclear Posture gives these weapons a much lower priority, while stating that with the consent of the allies, the US would be ready to withdraw TNW to its national territory.

With NATO expanding to the East, the past supremacy of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in general-purpose forces was replaced by a similar supremacy of NATO over Russia and the countries of CSTO.

In this light, it is evident that Russia perceives tactical nuclear weapons primarily as an instrument to neutralize NATO superiority in

²⁰ See Пикаев А. Указ. соч. С. 129–159 (Alexander Pikaev, Index of collected works, p. 129-159).

general-purpose forces, especially in the context of the eastward expansion of the Alliance. This is why Moscow has not been enthusiastic about negotiations on this subject. In the past, the US also tried to avoid the issue, as it strived to maintain its forward-based nuclear forces in Europe.

Secondly, Russia apparently regards its advantage in non-strategic nuclear arms as a compensation for the fact that it is falling behind the US in terms of strategic weapons – a gap that the new START Treaty will narrow, but will not bridge²¹.

Thirdly, Russia regards TNW as a counterbalance to the nuclear forces of third nuclear states, Russia's territory being within the range of nuclear weapons of all of these states. The reduction of strategic nuclear forces in line with US-Russia agreements relatively increases the role of Russia's non-strategic weapons as a deterrent against the nuclear powers in Eurasia.

Fourthly, there is still the issue of TNW used in response to an attack by US long-range precision-guided conventional weapons supported by advanced space information systems (reconnaissance, targeting, navigation and communications). This TNW purpose has not yet been discussed in the publicly available media, although there is a certain strategic logic behind that. If strategic nuclear forces are used in a retaliatory strike in response to non-nuclear aggression ("aerospace attack"), it would mean instant escalation of the conflict to the level of a total nuclear war. However, using TNW against air and naval bases as well as against surface ships and submarines carrying non-nuclear SLCMs could look more like an adequate response and a more credible deterrent against an "aerospace attack".

Meanwhile, China with its increasing military power and the 5,000 km of the border it shares with Russia cannot be disregarded either. However, this issue has been sidestepped in Russia's official papers for the reasons of political correctness.

Conditions for negotiating TNW. It appears that the top priority given in Russia's Military Doctrine of 2010 to the threat of the expansion of NATO and its basic infrastructure toward the Russian borders is considerably overstated, at least in terms of the threat of an actual armed attack against Russia and its allies.

In fact, the Allied Forces have been reduced: since the 1990s, the ground forces have been reduced by 35%, while the Navy and the Air Forces have decreased by 30% and 40%, respectively. The US troops have been reduced by a third within the same period (from 300,000 to 112,000).

²¹ In particular under the new START due to its counting rules and dismantling provisions the US will maintain a huge nuclear warheads up-load capacity (up to 2000 additional warheads), which Russia will be lacking.

In total, the NATO forces are below the initial CFE limits – by 42% in personnel, by 25% in armor and artillery and by 45% in combat helicopters and aircraft.

Thus, the increase in the number of NATO member-states does not automatically involve a build-up in the total amount of the Alliance's potential due to outscoring reduction of the armies by several states, in particular of the US continental troops, as well as of German, French, Italian, Spanish and Polish armies. Currently, the 28 NATO member-states have a lower overall amount of troops and weapons than the 16 NATO member-states of the early 1990s. This would hardly be the case if the Alliance was planning for a large-scale aggression against Russia.

The development of the US long-range precision-guided weapons relying on space information systems truly complicates Russia's defense planning. However, this threat should not be exaggerated either, since the risk of an attack by advanced conventional weapons against Russia with its huge nuclear arsenal would be disproportional to any imaginable gains of such an aggression in terms of its probable consequences.

It is equally important that after the end of the Cold War, in the context of increased economic, social and politic interdependence of the countries throughout the World resulting from the ongoing globalization, one can hardly see any realistic reason of an attack against Russia by the US and its allies.

Nevertheless, Russia cannot disregard the adverse trends in the balance between conventional and nuclear forces both globally and on the regional scale (even if these trends are to a large extent the result of the failures of its own military reform in the last 15 years). These military and security issues are prioritized in the country's new Military Doctrine, and this fact must be accepted as a military and political reality. Persuading Russia that its official perception of these issues is wrong will not relieve Russia's concerns. To do so, every possible step must be taken to remove these impediments by negotiations and by adjusting NATO military policy.

In the first place, it means that given the changes in Ukraine's domestic situation and Georgia's territory-related problems, the issue of NATO membership for these countries should be indefinitely postponed. The development of NATO-Russia and NATO-CSTO cooperation – primarily as regards stabilization in Afghanistan – must render impossible any future eastward expansion of NATO without Russia's consent. Along with ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty of former Soviet republics, it would be best to include these guarantees in the new European security system proposed by Russia.

The military component of such a system may be the revival of the system and process of reducing and limiting conventional forces and

weapons in Europe to serve as the framework for resolving issues related to non-expansion of NATO military infrastructure to the East. Creating a large CSTO-NATO rapid reaction corps for peacekeeping operations outside Europe (including Afghanistan) and a similar EU-Russia corps (in the framework of European Security and Defense Policy) for operations on the European continent would be of utmost importance to remove traditional fears of each other once and for all (like those of France and Germany).

Cooperative assessment of missile threats and cooperation in the development and deployment of US-EU-Russian missile defense systems to address these threats must replace unilateral efforts of the US and its allies in this sphere.

The limitation of long-range high-precision weapons is to a certain extent addressed by the new START Treaty with respect of ballistic delivery vehicles. Regarding cruise missiles this issue should be discussed in the course of further START negotiations. In other respects, this issue could be addressed in the context of a special new area of treaties on the reduction of weapons, confidence-building measures and military cooperation between the US and Russia.

The above "package" of negotiations and arrangements would provide proper political and strategic framework for Russia to agree to substantive discussion with the US and NATO of the issue of non-strategic nuclear forces.

With respect to China as an obscure threat on Russia's eastern frontiers, the multilateral agreement on the limitation of conventional armed forces and weapons in the 100-kilometer zone on either side of the Russian-Chinese border may become a sort of a foothold. Given the progress in strengthening mutual security in Europe as well as in NATO-CSTO-SCO cooperation on Afghanistan, additional steps must be made to reduce the forces of Russia and the People's Republic of China along their shared border and to deepen this area (up to 200-300 km) into the territories of the two friendly powers. In this case, the negotiations on TNW would be also linked to a package of agreements on the security of Russia's eastern frontiers.

Possible solutions. The current revival of the idea of nuclear disarmament as well as the progress in the strategic nuclear forces reduction will inevitably draw out the TNW issue. In addition, Russia links this issue to the termination of NATO eastward expansion and the progress on the CFE Treaty. Such a position is quite reasonable; it may become an additional means of achieving these objectives.

Incredible as it may seem, the new START Treaty has already had an indirect effect on the issue of non-strategic nuclear forces. However,

this effect was quite different from either what the US Senate would welcome or what many Western policy-makers and experts currently see.

During the negotiations on the START Treaty the US – pursuing its own interests – insisted that only operationally deployed nuclear weapons be counted, while "operationally deployed" are the warheads that are actually deployed on SLBMs and ICBMs. The armaments of heavy bombers (ALCMs and bombs) are not counted as separate warheads, since in peace time they are not loaded to airplanes, but located at airfield depots.

Under the same principle and following this precedent, all TNW are currently not "operationally deployed", since they are not deployed on delivery vehicles in peace time. Instead, they are stored at the facilities of the air and naval bases or at centralized storages in Russia and the US.

Of course START precedent should not necessarily apply to future TNW negotiations, and the 2010 Prague Treaty is valuable on its own terms. But technical and operational characteristics of TNW will nevertheless demand elaboration of specific counting rules, reduction and limitation provisions and verification regimes.

As mentioned above, it is not possible to associate the reduction and elimination of TNW with the reduction of strategic nuclear forces, since TNW employ dual-use delivery vehicles. In fact, the limitation, reduction and elimination of TNW means the dismantlement of nuclear warheads mounted onto dual-use missiles, torpedoes and bombs carried by multipurpose aircraft, surface ships and submarines. Therefore, the reduction of TNWs (unlike the reduction of strategic nuclear forces), can not be implemented and controlled through the elimination of delivery vehicles, launchers and platforms.

For the same reason, it is exceptionally difficult to agree on the reduction of TNW to certain levels and to verify such measures, since it would mean inspecting the containers with bombs and warheads at storage facilities instead of inspecting the deployed (as well as non-deployed) launchers and delivery vehicles. This would be a much more difficult task, since the TNW munitions are often stored together with strategic warheads and bombs removed from missiles and bombers under the START Treaties and together with munitions intended for elimination and utilization. Meanwhile, there are dozens of such storage locations and many thousands of munitions in containers.

Maintaining large numbers of delivery vehicles (of dual use) would make the physical elimination of TNW warheads a pure formality (as well as a complicated and a costly one), since it would be impossible to either strictly control the number of the remaining nuclear weapons in storages - or to guarantee that new weapons of the same class are not manufactured

and put to storage in order to replace the eliminated pieces (waiting to be returned to the military forces as the need arises).

Similarly, elimination of the outer cones of nuclear warheads (as is stipulated by the INF Treaty) would be an inefficient measure. The warheads of medium- and short-range missiles could not be returned to delivery vehicles since the latter were all dismantled, whereas the situation with TNW is completely different: their delivery systems would stay in service as conventional weapons.

While it might be possible to control the physical elimination of nuclear warheads without compromising military technical secrets, the control over the weapons at storage locations and in depots of manufacturing plants (or in assembly shops) would involve an unprecedented level of openness in one of the most delicate areas of military technologies of the parties – the designs of nuclear warheads and explosive devices.

The same applies to a simple exchange of information on the numbers and types of tactical weapons in storage, if it is to be reliably verified. Therefore, mutual elimination of a part of TNW (say, 50% or 80%) or a specified amount of TNW is hardly acceptable for the party that has a much lower number of such weapons, since it would be difficult to estimate exactly how many TNW the parties now have.

Therefore, in dealing with TNW the parties will have to deal much more with storages than with actual weapons. The first step may be the relocation of all tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases to central storage locations in more remote areas of the national territories (in point of fact, to the reserve). Prior to that, the parties would have to exchange information on the existing weapons of such class at their air and naval bases. As an option, the parties may initially agree on such measures with respect to TNW attributed to the Air Forces of the US and Russia, and then proceed with the Navy.

In this context, the US would initially withdraw its 200 air bombs from six storages in five European countries, while Russia would send a total of about 500 bombs and air-launched missiles from the air bases in its territory to central storage locations. The principle of equality will require not only a relocation of the US TNW to its national territory, but a ban on their presence at the air bases (and, subsequently, at the naval bases) or in any areas other than central storage locations to be designated specifically.

Complete withdrawal of TNW from forward bases is easier to verify – the storage facilities of known location and characteristics would simply be empty. There will also need to be an agreement on inspections upon request at short notice (similar to those agreed for strategic offensive weapons for the bases of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) at air and

naval bases in the territories of Russia and the US (probably also in the national territories of their allies, where such weapons had been located in the past). Therefore, in practical terms, the potential agreement may be a more complicated and delicate issue for the US than for Russia, and may require greater effort on US side.

Relocation to central storage locations would remove TNW from the forward positions and ensure greater security against their acquisition by terrorists, as well as against their unauthorized relocation or use. At the same time, such an arrangement would mean that Russia will be capable of returning the TNW to the armed forces if there is a security threat on the country's western or eastern borders. Likewise, NATO would theoretically be capable of a similar response. Provided reliable verification of storage facilities such a step would take a long time and would be highly visible for both sides and would not take any of them by surprise. Moreover, according to the Pentagon and to Russia's senior military officers, this will not imply serious expenditures, since the major part of TNW has already been moved to central storage locations in Russia and to storage facilities in the US.

At centralized storages TNW would be actually safely kept in reserve waiting till the time disarmament extends to eliminating nuclear warheads and utilizing nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. From the technical perspective and in terms of verification of compliance, the dismantlement and elimination (or destruction) of TNW would be identical to the elimination of strategic bombs and warheads, which is not on the agenda of START as yet. In the future, if the scope of nuclear disarmament is extended to include the elimination of nuclear warheads, it would probably involve both strategic and non-strategic warheads in parallel.

4. COOPERATION ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

From US/NATO perspective Europe figures in further nuclear disarmament mainly in the context of agreements on tactical nuclear weapons, which are closely intertwined with limitations on conventional arms and armed forces. But from Russia's angle it is the future of ballistic missile defense in US-NATO-Russia format which is of utmost importance.

The crisis in the US-Russian relations, provoked by the past plans of deployment of the US missile defense in Europe, which receded after the decision of President Obama's to go for a new missile defense architecture, may return in even more acute form if and when the new BMD system gain strategic capability by 2020.

New plans of US missile defense in Europe. In accordance with the plans to deploy missile defense announced in 2009 by the US Administration and Pentagon, further buildup of strategic Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska (Fort Greely, 26 interceptors) and in California (Vandenberg, 4 interceptors) is suspended. A reserve of 14 GBI silos is to be constructed in California. The interceptors are to be loaded in them in case of necessity. It is assumed that thus the protection of the US territory against single ICBM launches is ensured, but GBI test launches will continue.

The plans of deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) in Europe and other regions in order to ensure protection against Iran's ballistic missiles include four stages.

The first stage will be completed in 2011 and involve the deployment of ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors (Block IA) in the Mediterranean for protection of European territory and allied power projection forces from Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

At the second stage by 2015, improved SM-3 interceptors (Block IB) and additional radars will be deployed, which will enhance the efficiency of strategic interceptors in Alaska and California, as well as missile defense in Europe. Ground-based analogs of sea-launched SM-3S interceptors are to be deployed in Southern Europe.

At the third stage (2018), an upgraded SM-3 interceptor (Block IIA) and its ground-based version, both of which will have improved

efficiency in intercepting medium-range ballistic missiles, are to be deployed in Northern Europe. With this purpose SM-3 interceptors are developed which will have an extended range due to increased weight of solid fuel (diameter of the second and third stages will increase about 1.5 times, that is, from 0.343 to 0.533 m).

Finally, at the fourth stage, by 2020, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IIB) is to be further upgraded in order to enable it to engage ICBMs.

Alongside with that, throughout all four stages combat command and targeting systems will be improved. It is expected that the increased velocity of interceptors will enable them (if Aegis ships are deployed in the Mediterranean) to intercept Iranian medium-range and intercontinental missiles at the boost phase. At this moment some technical characteristics of TMD will cross the "gray area" between theater and strategic missile defense systems.

TMD and Russia's nuclear deterrence. By the present time, it is has not been finally decided whether ground-based version of SM-3 interceptors (in Romania, Bulgaria), or X-band (centimeter) radars will be deployed in Europe. It is not excluded that these radars may be deployed in Turkey, Georgia, and Eastern European countries. In any case, these radars will be an integral part of a common missile defense for the territories of the US and Europe, which will also include the radars of the missile launch early warning system. In this capacity, the system in general will be viewed by Russia as a threat to its nuclear deterrence capacity.

One assessment of the capability of US missile defense in Europe to intercept Iranian missiles was presented in May 2009 in joint papers by US and Russian experts published by the East-West Institute. These papers show, in particular, that X-band radars, due to their relatively high resolution (up to 15 cm), can detect some of decoys, as well as warheads, at the exoatmospheric part of trajectory, although they are incapable of guaranteed distinguishing between them. Besides, even relatively simple countermeasures available to Iranian missile forces can reduce the warhead cross section from 0.03 cm² to 0.01 cm², which would considerably reduce warhead acquisition range. At best, an increase of the X-band radar modules by 80,000 units will bring acquisition range to about 1,300 km. with the minimum necessary range being about 2,000 km. On an average, the destruction of one warhead of Iranian missile would require a total of five interceptors.

It is beyond any doubt that Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs are equipped with much more efficient missile defense penetration aids, which have been continuously advanced for several decades and are further upgraded and adapted to prospective missile defense systems. For this particular reason, the new US missile

defense to be deployed in and around Europe would have no practical effect on Russia's nuclear deterrence capacity.

A danger for the Russian Federation may only appear if there is a major deployment of land, sea, air and space echelons of interception of missiles and warheads at every phase of their trajectories, which is connected with the revival of nuclear standoff and new arms race. However, the possibility of such radical increase in tensions between the US and Russia is very small.

At the same time, in case the US unilaterally deploys its missile defense in Europe, even as envisaged by the new architecture announced by Obama's Administration, there *may be a new missile defense crisis in the two states' relations*, similar to the one that happened around the previous plans to deploy missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is even more so after the declarations on strategic cooperation were adopted, which also provide for such cooperation on missile defense. The linkage of strategic offensive and defensive arms was recognized in the new START Treaty in 2010. It is only possible to prevent such a crisis if steps are made to start real cooperation of the US/NATO and Russia on European and global missile defenses.

Advantages of joint US-Russian TMD. President Obama and the Pentagon leadership have already repeatedly announced their readiness to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. During President Obama's visit to Moscow he said: "In fact, I want to work together with Russia on a missile defense architecture that makes us all safer. But if the threat from Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program is eliminated, the driving force for missile defense in Europe will be eliminated, and that is in our mutual interests".²². Statements by Russian leadership on this subject are more cautious.

So far, the announced US and Russia's intentions to cooperate on missile defense have materialized only in assessing and searching for agreement upon possible missile threats. It is far from inconceivable that this process may turn out to be quite lengthy. Russian experts will continuously postpone Iran's and North Korea's developing extended-range missiles, as these countries use old technologies originating from the Soviet Union. American assessments will be based on the data showing that these countries use more up-to-date technologies obtained from other states.

Probably little if any consideration will be given to the recent assessments by competent US and Russian specialists in the framework of

²² See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation.

the project of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, describing in detail the status and prospects of Iranian and North Korean efforts to develop ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

Meanwhile, Russia's ability to cooperate fully at best does not increase over the years. Before, it could be said that Russia was more advanced in developing high-velocity interceptor missiles due to advanced solid fuel formulae, while now this is hardly true, as the US has been working intensively to develop interceptors to engage missiles at the boost phase.

Yet, there are still considerable possibilities related to missile defense information systems. According to US independent experts, the integration of the US and Russian missile launches early warning systems would render the detection of missile launches 30-70 percent more efficient. Deeper cooperation may be established through the deployment of low Earth orbit space information support systems of global missile defense. The spacecraft for this purpose may be placed in orbits with the required altitude and inclination with the help of the converted "heavy" rockets in the framework of Russian-Ukrainian Dnepr project.

In order to protect various sites in Russian and partly European territories, the joint missile defense could use Russian missile interception systems of the S-400 or prospective S-500 types.

It is advisable to overcome existing obstacles, primarily by restoring those elements of cooperation that have been lost in recent years. First and foremost, it is necessary to immediately revive the project of establishing a Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches (Joint Data Exchange Center - JDEC) the decision on which was made 12 years ago by the presidents of the US and Russia. The current presidents reiterated this intention at their meeting in Moscow in 2009. Alongside with that, the interrupted series of joint US-NATO-Russian computer TMD exercises should be renewed and expanded beyond the theater defense scale and from computers to test ranges. As the experience of joint exercises has shown, there should be no considerable difficulties in the division of zones of responsibilities in interception coverage.

Combining the detection, tracking and interception systems of NATO and CSTO air defense (primarily Russia and Belarus joint system) could be another key sphere of politico-military cooperation beyond the scope of traditional arms limitation. The threat of air terrorism makes it urgent that such combined system be created, although the urgency has not yet been perceived by the two sides' political and military community.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 showed the scale of damage inflicted by this type of terrorism even when no WMD are used. Air

terrorism with the use of nuclear explosive devices (or other WMD) poses an even greater threat, taking in consideration that aircraft are much more available and convenient means of delivering such weapon as compared to ballistic missiles against which the missile defense is assigned.

Joint air defense can also protect Russia and other European countries against long-range cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles carrying WMD and targeted with the help of widely available space navigation means, which can be acquired by terrorists. Finally, honed joint actions of air defense can be helpful in combating hijackers of civil aircraft which may cross the borders of several European states on their way, which would require trans-border coordination of air defense tracking and interception systems.

At the same time, the integration of air defense systems would eventually exclude the threat of NATO and Russia's air strikes against each other and their military clash in general, from the military doctrines and armed forces training and exercises. Due to the key role of air force in contemporary warfare, the countries with common air defense system would be technically unable to fight with each other (unless they previously withdraw from common air defense structures). The cooperation in this sphere would prevent any future tensions with regard to such steps as the development of joint Russian-Belarusian air defense or the deployment of the US Patriot systems in Poland.

By the summer of 2010, the tests of an element of a joint Air Traffic Control Coordination System²³ have commenced. Yet this is just the first step involving only operational exchange of information on possible aircraft hijacking. The system should be consistently expanded with the view to deep integration of information and interception systems of territorial air defense.

In addition to preventing a very likely new missile defense crisis in the US-Russian relations, the mentioned steps can have a decisive impact on positive transformation of the two nuclear superpowers' relations of mutual nuclear deterrence towards more constructive strategic cooperation relationship.

²³ See: Независимое военное обозрение. 14–20.05.2010. № 17. С. 2 (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. 14-20.05.2010. No.7, page 2).

5. THIRD NUCLEAR STATES

Presently, there are nine states that possess nuclear weapons, in the world. Those include five nuclear powers whose status is acknowledged under the NPT (Russia, the US, the United Kingdom, France and China). Besides, there are four states that possess nuclear capability and remain outside the NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK). In accordance with the criteria applied in the US-Russian nuclear disarmament process, the nuclear forces of all the four non-NPT states are considered to be non-strategic. However, these countries are involved in regional confrontation, and except for India, have no global ambitions. Indeed, in the regional context, medium- and shorter-range delivery means perform strategic functions.

Dialectic of third states' nuclear capabilities. As for "official" nuclear powers, all the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom, most of those of France, and some of the China's nuclear weapons can be referred to as strategic nuclear weapons. Yet China itself considers all its nuclear arsenal as strategic. The United Kingdom assigns part of its Trident-2 SLBMs (being bought from the US where they are referred to as exclusively strategic) to non-strategic tasks.

The situation of the US and Russia in relation to the third nuclear states is asymmetrical. Russia's territory lies within range of all the seven other countries' delivery means. The US, on the contrary, is separated by the oceans and to date remains inaccessible for the nuclear forces of the four non-NPT states. The United Kingdom and France are bound by alliance with the US. Although technically they can engage targets in the US territory, no doubt, such targets are not included in the flight programs of British and French nuclear forces. Besides Russia, China is the only country which is able to reach targets in the US territory. However, presently this potential is small enough and limited to about forty ICBMs. This is just over 15-20% of all China's nuclear capability.

Of all the non-NPT states, only DPRK is actively testing long-range missiles capable of reaching the US territory. Israel, on the contrary, seems to have voluntarily renounced developing intercontinental systems. Such systems are not necessary for ensuring its national security limited to the region of the Near and Middle East. Besides, the US and Israel

maintain close relations, so there can be no scenarios of their nuclear strikes against each other.

India and Pakistan might eventually acquire intercontinental missile capability in the future, although at present there is hardly any strategic rationale for such systems.

It can become a common concern of the US and Russia that China may buildup its nuclear forces. After the Cold War ended, Beijing has not increased its nuclear arsenals, confining itself to their qualitative modernization. China states that it has the smallest nuclear arsenal among the five nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT. However, during this decade, China apparently plans to increase the number of its mobile DF-31 ICBMs, is developing a new DF-41 MIRVed ICBM system and has commissioned a new Jin-class submarines. Each of them will be equipped with 12 SLBMs, possibly with multiple reentry vehicles. It is most likely that China expects to build at least four or five submarines of the new class.

This can be a qualitative leap for China's nuclear forces. Before, China had one strategic nuclear submarine, which due to continuous technical failures spent most time in base. In this decade, Beijing may build a full-fledged sea leg of its nuclear forces. Moreover, such modernization may bring about considerable — at least two-fold — quantitative buildup of China's nuclear assets.

This buildup would considerably increase the number of warheads able to engage targets in the US territory. Besides, this may bring about a qualitative change in the Chinese-Russian nuclear balance.

Asymmetries of US and Russian strategic planning. In comparison to Russia, the US has a wider range of measures to counter threats posed by the existing and future third nuclear powers. The remoteness from Eurasia gives Washington more opportunities to rely on missile defense in intercepting a limited nuclear strike of a third nuclear state. Russia, having long land frontiers, would have to create a missile defense of a much larger scale in order to protect its major economic centers even from a single missile strike. For the US, the task becomes easier, as it would have to intercept only intercontinental missiles, while Russia's territory is vulnerable to much greater number and range of types of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

The US has a global network of military bases and facilities providing their armed forces with reliable access to most of the world's regions posing nuclear or missile threat. Together with the overwhelming superiority in conventional arms and armed forces over any potential adversary, this enables the US to make extensive use of military force to prevent certain regimes from creating a nuclear arsenal posing threat to the

US. Russia's possibilities to perform similar counter-proliferation actions are extremely limited.

This means that in order to counter threats emanating from the third nuclear states, Russia has to rely on nuclear deterrence much more than the US. Besides, as was already mentioned, Russia's territory itself is more vulnerable than the American, which is a serious reason to keep tactical nuclear weapons rather than implement its reduction in bilateral US-Russian context.

The prospects of multilateral nuclear arms reduction and limitation. Involving third nuclear states in possible further US-Russian talks on nuclear forces reduction appears quite problematic.

Firstly, for India, Pakistan and Israel nuclear arsenals are to ensure security in the regional context. The scale of and the balance of the US and Russian nuclear arsenals has no considerable meaning for India's and Pakistan's nuclear policy. Hence, it is not US-Russian relations in the nuclear sphere, but the changing situation in the region, that affects changes in this policy.

Secondly, the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom, France and China, although correlate with the US-Russian nuclear balance, are relatively small. A considerable reduction of these arsenals can pose risk to their survivability. Besides, the British forces are entirely submarine-based, and the French ones are almost entirely submarine-based. It is possible to reduce the number of submarines to three or two, but this would seriously affect their operational mode (sustaining at least one SSBN of each state at sea at any given time). Hence, if any reduction or limitation is contemplated by Paris and London - the removal of part of SLBMs from launchers would be a more likely option. Theoretically integration of the two nuclear forces into common EU nuclear deterrent force might make such reductions easier.

Third states' nuclear capabilities should not be exaggerated. The nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France are the arsenal of minimum deterrence. That is, they can only be used for deterrence of nuclear attack providing limited retaliation capability. Therefore, from the purely strategic point of view, although these states maintain allied relations with the US, it appears highly unlikely that British and French nuclear forces might take part in coordinated counterforce strikes against Russia. Due to this they can, at least formally, be excluded from the US-Russian nuclear balance.

Although nuclear weapons delivery means of India, Israel and DPRK can engage targets in the territory of Russia, the nature of political relations between these countries and Russia virtually excludes the possibility of nuclear war between them. In the 1990's, some of Russian

publications expressed fear with regard to possible military clash between Russia and Pakistan. However, today there are much more fears of unauthorized use of Pakistan's nuclear weapons as a result of radical coup, breakup of the country, diversion of weapons to illicit trafficking, or its falling into the hands of terrorists. Besides, Pakistan's sharp confrontation with India and absence of global ambitions (accompanied by the absence of vital interests of Russia in South Asia) makes the clash between Pakistan and Russia improbable.

In the short run, unilateral disarmament of any of the third countries is hardly possible. Yet, it should not be completely excluded in the longer run. There is a historical precedent of such voluntary unilateral disarmament: in the early 1990's South Africa renounced its nuclear capability. In the middle of that decade, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan returned to Russia nuclear warheads and their delivery means remaining after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Israel and DPRK do not in principle deny that they can unilaterally disarm under certain conditions. Israel declares its readiness to such step if a reliable security system is established in the region, and does not exclude its accession to the zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. As for DPRK, it had assumed an obligation to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the framework of the six-party talks involving the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. Despite the current tensions in the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang still hints that it may return to the talks. The denuclearization appears quite possible in the context of eventual reunification of the two Koreas.

Finally, the third countries' nuclear capabilities are quite small. According to the estimates, their aggregate number is less than 1000 warheads, that is, their levels are still more than ten times lower than the aggregate US and Russian stockpiles (in deployed mode and in storages). This enables the US and Russia to make another round of reductions regardless of other nuclear powers' capability.

Russia's security interests require that the issue of the third nuclear states be taken in consideration. However, this does not prevent it from adopting new international legal limitations with regard to tactical weapons. Such limitations could be of a nature that would make it possible to take the arsenals of these countries in consideration.

Certainly, the third nuclear states could make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, taking voluntary measures to reduce or limit their nuclear forces in accordance with their declarations. After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom and France have made considerable unilateral reductions in their nuclear arsenals. The UK has fully given up nuclear warheads on tactical delivery vehicles. It has also

considerably limited the number of warheads deployed at Trident-II SLBMs. Although this force can carry over 500 warheads, the United Kingdom states that only about 160 warheads are actually loaded on missiles. France has completely renounced ground-based shorter- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

The United Kingdom has made it clear that it does not exclude further voluntary reductions. Apparently, it means the reductions of the number of new submarines to replace the existing Vanguard class missile submarines. London could manage with three new submarines. Yet it is quite possible that the reductions can be made through further downloading warheads from Trident-II missiles or reducing the number of SLBMs per boat.

In late 2000s France started to reequip its military aircraft with new air-to-surface missiles that are able to carry nuclear weapons. This would impede political decision on renouncing aviation component as a further voluntary reductions measure. So far, Paris has confined itself to promising not to buildup its nuclear forces over the level of 300 warheads.

As for China, it could take voluntary measures to increase the transparency of its nuclear forces. It could also adopt, like France, the threshold of 300 warheads.

Such limitations and transparency measures would be brought about by further US and Russia's nuclear disarmament steps. The START I Treaty and the new START Treaty provide for a wide range of transparency measures, notifications and cooperative measures, based on which the third nuclear powers could elaborate their own packages.

6. THE PROSPECTS OF THE CFE TREATY

Strategic offensive arms reduction may create a new political reality and more favorable environment for the US and Russia to develop partnership and close cooperation. Revitalization of nuclear arms reduction process may also allow for advances in other fields of arms control.

As the number of nuclear weapons — this "universal equalizer" of military potentials — reduces, the significance of conventional weapons will grow. The role of this factor is highlighted by Russian scientists who stress that "with lower nuclear weapons thresholds the absence of balance in general purpose forces and conventional arms, which at the moment is considerable and not in favor of Russia, becomes increasingly important".²⁴ Moreover, in the emerging realities, conventional arms are becoming an element of relations, which earlier characterized interaction in strategic sphere. As a result, "without taking these violations of balances in the current environment in consideration, one cannot develop adequate formulae of strategic stability in its integrity, both in the field of strategic nuclear weapons and in the field of general purpose forces and conventional arms".²⁵

Reductions of conventional armed forces in Europe. In the context of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, currently there is a notable asymmetry in the number of weapons of NATO and Russia, which will increasingly affect strategic stability and undermine political cooperation between the sides. Rapid changes in geopolitical realities led the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that originally belonged to other group of states (former members of the Warsaw Pact) and which were counted together with Russia in a mathematically accurate balance of forces vis-à-vis NATO, to join the NATO block.

An extended stalemate in this sphere, a prolonged reluctance of the western partners to ratify the agreement on further reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe (the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation

²⁴ Кокошин А. Обеспечение стратегической стабильности в прошлом и настоящем (теоретические и прикладные вопросы). М., 2009. С. 161. (Kokoshin A. Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and in Present (Theory and Application). Moscow, 2009, page 161.

²⁵ Ibid.

of the CFE Treaty) fuelled tensions in this field, which, together with general deterioration in relations between Russia and the Western countries, lead Moscow to announcing moratorium on the implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007. By that time, Russia's official representatives had made special emphasis on the superiority of NATO forces over Russia, which, as some of them believed, was estimated as 11:1 in the southern and northern zones.²⁶

This unbalanced force ratio is widely used by Russian political opposition to cooperation with the West, to corroborate their theses that the West strives to obtain military advantage over Russia. Thus, in order to improve NATO relations with Moscow and to support the process of democratic transition in Russia (which is closely enough linked to Russia's relations with the West), it would be necessary to make decisive steps in order to revive the regime and process of reduction and limitation of conventional arms in Europe.

Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed in 1999 in Istanbul (which is often referred to as the CFE-II Treaty, which was to replace the first one, the CFE-I Treaty signed in 1990) is a "new type" of agreement based on non-alliance counting principles. This instrument provides for ceilings for conventional armaments in Europe, the territory of which, for the purposes of implementation of the Treaty limitations, is divided into zones. The transfers of armaments between the zones (in the form of temporary deployment or emergency deployment) are admitted only in small numbers and must be notified to the state-parties. The instrument provides for relatively complicated procedure to justify such activities (which are, moreover, of short duration) and requires the consent of other state-parties to such activities.

As a result, despite some Russian politicians' and experts' fears of NATO military capability, this alliance would be physically unable at the same time to comply with the Treaty and to create a capability for a surprise and wide-scale offensive. Preventing this possibility had been the aim of the CFE Treaty according to the 1989 negotiating mandate.

Therefore, the Agreement on Adaptation, or the CFE-II Treaty is a qualitatively new level of confidence-building and ensuring security in Europe, primarily for Russia. However, this important document up till now has not been ratified by the overwhelming majority of the parties.

²⁶ See: Interview of Mikhail A. Konarovsky, Russian Ambassador in Croatia// Jutarnji list, December 21, 2007 (Text in Russian: <http://www.zagreb.mid.ru/interview/int2007-12-21.html>).

Only four states' legislatures (Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia) out of 30 have ratified the Agreement.

As a pretext for non-ratification the Western countries have used two documents – Russian-Georgian and Russian-Moldovan agreements. Those appeared accidentally during the 1999 Istanbul Summit and were consequently mentioned in the final document of the Summit.

The Russian-Georgian document set forth the terms of withdrawal of Russian Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) from the territory of Georgia and the Russian military bases, as well as the completion of talks on the terms and conditions of the functioning of these bases. Russia had fulfilled its obligations vis-à-vis Georgia before the 2008 conflict burst out.

As for Russian-Moldovan arrangements, Russia undertook to consider the issues of weapons remaining in Moldova since the Soviet period and stockpiled in the territory of self-proclaimed Moldavian Republic of Transnistria. The removal of these arms, the amount of which was almost 42,000 tons, proved a major technical and financial challenge. Still, with regard to Moldova, Russia fulfilled all procedures directly related to the CFE limitations.

No doubt, both bilateral documents have certain legal weight and political significance. However, as compared to a truly immense task of strengthening European security, which had been the purpose of the CFE-II Treaty, two short documents containing unspecified obligations and adopted, as diplomats say, "on the margins" of the Summit, should not have been considered as a serious obstacle. Yet, the Western partners have taken a legal and formal position and used this as a pretext for the non-ratification of the CFE-II Treaty.

As the Western countries delayed the ratification, the claims of the Russian side were increasing. They were based on the fact that initially, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-I Treaty) had been concluded between two groups of states, but as a result of the radical changes in the late 1990's one of these groups (NATO and Warsaw Pact were not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Treaty) broke up, and its former members joined the opposing group of states, that is, NATO.

Russia's had an extremely negative attitude to the policy of NATO expansion and the alliance itself, which has been viewed in Russia as a Cold War military legacy retaining anti-Russian capability. Neither mutual assurances of intentions "to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership" (NATO-Russia Founding Act, 1997), nor the obligation to "work as equal partners" (the Rome Declaration, 2002) managed to considerably change the situation.

In all the relevant Russian documents, the Alliance expansion has been long considered as posing a direct threat to Russia's national security. "The expansion of military blocs and alliances prejudicing the military security of the Russian Federation" occupied the fourth place in the Major External Threats section of the 2000 Military Doctrine. The recent Russian Military Doctrine (2010) regards the intention to "move the military infrastructure of NATO member states closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc" as a pre-eminent external military danger. All this clearly demonstrates that despite all declarations of "partnership", NATO-Russia relations are far from the level at which the sides would be ready to unconditionally trust each other's assurances of peaceful intentions unless those are supported by practical measures of verifiable armed forces and arms limitations.

Russian side was increasingly concerned, in the context of the CFE Treaty process, over the buildup of NATO's military capability due to accession of new members. Before Vladimir Putin announced the course towards "moratorium" on the implementation of Russia's obligations under the CFE Treaty on April 24, 2007, Russia officially had presented "accumulating concerns" which were regularly expressed in one form or another at the CFE Treaty review conferences.

After the President of the Russian Federation announced the moratorium, Russia's list of concerns increased. Reluctant to completely reject its obligations, the Russian side tried to soften the impact of the moratorium. It stressed that it was not a final and irreversible measure, and would remain in force "until all the States Parties had ratified the Agreement on Adaptation and begun to implement it rigorously"²⁷.

Due to the fact that exceptional circumstances relating to the Treaty have arisen²⁸, Russia insisted on convening extraordinary conference of the states parties, which took place on June 12-15, 2007. At the Conference, Russia's concerns were grouped in six, instead of four, clusters which developed the concerns expressed before.

²⁷ Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, at the Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Vienna, June 12, 2007. (Text in Russian: <http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/6786f16f9aa1fc72432569ea0036120e/8192ad47835579ec32572f90028c9ef?OpenDocument>).

²⁸ According to Russia, the exceptional circumstances included, in particular, serious problems in the implementation of the Treaty by NATO members as a result of the expansion of the alliance, and their delaying the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, signed in 1999.

Firstly, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were added to Bulgaria and Romania previously listed as violators, as they failed to formalize changes in the composition of the groups of states parties in connection with their accession to NATO.

Secondly, the partners in negotiations were accused of exceeding CFE "group" limitations by state-parties which signed or acceded to the Treaty of Washington of 1949 (as a result of the expansion of the alliance). The attention was drawn to the pertinent provision, implying that in case of the alliance expansion, NATO members should comply with initial CFE "group" levels.

As Russia's representatives reminded, this provision was included at the insistence of Russia in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act²⁹. (It should be noted that in this document such provisions are only implicit. It says that "the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty"³⁰, while the word "expansion" in connection with NATO was not mentioned at all.)

Thirdly, Russia stressed once again the "negative effect" of the planned deployment of the US conventional armaments in Bulgaria and Romania on compliance with the CFE "group" limitations.

Fourthly, (which was a new, "generalized" point) Russia's representatives drew attention to some states parties' failure to implement the political commitment adopted in Istanbul regarding the expeditious ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation.

Fifthly, Russia noted the failure of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to implement the commitments adopted in Istanbul regarding the downward adjustment of their territorial ceilings (TCs).

Sixthly, Russia highlighted the already mentioned "negative effect" of the failure of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to participate in the Treaty, which could lead to large deployments of NATO forces in the Baltic states without formal violation of the Treaty.

Based on the obligations under the CFE-I Treaty in the absence of a new ratified instrument, as Russia proposed, the so called "Western" group both formally and actually exceeded the levels for the holdings of armaments. According to Russian estimates, in the zone specified in Article V of the CFE Treaty, that is, in the flank area, NATO countries had the following actual holdings of TLE as of January 1, 2007: 5,954 battle

²⁹ See the statement by Anatoly I. Antonov.

³⁰ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris on May 27, 1997(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm).

tanks, 8,591 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), 7,590 artillery pieces. That is 1,254 tanks, 2,691 ACVs and 1,590 pieces of artillery above the levels set forth in Article V, para. 1 of the CFE Treaty³¹.

The painful issue of flank ceilings was also touched upon. As Russia is the only country observing such ceilings (besides small quotas of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Turkey), the Russian side called for a political decision to abolish them.

Certainly, the situation could appear less dramatic, if analyzed in the context of partnership. For instance, one could take into account official statements of the Baltic States on their readiness to accede to the CFE Treaty as soon as it was ratified. The military capabilities of Bulgaria, Romania and other smaller European countries which joined NATO are small and pose no military threat, although the mentioned alliance flank ceilings were really exceeded.

As the situation worsened, the negotiating concerns turned into political ones, when Russian senior military officials started to publicly accuse NATO of having hidden agendas and claim that Western countries refusal to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty implied intending to massively redeploy their military units in the European continent towards Russian borders.

The moratorium on the implementation of the CFE Treaty announced by Russia demonstrated that the compromise in settling these negotiating problems was not reached. The steps taken by Moscow in order to resolve the crisis by withdrawing troops from Georgia and Moldova had not satisfied the Western countries. NATO representatives have exercised no due political wisdom. The "window of opportunity" which was open for a long time, was not used, and the Georgian conflict that followed in 2008 brought the sides to a deep political deadlock.

In search for a compromise on the CFE Treaty. The role of NATO in searching for solution has increased recently, as well as the efforts of the US. Active participation of the latter in resolving issues of the CFE Treaty can only be welcomed.

Yet, constructive discussion of this package in recent years has been virtually pointless due to steadily deteriorating US-Russian relations. To date, especially after the new START Treaty was concluded, the situation is much more favorable.

³¹ See: Анализ исключительных обстоятельств, относящихся к Договору об обычных вооруженных силах в Европе. (Прил. I). 25 июня 2007 г. (Analysis of exceptional circumstances relating to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Annex I), June 25, 2007. (<http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/6786f16f9aa1fc72432569ea0036120e/e3c9929f66b06259c325730500216aad?OpenDocument>) (in Russian).

The obstacles to the implementation of the CFE Treaty-related arrangements include, *firstly*, the uncertainties of the future process of expansion of NATO.

Secondly, the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not recognized by the West, and the newly emerging Russian military bases in these countries are regarded as bases in the territory of Georgia.

The situation now has become more complicated than before. The Western state-parties to the CFE Treaty may believe that Russian military bases have never been removed from Georgian territory, while Russia has legal grounds to claim it has no military bases in Georgia.

No political decision to this complicated issue, which would satisfy both sides, can be expected in the near future. Yet, with regard to the CFE Treaty, a technical solution is theoretically possible. The issue of Russian military bases in the territories of the two republics might be "factored out", and a separate document might be adopted on this matter to govern the status of these bases. In future a "technical compromise" on this issue can be reached within a wider "package deal" on CFE, for instance, in linkage to agreements on TNW.

Before the 2008 crisis the North Atlantic Alliance had become a forum where possible solutions to the problem were proposed. NATO proposals on revitalizing the CFE Treaty regime deserve attention and can serve as a basis for future practical solutions.

In August 2007, the US on behalf of NATO countries, proposed the so-called "parallel actions package". According to it, NATO countries should commence ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation, while Russia was to renew the implementation of the CFE-I Treaty, complete the withdrawal of ammunition from Transdnistria, consent to the involvement of international forces in peacekeeping operation in Moldova, and resolve the issue of former Russian military base in Gudauta, Georgia. It was suggested that if Russia completed its steps in Autumn 2007, NATO countries could ratify the Agreement on Adaptation by Spring 2008.

Certainly, NATO's plan to put the Agreement on Adaptation in force by Summer 2008 was complicated by Russia's moratorium on the implementation of the CFE Treaty, which was announced by President Vladimir Putin in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in April 2007. NATO suggested to return to that plan on March 28, 2008, yet its further implementation was prevented by a serious crisis in relations, provoked by the conflict in Georgia.

However, this plan remains on the agenda. It provides for two stages: firstly, the Agreement on Adaptation should be put into force; secondly, further steps are to be taken to consider the parties' concerns. That has not satisfied Russia. It believed that in order to revive the CFE

Treaty, the adapted Treaty should be amended before its ratification, and not the other way round.

Yet, the West will hardly consent to this approach, as it believes that due to NATO expansion and military superiority it is Russia who should be more interested in the revitalization of the Treaty after its demarche with moratorium failed to make the expected impression on Washington and Brussels. The Western countries insist that now the priority task is to return to the 1999 basic version of the Treaty and its 1999 adaptation - rather than to overload it with Russia's new proposals. The latter might be discussed in the context of subsequent agreements, for which NATO may very well prepare its own proposals.

Another noteworthy point is the plan for provisional application of the adapted CFE Treaty as a step towards its ratification by all parties. Russia proposes a two-staged scheme of such application. At the first stage (about six months) states parties are to observe political commitments to act in accordance with the object and the purposes of the adapted CFE Treaty, and comply with its ceilings. Then, the provisional application of the Agreement on Adaptation is to commence unless the Agreement enters into force.

Russia has raised the flank issue at different levels for a long time. Beside complete abolition of flank sub-ceilings, raising such sub-ceilings accompanied by enhanced transparency on the part of Russia appears a promising option.

It should be reminded that in 1996, with Washington's active assistance the question of raising flank ceilings for Russia was resolved. It appears that today the US could also play a decisive role in resolving the flank issue. The signing of the new START Treaty has created favorable conditions for that.

More than a decade which elapsed since 1999 has seen notable changes in the situation around two issues which the Western side regarded as obstacles to the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation. All the procedures with respect to Moldova, relating to the limitations set forth by the Treaty itself have long been completed. The remaining limited Russian military presence is explained by the needs of peacekeeping in the region.

Up to a point this has found understanding on the part of the leadership of Moldova and Transdnistria. Joint statement adopted after the meeting of President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia with former President Vladimir Voronin of Moldova and Igor Smirnov, Head of Transnistria, noted the stabilizing role of "peacekeeping mission currently underway in the region", and stressed the expediency of transforming it "into a new peacekeeping operation under the aegis of the OSCE after settlement of the

Transdniester conflict"³². If there are certain formal obligations and guarantees by the sides concerned and the OSCE, the state-parties to the CFE Treaty could agree that there were no obstacles to the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation.

Legal arrangements, such as agreed statements, and in some cases, unilateral understandings, could facilitate resolution of issues pertaining to Georgia. The Western countries could, for instance, declare in the form of a unilateral statement that recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unacceptable. In return, Russia could declare its position on the status of these two republics.

In addition to search for a settlement under the Agreement, additional measures could be taken to break the deadlock. First of all, certain CFE Treaty elements could be restored, for instance, an agreed set of verification activities and data exchanges (transparency measures) set forth in the Treaty could be renewed. The Joint Consultative Group established by the Treaty and functioning in Vienna could be tasked with specifying the procedures and arrangements in question.

South Caucasus could be singled out as a "special region" the talks on which would be held in the framework of resolving regional issues, and, possibly, in the context of the new European security architecture. Linking the CFE Treaty revival to the resolution of the South Caucasus conflict would bring both problems to a more serious deadlock. On the contrary, the restoration of the CFE Treaty would facilitate the settlement in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh.

The ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, even with regional "reservations" (which include Baltic states, as well as the South Caucasus), would in itself be a great achievement in strengthening European security and alleviating Russia's concerns over NATO superiority in conventional arms, possible expansion of the alliance and bringing its infrastructure in proximity to Russian borders. It would hardly be advisable to overload this process with additional conditions, if aiming at overcoming the stalemate, rather than justifying its exacerbation. This is even more so in view of the fact that according to Russia's official statements, it has most interest in resolving the issues arising from NATO expansion.

It would be preferable to resolve all additional issues in the framework of negotiations on the follow-on CFE Treaty. This concerns, in

³² See: Dmitry Medvedev held talks with President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, and Igor Smirnov, head of Transdniester. March 18, 2009. (http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/news.shtml?month=03&day=18&year=2009&prefix=&value_from=&value_to=&date=&stype=&dayRequired=no&day_enable=true&Submit.x=9&Submit.y=6).

particular, considerable reductions of national and territorial quotas (by about 50 percent), which would harmonize them with real and planned levels of the armed forces of the parties and fundamentally new approaches to European security, recently expressed by Moscow. Such profound reduction of armaments and armed forces should logically be accompanied by abolition of flank ceilings and taking into account other Russia's concerns. In response to commitments on reducing collective ceilings of NATO countries' TLE Russia could agree to start talks on TNW limitations. Providing guarantees of suspending NATO expansion (on certain conditions) and substantive dialogue on Russia's proposals on new European security architecture would also be extremely helpful for shifting from traditional conventional arms control to integration of the armed forces of Russia, other post-Soviet states, NATO and the EU for common tasks and joint operations.

CONCLUSIONS

1. NATO and Russia cannot reach the level of long-term and constructive cooperation, let alone real partnership, without serious adjustments of the alliance foreign policy. It should renounce the practice of "persuading" Russia of its mistaken perception and engage in joint search of compromises and elimination of obstacles to partnership. Serious corrections of NATO foreign and military policy would be conducive to Russian profound political and economic reforms and to implementation of a long term strategy of "Partnership for Modernization" in relations between Russia and the West.

In light with the changes in the domestic situation in Ukraine and territory-related issues in Georgia, the prospect of their membership in NATO – the principal apple of discord between Russia and the West - should be postponed to an indefinite future. The development of *de-facto* allied NATO-Russia and NATO-CSTO relations, foremost in the context of stabilization in Afghanistan, should prevent any further expansion of NATO to the East without Russia's consent. This is also implied by the project of developing a joint US-NATO-Russian missile defense, global cooperation on counter-proliferation and suppression of terrorism.

Developing "special relations" between them, NATO and Russia should aim at their eventual genuine strategic partnership and even a formal NATO-Russia alliance in the longer term. Discussion of the details and conditions of this process should start as soon as possible by specially convened joint expert groups.

Talks on Russia's proposal on new European security architecture are a priority task for improving relations between Russia and other Euro-Atlantic countries. However disputable the first specific proposals on the subject might appear, they should not be discarded straight away, but rather discussed in detail in the spirit of goodwill in order to "reset" European security process.

The beginning of substantive dialogue to discuss major significant components of such system can in itself influence most favorably the relations between NATO, EU and Russia (and, more generally, between the West and Russia), encourage further nuclear arms reduction and limitation along the way of deep nuclear disarmament.

The principle of political legitimization is at the core of European security. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1975) was one of its vital stages, as it fixed the post-war borders and the major principles of the European process. Current European security structure also calls for political legitimization of the recent developments (independence of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia), that is, its de-facto acknowledgement by all international entities concerned. However the architecture of European security institutions should be profoundly revised on mutually accepted terms. Recognizing EU and NATO as economic, political and military security pillars of European security is unacceptable for Russia, which is not a member of either. Arranging European security with marginalized Russia (and hence estranged and opposed) would be a doomed project.

The OSCE could serve as the main platform for discussing President Medvedev's initiative. Nonetheless the renewal of the OSCE as a European "branch" of the UN would not be realistic, since OSCE has already assumed *de-facto* role of a supervisor of the human rights, democratic norms and the rights of ethnic minorities in Europe.

The principle role in shaping Euro-Atlantic security space should be delegated to a new organization of partnership and cooperation based on European Union and Russia with participation of the United States and some post-Soviet nations (foremost Ukraine and Belarus). In practical terms, the development of various forms of substantive cooperation is necessary. It would be of paramount importance to establish an EU-Russian military rapid deployment corps (in the framework of ESDP) for operations on the European continent (so called Petersburg missions of peace-keeping and conflict-resolution). A large joint NATO-CSTO rapid reaction corps would be needed to conduct peacekeeping, counterterrorist, counter-proliferation and other operations outside Europe (including in Afghanistan).

It goes without saying that the new architecture of security institutions would work only if the policies of major Euro-Atlantic nations are up to the present challenges. The biggest corrections are needed in the Western policy towards Russia and in Russia's policy towards its post-Soviet neighborhood.

2. To improve common security and alleviate mutual concerns, a joint US-NATO-Russian assessment of missile threats and cooperation in developing and deploying missile defense should substitute for unilateral steps taken by the US and their allies.

Revitalization of the project of establishing a Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches should be the first step. Alongside with that, the

interrupted series of joint US-NATO-Russian computer TMD exercises should be renewed and expanded beyond the theater scale and to firing ranges. At the next stage, the US and Russian missile attack warning systems could be integrated, rendering the detection of missile launches more efficient. In the longer run, deeper cooperation may be established in order to deploy low orbit Earth spacecraft for missile defense. They may be placed in orbits by the converted "heavy" rockets in the framework of Russian-Ukrainian Dnepr project. Russia could also contribute to the joint missile defense with its missile interception systems of the S-400 and more advanced future S-500 types.

Combining the detection, tracking and interception systems of NATO and CSTO air defenses could be another key sphere of politico-military cooperation beyond the scope of traditional arms limitation. The threat of air terrorism which can inflict immense damage following the scenario similar to those of 9/11 should be considered as a major argument in support of developing such combined system. Air terrorism with the use of nuclear explosive devices (or other WMD) poses a greater threat, than ballistic missiles, as do long-range cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft carrying WMD acquired by terrorists.

3. Involving the third nuclear states in possible further US-Russian talks on nuclear arms reduction will become increasingly necessary as this process advances. It would be helpful if the third nuclear states would take voluntary measures to limit their nuclear arsenals, as has already been done by the United Kingdom and France, which have unilaterally made considerable reductions of their nuclear arsenals and provided some transparency of their forces. With certain encouragement and strategic incentives China could also take voluntary measures to limit its nuclear forces and make them more transparent. The broad "menu" of such measures is contained in START-I and new START Treaty provisions.

4. The revival of the idea of nuclear disarmament and progress in SNF reductions will raise the issue of TNW. Russia's linking this issue to stopping NATO expansion towards the East and the revival of the CFE Treaty is justified.

With regard to TNW, the first step the US and Russia could agree upon may be the relocation of all tactical nuclear weapons from forward air and naval bases to central storage locations in the national territories (in point of fact, to the reserve). Prior to that, the parties would have to exchange information on the available weapons of this class at the air and naval bases.

5. Further nuclear arms reductions would be increasingly difficult without the reductions and limitations of conventional armed forces. The suspended adapted CFE Treaty ratification process by NATO states as well

as Russia's moratorium on the implementation of the basic CFE Treaty presently obstruct arms control and confidence building in Europe.

The newly-gained sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has become an obstacle for resuming the CFE Treaty process. However, with regard to the CFE Treaty it might be possible to find a technical solution: "factoring out" the issue of Russian bases in the territories of the two republics and adopting a separate document governing the status of these bases. It appears that some legal arrangements, such as agreed statements and unilateral understandings may be used to remove these issues as an obstacle to revitalization of the CFE process.

Restoring the transparency regime throughout the entire area of application of the CFE Treaty could be the first step towards resuming the CFE Treaty process. Further headway in this field may be achieved in parallel to the improvement of cooperation and confidence-building measures, opening the negotiations on TNW and facilitating a joint missile defense system.

It is a statement of fact that the success and effectiveness in resolving the issues examined in this paper and the first publication compiled in the framework of the present project primarily depends on the level of the US-Russian relations. Maintaining effective bilateral interaction between Moscow and Washington is still the key factor for furthering constructive NATO-Russia cooperation, enhancing multilateral security in the Euro-Atlantic space and facilitating a long term course of deep nuclear disarmament.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACV	armored combat vehicle
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile
BMD	ballistic missile defense
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EMERCOM	Emergency Control Ministry of Russia
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EST	European Security Treaty
EU	European Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
GBI	Ground-Based Interceptor
GLBM	ground-launched ballistic missile
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GUMO	Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense
JDEC	Joint Data Exchange Center
HB	heavy bomber
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IMEMO RAN	Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian Academy of Sciences
INF Treaty	Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter- Range Missiles
MIRV	multiple independent reentry vehicle
MoD	Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START Treaty	Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Prague, April 8, 2010)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NSP	Nuclear Security Project of the Nuclear Threat Initiative
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PRC	People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SLCM	sea-launched cruise missile
SNF	strategic nuclear forces
SORT Treaty	Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow, May 24, 2002),
SSBN	nuclear-powered ballistic missile
START I	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Moscow, July 31, 1991)
TC	territorial ceiling
TLE	Treaty-limited equipment
TMD	theater missile defense
TNW	tactical nuclear weapons
UN	United Nations
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

ANNEX
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING HELD ON
APRIL 20, 2010 IN IMEMO RAN

Alexander A. Dynkin, Director of IMEMO RAN, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN)

Alexei G. Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security of IMEMO RAN, Corresponding Member of RAN

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